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VOL. CCCXXXVI.

HISTORY OF EUROPE
FROM THE COMMENCEMENT
OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

VI.

HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE COMMENCEMENT

OF THE

FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS


IN M.DCCC.XV.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.

ADVOCATE.

"BELLUM maxime omnium memorabile quæ unquam gesta sint me scripturum; quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere. Nam neque validiores opibus ullæ inter se civitates gentesque contulerunt arma, neque his ipsis tantum unquam virium aut roboris fuit: et haud ignotas belli artes inter se, sed expertas primo Punico conserebant bello; odiis etiam prope majoribus certarunt quam viribus; et adeo varia belli fortuna, ancepsque Mars fuit, ut propius periculum fuerint qui vicerunt."—TIT. LIV. *lib.* 21.

VOL. VI.



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CHAPTER XLIV.

CAMPAIGN OF EYLAU.

DECEMBER 1806.—MARCH 1807.

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Advance of
the French
and Rus-
sians to the
Vistula.

THE campaign of Jena had destroyed the power of Prussia: inconsiderate valour had yielded to overwhelming force and skilful combination; with more justice the King than the people could say with François I at Pavia, *Tout est perdu fors l'honneur*. But Russia was still untouched; and while her formidable legions remained unsubdued, the war, so far from being completed, could hardly be said to be seriously commenced.—Napoléon felt this: on the Trebbia, at Novi, at Diernstein, and Austerlitz, the French had experienced the stern valour of these northern warriors; and he counted the hours, as the mortal conflict approached, which was to bring either universal empire or irreparable ruin in its train. Nor were the Russians less desirous to commence the struggle. Confident in the prowess of their arms—proud of the steady growth of an empire whose frontiers have never yet receded, and which its meanest peasant believes is one day to subdue the world—they anticipated a glorious result from their exertions; and, without underrating the forces of their opponents, indulged a sanguine hope that the North would prove the limits of their power, and that, while they repelled them from their own frontiers, they would afford the means of liberation to oppressed Europe. The severity of a Polish winter could not deter these undaunted combatants: eager for the conflict, both their mighty hosts approached the Vistula; and, at a period of the year when some respite is usually given in ordinary war to suffering humanity, commenced a new campaign, and advanced through a snowy wilderness to the bloody fields of Preussich-Eylau.

Alexander had displayed the greatest activity in repairing the losses which his army had sustained in the campaign of Austerlitz. Thirty fresh squadrons and fifty-one battalions had been added to its amount, all the chasms occasioned by the casualties of war supplied, and the new French organization into divisions universally adopted (1). Nor was this all:

(1) The Russian army was divided into eighteen divisions, each of which was composed of six regiments of infantry, ten squadrons of heavy cavalry, ten of light, two batteries of heavy cannon, three of light, or horse artillery, and a company of pioneers; in all for each, eighteen battalions, twenty squadrons, and seventy-two pieces of cannon; about 12,000 men. The army was thus divided.—

	Battalions.	Squadrons.	Cannons.
1. Guard under Grand Duke Constantine,	33	35	84
2. Polish army—Eight divisions under Osterman, Sacken, Gallitzin, Tousskoff, Barclay de Tolly, Doctoroff, Essen, Gortshakoff, afterwards Kamenskoï,	147	170	504
3. Army of Moldavia, five divisions under Michelson as General-in-Chief, commanded by Wolkonsky, Zacomilsky, Milaradowitch, Meindorf, and the Duke of Richelieu,	90	100	306
4. Intermediate corps under the Count Apraxin, consisted of the divisions of General Ritschhoff, Prince Labanoff, and Gortchakoff.	54	30	144
Total,	324	335	1038

besides the local corps in Georgia, Finland, and garrison battalions, The whole regular force was

anxious to rouse the religious enthusiasm of his subjects, and deeply impressed with the magnitude of the struggle which was approaching, he had called out a defensive militia of six hundred thousand men, and excited their devout loyalty to the highest degree by a proclamation, in which Napoléon was represented as the relentless enemy of the Christian religion, and they were called on to shed their best blood in defence of the faith of their fathers (1). This proclamation excited the ridicule of a large part of Europe, still tainted by infidel fanaticism, and not then awakened to the impossibility of combating revolutionary energy with any other weapons but those of religious fervour; but it was admirably calculated for the simple-minded people to whom it was addressed, and excited such an enthusiasm, that not only was this immense armament without difficulty raised, but, contrary to usual custom, the peasants drawn for the regular army joyfully left their homes, and marched with songs of triumph, amidst the blessings of their countrymen, towards the frontier, the anticipated scene of their glory or their martyrdom (2).

Composition
and character
of her
armies.

The troops who were now pressing forward to defend the western frontiers of the empire, were very different from those with whom the French had hitherto, for the most part, contended, in the fields of Germany or the Italian plains. The forces of civilisation, the resources of art, were exhausted; the legions of Napoléon had reached the old frontier of Europe; the energy of the desert, the hosts of Asia were before them; passions hitherto, save in la Vendée, inexperienced in the contest, were now brought into action. Religious enthusiasm, patriotic ardour, the fervour of youthful civilisation, were arrayed against the power of knowledge, the discipline of art, and the resources of ancient opulence. There was to be seen the serf but recently emancipated from the servitude of his fathers, whose mother and sisters had checked the lamentations of nature when he assumed the military habit, and bade him go forth, the champion of Christendom, to present glory or future paradise; there the peasant, inured from infancy to hardy exercise, ignorant alike of the enjoyments and corruptions of urban society, long accustomed to rural labour, and habituated equally to the glow of a Russian bath or the severity of a Scythian winter; there the Cossack, whose steed, nourished on the steppes of the Don, had never yet felt the curb, while his master, following his beloved Attaman to the theatre of action, bore his formidable lance in his hand, his pistols and sword by his side, and his whole effects, the fruit of years of warfare, in the folds of his saddle. Careless of the future, the children of the Desert joyfully took their way to the animating fields of plunder and triumph; mounted on small but swift and indefatigable horses, they were peculiarly adapted for a country where provisions were scanty, forage exhausted, and hardships universal; the heat of summer,

about 380,000 men; but in no country is the difference between the numbers on paper and in the field so great as in Russia, and the troops in the campaign of Poland never exceeded 80,000 men.—See JOMINI, ii. 335, and WILSON, 4.

(1) "Bonaparte," said this proclamation, which was read in all the Russian churches, "after having by open force, or secret intrigue, extended his power over the countries which he oppresses, menaces Russia, which Heaven protects. It is for you to prevent the destroyer of peace, of the faith, and of the happiness of mankind, from seducing the orthodox Christians. He has trampled under foot every principle of truth; in Egypt he preached the Koran of Mahomet, in France manifested his contempt for the religion of Jesus-Christ by convoking

Jewish synagogues. Do you love your fellow-creatures, fly the persecutor of Christians; do you desire to be saved, oppose an invincible barrier to his advances. He has dared to the combat God and Russia; prove that you are the defenders of the Most High and of your country. Chase far from your frontiers that monster; punish his barbarity to so many innocents, whose blood cries aloud to Heaven for vengeance; God will hear the prayer of the faithful; he will shield you with his power, he will cover you with his grace, your exploits will be celebrated by the church and by your country; immortal crowns or abodes of eternal felicity await you."—HARDENBERG, ix. 376.

(2) Jom. ii. 335. Hard. ix. 375, 376. Dum. xvii. 99. Wilson, Polish War, 10, 11

the frost of winter, were alike unable to check the vigour of their desultory operations; but when the hosts on either side were arrayed in battle, and the charge of regular forces was requisite, they often appeared with decisive effect at the critical moment, and urging their blood horses to full speed, bore down, by the length of their spears and the vehemence of their onset, the most powerful cavalry of Western Europe (1).

Improvident division of their force by the invasion of Moldavia. If the whole disposable Russian forces had been united upon the Vistula, they would have presented an imposing mass of a hundred and fifty thousand warriors, against which all the efforts of Napoléon would, in all probability, have been exerted in vain. But, by a strange and unaccountable infatuation, at the very moment when this formidable contest awaited them on the Polish plains, a large portion of their disposable force was drawn off to the shores of the Danube, and a Turkish superadded to the already overwhelming weight of the French war. Of the causes which led to this unhappy diversion, and the grounds which the cabinet of St.-Petersburg set forth in vindication of their aggression on the Ottoman dominions, a full account will be given in the sequel of this work (2); but, in the mean time, its effect in causing a most calamitous division of the Russian force, is too obvious to require illustration. At Eylau the hostile forces on either side were nearly equal, and both retired without any decisive advantage from that scene of blood; ten thousand additional troops would there have overthrown Napoléon, and driven him to a disastrous retreat, while fifty thousand of the best troops of the empire were uselessly employed on the banks of the Danube. At the same time, it is evident that the war in Moldavia was resolved on, and the necessary orders transmitted, before the disasters in Prussia were known, or the pressing necessity for succour on the Vistula could have been anticipated; the battle of Jena was fought Nov. 23. on the 14th October, and on the 23d November General Michelson entered Moldavia and commenced the Turkish campaign. But though the Russian cabinet is thus not answerable for having given orders to commence an additional war unnecessarily in the midst of the desperate struggle in the north of Germany, yet it cannot be relieved of the responsibility of having, without any adequate cause, provoked hostilities in the southern provinces of its empire, at the time when the contest in Saxony, if not commenced, might at least have been easily foreseen, when the resolution to annul the treaty, signed by d'Oubril at Paris, had been already taken, and all the strength of Europe was required to meet the encounter with the Conqueror of Austerlitz on the banks of the Elbe (3).

(1) Wilson, viii. 28. Personal observation.

"Mounted," says Sir Robert Wilson, "on a little, ill-conditioned, but well-bred horse, which can walk with ease at the rate of five miles an hour, or dispute in his speed the race with the swiftest, with a short whip on his wrist, as he wears no spur, armed with the lance, a pistol in his girdle, and a sword, the Cossack never fears a competitor in single combat; but in the Polish war he irresistibly attacked every opposing squadron in the field. Terror preceded his charge; and in vain discipline endeavoured to present an impediment to the protruding pikes. The cuirassiers alone preserved some confidence, and appeared to baffle the arms and skill of the Cossack; but in the battle of Preuss-Eylau, when the cuirassiers made their desperate charge on the Russian centre, and passed through an interval, the Cossacks instantly bore down on them, speared them, unhorsed them, and, in a few moments, five hundred and thirty Cossacks reap-

peared in the field, equipped with the spoils of the slain. But they did not permanently wear them; the steel trophies were conveyed by subscription to the Don and the Volga; where they are inspected as trophies of their prowess and respect for the pride of their kindred and glory of their nation."—Wilson, 27, 28. When the author saw the Cossacks of the Don and the guard at Paris in May 1814, this description was still precisely applicable.

(2) See chap. li., on the Turkish war.

(3) Jom. ii. 336, 337. Ann. Reg. 1806, 209. Bign. vi. 57.

The determination to refuse the ratification of the treaty, signed at Paris by d'Oubril, was taken at St Petersburg on the 25th August—the Decree was passed on the 23d November. The resolution to provoke a Turkish war, therefore, was taken after it was known that a continued struggle with the enemy, whose strength they had felt at Austerlitz, had become inevitable.—*Ante*, v. 336.

Embarrassment of Napoléon on the Polish question.

While Russia, distracted by the varied interests of her mighty dominions, was thus running the hazard of destruction by the imprudent division of her forces in presence of the enemy, Napoléon was extremely perplexed at Posen by the consideration of the Polish question. The destiny of this people, which enters so deeply into the consideration of every political combination of the nineteenth century, here stood in the very foremost rank, and called for immediate decision. The advance of the French armies through Prussian Poland towards Warsaw, the ambiguous, but still encouraging words of the Emperor to the numerous deputations which had approached him, had awakened to the highest degree the hopes and expectations of that unfortunate, but impassioned race. A solemn deputation from Great Poland, headed by Count Dzadiniki, waited upon Napoléon, and announced an immediate insurrection of the Polish nation, headed by their nobles, palatines, and chiefs; a great ferment prevailed in Lithuania, and symptoms of alarming effervescence were visible even in Galicia. The crisis was of the most violent kind; an immediate decision was called for by imperious necessity; Napoléon was much at a loss how to act; and the question was warmly debated by the Council assembled at his headquarters (1).

Arguments in favour of the restoration of Poland.

On the one hand, it was urged by the friends of Poland, "that the only ally in the east of Europe, on whom France could really and permanently depend, was now prepared to range itself by her side, and enter into a contest of life or death for her support. The alliances of cabinets may be dissolved, the friendships of kings may be extinguished, but the union of nations, founded on identity of interest and community of feeling, may be calculated upon as of more lasting endurance. But what people was ever impelled towards another by such powerful motives, or animated in the alliance by such vehement passions as Poland now is toward France? Alone of all great nations, in ancient or modern times, she has been partitioned by her powerful and ambitious neighbours, struck down to the earth by hostile armies, and swept by repeated spoliation, from the book of existence. Her nationality is destroyed, her people scattered, her glories at an end. Is it possible that these injuries can be forgotten, that such unparalleled calamities leave no traces behind them, in the breasts of the descendants of the Sarmatian race? Is it not certain, on the contrary, that they have left there profound impressions, ineradicable passions, which are ready, on the first favourable opportunity, to raise throughout the whole scattered provinces of the old Republic an inextinguishable flame? Where has the Emperor found such faithful followers, such devoted fidelity, as in the Polish legions of the Italian army, whom Muscovite barbarity drove to seek an asylum in foreign lands? Is it expedient to refuse the proffered aid of a hundred thousand such warriors, who are ready to fly to his standards from the whole wide-spread fields of Sarmatia? True, they are undisciplined—without arms, fortresses, magazines, or resources—but what does all that signify? Napoléon is in the midst of them; his invincible legions will precede them in the fight; from their enemies and their spoilers his victorious sword will wrest the implements of war; in their example, they will see the model of military discipline. The Poles are by nature warriors; little discipline or organization is requisite to bring them into the field. When the regular forces of Germany had sunk in the conflict, their tumultuary array chased the infidels from the heart of Austria, and delivered Vienna from Mussulman bondage. Nor is it

(1) Jom. i. 328. Oginski, ii. 335, 336, 338.

merely a temporary succour which may be anticipated from their exertions; lasting aid, a durable alliance, may with confidence be expected from their necessities. Surrounded by the partitioning powers, they have no chance of independence but in the French alliance; the moment they desert it, they will be again crushed by their ambition. Not only the nationality of Poland, but the individual safety of its whole inhabitants, must for ever bind them to their deliverers; they well know what cruel punishments and confiscations await them, if they again fall under the Muscovite yoke. In restoring the oldest of European commonwealths, therefore, not only will a memorable act of justice be done—a memorable punishment of iniquity inflicted, but a durable alliance on the frontier of civilisation will be formed, and a barrier erected against the inroads of barbarism in the people, who, in every age, have devoted their blood to combating its advances (1).”

Arguments
on the other
side, against
interfering
with the
Poles.

Specious as these arguments were, and powerfully as they appealed to the generous feelings of our nature, it may be doubted whether they were not opposed by others of greater solidity. “It is in vain,” it was urged, “to dwell on the misfortunes of Poland, or represent her partition as an unavoidable calamity for which her inhabitants are noways answerable. Such a misfortune may doubtless sometimes occur to a small state surrounded by larger ones; but was that the case in the present instance? On the contrary, Poland was originally the most powerful nation in the north: her dominions extended from the Euxine to the Baltic, and from Swabia to Smolensko. All Prussia, great part of the Austrian dominions, and a large portion of Russia, have at different times been carved out of her wide-spread territories. So far from being weaker than Russia, she was originally much stronger; and the standards of the Jagellons and the Piasts have more than once been planted in triumph on the walls of the Kremlin. Nevertheless, her history for the last five hundred years has been nothing but a succession of disasters, illuminated at intervals by transient gleams of heroic achievement; and, notwithstanding the valour of her inhabitants, her frontiers have, from the earliest times, been constantly receding, until at length she became the prey of potentates who had risen to importance by acquisitions reft from herself. So uniform and undeviating a course of misfortune, in a nation so brave, so enthusiastic, and so numerous, as even, at the moment of its partition, to contain sixteen millions of inhabitants, argues some incurable vice in its domestic institutions. It is not difficult to see what this vice was, when we contemplate the uniform and fatal weakness of the executive, the disorders consequent on an elective monarchy, the inveterate and deadly animosity of faction, and the insane democratic spirit of a plebeian noblesse, which made John Sobieski, a century before its final destruction, prophesy the approaching ruin of the commonwealth.

“Such being the character of Polish institutions, as they have been ascertained by experience and proved by the ruin of the commonwealth, it becomes a most serious question whether it is for the interest of France, for the aid of such an ally, to incur the certain and inveterate hostility of the three northern powers. That Russia, Prussia, and Austria will thenceforth be combined in an indissoluble alliance against France, if Poland is restored, and the rich provinces now enjoyed by them from its partition wrested from their vast dominions, is evident; and, whatever may be thought of the strength of the Sarmatian levies, there can be but one opinion as to the military resources which they enjoy. What aid can Polish enthusiasm bring to the French

(1) *Jom.* ii. 328. *Oginski*, ii. 337.

standards to counterbalance this strong combination of the greatest military powers of Europe? A hundred thousand horsemen, brave, doubtless, and enthusiastic, but destitute of fortresses, magazines, and resources, and inhabiting a level plain, unprotected by mountains, rivers, or any natural frontier, and open on all sides to the incursions of their well-organized opponents—Supposing that, by the aid of the vast army and still vaster reputation of Napoléon, they shall succeed at this time in bearing back the Russian hosts, and wresting Lithuania from their grasp, what may not be apprehended from the appearance of Austria on the theatre of conflict, and the debouching of a hundred and fifty thousand men in the rear of the grand army, when far advanced in the deserts of Muscovy? That the cabinet of Vienna is preparing for the conflict is evident; that she is arming is well known; fear and uncertainty as to the future alone restrain her forces; but the stroke which, by restoring Poland, severs Galicia from her empire, will at once determine her policy, and bring the imperial legions in formidable strength to the banks of the Elbe. Even supposing that, by an unprecedented series of victories, these dangers are averted for the moment, and the French battalions, loaded with honours, regain the Rhine; how is Poland, still torn by intestine faction, and destitute of any solid institutions, to withstand her formidable military neighbours; and how is France, at the distance of four hundred leagues, to protect a power whose internal weakness has always been such that it has never been able to protect itself against its own provinces? If a barrier is to be erected against Russian ambition, and a state formed dependent on the French alliance for its existence, far better to look for it in Prussia, whose history exhibits as remarkable a rise as that of Poland does a decline, and the solidity of whose institutions, not less than the firmness of its national character, has been decisively exhibited in contending with all the military forces of Europe during the Seven Years' War (1)."

Napoléon adopts a middle course, and rouses only Prussian Poland. Pressed by so many difficulties, and struck in an especial manner by the danger of bringing the forces of Austria upon his rear, while engaged in the hardships of a winter campaign in Poland, Napoléon resolved upon a middle course (2). Irrevocably fixed upon humbling Prussia to the dust, and entirely indifferent to the irritation which he excited among its people, he resolved to rouse to the uttermost the inhabitants of Prussian Poland; but at the same time sedulously abstain from any invitations to Galicia to revolt, and even held out no encouragement to the Russian provinces of Lithuania to join the standard of Polish independence. Kosciusko, who, since his heroic achievements in 1794, had lived in retirement near Fontainebleau, was invited by Napoléon to join his countrymen, and a proclamation, drawn in his name, was even published in the French papers, in which he promised speedily to put himself at their head (3); but the course of time soon dispelled the illusion, and it became painfully

(1) Jom. ii. 329.

(2) "I love the Poles," said he to Rapp, after having received one of their deputations; "their ardour pleases me. I could wish to render them an independent people, but it is no easy undertaking. Too many nations are interested in their spoils—Austria, Russia, Prussia. If the match is once lighted, there is no saying where it would stop. My first duty is towards France, and it is no part of it to sacrifice its interests to Poland—that would lead us too far. We must leave its destinies, in the hands of the Supreme Disposer of all things, to Time. It will possibly teach us hereafter what course we ought to pursue."—Bour. vii. 250.

(3) "Kosciusko," said this fabricated epistle, dated 1st November, "is about to place himself in the midst of you. He sees in your deliverers no ambitious conquerors; the great nation is before you; Napoléon expects you; Kosciusko calls you. I fly to your succour; never more to leave your side. Worthy of the great man whose arm is stretched forth for your deliverance, I attach myself to your cause never again to leave. The bright days of Poland have returned: we are under the ægis of a monarch accustomed to overcome difficulties by miracles."—HARDENBERG, ix. 329.

evident to the Poles that their illustrious hero, despairing of success, or having no confidence in their pretended allies, was resolved to bear the responsibility of no future insurrections under such auspices. In fact, he had been profoundly affected by the indifference manifested by all the European powers to the fate of Poland on occasion of the last partition, and thoroughly impressed with the idea that no efficacious co-operation could be expected from any of them; and, while he rendered full justice to the military talents of Napoléon, despaired of seeing the deliverance of Sarmatia in good faith attempted by his despotic arms (4). The task of rousing the Poles in the Prussian dominions was therefore committed to Dombrowski and Wybicki; the former of whom had acquired a deserved celebrity at the head of the Polish Legion in Italy, while the latter possessed such influence with his countrymen as to promise great advantage to the cause of Napoléon.

At the same time, every care was taken to excite the feelings and diminish the apprehensions of the Poles of Prussia; heart-stirring proclamations in Kosciusko's name were addressed to them by the generals of their nation in the Italian army, but that brave man himself, faithful to the oath he had taken to the Emperor of Russia, and aware of the delusive nature of Napoléon's support, refused to take any part in these proceedings; resisted all the brilliant offers which he made to induce him to engage in his service, and even had the boldness, in foreign journals, to disavow the letter which the French government had published in his name. Notwithstanding this reserve, however, the advance of the French armies to Warsaw, and the sedulous care which they took to save the inhabitants from every species of insult or contribution, produced an extraordinary ferment in the Polish provinces—universally they were hailed as deliverers—the substantial benefits, the real protection, the fostering tranquillity of the Prussian administration, were forgotten in the recollection of ancient achievements, and, incited by the heart-stirring prospect of coming independence, the nation was fast running into its ancient and ruinous anarchy. The public exultation was at its height when Napoléon arrived at Posen: several regiments were already formed in Prussian Poland; and the arrival of the French troops in Warsaw, which the Russians evacuated at their approach, was universally hailed as the first day of Polish Restoration (2).

Napoléon's
dubious bul-
letin on the
subject.

Napoléon was not insensible to the important effects of this national enthusiasm, both in augmenting the resources of his own army and intercepting those of his opponents; but at the same time he felt the necessity of not rousing all Poland in a similar manner, or incurring the immediate hostility of Austria, by threatening the tenure by which she held her Polish acquisitions. He resolved, therefore, to moderate the general fervour, and confine it to the provinces of Prussia, where it was intended to excite a conflagration; and this was done by the bulletin which appeared on the 1st December:—"The love which the Poles entertain for their country, and the sentiment of nationality, is not only preserved entire in the heart of the people, but it has become more profound from misfortune. Their first passion, the universal wish, is to become again a nation. The rich issue from their chateaux to demand with loud cries the re-establishment of the nation, and to offer their children, their fortune, their influence, in the cause. That spectacle is truly touching. Already they have every where resumed their ancient costumes, their ancient customs: is then the throne of Poland about to be restored, and is the nation destined to resume its exis-

(1) Oginski, ii. 337.

(2) Oginski, ii. 337, 338. Hard. ix. 344, 347. Bigu. vi. 79, 81.

tence and independence? From the depth of the tomb, is it destined to start into life? God alone, who holds in his hand the combination of great events, is the arbiter of that great political problem, but certainly never was an event more memorable or worthy of interest." Situated as Napoléon was, the reserve of this language was an act of humanity as well as justice to the unhappy race whose destiny it still held in suspense; but it contributed powerfully to allay the rising enthusiasm of the Russian and Austrian provinces of the ancient commonwealth; and the prudent, despairing of any national resurrection from such an ally, began to ask, "if the restoration of the Republic of Poland, could, in good faith, be expected from the man who had extinguished the liberty of his own country (1)."

Napoléon proposes to Austria to exchange Gallicia for Silesia, which is refused. One chance, and only one, remained to Napoléon of smoothing away the difficulties which surrounded the restoration of Poland, and that consisted in the proposal, which at this time he made to Austria, to exchange its share of Poland for its old province of Silesia. During the negotiation with Prussia for a separate peace, he only held out the prospect of this exchange in a doubtful manner to the cabinet of Vienna; but no sooner had the King of Prussia refused to ratify the armistice of Charlottenberg, than General Andreossey was authorized to propose it formally to that power. Count Stadion replied, that the good faith of the Imperial government would not permit them to accept a possession which was not assented to by Prussia; and it would indeed have been an extraordinary fault in policy, as well as breach of morality, to have thus despoiled a friendly power and reopened an ancient wound, at the very moment when a concentration of all energies was required to resist the enemy who threatened to destroy all the European states. In consequence of this refusal, the conduct of Napoléon, in regard to Poland, became still more guarded; and although a provisional government and local administration were formed at Warsaw, yet none but natives of Prussian Poland were admitted to any share in the direction of affairs (2).

His proclamation to his soldiers on the anniversary of Ansterlitz. While this great political question was under discussion, during the fortnight that the Emperor's stay continued at Posen, the army in great force approached the Vistula; but the severity of the weather, and the incessant fatigue of the troops, in the long and dreary marches through that monotonous country at so inclement a season, produced a general feeling of despondency among the soldiers, and gave rise to a fermentation which even Napoléon deemed alarming. To the intoxication consequent on the victory of Jena had succeeded a mortal inquietude, when,

(1) Oginski, ii. 339. Bign. vi. 80, 81. Lucches, ii. 226.

(2) Bign. vi. 90, 91. Hard. ix. 349, 350.

Napoléon's strong declaration in favour of Turkey. During his stay at Posen the French Emperor made, on repeated occasions, the strongest professions of his resolution to support the Turks against the invasion of the Russians. To the Prussian plenipotentiaries at Charlottenberg he declared, "that the greatest of all the evils which Prussia has occasioned to France by the late war, is the shock they have given to the independence of the Ottoman Porte; as the imperious commands of the Emperor of Russia have brought back to the government of Wallachia and Moldavia the hospodars justly banished from their administration; which, in effect, reduces their principalities to the rank of Russian provinces. But the full and complete independence of the Ottoman Empire will ever be the object most at heart with the Emperor, as it is indispensable for the security of France and

Italy. He would esteem the successes of the present war of little value, if they did not give him the means of reinstating the Sublime Porte in complete independence. In conformity with these principles, the Emperor is determined that, until the Sultan shall have recovered the full and entire command both of Moldavia and Wallachia, and is completely secured in his own independence, the French troops will not evacuate any part of the countries they have conquered, or which may hereafter fall into their power!" [Lucches, ii. 186, 187.] The same resolution was publicly announced in the bulletins, when intelligence of the ill-judged invasion of the principalities arrived; and yet, within six months afterwards, Napoléon, though Turkey had faithfully and gallantly stood to the French alliance, under circumstances of extreme peril, as will shortly appear, signed a treaty at Tilsit, by which not only were Wallachia and Moldavia ceded to Russia, but provision was made for the partition of the whole Turkish dominions in Europe!

immediately after such glorious successes, instead of the cantonments and repose which they expected, they found themselves dragged on in the depth of winter to begin a new campaign, amidst pathless snows and gloomy forests. In order to dispel these sinister presentiments, Napoléon took advantage of the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz to address an animating proclamation to his army:—"Soldiers! This day year, at this very hour, you were on the memorable field of Austerlitz. The Russian battalions fled in terror before you, or, surrounded on all sides, laid down their arms to their conquerors. On the day following they read the words of peace; but they were deceitful. Hardly had they escaped, by the effects of a generosity, perhaps blamable, from the disasters of the third coalition, than they set on foot a fourth; but the new ally, on whose skilful tactics they placed all their hopes, is already destroyed. His strongholds, his capital, his magazines, two hundred and eighty standards, seven hundred field-pieces, five first-rate fortresses are in our power. The Oder, the Warta, the deserts of Poland, have been alike unable to restrain your steps. Even the storms of winter have not arrested you an instant—you have braved all—surmounted all. Every thing has flown at your approach. In vain have the Russians endeavoured to defend the capital of the ancient and illustrious Poland. The French eagle hovers over the Vistula—the brave and unfortunate Poles, when they behold you, imagine that they see the soldiers of Sobieski returning from his memorable expedition. Soldiers! we shall not again lay down our arms till a general peace has secured the power of our allies, and restored to our commerce liberty and its colonies. We have conquered, on the Elbe and the Oder, Pondicherry, our establishments in the Eastern Seas, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Spanish Colonies. Who has given the Russians right to hope that they can balance the weight of destiny? Who has authorized them to overturn such great designs? Are not they and we the soldiers of Austerlitz (1)?" Even in the forests of Poland, and amidst ice and snow, the thoughts of Napoléon were incessantly fixed on England and the East; and it was to overthrow her maritime power on the banks of the Ganges, that a campaign was undertaken in the depth of winter on the shores of the Vistula.

Its great
effect.
Formation
of the Tem-
ple of Glory
at Paris.

This proclamation, dictated by a profound knowledge of the French character, produced an extraordinary effect upon the soldiers. It was distributed with profusion over all Germany, and none but an eyewitness could credit the influence which it had in restoring the spirit of the men. The veterans in the front line forgot their fatigues and privations, and thought only of soon terminating the war by a second Austerlitz on the banks of the Vistula; those who were approaching by forced marches in the rear, redoubled their exertions to join their comrades in the more forward stations, and counted the days till they gained sight of the eagles which appeared to be advancing to immortal renown. The better to improve upon these dispositions, and at the same time establish a durable record of the glorious achievements of his troops, Napoléon, by a decree published on the same day, gave orders for the erection of a splendid edifice on the site of the convent of the Madeleine, at the end of the Boulevards des Italiens at Paris, with the inscription—"The Emperor Napoléon to the soldiers of the Grand Army." In the interior were to be inscribed, on tablets of marble, the names of all those who had been present in the battles of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena; on tablets of massy gold, the

(1) Bign. vi. 75, 76. Bour. vii. 251, 252.

names of all those who had fallen in those memorable conflicts. There also were to be deposited the arms, statues, standards, colours, and monuments of every description taken during the two campaigns by the grand army. Every year a great solemnity was to commemorate the glory of these memorable days; but, in the discourses or odes made on the occasion, no mention was ever to be made of the Emperor: like the statues of Brutus and Cassius at the funeral of Junia, his exploits, it was well known, would only be the more present to the mind from being withdrawn from the sight. This project took a strong hold of the imagination of Napoléon; he gave immediate orders for the formation of plans for the edifice, and the purchase of all the buildings in the vicinity, in order to form a vast circular place of uniform buildings around it; and, as a previous decree had directed the construction of the Bourse or public exchange on that situation, he shortly after directed the Minister of the Interior to look out for another isolated situation for that structure, "worthy of the grandeur of the capital, and the greatness of the business which will one day be transacted within its walls." Such Letter, 7th March, 1807. was the origin of those beautiful edifices, the Church of the Madeleine and the Exchange at Paris; and which, carried on through other reigns and completed under another dynasty, with that grandeur of conception and perseverance in execution by which all their public edifices are distinguished, will for centuries attract the world to Paris, as the centre of modern architectural beauty. To the world at that time Napoléon revealed no other design in the structure of the Madeleine than that of a monument to the grand army; but, penetrated with the magnitude of the mission with which he was persuaded he was intrusted of closing the wounds of the Revolution, he in his secret heart destined for it another and a greater object. He intended to have made it an expiatory monument to Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, and the other victims of the Revolution; a design which he did not purpose to declare for ten years, when the fever of revolutionary ideas was in a great measure exhausted; and therefore it was, that he directed its front to face the centre of the Place Louis XV, where those august martyrs had perished, and constructed it on the site of the Madeleine, where their unconfined remains still lay in an undistinguished grave (1).

The commencement of a winter campaign which would obviously be attended with no ordinary bloodshed, required unusual precautions for the protection of the long line of communication of the grand army, and the efforts of Napoléon were incessant to effect this object. The march of troops through Germany was urged forward with

(1) Bour. vii. 254, 255. Bign. vi. 77, 78. Las Cas. i. 370, 371.

Napoléon's secret design in this edifice. "No one but myself," said he, "could restore the memory of Louis XVI, and wash from the nation the crimes with which a few galley slaves and an unhappy fatality had stained it. The Bourbons being of his family, and resting on external succour, in striving to do so, would have been considered as only avenging their own cause, and increasing the public animosity. I, on the contrary, sprung from the people, would have purified their glory, by expelling from their ranks those who had disgraced them; and such was my intention; but it was necessary to proceed with caution; the three expiatory altars at St. Denis were only the commencement; the Temple of Glory, on the foundation of the Madeleine, was destined to be consecrated to this purpose with a far greater éclat. It was there, that near their tomb, above their very bones, the monu-

ments of men, and the ceremonies of religion would have raised a memorial to the memory of the political victims of the Revolution. This was a secret which was not communicated to above ten persons; but it was necessary to allow it to transpire in some degree to those who were intrusted with the preparation of the design for the edifice. I would not have revealed the design for ten years, and even then I would have employed every imaginable precaution, and taken care to avoid every possibility of offence. All would have applauded it; and no one could have suffered from its effects. Every thing in such cases depends on the mode and time of execution. Carnot would never have ventured under my government to write an apology for the death of the King, but he did so under the Bourbons. The difference lay here, that I would have marched with public opinion to punish it, whilst public opinion marched with him, so as to render him unassailable."—LAS CAS, i. 370-371.

all possible rapidity; some attempts at insurrection in Hesse were crushed with great severity; the conscripts, as they arrived from the Rhine or Italy at the different stations in the Prussian states, organized and sent into the field almost before they had acquired the rudiments of the military art; and the subsidiary contingent of Saxony, Hesse Cassel, and the states of the Rhenish confederacy, raised to double their fixed amount. By these means not only were the rear and communications of the grand army preserved from danger, but successive additions to its active force constantly obtained; while at the same time Austria was overawed, whose formidable armaments on the Bohemian frontier already excited the attention of the Emperor (1), and had given rise to pointed and acrimonious remonstrances from his military envoy, General Andreossy, to the cabinet of Vienna (2).

Enormous
contribu-
tions levied
on all the
conquered
states.

How to maintain these vast and hourly increasing armaments was a more difficult question; but here, too, the indefatigable activity of the Emperor, and his grinding system of making war support war, contrived to find resources. Requisitions of enormous magnitude were made from all the cities in his rear, especially those which had been enriched by the commerce of England: Napoléon seemed resolved that their ill-gotten wealth should, in the first instance, be devoted to the necessities of his troops. The decrees against English commerce were every where made a pretext for subjecting the mercantile cities to contributions of astounding amount. Fifty millions of francs (L.2,000,000) was in the first instance demanded from Hamburg as a ransom for its English merchandize, seized in virtue of the decree of 21st November; and it only escaped by the immediate payment of sixteen millions. In addition to this, that unhappy city, which had taken no part in hostilities against France, was ordered to furnish at once fifty thousand great-coats for the use of the troops, while Lubeck, which had been successively pillaged by the troops of Blucher and Bernadotte, was compelled to yield up four hundred thousand lasts of corn (3), and wood to the value of sixty thousand pounds; Leipsic redeemed its English merchandise, seized for ten millions of francs (L.400,000), while all the other Hanse towns were subjected to equally severe requisitions; and the great impost of one hundred and sixty-nine millions of francs (L.6,100,000), imposed after the battle of Jena, was every where collected from the Prussian territories with a rigour which greatly added to its nominal amount. Under pretext of executing the decree against English commerce, pillage was exercised in so undisguised a manner by the French inferior agents, that it attracted in many places the severe animadversion of the chiefs of the army. Thus, while the decrees of the Emperor professed to be grounded on the great principle of compelling the English government, by the pressure of mercantile embarrassment, to accede to the liberty of the seas, in their execution they had already departed from their ostensible object; and, while the merchandize seized was allowed to remain in the emporium of British commerce, its confiscation was made a pretext for subject-

(1) Jom. ii. 332, 333. Bign. vi. 94, 95.

(2) In an audience of the Emperor of Austria, which that general obtained, he said, with more of military frankness than diplomatic ambiguity.—“The Emperor Napoléon fears neither his avowed nor his secret enemies. Judging of intentions by public acts, he is too clear-sighted not to dive into hidden dispositions; and in this view, he would infinitely regret if he were compelled to arrive at the conclusion, that the considerable armaments which your Majesty has had on foot since the commencement of hostilities, were intended to be directed, in

certain events, against himself. Your Majesty appears to have assembled on the flank of the French army all your disposable forces, with magazines beyond all proportion to their amount. The Emperor asks what is the intention of this army while he is engaged with Russia on the banks of the Vistula. Ostensibly intended for the preservation of neutrality, how can such an object be its real destination, when there is not the slightest chance of its being threatened?”—BIGNON, vi. 88.

(3) Each last weighs 2000 kilogrammes, or about half a ton.—BOUÉ, vii. 219.

ing their neutral inhabitants to inordinate requisitions for the support of the grand army (1).

Positions and force of the French on the Vistula. By these different means Napoléon was enabled, before the middle of December, not only to bring a very great force to bear upon the Vistula, but to have the magazines and equipments necessary for qualifying it to undergo and keep the field during the rigours of a Polish winter in a complete state of preparation. Davoust and Murat had entered Warsaw at the end of November, which was abandoned by the Prussians at their approach, and two days afterwards they crossed the Vistula, and occupied the important *tête-de-pont* of Prague on its right bank, which Nov. 30. was in like manner evacuated without a struggle; on the right Dec. 2. Lannes supported them and spread himself as far as the Bug; while on the left, Ney had already made himself master of Thorn, and marched out of that fortress, supported by the cavalry of Bessières and followed by the corps of Bernadotte; in the centre, Soult and Augereau were preparing with the utmost activity to surmount the difficulties of the passage of the Vistula between Modlin and Wyssogrod; thus, eight corps were assembled ready for active service on the Vistula; which, even after taking into view all the losses of the campaign, and the numerous detachments requisite to keep up the communications in the rear, could in all bring a hundred thousand men into the field, while the powerful reinforcements on their march through Prussia and Poland, promised to enable the Emperor to keep up the active force in front at that great numerical amount (2).

And of the Russians. Their dispositions, and evacuation of Warsaw. The Emperor Alexander was far from having an equal force at his disposal. The first army, under Benningsen, consisting of sixty-eight battalions, and one hundred and twenty-five squadrons, could muster forty-five thousand men, divided into four divisions, under Osterman Tolstoy, Saeken, Prince Gallitzin, and Sidmaratzki. It arrived on the Vistula in the middle of November; the second, consisting also of sixty-eight battalions and one hundred squadrons, arranged in the divisions of Tutschakoff, Doetoroff, Essen, and Aurepp, was about thirty thousand strong, its regiments having not yet recovered the elasmis made by the rout of Austerlitz. The wreck of the Prussian forces, re-organized and directed under the able management of General Lestocq, was not more than fifteen thousand men, when the numerous garrisons of Dantzic and Graudentz were completed from its shattered ranks: thus the total Allied force was not above ninety thousand strong, and for the actual shock of war in the field not more than seventy-five thousand men could be relied on. This imposing array was under the command of Field-Marshal Kamenskoi, a veteran of the school of Suwarrow, nearly eighty years of age, and little qualified to measure swords with the Conqueror of Western Europe; but the known abilities of Benning-sen and Buxhowden, the two next in command, would, it was hoped, compensate for his want of experience in the novel art of warfare which Napoléon had introduced. Headquarters had been established at Pultusk since Nov. 12. the 12th November: Warsaw, all the bridges of the Vistula were in the hands of the Allies, and the firmness of their countenance gave rise to a

(1) Bour. vii. 247, 248. Bign. vi. 98, 99. Hard. ix. 371, 372.

As an example at once of the enormous magnitude of these contributions, and the provident care of the Emperor for the health and comfort of his troops, reference may be made to his letter to the French governor of Stettin, from whom contributions to the amount of twenty millions (L.800,000) was demanded, though the city only contained

32,000 inhabitants. "You must seize goods to the amount of twenty millions, but do it by rule, and give receipts. Take payment as much as possible in kind; the great stores of wine which its cellars contain, would be of inestimable importance: it is wine which in winter can alone give the victory."

—BIGNON, vi. 99.

(2) Dum. xvii. 106, 116. Jour. ii. 337, 338.

belief that they were disposed to dispute the passage of that river with the invaders. Until the arrival of the second army, under Buxhowden, however, which was advancing by forced marches from the Niemen, they were in no condition to keep their ground against the French; and it was deemed better to give them the moral advantage arising from the occupation of the Polish capital, than hazard a general engagement with so decided an inferiority of force. After some inconsiderable skirmishes, therefore, the Russians fell back at all points, their advanced posts were all withdrawn across the Vistula, and Warsaw, evacuated on the 28th, was occupied by Davoust on the 30th November (1).

Application for assistance in men and money to England. Its impolitic refusal. Sensible of the inferiority of its forces to those which Napoléon had assembled on the Vistula from all the states of Western Europe, the Russian cabinet made an application to the British government for a portion of those subsidies which she had so liberally granted on all former occasions to the powers who combated the common enemy of European independence; and considering that the whole weight of the contest had now fallen on Russia, and the danger had now approached her own frontiers, they demanded, not without reason, a loan of six millions sterling, of which one was to be paid down immediately for the indispensable expenses connected with the opening of the campaign. It was easy to see, from the answer to this demand now, however, that the spirit of Pitt no longer directed the British councils—the request was refused by the Ministry on the part of government, but it was proposed that a loan should be contracted for in England for the service of Russia, and that, for the security of the lenders, the duties on English merchandise, at present levied in the Russian harbours, should be repealed, and in lieu thereof, the same duties should be levied at once in the British harbours, and applied to the payment of the interest of the loan to the British capitalists. This strange proposition, which amounted to a declaration of want of confidence, both in the integrity of the Russian government and the solvency of the Russian finances, was of course rejected, and the result was, that no assistance, either in men or money, was afforded by England to her gallant ally in this vital struggle; an instance of parsimony beyond all example calamitous and discreditable, when it is considered that Russia was at that moment bearing the whole weight of France on the Vistula, and that England had at her disposal twenty millions in subsidies, and a hundred thousand of the best soldiers in Europe (2).

The Russians resume the offensive. No sooner had the heads of Buxhowden's column begun to arrive in the neighbourhood of Pultusk, than Kamenskoi, whose great age had by no means extinguished the vigour by which he was formerly distinguished, made a forward movement: head-quarters were ad-

(1) Dum. xvii. 99, 110. Join. ii. 338, 339. Bign. vi. 109, 110.

Proclama- Previous to the opening of the winter campaign, Alexander addressed the under to the following proclamation to his soldiers: —“Prussia formerly was the barrier between France and Russia, when Napoléon's tyranny extended over all Germany. But now the flame of war has burst out also in the Prussian states, and after great misfortunes, that monarchy has been struck down, and the conflagration now menaces the frontiers of our territory. It would be useless to prove to the Russians, who love the glory of their country, and are ready to undergo every sacrifice to maintain it, how such events have contributed to render our present efforts inevitable. If honour alone compelled us to draw our sword for

the protection of our Allies, how much more are we now called upon to combat for our own safety? We have in consequence taken all the measures which the national security requires—our army has received orders to advance beyond the frontier—Field-Marshal Kamenskoi has been appointed to the command, with instructions to march vigorously against the enemy—all our faithful subjects will unite their prayers to ours to the Most High, who disposes of the fate of empires and battles, that he will protect our just cause, and that his victorious arm and blessing may direct the Russian army employed in the defence of European freedom.”—DUMAS, xvii. 94.

(2) Hard. ix. 399, 400. Bign. vi. 107, 108. Letter to the Marquis of Douglas, Jan. 13, 1807.

vanced to Nasielsk, and the four divisions of Benningsen's army cantoned between the Ukra, the Bug, and the Narew; while Buxhowden's divisions, as they successively arrived, were stationed between Golymin and Makow; and Lestocq, on the extreme right of the Allies, encamped on the banks of the Drewentz, on the great road leading to Thorn, was advanced almost up to the walls of that fortress. The object of this general advance was to circumscribe the French quarters on the right bank of the Vistula; and as it was known that Napoléon with his Guard was still at Posen, hopes were entertained that his troops would be entirely drawn from the right bank before his arrival, and the river interposed between the winter quarters of the two armies (1).

Dec. 16.

No sooner did Napoléon hear of this forward movement of the Russians, than he broke up from his quarters at Posen, and arrived at Warsaw two days afterwards. No words can do justice to the warlike and patriotic enthusiasm which burst forth in that capital when they beheld the hero whom they hailed as their deliverer, actually within their walls, and saw the ancient arms of Poland affixed to the door of the hotel where the provisional government of Prussian Poland was established. The nobility flocked into the capital from all quarters; the peasantry every where assembled in the cities, demanding arms; the national dress was generally resumed; national airs universally heard; several regiments of horse were speedily raised, and before the conclusion of the campaign, thirty thousand men were enrolled in disciplined regiments from the Prussian provinces alone of the ancient monarchy. Still the general enthusiasm did not make Napoléon forget his policy; the provisional government was established by a decree of the Emperor, only "until the fate of *Prussian Poland* was determined by a general peace;" and the prudent began to entertain melancholy presages in regard to the future destiny of a monarchy thus agitated by the passion of independence and the generous sentiments of patriotic ardour, with only a quarter of its former inhabitants to maintain the struggle against its numerous and formidable enemies (2).

And resumes the offensive against the Russians.

Having taken the precaution to establish strong *têtes-de-pont* at Prague, Modlin, Thorn, and all the bridges which he held over the Vistula, Napoléon lost not an instant in resuming the offensive, in

order to repel this dangerous incursion of the enemy. Davoust, who formed the advanced guard of the army, was pushed forward from Prague on the roads towards Pultusk, and soon arrived on the Bug; and after having reconnoitred the whole left bank of that river, from its confluence with the Narew to its junction with the Vistula, made preparations for effecting the passage at Okernin, a little below the junction with the Ukra. The Cossacks and Russian outposts lined the opposite bank, and the difficulties of the passage were considerable; but the Russians were not in sufficient force to dispute it in a serious manner; and after some sharp skirmishing, the experienced talents of General Gauthier, who was intrusted with the enterprise, established the French on the right bank, where they soon after sustained a severe action with the Russian advanced guard at Czarnowo. The Russians, however, returned in greater force; and the result was, that all the French advanced guards which had been passed over were cut off, and their detachment fell back to the *tête-de-pont* established at the river. Mean-

(1) Dum. xvii. 121, 125. Jom. ii. 339. Bign. vi. 110.

(2) Bign. vi. 92. Camp. de Saxe, iii. 178, 179.

Dec. 21.

while Soult advanced on the left to Plousk, and Ney and Berna-

Dec. 22.

dotte, with a portion of Murat's cavalry, moved forward to Soldan and Biezun from Thorn, in such a manner as to threaten to interpose between the detached corps under Lestocq, and Benningsen's main body, which was concentrated in the neighbourhood of Pultusk (1).

Forcing of
the passage
of the Ukra
by the
French.

This partisan warfare continued for ten days without any decisive result on either side; but the arrival of Napoléon at Warsaw was the signal for the commencement of more important operations. On the 25d December, at daybreak, he set out from that capital for the army, with the guards and Lannes' corps, and no sooner arrived at the advanced posts of Davoust, than he dictated on the spot directions for the forcing the passage of the Ukra, which had hitherto bounded all their incursions (2). The operation was carried into effect with the happiest success at Czarnowo, and that ardour with which the presence of the Emperor never failed to animate the troops. After a severe action of fourteen hours, the passage was forced, and Count Osterman, who commanded the Russian rearguard, retreated upon Nasielsk. In this well-contested affair each party had to lament the loss of about a thousand men. Kamenskoi, finding the barrier which covered the front of his position forced, gave orders for concentrating his forces towards Pultusk; and the Allies accordingly fell back at all points. They were vigorously pursued by the French, and another desperate conflict took place in front of Nasielsk, between General Rapp and the Russians under Count Osterman Tolstoy, in which the latter were worsted, but not without a severe loss to the enemy; and the opposite bodies had become so intermingled, that Colonel Ouwaroff, an aide-de-camp of Alexander, was made prisoner by the French, while Count Philippe de Ségur, destined for future celebrity as the historian of the still more memorable campaign of 1812, and attached to Napoléon's household, fell into the hands of the Russians. On the

Dec. 24.

same day Augereau fought from daybreak till sunset at Lochoczyn with the divisions opposed to him, which, at length, began to retire. Thus the Russians, pierced in the centre by the passage of the Ukra at Czarnowo and the combat at Nasielsk, were every where in full retreat. No decisive advantage had been gained; but the initiative had been taken from the enemy, and his divisions, separated from each other, were thrown into eccentric lines of retreat, which promised every moment to separate them more widely from each other (3).

Kamenskoi
loses his
presence of
mind, and
orders the
sacrifice of
the artillery.

Kamenskoi, though a gallant veteran, was altogether unequal to the perilous crisis which had now arrived. The army, separated into two parts, of which one was moving upon Golymin, the other falling back towards Pultusk, was traversing a continual forest, through roads almost impassable from the mud occasioned by a long-continued thaw, and the passage of innumerable carriages, which had broken it up in all parts. Overwhelmed by these difficulties, he issued orders to sacrifice the artillery, which impeded the retreat—gave directions to stop the sup-

(1) Jom. i. 339. Dum. xvii. 126, 132. Wilson, 73, 74.

(2) Napoléon, says Rapp, no sooner arrived in sight of Okernin, than he reconnoitred the position of the Russians, and the plain which it was necessary to pass before arriving at the river. Covered with woods, intersected by marshes, it was almost as difficult to traverse as the field works, which were bristling with Cossacks, were to carry on the opposite bank. The Emperor surveyed them long and with close attention; but as the thickets of

wood in some places intercepted his view, he caused a ladder to be brought and ascended to the roof of a cottage where he completed his observations. He then said, "It will do—send an officer," and when he arrived, dictated on the spot the minute directions for the movement of all the corps during the operation, which are preserved in Dumas, xvii. 137.—*Vide Rapp*, 125.

(3) Wilson, 75, 76. Jom. ii. 340. Dum. xvii. 140, 153.

plies, destined for the army at Grodno, and himself took the road of Lomza. Deeming such an order wholly unnecessary, and the result of that approaching insanity which soon after entirely overset the mind of the veteran marshal, Benningsen took upon himself the bold step of disobeying it; and in order to gain time for the artillery and equipages to defile in his rear, resolved to hold fast in the position of PULTUSK, with all the troops which he had at his disposal. Nothing could be more acceptable to the Russians, to whom the fatigues and privations of a retreat, at a season when sixteen hours out of the twenty-four were involved in total darkness, and the roads, bad at all times, were in many places several feet deep of mud, had been the severest trial of discipline and courage. No sooner, however, was it known that they were marching towards a chosen field of battle, than their hardships and difficulties were all forgotten, and the troops which, from midday on the 25th, successively arrived at Pultusk, took up their ground in parade order, full of enthusiasm for the battle on the morrow. Before it was dark, sixty battalions and fifty-five squadrons, with one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, in all about forty thousand men, were here assembled, while the divisions of Doctoff, Sacken, and Gallitzin were opposed at GOLYMIN to Augereau's corps, two divisions of Davoust's, and part of Murat's cavalry. Three Russian divisions, viz. those of Essen, Aurepp, and Tutschakoff, were at such a distance in the rear both of Pultusk and Golymin, that they could not be expected to take any part in the actions which were approaching (1).

Object of Napoleon in these movements. The object of Napoléon, in these complicated operations, was in the highest degree important; and the vigour of Benningsen and Prince Gallitzin, joined to the extreme shortness of the days and the horrible state of the roads, alone saved the Allies from a repetition of the disasters of Auerstadt and Jena. His right wing, under Lannes, was intended to cut Benningsen's army off from the great road through Pultusk: his centre, under Davoust, Augereau, Soult, and Murat, was destined to penetrate by Golymin and Makow to Ostrolenka, directly in the rear of that town, and two marches between Benningsen and the Russian frontier; while the left wing, under Ney, Bernadotte, and Bessiéres, interposed between Lestoeq and the Russian centre, and threw him back into Eastern Prussia, where, driven up to the sea, he would soon, if the Russians were disposed of, be compelled, like Blueher, to surrender. A more masterly project never was conceived: it was precisely a repetition of the semicircular route of his left wing under Bernadotte, round Mack at Ulm; and the hesitation of Kamenskoi between an advance and a retrograde movement served to offer every facility for the success of the enterprise. The celerity of the Russian retreat, the sacrifice of seventy pieces of their heavy artillery, and the dreadful state of the roads, which impeded the French advance, and the impervious intervening country, which separated their numerous corps from each other, alone defeated this profound combination, and brought their corps to Pultusk and Golymin a few hours before the enemy, who were there destined to fall upon their retreating columns, or bar the road to the frontiers of Russia (2).

Description of the field at Pultusk, and of the positions of the two hostile bodies. The position of Pultusk is the only one in that country where the ground is so far cleared of wood as to permit of any considerable armies combating each other in a proper field of battle—an open and cultivated plain on this side of the river Narew, there stretches out to the south and east of that town, which lies on the banks of its mean-

(1) Wilson, 77, 80. Jom. ii. 341. Dum. xvii. 159, 162.

(2) Jom. ii. 340, 341. Dum. xvii. 162, 164.

dering stream—a succession of thickets surround this open space in all directions, excepting that on which the town lies; and on the inside of them the ground rises to a semi-circular ridge, from whence it gradually slopes down towards the town on one side, and the forest on the other; so that it is impossible, till this barrier is surmounted, to get a glimpse even of the buildings. There the Russians were drawn up in admirable order, in two lines; their left resting on the town of Pultusk, their right on the wood of Moszyn, which skirted the little plain, the artillery in advance; but a cloud of Cossacks swarmed in front of the array, and prevented either the force or composition of the enemy from being seen by the French as they advanced to the attack. Sacken had the command of the left; Count Osterman Tolstoy of the right; Barclay de Tolly, with twelve battalions and ten squadrons, occupied a copse-wood in front of the right; Benningsen was stationed in the centre—names destined to immortal celebrity in future wars, and which, even at this distant period, the historian can hardly enumerate without a feeling of exultation and the thrilling interest of former days (1).

Battle of
Pultusk.
Dec. 26. Lannes, with his own corps, and the division Gudin from that of Davoust—in all about thirty-five thousand men—resolved to force the enemy in this position; and for this purpose he, early on the morning of the 26th, advanced to the attack. The woods which skirted the little plain occupied by the Russian light troops in front of their position, were forced by the French *voltigeurs* after an obstinate resistance, and a battery which galled their advance, and which could not be withdrawn, carried by assault; but no sooner had Lannes, encouraged by this success, surmounted the crest of the ridge, and advanced into the open plain, than the cloud of Cossacks dispersed to the right and left, and exposed to view the Russian army in two lines, in admirable order, with a hundred and twenty guns disposed along its front. Astonished, but not panic-struck by so formidable an opposition, Lannes still continued to press forward, and as his divisions successively cleared the thickets and advanced to the crest of the hill, they deployed into line. This operation, performed under the fire of all the Russian cannon, to which the French had as yet none of equal number to oppose, was executed with admirable discipline, but attended with a very heavy loss, and the ground was already strewn with dead bodies when the line was so far formed as to enable a general charge to take place. It was attended, however, with very little success: the soil, cut up by the passage of so many horses and carriages, was in many places knee-deep of mud; heavy snow showers at intervals obscured the heavens and deprived the French gunners of the sight of the enemy, while the Russian batteries, in position and served with admirable skill, alike in light and darkness sent their fatal storm of grape and round-shot through the ranks of the assailants. Notwithstanding these obstacles, however, the French advanced with their wonted intrepidity to the attack, and gradually the arrival of their successive batteries rendered the fire of cannon on the opposite sides more equal. Suchet, who commanded the first line, insensibly gained ground, especially on the right, where the division of Barclay was stationed; but Benningsen, seeing the danger, reinforced that gallant officer with fresh troops; a battalion of the French infantry was broken and cut to pieces by the Russian horse, and the rout in that quarter became so serious, that Lannes was compelled to advance in person with his reserve to repair the disorder. By these efforts the forward movement of the Russians in that direction was arrested, and their victorious columns, charged

(1) Wilson, 77, 78. Join, ii. 341. Dum., xvii. 162, 165.

in flank while disordered by the rapidity of their advance, were forced to give ground, and resume their former position in front of Pultusk (1).

Which turns out to the disadvantage of the French. Meanwhile Suchet, on the left of the French, had commenced a furious attack on the advanced post in the wood on the right of the Russians, occupied by Barclay de Tolly. After a violent struggle the Russians were driven back; reinforced from the town, they again regained their ground, and drove the French out of the wood in disorder. Lannes, at the head of the 34th regiment, flew to the menaced point, and again in some degree restored the combat; but Barclay had regained his lost position, and menaced the French extreme left. Osterman Tolstoy brought up the Russian reserve, and after a murderous conflict, which lasted long after it was dark, a frightful storm separated the combatants. Neither party could boast of decisive success; but the Russians remained masters of the field of battle till midnight, when they crossed the Narew by the bridge of Pultusk, and resumed their retreat in the most orderly manner, while the French also retreated to such a distance, that next day the Cossacks, who patrolled eight miles from the field of battle towards Warsaw, could discover no traces of the enemy. The losses were severe on both sides—on that of the French they amounted to six thousand men; on that of the Russians nearly five thousand; and the twelve guns which they lost in the morning were never regained (2).

Combat of Golymin. On the same day on which this bloody battle took place at Pultusk, a serious conflict also occurred at Golymin, about thirty miles from the former field of battle. Davoust and Augereau, supported by a large party of Murat's cavalry, there attacked Prince Gallitzin, who, with fifteen battalions and twenty squadrons, had taken post at the entrance of the town, to gain time for his artillery and carriages to defile through the forest in his rear. His force was successively augmented, however, in the course of the day, by the arrival of other troops from Sacken and Doctoroff's corps, and before nightfall twenty-eight battalions and forty squadrons were assembled in line.

Dec. 24. Operations in that quarter began at daylight on the 24th, which in that inclement season was at eight in the morning; the bridge of Kollosump, over the Ukra, was carried by a brilliant charge by Colonel Savary; but that of Choczyn resisted all their efforts, and it was only when it became no longer tenable, from the number who had crossed at Kollosump, that orders for the evacuation of the post were given. Continuing his march all the succeed-

Dec. 26. ing day, Augereau found himself, on the morning of the 26th, in presence of Prince Gallitzin, who was advantageously posted on the right of Golymin. As the French battalions and squadrons successively arrived on the ground, and deployed to the right or left, they were severely galled by the Russian artillery stationed in front of their positions; but they bravely formed line, and advanced with their accustomed gallantry to the attack, though few of their guns could as yet be brought up to reply to the enemy. The resistance, however, was as obstinate as the assault was impetuous, and, despite all their efforts, the French, after several hours' hard fighting, had not gained any ground from the enemy. But while this severe conflict was going on in front, a division of Murat's cavalry, advancing on the road from Czarnowo, was discerned driving before it a body of Cossacks who had been stationed in that village; while a powerful mass of Davoust's infantry, which had broken up that morning from Stretzegoczyn, joined the horse in front of Czarnowo, and their united mass, above fifteen thousand strong, bore down upon the

(1) Dum. xvii. 164, 168; Jom. ii. 342. Wilson, 76, 80. Rapp. 127.

(2) Wilson, 79, 80. Jom. ii. 341, 342. Dum. xvii. 168, 174.

troops of Gallitzin, already wearied by a severe combat of several hours' duration (1).

Its doubtful
issue.

This great addition to the attacking force must have proved altogether fatal to the Russian troops, had they not shortly after received considerable reinforcements from the corps of Doctoroff and Tutschakoff, which, in some degree, restored the equality of the combat. Davoust, with the divisions Morand and Friant, so well known from their heroic conduct on the plateau of Auerstadt, charged vehemently through the woods which skirted the open space in front of Golymin; throwing off their haversacks, the Russian infantry met them with the bayonet; but, after repulsing the French advance, they were themselves arrested by the murderous fire of the tirailleurs in the wood. Nearly encircled, however, by hourly increasing enemies, Prince Gallitzin withdrew his troops, towards evening, into the village; but there maintained himself with heroic constancy till nightfall, vigorously repulsing the repeated attacks of the conquerors of Jena and Auerstadt. Davoust, after occupying all the woods round the town, detached a brigade of horse to cut off the communication by the great road with Pultusk; and they succeeded in clearing the causeway of the Cossacks and light horse who were posted on it. But the French dragoons, following up their success, were assailed by so murderous a fire from the Russian voltigeurs, stationed in the marshes on either side of the road, that half their number was slain; General Rapp, while bravely heading the column, had his left arm broken, and the discomfited remnant sought refuge behind the ranks of their infantry. When night closed on this scene of blood, neither party had gained any decisive advantage; for if the French had taken twenty-six pieces of cannon and a large train of carriages which had stuck fast in the mud, the Russians still held the town of Golymin, and had inflicted upon them a loss of above four thousand men (2), while they had not to lament the destruction of more than half the number, in consequence chiefly of their great superiority in artillery to their assailants. As the order for retreat still held good, Prince Gallitzin, at midnight, resumed his march for Ostrolenka (5).

Napoléon
stops his ad-
vance, and
puts his
army into
winter
quarters.

Dec. 19
and 24.

Notwithstanding the obstinate resistance thus experienced by his lieutenants on both the roads on which his corps were advancing, and the unsatisfactory issue of the combats in which they had been engaged, Napoléon was still not without hopes of effecting the grand object of his designs, the isolating and surrounding the enemy's centre or left wing. On the extreme left of the French, Bernadotte and Ney had succeeded, after several severe actions, particularly one at Soldan, which was taken and retaken several times, and where the Prussians behaved with the most heroic resolution, in interposing between Lestocq and the Russian forces on the Ukra, and throwing the Prussian general back towards Königsberg; and if Soult could have effected the movement on Makow which was prescribed to him, he would have been directly in the rear of the troops who had combated at Pultusk and Golymin, who must have been reduced to the necessity of laying down their arms, or cutting their way through against great odds. But the frightful state of the roads, which in many places were three feet deep of mud, and the rudeness of the season, which alternately deluged the marching columns with drenching rain, driving sleet, and melt-

(1) Dum. xvii. 176, 182. Jom. ii. 342. Rapp, 127.

(2) The 47th Bulletin admits a loss of 800 killed and 2000 wounded on the part of the French at Golymin and Pultusk; and as their usual practice was to allow only a loss of a third to a fourth of its

real amount, this would seem to imply that they lost on these occasions at least 10,000 or 12,000 men.—See 40th Bulletin in *Camp. en Prusse*, iii. 222.

(3) Rapp, 127, 128, Dum. xvii. 183, 185.

ing snow, rendered it totally impossible for that enterprising officer to effect the forced marches necessary to outstrip and get into the rear of the enemy ; and the Russians, retiring to Ostrolenka and Hohenstein, still found the line of their retreat open. On the 28th, Napoléon advanced his headquarters to Golymin ; but having received there certain intelligence that the Russians must arrive at Makow before Soult could possibly get there, he saw the object of the campaign was frustrated, and resolved to put his troops into winter quarters ; on that day, accordingly, he issued orders to stop the advance of the troops at all points ; they were put into cantonments between the Narew and the Ukra, and the Emperor himself returned with the guards to Warsaw (1).

The Russians also go into winter quarters.

On the side of the Russians repose had become nearly as necessary : the weather was as unfavourable to them as to the French ; their infantry, equally with the enemy's, had shivered up to the knees in mud at Pultusk ; their cavalry, equally with his, sunk in the marshes of Golymin ; the breaking up of the roads was more fatal to them than their opponents, as the guns or chariots, which were left, necessarily fell into hostile hands, and experience had already begun to evince (2), what more extended observation has since abundantly confirmed, that exposure to an inclement season was more fatal to the troops of the north than the south of Europe. In these circumstances it was with the most lively satisfaction that they perceived that Napoléon was disposed to discontinue the contest during the remainder of the rigorous season ; and their troops, retiring from the theatre of this bloody strife, were put into cantonments on the left bank of the Narew, after having evacuated the town and burned the bridge of Ostrolenka (3).

Results of this winter campaign, and impression which it produces in Europe.

This desperate struggle in the forests of Poland in the depth of winter, made the most lively impression in Europe. Independent of the interest excited by the extraordinary spectacle of two vast armies, numbering between them a hundred and fifty thousand combatants, prolonging their hostility in the most inclement season, and engaging in desperate conflicts amidst storms of snow, and when the soldiers on both sides were often sunk up to the middle in morasses, bivouacking for sixteen hours together without covering on the cold damp ground, or plunging fearlessly into streams swollen by the rains and charged with the ice of a Polish winter, there was something singularly calculated to awaken the passions in the result of this fearful contest. Both parties loudly claimed the victory ; Te Deum was sung at St.-Petersburg ; the cannon of the Invalides roared at Paris ; and Benningsen, imitating in his official despatches the exaggerated accounts of the bulletins, asserted a complete victory at Pultusk, under circumstances where a more faithful chronicler would only have laid claim to the honour of a divided combat. The French indignantly repelled the aspersion on their arms, and pointed with decisive effect to the cantonments of their troops, for evidence that the general result of the struggle had been favourable to them. But though there was no denying this, when the Russian troops, instead of having their advanced posts between the Bug and the Vistula, had now retired behind the Narew at Ostrolenka, still enough was apparent on the face of the campaign to excite the most vivid hopes on the one side, and serious apprehensions on the other, throughout Europe. It was not to win merely eighty miles of forest, interspersed with the wretched

(1) Dum. xvii. 185, 191. Jour. ii. 342, 343. Wilson, 82, 83.

(2) Larrey's surgical campaign.

(3) Dum. xvii. 191, 194. Jour. ii. 344.

hamlets or squalid towns of Poland, that the Emperor had left Warsaw at the dead of winter, and put so vast an army in motion over a line thirty leagues in length; there was no claiming of the victory on both sides at Austerlitz or Jena; the divided trophies of the late engagement indicated a struggle of a very different character from those which had preceded them; it was evident that the torrent of French conquest, if not averted, had been at least stemmed. The interest excited by these events accordingly was intense over all Europe, but especially in England and Germany, and hopes began to be entertained that the obstinate valour of the North would at length put a stop to the calamities which had so long desolated Europe. Happy would it have been if the cabinet either of Vienna or St.-James's had improved on these dispositions, and taken advantage of the pause in the career of universal conquest, to render effectual aid to the powers who now threw the last die for the independence of Europe on the shores of the Vistula (1).

Positions of the French army in winter quarters. The French army, which was now put into winter quarters, amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand men, and was accompanied by forty thousand horse: so wonderfully had the levies in France and the allied states compensated the prodigious consumption of human life during the bloody battles and wasteful marches which had occurred since they arrived on the banks of the Saale. The cantonnments, from the extreme right to left, extended over a space of fifty leagues, forming beyond the Vistula the chord of the arc which that river describes in its course from Warsaw to Dantzic. The left wing, under Bernadotte, was, from its position, most exposed to the incursions of the enemy; but no apprehensions were entertained of its being disquieted, as that marshal had fifty-five thousand men under his command, and could speedily receive succour, in case of need, from Marshal Ney, whose rallying point was Osterode, and who lay next to his right. The centre and right wing, nearly a hundred thousand strong, were almost detached from the left wing, and lay more closely together on either side of Warsaw (2).

Napoleon's measures to provide food and secure his cantonnments. How to provide subsistence for so great a multitude amidst the forests and marshes of Poland, was no easy matter; for its fertile plains, though the granary of Western Europe, raise their admirable wheat crops only for exportation, and present, in proportion to their extent of level surface, fewer resources for an army than any country in Europe. But it was in such subordinate, though necessary cares, that the admirable organization and indefatigable activity of the Emperor shone most conspicuous. Innumerable orders, which for a long time back had periodically issued from headquarters, had brought all the resources of Germany to the supply of the army in Poland. Convoys from all quarters were incessantly converging towards the Vistula, and supplies of every sort, not only for the maintenance of the soldiers, but for the sick and the wounded, as well as the munitions of war, transported in many thousand carriages, were, from the Rhine and the Danube, to be had in abundance. So great was the activity in the rear of the army, that the roads through Prussia bore rather the appearance of a country enriched by the extended commerce of profound peace, than of a district lately ravaged by the scourge of war. Great hospitals were established at Thorn, Posen, and Warsaw; thirty thousand tents taken from the Prussians, cut down into bandages for the use of the wounded; immense magazines formed all along the Vistula, and formidable entrenchments erected to protect the *têtes-de-pont* of Prague, Thorn and Modlin

(1) Wilson, 82, 83. Dum. xvii. 206.

(2) Dum. xvii. 198, 208. Jom. ii. 344.

on the Vistula, and Sierock on the Narew. Though the blockade of Dantzic was not yet formally commenced, yet it was necessary to neutralize the advantages which the enemy derived from the possession of so important a fortress on the right of their line; and for this purpose a French division, united to the contingent of Baden and the Polish levies, was formed into the tenth corps, and placed under the command of Marshal Lefebvre. It soon amounted to twenty-seven thousand men, and began to observe the fortresses of Dantzic and Colberg (1); while Napoléon evinced his sense of the dubious nature of the struggle in which he was engaged, by sending for his experienced lieutenant Masséna, from the scene of his easy triumphs amidst the sunny hills of Calabria, to a sterner conflict on the frozen fields of Poland.

Successive reduction of the fortresses in Silesia. The repose of the army at Warsaw was no period of rest to the Emperor. Great care was taken to keep alive the spirits of the Poles, and conceal from them the dubious issue of the late conflict; and for this purpose it was announced that almost all the prisoners taken from the Russians had either been marched off for France, or already entered the ranks of the grand army, while the eighty pieces of cannon, which they had been forced to leave behind them in their retreat, were ostentatiously placed before the Palace of the Republic. Orders were at the same time sent to Jerome to press the siege of the fortresses in Silesia which still remained in the hands of the Prussians. The pusillanimous and unaccountable surrender of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, have already been mentioned (2); and in the

Dec. 2. consequences which immediately flowed from those disgraceful derelictions of duty, was soon made manifest of what vast importance it is, that all officers, even in commands apparently not very considerable, should under all circumstances adhere to the simple line of duty, instead of entering into capitulations from the supposed pressure of political considerations. The transport of artillery and a siege equipage from the Rhine or the Elbe to the Oder, would have taken a very long period, and prolonged the reduction of the interior line of the Prussian fortresses; but the surrender of Custrin to the summons of a regiment of infantry and two pieces of cannon, enabled Vandamme speedily to surround Glogau with a formidable battering train, which, before the first parallel was completed, induced its feeble governor to lower his colours. From the vast military stores captured in that town, a battering-train for the reduction of Breslaw was immediately obtained, and

Dec. 15. forwarded along the Oder with such rapidity, that on the 15th December, the trenches before that place, the capital of Silesia, *à cheval* on the Oder, and a fortress of the first order, were opened, and a heavy bombardment kept up upon the town. The defence, however, was much more creditable to the Prussian character, and proved of what inestimable importance it would have been to the monarchy had the French arms been in like manner delayed before the walls of the other fortresses. Twice during its continuance Prince Anhalt, who, with a few battalions and a levy of peasants, still maintained himself in Upper Silesia, approached the besiegers' lines and endeavoured to throw succours into the town; but on the first occasion his efforts were frustrated by the vigilance of the French and Bavarians, who formed the covering force; and in the last attack he was totally defeated,

Dec. 31. with the loss of two thousand men. Soon after, a severe frost deprived him of the protection of the wet ditches; and the governor, despairing of being relieved, and seeing the besieger's succours rapidly and hourly

(1) *Jom.* ii. 345. *Dun.* xvii. 205, 208. *Ann.* (2) *Ante*, V., 390.
Reg., 1807, 3.

augmenting by the arrival of military stores from Glogau, surrendered, with the garrison of six thousand men; the private men being prisoners of war, the officers dismissed on their parole not to serve against France till exchanged. By this acquisition, 500 pieces of cannon, and immense military stores of all sorts fell into the hands of the conquerors (1).

Capture of
Brieg and
Schweid-
nitz, and
total con-
quest of
Silesia. This great achievement made the reduction of the other fortresses in Silesia a matter of comparative ease, by furnishing, close at hand, all the resources necessary for their reduction. They were almost forgotten accordingly, and fell, without being observed, into the hands of the invaders. Brieg surrendered almost as soon as it was
Jan. 17. invested. Kosel fell in silence, after a siege of a few days! Napoléon, delighted with these acquisitions, which entirely secured the right flank of his army, and were of the greater importance from the menacing aspect of the force which Austria was collecting on the Bohemian frontier, named Jerome Bonaparte governor of the province of Silesia; and, after having drawn all the resources out of its rich cities and powerful fortresses which they were capable of yielding, for the prosecution of operations against Dantzic and the strongholds on the Lower Vistula, dispatched Vandamme, with twelve thousand men, to besiege Schweidnitz, Neiss, and Glatz, the only remaining towns in the upper province which still hoisted the Prussian colours. The reduction of these strong fortresses, which had been the object of several campaigns to the Great Frederick, did not take place for some months afterwards, and was hardly noticed by Europe amidst the whirl of more important events on the Lower Vistula (2).

Operations
on the left
towards Po-
merania and
Dantzic. The task of reducing the fortified towns on the Lower Oder, and between that and the Vistula, was allotted to Marshal Mortier. He took a position, in the middle of December, at Anclam; and, upon his approach, the Swedish forces retired to Stralsund. While in this station, he drew his posts round Colberg, and several skirmishes occurred with the Prussian garrisons of that place. Matters remained in that situation till the end of January, when the blockade of Stralsund was more closely established, which continued till the conclusion of the campaign. More important operations took place at Dantzic and Graudentz, the siege of both which places was much facilitated by the great military stores taken in the towns of Silesia. They were brought down the Oder to near its mouth, and thence transported by land to the neighbourhood of these fortresses; and with such vigour did Marshal Lefebvre push forward the operations, especially against the former of these towns, that, before the end of January, considerable progress had been made in the works (3).

Operations
of Marmont
in Illyria. On the return of Napoléon to Warsaw, he received detailed accounts of the operations of Marmont in Illyria since the commencement of hostilities in October. For a long period, and during the time when it was understood that a negotiation was on foot between the two governments, a sort of tacit suspension of arms existed between the French marshal and

(1) Dum. xvii. 214, 223. Jom. ii. 250. Ann. Reg. 1807, 22.

(2) Dum. xvii. 95, 101. Jom. ii. 251.

As fast as these fortresses in Silesia fell into the hands of Napoléon, they were, by his orders, totally dismantled and their fortifications razed to the ground. Their inhabitants were seized with consternation when they beheld these rigorous orders carried into full execution, and anticipated a total separation from the Prussian Monarchy, to which they were much attached, from so complete a de-

struction of the barrier raised with so much care both against Austria and Russia. Nothing could more clearly demonstrate the determination of the French Emperor to reduce Prussia to the rank of a third-rate power; but the policy, with reference to the future interests, both of France and Germany, of destroying the chief barrier of both against Muscovite aggression, was extremely doubtful.—See MONTVERAN, *Hist. Const. de la Situat. de l'Angleterre en 1816, 147*, and Dum. xvii. 99, 100.

(3) Dum. xvii. 223, 237. Jom. ii. 387.

the Russians; but when it was distinctly ascertained that hostilities had been resumed, the flames of war extended to the smiling shores of the Adriatic sea. The Russians, strengthened by the arrival of Admiral Siniavin with a powerful squadron, resumed the offensive, and compelled Marmont to abandon the point of Ostro, and fall back on Old Ragusa, where he fortified himself in a strong position in front of the town, and resolved to await the arrival of his
 Sept. 29. flotilla and reinforcements. Encouraged by this retrograde movement, the Russians, six thousand strong, supported by some thousand Montenegrins, advanced to the attack; but they were anticipated by the
 Sept. 30. French general; and after a sharp action, the new levies were dispersed, and the regular troops compelled to take refuge within the walls of Castel Nuovo, after sustaining a loss of six hundred men (1).

Napoléon's efforts to stimulate the Turks to vigorous resistance. At the same period, a courier from Constantinople brought intelligence of the declaration of war by the Porte against Russia. This was an event of the very highest importance, promising, as it did, to effect so powerful a diversion in the Russian forces; and Napoléon therefore resolved to improve to the uttermost so auspicious a change, by contracting the closest alliance with the Turkish government. Though General Michelson had early gained considerable advantage, and was advancing towards Belgrade, which had fallen into the hands of Czerny George and the insurgent Georgians, yet the disasters of the Prussian war had opened the eyes of the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg, when it was too late, to the imprudence of which they had been guilty in engaging at once in two such formidable contests; and thirty-six battalions and forty squadrons (about twenty-five thousand men) were ordered to advance with all possible rapidity from the plains of Moldavia to the banks of the Bug. Desirous to derive every possible advantage from this great diversion, Napoléon sent instructions to his ambassador at Constantinople, General Sebastiani, to use the greatest efforts to induce the Turkish government to enter vigorously into the contest; while to Marshal Marmont he gave orders to send French officers into all the Ottoman provinces, with orders to do their utmost every where to rouse the Mussulman population against the Muscovite invaders (2); while the relations of France with Persia and Turkey were considered of such paramount importance, that

(1) Dum. xvii. 240, 256.

(2) These instructions to Marmont are well worthy of attention, both as evincing the views Napoléon already entertained in regard to the Ottoman empire, and setting in a clear light his subsequent perfidious conduct in abandoning that power to the ambition of Russia, by the treaty of Tilsit. Jan. 2, 1807. "A courier, just arrived from Constantinople, has announced that war against Russia is declared: great enthusiasm prevails at that capital; twenty regiments of Janissaries have just set out from its walls for the Danube, and twenty more will speedily follow from Asia. Sixty thousand men are at Herson, Paswan Oglou has assembled twenty thousand at Widdin. Send immediately five engineer officers and as many of artillery to Constantinople—aid the pachas in every possible way with counsel, provision, and ammunition. It is not unlikely that I may send you with 25,000 men to Widdin, and there you will enter into the system of the grand army, of which you would form the extreme right. Twenty-five thousand French, supported by sixty thousand Turks, would soon force the Russians not to leave thirty thousand men on the Danube, as they have done, but to forward twice that number to defend their own frontiers in that quarter. Send twenty or thirty officers to the pachas, if they demand so many; but the period for the employment of troops

is not yet arrived. The Turks may be relied on as faithful allies, because they hate the Russians; therefore be not sparing in your supplies of all sorts to them. An ambassador from Persia as well as Turkey has just been at Warsaw; the court of Ispahan also, as the sworn enemy of Russia, may be relied on as our friend. Our relations with the Eastern powers are now such that we may look forward shortly to transporting forty thousand men to the gates of Ispahan, and from thence to the shores of the Indus,—projects which formerly appeared chimerical are now no longer so, when I receive ambassadors from the Sultan, testifying a serious alarm at the progress of Russia, and the strongest confidence in the protection of France. In these circumstances, send your officers over all the Turkish provinces; they will make known my disposition towards the Grand Seigneur, and that will exalt the general enthusiasm, while at the same time you will be able to acquire for me information which may prove in the highest degree useful. In a word, General, I am the sincere friend of Turkey, and wish to do it all the good in my power; let that principle regulate all your actions. I consider the Turkish declaration of war against Russia as the most fortunate circumstance which could possibly have occurred in my present situation."—JOMINI, ii. 347-349.

they were made the subject of a special message to the Senate, which declared, "the Emperor of Persia, tormented, as Poland was for sixty years, by the intrigues of Russia, is animated by the same sentiments as the Turks. He has resolved to march upon the Caucasus to defend his dominions. Who could number the duration of the wars, the number of campaigns, which would be required one day to repair the calamities consequent upon the Russians, obtaining possession of Constantinople? Were the tiara of the Greek faith raised again, and extended from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, we should see in our own days our provinces attacked by clouds of barbarians; and if, in that tardy struggle, civilized Europe should happen to fall, our culpable indifference would justly excite the reproaches of posterity, and would become a subject of opprobrium in history." Memorable words! when the events which subsequent times have brought about, and the objects of political apprehensions in our own time, are taken into view (1).

Delightful
residence of
the French
at Warsaw.

The residence of the French generals and officers at Warsaw appeared a perfect Elysium, after the fatigues and privations to which they had been exposed. The society of that capital is well known to be one of the most agreeable in Europe, from the extraordinary talents and accomplishments of the women of rank of which it is composed. No person can have mingled in those delightful circles without perceiving that the Polish women are the most fascinating in Europe. Endowed by nature with an ardent temperament, an affectionate disposition, and an exalted imagination, they have, at the same time, all the grace and coquetry which constitute the charm of Parisian beauty, and yet retain, in most cases, the domestic virtues and simplicity of manner which nurse in infancy the national character of the English people (2). Speaking every language in Europe with incomparable facility,—conversing alternately in French, German, Italian, Russian, and sometimes English, with the accent of a native,—versed in the literature and history of all these countries, and yet preferring to them all, the ruins of their own wasted land,—enthusiastic in their patriotism, and yet extended in their views,—with hearts formed in the simplicity of domestic life, minds cultivated during the solitude of rural habitation, and manners polished by the elegance of metropolitan society,—they approach as near as imagination can figure to that imaginary standard of perfection which constitutes the object of chivalrous devotion. Melancholy reflection! that the greatest charms of society should be co-existent with the most vicious and destructive national institutions; and that its principal excellencies should have been called forth by the miserable and distracted customs which had brought the Polish nation to a premature dissolution (3)!

If such are the attractions of Warsaw, even to a passing traveller, it may easily be believed what it appeared to the French officers after the storms of Pultusk and Golymin. From all parts of Prussian Poland the great fami-

(1) *Jom.* ii 345, 349. *Bign.* vi. 124.

(2) This observation applies to the character of the female part of the Polish rural nobility. Those who have made Warsaw or other great capitals their habitual residence, have too often contracted the vices incident to a polished and corrupted society.

(3) Personal observation. *Savary*, iii. 17.

"It may with truth be said," says *Savary*, "that the Polish women are fitted to inspire jealousy to the most accomplished ladies in the civilized world: they unite, for the most part, to the manners of the great world, a depth of information which is rarely to be seen even among the French women, and which is infinitely superior to what is usually to

be met with in the most accomplished urban society. It would appear, that being obliged to pass more than half the year on their estates, they devote themselves to reading and mental cultivation; and thence in the capitals, where they go to pass the winter, they so frequently appear superior to all their rivals."—*Savary*, iii. 17.

"I did not require to learn," says *Duroc*, "that the Polish women are the most agreeable in Europe; but it was not till I arrived in Poland that I became acquainted with the full extent of their charms.—The attractions of Warsaw are indescribable. It contains several agreeable circles—one charming."—*Letter of Duroc to Junot*, Dec. 17, 1806; *D'Abrantes*, ix. 350.

Enthusias-
tic reception
of the
French by
the Polish
women.

lies flocked to her capital, and soon formed a society in the midst of the horrors of war, which rivalled any in Europe in splendour and attractions. Abandoning themselves without reserve to the delightful prospects which seemed to be opening on their country, the Polish women saw in the French officers the deliverers of Sarmatia, the invincible allies who were to restore the glories of the Piasts and the Jagellons. An universal enthusiasm prevailed; fêtes and theatrical amusements succeeded each other in varying magnificence; and, following the general bent, even the intellectual breast of Napoléon caught the flame, and did homage to charms which, attractive at all times, were in that moment of exultation irresistible. But these fairy scenes were of short duration; and war, in its most terrible form, was destined soon to rouse them from this transient period of enchantment (1).

Kamenskoi
goes mad,
and Ben-
ningsen as-
sumes the
command.
He advances
against Ber-
nadotte.

When the French were put into cantonments on the right bank of the Vistula, the situation of the Russian army was such, that it could hardly be said to have a commander. Kamenskoi retired far to the rear to Grodno, where he went out in his shirt to the streets, and gave unequivocal proofs of mental derangement. Buxhowden commanded his own corps, while Benningsen did the same with his; and the jealousy of each of these officers for a time prevented the one from obeying the commands of the other: but at length the appointment of the latter to the supreme command restored unity to the operations of the army. Fortunately for the Russians, the suspension of hostilities, and the interval of fifteen leagues, which separated them from the enemy, prevented them from suffering under this division of council; and when Benningsen assumed the command, he resolved to continue the design of Buxhowden, and, instead of allowing the army to repose in its cantonments, commence an offensive movement with the whole army against the French left under Bernadotte and Ney, which had extended itself so far as to menace Königsberg, the second city of the Prussian dominions, and the capital of the old part of the monarehy. Many reasons recommended this course. It was evident that Napoléon would turn to the best account the breathing-time afforded him in winter-quarters. His army would be recruited and strengthened, his cavalry remounted, his magazines replenished on the Vistula; the fortresses at its mouth were already observed; and when the mild season returned in May, there was every reason to fear that it would be as solidly established on the line of that river by the capture of Colberg, Graudentz, and Dantzic, as it was now on the Oder and in Silesia by the reduction of the fortresses of that province. And the situation of Bernadotte and Ney, who had extended their cantonments beyond what was either necessary or prudent, and such as almost to indicate an offensive intention, suggested a hope, that by a rapid movement their corps might be isolated and destroyed before the bulk of the grand army, grouped round Warsaw, could advance to their relief (2).

Rapid ad-
vance of
Benningsen
towards
Königsberg.

Impressed with these ideas, the Russian army, seventy-five thousand strong, with five hundred pieces of cannon, was every where put in motion, crossed the Narew, and marched upon the Bobr. The corps of Benningsen and Buxhowden, so long separated, effected a junction at Biala on the 14th January: and on the 15th, headquarters were established at that place. Essen was left with one division on the Narew to mark this forward movement; and there he was soon after joined by

(1) Savary, iii. 17.

(2) Wilson, 83, 84. Dum. xvii. 295, 297. Jom.
ii. 351. Sav. iii. 26, 27.

the divisions from Moldavia. This great assemblage of force was the more formidable that it was entirely unknown to the enemy, being completely concealed by the great Forest of Johansberg and the numerous chain of lakes, intersected by woods, which lie between Arys, in East Prussia, and the shores of the Vistula. Rapidly advancing after its columns were united, the Russian army moved forward between the lakes of Sperding and Lowenthin; and on

Jan. 17. the 17th, headquarters were established at Rhein in East Prussia. Meanwhile, the cavalry, consisting of forty squadrons under Prince Gallitzin, pushed on for the Alle, on the roads leading to Königsberg and Bischofstein; and on the other side of that river, surprised and defeated the light-horse of

Jan. 19. Marshal Ney, which had advanced in pursuit of Lestocq to Schippenhal, within ten leagues of Königsberg. Thus, on the 20th Ja-

Jan. 20. nuary, the Russian army, perfectly concentrated, and in admirable order, was grouped in the middle of East Prussia, and was within six marches of the Lower Vistula, where it might either raise the blockade of Dantzic and Graudentz, or fall with a vast superiority of force upon Bernadotte or Ney, still slumbering in undisturbed security in their cantonments (1).

He surprises Ney's corps. Had Benningsen been aware of the scattered condition of Marshal Ney's corps, he might, by the admission of the French military historians, have destroyed the whole before it could by possibility have been united and put in a condition to give battle. As it was, great numbers of his detached bodies were made prisoners; and the conduct of the Marshal, in first, by his senseless incursions attracting the enemy, and then, by his undue dispersion, exposing himself to their attacks, drew down a severe reproof from Napoléon (2). But a glance at the map must be sufficient to show that great and decisive success was at this moment within the grasp of the Russian General; and that if, instead of making a long circuit to reach the head of Marshal Ney's corps, scattered over a space of eighteen leagues, and drive it back upon its line of retreat towards Warsaw, he had boldly thrown himself, three days earlier, upon its flank, he would have separated it from the centre of the army, and driven both it and Bernadotte to a disastrous retreat into the angle formed by the Vistula and the Baltic Sea. The movement of Benningsen to the head of Ney's column, however, having prevented this, he turned his attention to Bernadotte, who had received intelligence of his approach, and had rapidly concentrated his corps from the neighbourhood of Elbing at Mohrungen. Meanwhile, the Russian army continued its advance; on the 22d, headquarters were established at Bischofstein, and the Cossacks pushed on to Heilsberg; and on the same day, a severe action took place at Lecberg, from whence the French cavalry, under Colbert, were driven in the direction of Allenstein. Ney, now seriously alarmed, dispatched couriers in all directions to collect his scattered divisions, and on the 25d resumed his headquarters at Neidenberg, extending his troops by the left towards Gilgenberg to lend assistance to Bernadotte (3).

Bernadotte, informed by despatches from all quarters of this formidable irruption into his cantonments, was rapidly concentrating his troops at Mohrungen, when Benningsen, with greatly superior forces, fell upon him. The French troops, eighteen thousand strong, were posted in rugged ground

(1) Wilson, 83, 85. Dum. xvii. 295, 302. Jom. ii. 352.

(2) He severely blamed the Marshal "for having, by an inconsiderate movement, attracted the enemy, and even endeavoured to engage Marshal Soult, who declined to follow him, in the same expedition. You will immediately resume the winter-

quarters prescribed for your corps, and take advantage of them to give rest to your cavalry, and repair, the best way you can, the fault you have committed."—Dum. xvii. 303.

(3) Dum. xvii. 297, 307. Jom. ii. 353. Wilson, 84, 85.

Bernadotte, attacked near Mohrungen, escapes with difficulty. at Georgenthal, two miles in front of that town. General Makow attacked them with the advanced guard of the Russians, before sufficient forces had come up, and after a sanguinary conflict, in which the eagle of the 9th French regiment was taken and retaken several times, and finally remained in the hands of the Russians, suffered the penalty of his rashness by being repulsed towards Liebstadt. In this bloody affair both parties had to lament the loss of two thousand men, and the Russian General Aurepp was killed. It was the more to be regretted that this premature attack had been made, as Lestocq was at the moment at Wormditt, or five leagues distant on the right; Gallitzin, with five thousand horse, at All-Reichau, at the same distance on the left; Osterman Tolstoy at Heilighenthal, and Sacken at Elditten, all in the immediate neighbourhood; so that, by a concentration of these forces, the whole French corps might with ease have been made prisoners. As it was, Prince Michael Dolgoroucki, who had been detached by Prince Gallitzin towards Mohrungen in consequence of the violent fire heard in that direction, fell upon the rear of Bernadotte's corps, penetrated into the town, made several hundred prisoners, and captured all his private baggage, among which, to his eternal disgrace, were found, as in the den of a common freebooter, silver plate, bearing the arms of almost all the states in Germany, 10,000 ducats, recently levied for his own private use, and 2500 for that of his staff, from the town of Elbing (1).

The narrow escape, both of Ney and Bernadotte, from total destruction in consequence of this bold and vigorous enterprise, excited the utmost alarm in the French army. The latter fell back rapidly towards Thorn on the Lower Vistula, by Deutch-Eylau, severely pressed by the Cossacks, who almost totally destroyed his rear-guard, and made many thousand prisoners. Headquarters were advanced by Benningsen on the 26th to Mohrungen, where they remained, from the exhaustion of the troops, till the 2d February. Taking advantage of the aid thus obtained, the brave and active Lestocq succeeded in raising the blockade of Graudentz, the key to the Lower Vistula, and throwing in supplies of ammunition and provisions, which enabled that important fortress to hold out through all the succeeding campaign. The whole French left wing raised their cantonments, and fell back in haste, and with great loss, towards the Lower Vistula; and the alarm, spread as far as Warsaw, gave the most effectual refutation of the false accounts published in the bulletins of the successive defeats of the Russian army (2). At the same time, intelligence was received of the arrival of the Russian divisions from the army of Moldavia, on the Narew and the Bug, where they formed a junction with General Essen, and raised the enemy's force in that quarter to thirty thousand men (3).

These untoward events made a great impression on the mind of Napoléon, who had never contemplated a renewal of active operations till his reinforcements from the Rhine had arrived at headquarters, and the return of the mild season had enabled him to resume hostilities without the excessive hardships to which his troops, dur-

Extraordinary energy of Napoléon in reassembling his army.

(1) Bign. vi. 115. Wilson, 85. Dum. xvii. 307, 319. Jom. ii. 353.

(2) "In Bernadotte's baggage, taken at Mohrungen, were found curious proofs of the arrangements for stage effect and false intelligence, made by all the officers of the French army, from the Emperor downwards. An order was there found, giving the most minute directions for the reception of Napoléon at Warsaw, with all the stations and crossings where 'Vive l'Empereur!' was to be

shouted; and official despatches of all the actions of the campaign in which Bernadotte had been engaged, for publication, and private despatches, giving the facts as they really occurred, for the Emperor's secret perusal. These papers are still in the possession of General Benningsen's family."—Wilson's *Polish Campaign*, 86.—Note.

(3) Wilson, 86, 87. Dum. xvii. 307, 322. Bign. vi. 115, 116.

ing the later stages of the campaign, had been exposed. The cold was still extreme : the Vistula and the Narew were charged with enormous blocks of floating ice, which daily threatened to break down the bridges over them ; the earth was covered with snow, the heavens exhibited that serene deep-blue aspect which indicated a long continuance of intense frost : magazines there were none in the country which was likely to become the theatre of war ; and, though the highly cultivated territory of Old Prussia offered as great resources as any of its extent in Europe (1) for an invading army, yet it was impossible to expect that it could maintain, for any length of time, the enormous masses who would speedily be assembled on its surface. But there was no time for deliberation ; matters were pressing, the right of Benningsen was now approaching the Lower Vistula, and in a few days the Russian army would raise the blockade of Dantzic, and, resting on that fortress as a base from whence inexhaustible supplies of all sorts might be obtained by sea, would bid defiance to all his efforts. It was in such a crisis that the extraordinary activity and, indefatigable perseverance of Napoléon appeared most conspicuous. Instantly perceiving that active operations must be resumed even at that rude season, he

Jan. 23.

despatched orders from the 23d to the 27th January, for the assembling of all his army ; and as, with the exception of Bernadotte and Ney, they all lay in cantonments not extending over more than twenty leagues, this was neither a tedious nor a difficult operation. Bernadotte was enjoined to assemble around Osterode, Lefebvre at Thorn to observe Dantzic, Soult at Pragnitz, Davoust at Pultusk, Ney at Nudenberg, Bessiéres and Murat at Warsaw with the imperial guard and cavalry : though breathing only victory in his proclamations to his troops, he in reality was making every preparation for defeat ; Lefebvre received orders to collect all the forces at his disposal, without any regard to the blockade of Dantzic, in order to secure the fortress and bridge of Thorn, the direct line of retreat across the Vistula from the theatre of war, while Lannes was disposed as a reserve on the right, and Augereau on the left bank of that river. On the 27th, orders were given to all the columns to march, and early on the morning of the 30th the Emperor set out from Warsaw (2).

Napoléon marches for the rear of Benningsen, who discovers his design and falls back.

Following his usual plan of marching with the bulk of his forces, so as to get in the rear of the enemy during his advance, Napoléon marched towards Allenstein, where he arrived on the 2d February with the corps of Soult, Augereau, and Ney, while Davoust was, at a short distance still farther on his right, at Wartenberg. Already he had interposed between Benningsen and Russia ; the only line of retreat which lay open to that officer was to the north-east, in the direction of Königsberg and the Niemen. The Russian army was stationed between the Pasarge and the Alle, from Guttstadt and Heilsberg on the latter river, to Liebstadt and Wormditt in the neighbourhood of the former ; but these movements of Napoléon induced Benningsen to concentrate his divisions and move them

(1) The territory of Old Prussia is not naturally more fertile than the adjoining provinces of Poland, but nevertheless it is as rich and cultivated as they are sterile and neglected. On one side of the frontier line is to be seen numerous and opulent cities, smiling well-cultivated fields, comfortable hamlets, and an industrious and contented population ; on the other, endless forests of pine, wretched villages, a deplorable agriculture, squalid huts beside a few gorgeous palaces. Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the vicious and ruinous political institutions which have prevailed amidst the mingled anarchy, tyranny, and democracy of Old Poland. This difference, so well known to travellers, re-

peatedly attracted the attention even of the military followers of the French army.—See *Secua, Camp. de Russie*, i. 127, and *Jomini*, ii. 354.

(2) *Dum.* xvii. 322, 325. *Jom.* ii. 354, 355.

“The orders given by Napoléon to all the marshals and chief officers of his army on this trying emergency, may be considered as a master-piece of military skill and foresight, and deserve especial attention from all who desire to make themselves acquainted either with his extraordinary activity and resources, or the multiplied cares which, on such an occasion, devolve on a commander-in-chief. —See the whole in *Dumas*, xvii. 330-374 ; *Pièces Just.*

to the eastward, in the direction of Spiegelberg and the Alle, on the 1st and Feb. 1 and 2. 2d of February, in order to preserve his communications with the Russian frontier. The whole army assembled in order of battle on the following day, in a strong position on the heights of Junkowo, covering the great road from Allenstein to Liebstadt, its right resting on the village of Mondtken. Napoléon instantly directed Davoust to march from Wartenberg to Spiegelberg with his whole corps, in order to get entirely round the left flank of the Russians in this position and attack them in rear, while Soult received orders to force the bridge of Bergfried, by which their retreat and communications lay across the Alle. It was all over with the Russians if these orders had been carried into full execution without their being aware how completely they were in course of being encircled; but by a fortunate accident the despatches to Bernadotte, announcing the design, and enjoining him to draw Benningsen on towards the Lower Vistula, had previously fallen into the hands of the Cossacks, and made that general aware of his danger; he immediately dispatched orders to the officer at Bergfried to hold the bridge to the last extremity, which was so gallantly obeyed, that, though Soult assailed it with all his corps, and it was taken and retaken several times, yet it Feb. 3. finally remained in the hands of the Russians. The situation of Benningsen, however, was now very critical; he was compelled to fall back to avoid being turned in presence of very superior forces, and by his lateral movement from Mohrungeu he had become entirely separated from Lestocq, who saw the most imminent danger of being cut off and destroyed by the superior forces of Bernadotte. Fortunately, however, from the despatches being intercepted, that Marshal remained entirely ignorant, both of what was expected from him, and of the great advantages which remained in his power; and Lestocq, without being disquieted, was enabled to check his advance and make preparations for a retreat, which was presented to him from Freystadt, where he had been covering the revictualling of Graudentz, by Deutch-Eylau, Osterode, Mohrungeu to Liebstadt, while Benningsen himself on the night of the 3d, broke up from Junkowo, and retired in the same direction (1).

The French pursue the Russians, who resolve to give battle. By daybreak the French army, headed by Murat, with his numerous and terrible dragoons, were in motion to pursue the enemy; and as the Russians had been much retarded during the night by the passage of so many pieces of cannon and waggons through the narrow streets of Junkowo, they soon came up with their rear-guard. By Feb. 4. overwhelming numbers, the Russians were forced from the bridge of Bergfried; but they rallied in the village, and forming barricades with tumbrils, waggons, and chariots, effectually checked the advance of the enemy, until the carriages in the rear had got clear through, when they retired, obstinately contesting every inch of ground, which they did with such effect that the French lost fifteen hundred men in the pursuit, without inflicting a greater loss on their adversaries. Nor were any cannon or chariots taken—a striking proof of the orderly nature of the retreat, and the heroism with which the rearguard performed its duty, when it is recollected that Napoléon, with eighty thousand men, thundered in close pursuit; and that, from the state of the roads, the march which had been ordered upon three lines, could take place on two only. Soult and Davoust continued to manœuvre, in order to turn the Russian left, while Murat and Ney pressed their rearguard. On the Feb. 5. night of the 4th, the Russians retired to Frauendorf, where they stood firm next day. But this continued retreat in presence of the enemy

(1) Wilson, 89, 92. Jom. ii. 355, 356. Dum, xvii, 330, 349.

was now beginning to be attended with bad effects, both upon the health and spirits of the soldiers. The Russian commissariat was then wretched; magazines there were none in the country which was now the theatre of war; and the soldiers, when worn out with a night march over frozen snow, had no means of obtaining subsistence but by prowling about to discover and dig up the little stores which the peasants had buried for the use of their families. The men every where lay on the bare ground in intense frost, with no other bed but the snow, and no covering but their greatcoats, which were now little better than rags. They were not as yet inured to retire before the enemy; and the murmur against any further retreat was so loud, that Benning-sen resolved to fall back only to a chosen field of battle; and, upon examining the map, that of PREUSSICH-EYLAU was selected for this purpose. No sooner was this announced to the troops than their discontents were appeased, the hardships of the night marches were forgotten, and, from the joyful looks of the men, it would rather have been supposed they were marching to tranquil winter quarters, than the most desperate struggle which had occurred in modern times (1).

Severe actions, however, awaited these brave men ere they reached the theatre of final conflict. On the night of the 5th, the army moved to Landsberg, where the troops from Heilsberg joined them, notwithstanding a bloody combat with Marshal Davoust. On the following day, the rearguard, under Bagration, posted between Hoff and that town, was assailed with the utmost vehemence by Murat, at the head of the cavalry and the principal part of the corps of Soult and Augereau. The approach of these formidable masses, and the imposing appearance of their cavalry, as well as the balls which began to fall from the French batteries, occasioned great confusion among the cannon and carriages in the streets of the town. But with such resolution did the rearguard maintain their position, that though they sustained a heavy loss, the enemy were kept at bay till night closed the carnage, and relieved the Russian general from the anxieties consequent on so critical a situation in presence of such enormous forces of the enemy. Two battalions of Russians were trampled under foot in the course of the day, or cut down chiefly by one of their own regiments of horse dashing over them, when broken and flying from Murat's dragoons. Benning-sen, upon this, supported the rearguard by several brigades of fresh troops, and the combat continued with various success till night, when both armies bivouacked in presence of each other; that of the French on the heights of Hoff, that of the Russians on those which lie in front of Landsberg, and the little stream of the Stein separating their outposts from each other. In this untoward affair the Russians sustained a loss of 2500 men, among whom was Prince Gallitzin, whose chivalrous courage had already endeared him to the army; but the French were weakened by nearly as great a number. During the night the whole army again broke up, and, without farther molestation, reached Preussich-Eylau at seven the next morning, when they passed through the town, and moved quietly to the appointed ground for the battle on the other side, where it arrived by noonday (2).

Combat of
Leibstadt,
and retreat
of Lestocq.

This rapid concentration and retreat of the Russians isolated the Prussian corps of Lestocq, and gave too much reason to fear that it might be cut off by the superior forces of Bernadotte or Ney,

(1) Wilson, 92, 94. Jom. ii. 356. Dum, xvii. 349, 352. (2) Dum, xvii, 354, 365. Wilson, 94, 95. Jom. ii, 356.

who were now pressing on it on all sides. But the skilful movements of the Prussian general extricated him from a most perilous situation. On the Feb. 5.

5th, he set out from Mohrungen, and his horse encountered the cavalry of Murat near Dippen, while the head of the column of infantry was at the same time charged by Ney, who had crossed the Passarge to intercept his progress near Waltersdorf. The heroic resistance of the advanced guard, only three thousand strong, gave time for the main body to change the line of its march, and escape in the direction of Schloditten; but it proved fatal to itself, as almost the whole were slain or made prisoners, with twelve pieces of cannon. The firm countenance of the cavalry, however, defeated all the efforts of Murat, who in vain charged them repeatedly with six thousand horse: and, after baffling all his attacks; they retired leisurely and in the best order, covering the march of the infantry all the way; crossed the

Feb. 7. Passarge at Spandau; and arrived, on the 7th, in safety at Husseln in the neighbourhood of Preussich-Eylau (1).

Thus, after sustaining incredible hardships, and undergoing serious dangers, the whole Russian army was at length concentrated in one field of battle, and about to measure its strength with the enemy. It was reduced, by the fatigues and losses of this winter campaign, to sixty-five thousand men, assembled around Eylau, to which if ten thousand be added as Lestocq's division, which might be expected to co-operate in the approaching action, the whole amount that could be relied on for the shock was seventy-five thousand, with 460 pieces of cannon. The French, after deducting the losses of this dreadful warfare, exclusive of Bernadotte, who did not arrive on the ground for two days after, could still bring eighty-five thousand men into the field, including nearly sixteen thousand horse; but they had not above three hundred and fifty pieces of artillery (2). Thus the two armies were nearly equal—the French superiority in numbers, and especially in cavalry, being counterbalanced by the advantage which the Russians had in that important arm, the artillery. Their spirit and courage were at the same level; for if the French could recall with deserved pride the glorious achievements of the campaign, and a long course of almost unbroken victories, the Russians on their side, had the triumphs of Suwarrow in Turkey, Poland, and the Italian plains, to commemorate: and if the former was impelled by the ardour of a revolution converted by consummate genius

(1) Jour. ii. 356, 357. Dum. xvii. 352, 356.

(2) The following is the account given by Dumas

of the troops present under arms, in January 1807, under Napoleon on the Vistula:—

	Infantry and Artillery.	Cavalry.
Imperial Guard under Bessières,	9,199	3,829
Oudinot,	6,046	
First Corps, Bernadotte,	18,073	950
Third do. Davoust,	19,000	757
Fourth do. Soult,	26,329	1,495
Fifth do. Lannes,	16,720	1,399
Sixth do. Ney,	15,158	881
Cavalry do. Murat,	753	14,868
Total on the Vistula,	109,238	20,350
Detached, viz. Mortier in Pomerania,	15,868	1,254
Jerome and Vandamme, in Silesia,	18,232	2,207
Lefebvre, Dantzic,	23,248	547
Hanover, Dumonceau,	6,898	689
Total,	173,464	25,047

If from this mass of 109,238 infantry, and 20,000 cavalry, there be deducted 18,000 absent, under Bernadotte, 16,000 under Lannes, and 10,000 lost or left behind during the march from Warsaw, there

will remain, on their own showing, 85,000 in line at Eylau, and that agrees nearly with Sir Robert Wilson's estimate.—Dumas, vol. xviii. 592; Wilson, 99.

into that of military conquest, the latter were buoyant with the rising energy of an empire whose frontiers had never yet receded before the standards of an enemy (1).

Bloody combats around Eylau the day before the battle. The Russian rearguard, ten thousand strong, under Bagrathion, was leisurely retiring towards Eylau, and at the distance of about two miles from that village, when it was attacked by the French infantry. The Russians were at first compelled to give way, but the St.-Petersburg dragoons, whose rout had occasioned such damage to their own comrades on the preceding day, emulous to wipe away their disgrace, assailed the enemy so opportunely in flank, when emerging from the tumult of the charge, that they instantly cut to pieces two battalions, and made prize of their eagles. Disconcerted by this check, the French gave no further

Feb. 7. molestation to the Russian rearguard, which retired into Eylau. By a mistake, however, the division destined to occupy that important station evacuated it, along with the rest of the army; and though Benningsen instantly ordered it to be re-occupied by fresh troops, the French had, meanwhile, entered in great numbers, and the assailing division, under Barclay de Tolly, had a rude contest to encounter in endeavouring to regain the lost ground. By vast exertions, however, they at length succeeded in expelling the enemy: the French again returned in greater force; the combat continued with the utmost fury till long after sunset; fresh reinforcements came up to the Russians; twice Barclay carried the village after dark, by the light of the burning houses; and when at length driven out of the town, which, from lying in a hollow and being commanded on all sides, was no longer tenable after the enemy had brought up their heavy artillery, that gallant commander, with this heroic rearguard, entrenched himself in the church and churchyard, which stands on an eminence by the road, on issuing from the town on the other side, and there maintained a sanguinary resistance till past ten at night, when he was severely wounded. Then the object of the strife having been gained by the heavy artillery having all arrived by the road of Schloditten, and taken up its position on the field of battle behind the village, the unconquered Russians were withdrawn from the churchyard, which, with its blood-stained graves, and corpse-cased slopes, remained in the hands of Napoléon (2).

Anxious situation of both armies in their night's bivouac. Never in the history of war did two armies pass a night under more awful and impressive circumstances, than the rival hosts who now lay, without tent or covering, on the snowy expanse of the field of Eylau. The close vicinity of the two armies, the vast multitude assembled in so narrow a space, intent only on mutual destruction; the vital interests to the lives and fortunes of all, which were at stake; the wintry wildness of the scene, cheered only by the watchfires, which threw a partial glow on the snow-clad heights around; the shivering groups who in either army lay round the blazing fires, chilled by girdles of impenetrable ice; the stern resolution of the soldiers in the one array, and the enthusiastic ardour of those in the other; the liberty of Europe now brought to the issue of one dread combat; the glory of Russia and France dependent on the efforts of the mightiest armament that either had yet sent forth, all contributed to impress a feeling of extraordinary solemnity, which reached the most inconsiderate breast, oppressed the mind with a feeling of anxious thought, and kept unclosed many a wearied eyelid in both camps, notwithstanding the extraor-

(1) Dum. xviii. 1, 10. Wilson, 98, 99.

(2) Wilson, 97, 98, 100. Jom. ii. 357, 358. Dum. xviii. 6, 8. Bign. vi. 126.

dinary fatigues of the preceding days. But no sooner did the dawn break, and the quick rattle of musketry from the outposts commence, than these gloomy presentiments were dispelled, and all arose from their icy beds with no other feelings but those of joyous confidence and military ardour (1).

Description of the field of battle and the positions of either army. The evacuation of Eylau, on the preceding night, had led Napoléon to suppose that the enemy were not to give battle on the succeeding day; and, overwhelmed with the extraordinary fatigues he had undergone since leaving Warsaw, during which time he had been occupied in business or marching twenty hours out of the twenty-four, he retired to a house in the town, and there, amidst all the horrors of a place carried by assault, fell into a profound sleep. The two armies were within half cannon-shot of each other, and their immense masses disposed in close array on a space not exceeding a league in breadth. The field of battle was an open expanse of unenclosed ground, rising into swells, or small hills, interspersed with many lakes; but as the whole surface was covered with snow, and the lakes so thoroughly frozen as to bear any weight either of cavalry or artillery, the whole surface was accessible to military operations. The Russian right, under Tutschakoff, lay on either side of Schloditten; the centre, under Sacken, occupied a cluster of little open hills, intercepted by lakes, in front of Kuschnitten; the left under Osterman Tolstoy, rested on Klein-Saussgarten; the advanced guard, ten thousand strong, with its outposts extending almost to the houses of Eylau, was under the command of Bagration; the reserve, in two divisions, was led by Doctoroff. The whole army in front was drawn up in two lines with admirable precision; the reserve, in two close columns behind the centre; the foot artillery, consisting of 400 pieces, was disposed along the front of the lines; the horse artillery, carrying sixty guns; cavalry and Cossacks, under Platoff, in reserve behind the centre and wings, in order to support any point which might appear to require assistance. Lestocq, with his division, was not yet in line, but he had lain at Hussehnien the preceding night, which was only three leagues off, and might be expected to join before the battle was far advanced (2).

Distribution of the French forces. The French position, generally speaking, was more elevated than that of the Russians, with the exception of the right, where it was commanded by the heights of Klein-Saussgarten. The town of Eylau, however, occupied in force by their troops, was situated in a hollow, so low that the roofs of the houses were below the range of the cannon-shot, and the summit of the church steeple, which stands on an eminence, alone was exposed to the destructive storm. Davoust was on the right, and received orders to attack the villages of Klein-Saussgarten and Serpallen, occupied by the enemy. Soult in the centre, was destined to advance against the Russian main body and the strong batteries placed opposite to Eylau; Augereau was on the left, to support his attack; the Imperial Guard and cavalry of Murat, in reserve behind the centre, ready to support any attack which might appear likely to prove unsuccessful. Orders had been despatched to Ney to attack the Russian right as soon as the action was warmly engaged; and it was hoped he would arrive on the field, at least as soon as Lestocq on the other side, upon whose traces he had so long been following. Lannes had been detained by sickness at Pultusk, and his corps, placed under the orders of Savary, afterwards Duke of Rovigo, was observing the Russian forces left on the Bug and the Narew (3).

(1) Wilson, 101. *Jom.* ii. 358.(3) Wilson, 101. *Jom.* ii. 360, 361. *Dum.* xviii.(2) *Dum.* xviii. 12, 13. *Jom.* ii. 359, 360. *Wil.* 9, 15.
son, 101.

Battle of Eylau.
 Defeat of Augereau.
 Feb. 8.

Napoléon's design, when he saw that the Russians stood firm, and were resolved to give battle, was to turn their left by the corps of Marshal Davoust, and throw it back, as at Austerlitz, on the middle of the army; but the better to conceal this object he commenced the action soon after daylight by a violent attack on their right and centre. The Russian cannon played heavily, but rather at hazard, on the hostile masses in front of Eylau, while the French guns replied with fatal effect from their elevated position down upon the enemy, whose lines were exposed from head to foot to the range of their shot. Presently the left, under Augereau, advanced in massy columns towards Schloditten; while Soult's corps, preceded by a hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, marched with an intrepid step against the Russian centre, and forty guns of the Imperial Guard posted on an eminence near the church of Eylau, opened a heavy fire on the great central Russian battery. These troops had not advanced above three hundred yards, driving the Russian tirailleurs before them, when the Russian cannon-shot, from two hundred pieces, admirably directed, ploughed through the mass, and so shattered it, that the whole body inclined to the left, to get under the shelter of a detached house which stood in the way. A snow-storm at the same time set in and darkened the atmosphere, so that neither army could see its opponent, but nevertheless the deadly storm of bullets continued to tear the massy columns of Augereau; and the fire was so violent as to prevent Soult from rendering him any effectual support. Augereau's divisions were already severely shaken by this murderous fire, when they were suddenly assailed on one side by the right wing of the Russians, under Tutschakoff, and on the other by their reserve and a powerful cavalry, under Doctoroff. So thick was the snow-storm, so unexpected the onset, that the assailants were only a few yards distant, and the long lances of the Cossacks, almost touching the French infantry when they were first discerned. The combat was not of more than a few minutes' duration; the corps, charged at once by foot and horse with the utmost vigour, broke and fled in the wildest disorder back into Eylau, closely pursued by the Russian cavalry and Cossacks, who made such havoc, that the whole, above sixteen thousand strong, were, with the exception of fifteen hundred men, taken or destroyed; and Augereau himself, with his two generals of divisions, Desgardens and Heudelet, desperately wounded (1).

Imminent danger of Napoléon.

Napoléon was apprised of this disaster by the torrent of fugitives which rushed into Eylau; and the snow-storm clearing away at the same time, showed him the Russian right and centre far advanced, with their light troops almost at the edge of the town. He himself was stationed at the churchyard on its eastern side, which had been the scene of such a sanguinary conflict on the preceding night; and already the crash of the enemy's balls on the steeple and walls of the church showed how nearly danger was approaching. Presently one of the Russian divisions, following rapidly after the fugitives, entered Eylau by the western street, and charged, with loud hurrahs, to the foot of the mount where the Emperor was placed with a battery of the Imperial Guard and his personal escort of a hundred men. Had a regiment of horse been at hand to support the attack, Napoléon must have been made prisoner; for though the last reserve, consisting of six battalions of the old guard, were at a short distance, he might have been enveloped before they could get up to his rescue. The fate of Europe then hung by a thread, but in that terrible moment the Emperor's presence of

(1) Wilson, 101, 102. Jour. ii. 361. Dum. xviii. 17, 18. Bign. 129, 130.

mind did not forsake him ; he instantly ordered his little body-guard, hardly more than a company, to form line, in order to check the enemy's advance, and dispatched orders to the old guard to attack the column on one flank, while a brigade of Murat's horse charged it on the other. The Russians, disordered by success, and ignorant of the inestimable prize which was almost within their grasp, were arrested by the firm countenance of the little band of heroes who formed Napoléon's last resource; and before they could reform their ranks for a regular conflict, the enemy were upon them on either flank, and almost the whole division was cut to pieces on the spot (1).

The disorder produced by the repulse of Soult and the almost total destruction of Augereau's corps, however, was such, that the French Emperor was compelled to strain every nerve to repair it. For this purpose he prepared a grand charge by the whole cavalry and Imperial Guard, supported by the divisions of Soult, which were again formed and led back to the attack. The onset of this enormous mass, consisting of fourteen thousand cavalry, and twenty-five thousand foot soldiers, supported by two hundred pieces of cannon, was the more formidable, that the thick storm of snow prevented them from being perceived till they were close upon the first line. The shock was irresistible; the front line of the Russians was forced to give ground, and in some places thrown into disorder; their cavalry crushed by the enormous weight of the seventy squadrons which followed the white plume of Murat; and a desperate *mêlée* ensued, in which prodigious losses were sustained on both sides; for the Russian battalions, though broken, did not lay down their arms or fly, but falling back on such as yet stood firm, or uniting in little knots together, still maintained the combat with the most dogged resolution. Instantly perceiving the extent of the danger, Benningsen, with his whole staff, galloped forward from his station in the rear to the front, and at the same time dispatched orders to the whole infantry of the reserve to close their ranks, and advance to the support of their comrades engaged. These brave men inclining inwards, pressed eagerly on, regardless of the shower of grape and musketry which fell in their advancing ranks, and uniting with the first line, charged home with loud hurrahs upon the enemy. In the shock Essen's Russian division was broken, and the French horse, pursuing their advantage, swept through several openings, and got as far as the reserve cavalry of Benningsen; but no sooner did Platoff see them approaching with loud cries, and in all the tumult of victory, than he gave orders to the Cossacks of the Don to advance. Regardless of danger, the children of the desert joyfully galloped forward to the charge; their long lances are in rest, their blood horses are at speed; in an instant the French cuirassiers are broken, pierced through, and scattered. Retreat was impossible through the again closed ranks of the enemy, and eighteen only of the whole body regained their own lines by a long circuit, while five hundred and thirty Cossacks returned, each cased in the shining armour which they had stripped from the dead bodies of their opponents. At all other points the enemy were, after a desperate struggle, driven back;

(1) Bign. vi. 130. Dum. xviii. 19, 20. Jom. ii. 362, 363. Wilson, 101, 102.

"I never was so much struck with any thing in my life," said General Bertrand at St.-Helena, "as by the Emperor at Eylau at the moment when, alone with some officers of his staff, he was almost trodden under foot by a column of four or five thousand Russians. The Emperor was on foot; and Berthier gave orders instantly for the horses to be brought forward: the Emperor gave him a reproachful look,

and instead ordered a battalion of his guard, which was at a little distance, to advance. He himself kept his ground as the Russians approached, repeating frequently the words, 'What boldness! what boldness!' At the sight of the grenadiers of his guard, the Russians made a dead pause; the Emperor did not stir, but all around him trembled."—LAS CASES, ii. 151. See also *Relation de la Bataille d'Eylau, par un Témoin oculaire. Camp. en Prusse et Pol.* iv. 45.

and several eagles, with fourteen pieces of cannon, remained in the hands of the victors (1).

The battle appeared gained; the French left and centre had been defeated with extraordinary loss; their last reserves, with the exception of part of the Guard, had been engaged without success; to the cries of *Vive l'Empereur*, and the shouts of enthusiasm with which they commenced the combat, had succeeded a sullen silence along the whole line in front of Eylau; the Russians were several hundred paces in advance of the ground which they occupied in the morning; and a distant cannonade on both sides evinced the exhaustion and fatigue which was mutually felt. Lestocq had not yet arrived, but he was hourly and anxiously expected, and the addition of his fresh and gallant corps would, it was hoped, enable Benningsen to complete the victory. But while all eyes were eagerly turned to the right, where it was expected his standards would first appear, a terrible disaster, wellnigh attended with fatal consequences, took place on the left. Davoust, who was intrusted with the attack which was intended to be the decisive one in that quarter, had long been delayed by the firm countenance of Bagavout and Osterman Tolstoy; but at length the increasing numbers and vigorous attacks of the French prevailed, and the village of Klein-Saussgarten fell into their hands. It was again reconquered by the Russians, but finally remained in the possession of their antagonists. Nor was the action less warmly contested at Serpallen. Supported by a battery of thirty pieces of artillery, Bagavout there, for three hours, made head against the superior forces of St.-Hilaire and Morand; at length the two lines advanced to within pistol-shot, when the Russians gave way; the cannoniers bravely resisting, were bayoneted at their guns, and the pieces were on the point of being taken, when they were reinforced by two regiments which Benningsen sent to their support, and the French, in their turn, were charged in flank by cavalry, broken and driven back upwards of three hundred yards. But notwithstanding this success at Serpallen, the progress of the enemy at Klein-Saussgarten was so alarming, that the Russians were unable to maintain themselves on the ground they had so gallantly regained. Friant debouched in their rear in great strength, and, rapidly continuing his advance from left to right of the Russian position, he had soon passed, driving every thing before him, the whole ground occupied by their left wing; and continuing his triumphant course in their rear, carried by assault the hamlet of Anklappen, and was making dispositions for the attack of Kusechnitten, which had been the headquarters of Benningsen during the preceding night, and lay directly behind the Russian centre. Never was change more sudden; the victorious centre, turned and attacked both in flank and rear, seemed on the point of being driven off the field of battle; already the shouts of victory were heard from Davoust's divisions, and vast volumes of black smoke, blown along the whole Russian centre and right from the flames of Serpallen, evinced in frightful colours the progress of the enemy on their left (2).

Benningsen
throws back
his left to
arrest the
evil.

The firmness of Benningsen, however, was equal to the emergency. Orders were dispatched to the whole left wing to fall back, so as to come nearly at right angles to the centre and right; and although this retrograde movement, performed in presence of a victorious enemy, was necessarily attended with some disorder, yet it was successfully accomplished; and, after sustaining considerable loss, the Russian left wing was

(1) Dum. xviii. 19, 20. Join. ii. 362. Wilson, 103, 104.

(2) Wilson, 104, 105, Dum. xviii. 21, 29. Join. ii. 363, 364.

drawn up, facing outwards, nearly at right angles to the centre, which still retained its advanced position, midway between the ground occupied by the two armies where the fight began in the morning. As the Russian left fell back to the neighbourhood of the centre, it received the support of the reserves, while Benningsen wheeled about to the assistance of the discomfited wing (1); and although St.-Hilaire carried Kuschnitten, this was the last of his advantages in that quarter, and the victorious Davoust was at length arrested.

Lestoeq at length appears on the Russian right, and restores the battle. The battle was in this critical state, with the French victorious on one wing and the Russians on the centre and the other, but without any decisive advantage to either side, when the corps of Lestoeq, so long expected, at length appeared on the extreme Russian right, driving before him the French battalions which were stationed near the village of Althof. Orders were immediately dispatched to him to defile as quickly as possible in the rear of the Russian right, so as to assist in the recapture of Kuschnitten behind their centre, where St.-Hilaire had established himself in so threatening a manner. These directions were rapidly and ably performed; moving swiftly over the open ground in the rear of the Russian right in three columns, he arrived in the neighbourhood of Kuschnitten an hour before it was dark, with seven thousand men, having left two thousand to occupy Althof, and lost nearly a thousand in the course of the march that morning, which had been a constant fight with Marshal Ney's corps. Dispositions for attacking the village and cutting off the retreat of the enemy were instantly made; a terrible cannonade was kept up on its houses, and the Prussians, under cover of the guns, charging in three columns, carried it with irresistible force, destroying or making prisoners the 51st and one battalion of the 108th regiments stationed there, with an eagle, and recovering the Russian guns which had been abandoned on the retreat from Serpallen. Not content with this great success, Lestoeq immediately re-formed his divisions in line, with the cavalry and Cossacks in rear, and advanced against the hamlet of Anklappen and the wood adjoining. The division of Friant, wearied by eight hours' fighting, was little in a condition to withstand these fresh troops, flushed by so important an advantage. The combat, however, was terrible; Davoust was there, and his troops, though exhausted, were more than double the numbers of the enemy, and he made the utmost efforts to maintain his ground — "Here," said the Marshal, "is the place where the brave should find a glorious death; the cowards will perish in the deserts of Siberia." Notwithstanding all his exertions, however, Friant was driven out of the wood, after an hour's combat, with the loss of three thousand men; the Russians, by a bold attack of cavalry regained the smoking walls of Anklappen, and the whole allied line was pressing on in proud array, driving the enemy before them over the open ground between that ruin and Saussgarten, when night drew her sable mantle over this scene of blood (2).

Schloditten, is carried by Ney, and retaken by Benningsen. The battle was over on the centre and left, and already the French lines were illuminated by the fire of innumerable bivouacs, when both armies were startled by a sharp fire succeeded by loud shouts on the extreme right of the Russians towards Schloditten; it was occasioned by Marshal Ney's corps, which, following fast on the traces of Lestoeq, had, at night-fall entered Althof, driving the Prussian detachment which occupied it before him, and had now carried Schloditten, so as to interrupt the Russian

(1) Wilson, 104, 105. Jom. ii. 363, 364. Dum. xviii. 24, 29.

(2) Dum. xviii. 30, 35. Wilson, 105, 106. Jom. ii. 364, 365.

communication with Königsberg. Benningsen immediately ordered the Russian division of Kamenskoi which had suffered least in the preceding action, to storm the village, which was executed at ten at night in the most gallant style. The loud cheers of their victorious troops were heard at Preussich-Eylau; and Napoléon, supposing that a general attack was commencing for which he was little prepared, gave orders for his heavy artillery and baggage to defile towards Landsberg, and ordered Davoust to draw back to the position which he had occupied in front of the wood when the action commenced in the morning, and this terminated the changes of this eventful day (1).

Benningsen, contrary to the wishes of his officers, resolves to retreat.

From the mortification, however, of retiring for the first time in his life from before an enemy in an open field, Napoléon was relieved by the measures adopted by the Russian General. At eleven at night, a council of war was held by the Generals on horseback, as to the course which the army should pursue. It was strongly represented by Osterman Tolstoy, the second in command, and Generals Knoring and Lestocq, that at last Bonaparte had now been defeated in a pitched battle, and that it would be to the last degree impolitic to destroy the moral effect of such an advantage by retreating before him, and thus giving him a fair pretext for representing it as a victory; that they were ready instantly or next day to follow up their success, and attack the enemy wherever they could find him; and that at all events, they would pledge their heads, that if he would only stand firm, Napoléon would be driven to a disastrous retreat. Strong as these considerations were, they were overbalanced, in Benningsen's estimation, by still stronger. He knew that his own loss was not less than twenty thousand men, and though he had every reason to believe that the enemy's was still heavier, yet the means of repairing the chasm existed to a greater degree in the hands of Napoléon than his own: Ney, whose corps had comparatively suffered little, had just joined him: Bernadotte, it was to be presumed, would instantly be summoned to headquarters, and these fresh troops might give the enemy the means of cutting them off from Königsberg, in which case, in the total destitution for provisions which prevailed, the most dreadful calamities might be apprehended. Influenced by these considerations, Benningsen, who was ignorant of the enormous magnitude of the losses which the French had sustained, and who, though a gallant veteran, had lost somewhat of the vigour of youth, and had been thirty-six hours on horseback with hardly any nourishment, persevered in his opinion, and directed the order of march, which began at midnight, through Schloditten towards Königsberg, without any molestation from the enemy. They took post at Wottenberg, three leagues in front of that town, where the wearied soldiers, after a struggle of unexampled severity, were at length enabled to taste a few hours of repose (2).

Results of the battle, and losses on both sides.

Such was the terrible battle of Eylau, fought in the depth of winter, amidst ice and snow, under circumstances of unexampled horror; the most bloody and obstinately-contested that had yet occurred during the war; and in which, if Napoléon did not sustain a positive defeat, he underwent a disaster which had wellnigh proved his ruin. The loss on both sides was immense, and never, in modern times, had a field of battle been strewed with such a multitude of slain. On the side of the Russians twenty-five thousand had fallen, of whom above seven thousand were already no more: on that of the French, upwards of thirty thousand

(1) Wilson, 106, 107. Dum. xviii. 35, 37. Jom. ii. 365. Bign. vi. 133, 134.

(2) Wilson, 108, 109. Jom. ii. 365, 366. Dum. xviii. 37, 39.

were killed or wounded, and nearly ten thousand had left their colours, under pretence of attending to the wounded, and did not make their appearance for several days afterwards. The other trophies of victory were nearly equally balanced: the Russians had to boast of the unusual spectacle of twelve eagles taken from their antagonists; while they had made spoil of sixteen of the Russian guns, and fourteen standards. Hardly any prisoners were made on either side during the action; but six thousand of the wounded, most of them in a hopeless state, were left on the field of battle, and fell into the hands of the French (1).

Never was spectacle so dreadful as the field of battle presented on the following morning. Above fifty thousand men lay in the space of two leagues, weltering in blood. The wounds were, for the most part, of the severest kind, from the extraordinary quantity of cannon-balls which had been discharged during the action, and the close proximity of the contending masses to the deadly batteries which spread grape at half-musket shot through their ranks. Though stretched on the cold snow, and exposed to the severity of an arctic winter, they were burning with thirst; and piteous cries were heard on all sides for water, or assistance to extricate the wounded men from beneath the heaps of slain, or load of horses by which they were crushed. Six thousand of these noble animals encumbered the field, or, maddened with pain, were shrieking aloud amidst the stifled groans of the wounded. Subdued by loss of blood, tamed by cold, exhausted by hunger, the foemen lay side by side amidst the general wreck. The Cossack was to be seen beside the Italian; the gay vinedresser, from the smiling banks of the Garonne, lay athwart the stern peasant from the plains of the Ukraine. The extremity of suffering had extinguished alike the fiercest and the most generous passions. After his usual custom, Napoléon in the afternoon rode through this dreadful field, accompanied by his generals and staff, while the still burning piles of Serpallen and Saussgarten sent volumes of black smoke over the scene of death: but the men exhibited none of their wonted enthusiasm; no cries of *Vive l'Empereur* were heard; the bloody surface echoed only with the cries of suffering, or the groans of woe. It is this moment which the genius of Le Gros has selected for the finest and most inspired painting that exists of the Emperor, in that immortal work, which, amidst the false taste and artificial sentiment of Parisian society, has revived the severe simplicity and chastened feeling of ancient art (2).

For nine days after the battle, the French remained at Eylau, unable to advance, unwilling to retreat, and apparently awaiting some pacific overture

(1) *Jom.* ii. 365. *Dum.* xviii. 39, 40. *Wilson*, 108, 109, 111.

The official accounts of this great battle on both sides are so much interwoven with falsehood, as to furnish no clue whatever to the truth. That of Napoléon is distinguished by more than his usual misrepresentation. He states his loss at 1900 killed, and 5700 wounded, in all 7600. [58th Bulletin.] Judging by his usual practice, which was to avow a loss about a fourth of its real amount, this would imply a loss of 30,000 men. At St. Helena he admitted that he lost 18,000; [Monte, *Mélanges*, 268] and, considering that the Russians admit a loss of above 20,000, that their artillery throughout the day was greatly superior to that of the French, and that they sustained no loss in any quarter comparable to that of Augereau's corps, which was so completely destroyed that its remains were immediately incorporated with the other corps, and the corps itself disappeared entirely from the Grand Army, it may safely be concluded that this estimate is not exaggerated.

"Our loss," says the Duchess of Abrantes, "at Eylau, was enormous—why conceal the truth? The Emperor avowing the truth at Eylau would have appeared to me more truly great than putting forth an official falsehood which no child could believe, more especially if he was nephew or son of Col. Semelé of the 24th regiment of the line, one of the finest in the army, and itself equal almost to a brigade, which was to a man destroyed."—*D'ABRANTES*, ix. 367.

(2) *Dum.* xviii. 40, 41. *Wilson*, 109. *Ann. Reg.* 1807, 14, 15.

This admirable painting, the masterpiece of modern French art, is to be seen in the Luxembourg at Paris, standing forth in dark simplicity amidst its meretricious competitors: it is worthy to be placed beside the finest battle-pieces of Le Brun or Tempesta; and in grandeur of thought and of effect, greatly excels any British work of art since the days of Reynolds.

Inactivity
and losses of
the French
after the
battle.
Feb. 14.

from the enemy. The only movement of any consequence which was attempted was by Murat, with twelve regiments of cuirassiers, who approached the Russian position in front of Königsberg; but they were defeated by the Allied horse, with the loss of four hundred killed and three hundred prisoners. Elated with this success, the Cossacks became daily more enterprising in their excursions: night and day they gave the enemy no rest in their position; their foraging parties were all cut off; and to such a length was this partisan warfare carried, and so completely did the superiority of the Cossacks in its conduct appear, that during the ten days the French remained at Eylau, upwards of fifteen hundred of their cavalry were made prisoners, and brought into Königsberg. Meanwhile, the relative situation of the two armies was rapidly changing: the Russians, with the great seaport of Königsberg in their rear, were amply supplied with every thing, and their wounded carefully nursed in the great hospitals of that city; while the French, still starving on the snows of Eylau, and unable, from the superiority of the Russian horse, to levy requisitions in the surrounding country, were daily reduced to greater straits from want of provisions, and totally destitute of all the accommodations requisite to withstand the rigour of the season (1).

Napoléon
calls in all
his rein-
forcements,
and propo-
ses peace.

Meanwhile Napoléon, however, was not idle. The day after the battle he issued orders for all the troops in his rear to advance by forced marches to the scene of action. The cuirassiers of Nansouty, which had not been engaged, arrived in consequence two days after. Lefebvre received orders to suspend the blockade of Dantzic, and concentrate his corps at Osterode, in order to form a reserve to the army, and co-operate with Savary, who had the command of Lannes' corps on the Narew. All the bridges on the Lower Vistula were put in a posture of defence, and Bernadotte was brought up to Eylau. Such, however, had been the havoc in the army, that the Emperor, notwithstanding these great reinforcements, did not venture to renew hostilities, or advance against Königsberg, the prize of victory, where he would have found the best possible winter quarters, and the steeples of which were visible from the heights occupied by his army (2). Even the critical position of the Russian army, with its back to the sea and the river Pregel, where defeat would necessarily prove ruin, could not induce Napoléon to hazard another encounter; and finding that the Russians were not disposed to propose an armistice, he de-

Feb. 15.

termined himself to take that step. For this purpose, General Bertram was sent to Benningsen's outposts with proposals of peace both to the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia. The Russian general sent him on to Memel, where the latter was, with a letter strongly advising him not to treat, and representing that the fact of Napoléon proposing an armistice after so doubtful a battle, was the best evidence that it was not for the in-

Feb. 17.

terest of the Allies to grant it. The terms proposed were very different from those offered after the triumph of Jena: there were no more declarations that the House of Brandenburg must resign half its dominions (3), or that he would make the Prussian nobles so poor that they should be reduced to beg their bread (4).

(1) Wils. 109, 111. Dum. xviii. 49, 51.

(2) When Napoléon began the battle of Eylau, he never doubted he would be in Königsberg next day. In his proclamation to his soldiers, before the action commenced, he said, "In two days the enemy will cease to exist, and your fatigues will be compensated by a luxurious and honourable repose."

And on the same day Berthier wrote to Joséphine—
"The Russians have fled to Gumbinnen on the road to Russia; to-morrow Königsberg will receive the Emperor."—WILSON, 113.

(3) Hard. ix. 395, 399. Lucches. Bign. vi. 154, 155.

(4) Napoléon's letter to the King of Prussia was

Which are refused by Prussia. Frederick William, however, was not led to swerve from the path of honour even by this tempting offer. Widely as the language of the French Emperor differed from that which he had formerly employed, and clearly as his present moderation evinced the extent of the losses he had sustained at Eylau, still the existing situation and recent engagements of the Prussian monarch precluded his entering, consistently with national faith, into a separate negotiation. The Emperor of Russia had just given the clearest indication of the heroic firmness with which he was disposed to maintain the contest, by the vigorous campaign which he had commenced in the depth of winter, and the resolution with which he had sustained a sanguinary battle of unexampled severity. The conduct of England, it is true, had been very different from what it had hitherto been during the Revolutionary War, and hardly any assistance had been received, either from its arms or its treasures, by the Allies engaged in a contest of life or death on the shores of the Vistula; but this parsimonious disposition had recently relented, and some trifling succours had just been obtained from the British government, which, although unworthy for England to offer, were yet gratefully received, as indicating a disposition on the part of its cabinet to take a more active part in the future stages of the struggle (4). Under the influence of these feelings and expectations, the Prussian government, notwithstanding the almost desperate situation of their affairs, and the occupation of nine-tenths of their territories by the enemy's forces, refused to engage in any separate negotiation; an instance of magnanimous firmness in the extremity of danger which is worthy of the highest admiration, and went far to wipe away the stain which their former vacillating conduct towards Napoléon had affixed to the Prussian annals (2).

Napoléon retreats, and goes into cantonments on the Passarge. Foiled in his endeavours to seduce Prussia into a separate accommodation. Napoléon was driven to the painful alternative of a retreat. Orders were given on the 17th for all the corps to fall back, the advanced posts being strengthened, in order to prevent the enemy from becoming aware of what was going forward or commencing a pursuit. Eylau was evacuated, and six hundred wounded abandoned to the humanity of the enemy; and the army, retiring by the great road through Landsberg, spread itself into cantonments on the banks of the Passarge from Hohenstein, where it takes its rise, to Braunsberg, where it falls into the Baltic Sea. Headquarters were established at Osterode, in the rear of the centre of the line; the bulk of the army was quartered between that place and Wormditt. Lefebvre received orders to return to Thorn, unite with the Polish and Saxon contingents, and resume the siege of Dantzic, the preparations for which had been entirely suspended since the general consternation which followed the battle of Eylau (5).

in these terms:—"I desire to put a period to the misfortunes of your family, and organize as speedily as possible the Prussian monarchy, whose intermediate power is necessary for the tranquillity of Europe. I desire peace with Russia—and, provided the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg has no designs on the Turkish Empire, I see no difficulty in obtaining it. Peace with England is not less essential to all nations; and I shall have no hesitation in sending a minister to Menel to take part in a Congress of France, Sweden, England, Russia, Prussia, and Turkey. But as such a Congress may last many years, which would not suit the present condition of Prussia, your Majesty therefore will, I am persuaded, be of opinion that I have taken the simplest method, and which is most likely to secure the prosperity of your subjects. At all events I entreat your

Majesty to believe in my sincere desire to re-establish amicable relations with so friendly a power as Prussia, and that I wish to do the same with Russia and England."—HARD, ix. 396; SCHOEL, viii. 37—405.

(1) They consisted only of L.80,000 in money. A further subsidy of L.100,000, and L.200,000 worth of arms and ammunition, which, with the promise of future succours, were furnished by the British government in May following, in return for a solemn renunciation, on the part of the cabinet of Berlin, to all claim to the Electorate of Hanover.—HARD, ix. 397; *Ann. Reg.* 1807, 23; *Parl. Deb.* ix. 987.

(2) *Ibid.* vi. 158. *Parl. Deb.* ix. 989. HARD, ix. 398. *Lueches.* i. 290, 291.

(3) Wilson, 115, 116. *Dnn.* xviii. 56, 64.

The Russians advance, and also go into cantonments.

Benningsen hastened to occupy the country which the enemy had evacuated, and on the 25th February his headquarters were advanced to Landsberg. As the Russian army passed over the bloody fields of Preussich-Eylau and Hoff, still encumbered with dead, and strewed with the remains of the desperate contest of which they had recently been the theatre, they felt that they had some reason to claim the advantage in those well-fought fields; and Benningsen issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he now openly claimed the victory (1). Napoléon also addressed his soldiers; but though it was with his usual confidence, yet it was impossible to conceal from the men or from Europe that the Grand Army had now for the first time retreated, and that the remains of their comrades on the field of battle had to trust to the humanity of an enemy for their sepulture (2). In truth, however, not only the battle but the objects of the winter campaign had been equally divided. It was not to draw the French army from the Vistula to the Passarge, a distance of above a hundred miles, that Benningsen had concentrated his troops and resumed offensive operations in the depth of winter; and it was not to retire from within sight of the steeples of Königsberg, to the wretched villages on the latter stream, that Napoléon had fought so desperate a battle at Eylau. The one struck for Dantzic, the other for Königsberg, and both were foiled in their respective objects—fifty thousand men had perished without giving a decisive advantage to either of the combatants (3).

Operations of Essen against Savary. Combat of Ostrolenka.

To this period of the Polish war belong the operations of Essen and Savary on the Narew and the neighbourhood of Ostrolenka. Savary had occupied that town with a large part of Lannes' corps, who, as already mentioned, was sick; and Essen having received considerable accessions of force from the army of Moldavia, which raised his disposable numbers to twenty thousand men, received orders, early in February, to attack the French in that quarter, and engage their attention, in order to prevent any reinforcements being drawn from that corps to the main army, then advancing to the decisive battle of Eylau. Essen advanced with his corps on each side of the river Narew. That commanded by the Russian general in person on the right bank encountered Savary, who was supported by Suchet with his brilliant division; a rude conflict ensued, in which the Russians were finally worsted. Greater success, however attended their efforts on the left bank: supported by the fire of fifty pieces of artillery, they drove back the French to the walls of Ostrolenka, and entering pell-mell with

(1) Benningsen said—"Soldiers! As the enemy was manœuvring to cut us off from our frontiers, I made my army change its position, in order to defeat his projects. The French, deceived by that movement, have fallen into the snare laid for them. The roads by which they followed us, are strewed with their dead. They have been led on to the field of Eylau, where your incomparable valour has shown of what the Russian heroism is capable. In that battle more than thirty thousand French have found their graves. They have been forced to retire at all points, and to abandon to us their wounded, their standards, and their baggage. Warriors! you have now reposed from your fatigues; forward, let us pursue the enemy, put the finishing stroke to our glorious deeds, and after having, by fresh victories, given peace to the world, we will re-enter our beloved country."—DUMAS xviii. 67.

(2) Napoléon's address was as follows:—"Soldiers! we were beginning to taste the sweets of re-

pose in our winter quarters, when the enemy attacked the first corps on the Lower Vistula; we flew to meet him; pursued him sword in hand for eighty leagues; he was driven for shelter beneath the cannons of his fortresses, and beyond the Pregel. In the combats of Bergfried, Dippen, Hoff, and the battle of Eylau, we have taken sixty pieces of cannon, sixteen standards; killed, wounded, or taken more than 40,000 Russians; the brave who have fallen on our side have fallen nobly, like tried soldiers. Their families shall receive our protection. Having thus defeated the whole projects of the enemy, we will draw near to the Vistula, and re-enter our winter quarters; whoever ventures to disturb our repose, shall repent of it—for beyond the Vistula as beyond the Danube, in the depth of winter as in the heat of summer, we shall always be the soldiers of the Grand Army."—DUM. xviii. 63.

(3) Dum. xviii. 64, 67. Wilson, 116.

the fugitives, penetrated into the principal square, and were on the point of obtaining decisive success, when Oudinot, who was marching with six thousand of the Guard to join the Grand Army from Warsaw, arrived with his division of fresh troops, and uniting with Suchet, who halted in the midst of his pursuit on the right bank to fly to the scene of danger, succeeded, after a bloody encounter in the streets, in driving them into the sand-hills behind the town, where a destructive cannonade was kept up till nightfall. In this affair the Russians lost seven guns and fifteen hundred men, and the French as many: but having succeeded in their object in defending the town, and keeping the communication of the Grand Army open with Warsaw, they with reason claimed the victory (4).

Immense
sensation
excited by
the battle of
Eylau in
Europe.

The battle of Eylau excited a prodigious sensation in Europe, and brought Napoléon to the very verge of destruction. Had a ministry of more capacity in military combination been then at the head of affairs in England, there cannot be the smallest doubt that the triumphs of 1815 might have been anticipated by seven years, and the calamities of Europe at once arrested. The first accounts of the battle received through the French bulletins, rendered it evident that some disaster had been incurred, and the anxious expectation every where excited by this unsatisfactory communication, was increased to the highest pitch of transport, when, from Benningsen's report, it appeared that he claimed the victory, and, from the stationary condition of the Russian army in front of Königsberg, and the ultimate retreat of the French to the banks of the Passarge, that these pretensions were not devoid of foundation. It was confidently expected that, now that Napoléon had for once been decisively foiled, the Austrians would instantly declare themselves, and their forty thousand men in observation in Bohemia be converted into a hundred thousand in activity on the Elbe (2). To stimulate and support such a combination, the public voice in England loudly demanded the immediate despatch of a powerful British force to the mouth of the Elbe: and recollecting the universal exasperation which prevailed in the north of Germany at the French, in consequence of the enormous requisitions which they had every where levied from the inhabitants, whether warlike or neutral, there cannot be a doubt that the appearance of fifty thousand English soldiers would have been attended with decisive effects both upon the conduct of Austria and the future issue of the war. Nothing, however, was done; the English ministry, under the direction of Lord Howick, notwithstanding the most urgent entreaties from Russia and Prussia, sent no succours in men or money. The decisive period was allowed to pass by without any thing being attempted in support of the common cause, and the British nation in consequence had the Peninsular war to go through to regain the vantage ground which was then within their grasp (5).

(4) Sav. iii. 36, 39. Wilson, 119. Jom. ii. 367, 368. Dum. xviii. 69, 75.

(2) "I trembled," says Jomini, speaking in the person of Napoléon, "lest 150,000 of those mediators had appeared on the Elbe, which would have plunged me in the greatest difficulties. I there saw that I had placed myself at the mercy of my enemies. More than once I then regretted having suffered myself to be drawn on into those remote and inhospitable countries, and received with so much asperity all who sought to portray its danger. The Cabinet of Vienna had then a safer and more honourable opportunity of re-establishing its preponderance than that which it chose in 1813, but it had not resolution enough to profit by it, and my firm countenance proved my salvation."—JOMINI, ii. 369.

(3) "Repeated and urgent applications were made in February and March, 1807, for an English army, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, to co-operate with the Swedish forces in Pomerania, but in vain.—Some subsidies were granted in April, but no troops sailed from England till July, when they consisted only of 8000 men, who were sent to the Island of Rugen." To the earnest request for an auxiliary force, Lord Howick replied on March 10— "Doubtless the spring is the most favourable period for military operations, but at the present juncture the allies must not look for any considerable land force from Great Britain." This was after the battle of Eylau was known by the cabinet of London.—See *Annual Register*, 1807, 23, and LUCCHESINI, ii. 295—296.

Universal
consterna-
tion at Pa-
ris on the
news being
received of
Eylau.

In proportion to the sanguine hopes which this bloody contest excited in Germany and England, was the gloom and depression which it diffused through all ranks in France. The Parisians were engaged in a vortex of unusual gaiety; balls, theatres, and parties succeeded one another in endless succession, when the news of the battle of Eylau fell at once on their festivity like a thunderbolt. They had learned to distrust the bulletins; they saw clearly that Augereau's divergence had been occasioned by something more than the snow-storm. The funds rapidly fell, and private letters soon circulated and were eagerly sought after, which rendered a true and even exaggerated account of the calamity. Hardly a family in Paris but had to mourn the loss of some near relation: the multitude of mourners cast a gloom over the streets, the general consternation suspended all the amusements of the capital. The most exaggerated reports were spread, and found a ready entrance in the excited population; one day it was generally credited that Napoléon had fallen back behind the Vistula; the next that a dreadful engagement had taken place, in which he himself with half his army had fallen. So far did the universal consternation proceed, that the members of the government began to look out for their own interests in the approaching shipwreck; and even the Imperial Family itself was divided into factions, Joséphine openly supporting the pretensions of her son, Eugène, to succeed to the throne, and the Princess Caroline employing all the influence of her charms to secure Junot, governor of Paris, in the interest of her husband Murat (1).

Napoléon
demands a
third con-
scription
from the
14th Octo-
ber.

The general gloom was sensibly increased when the message of Napoléon, dated March 26, to the Conservative Senate, announced that a fresh conscription was to be raised of eighty thousand men, in March, 1807, for September, 1808. This was the *third* levy which had been called for since the Prussian war began; the first when the contest commenced, the second during the triumph and exultation which followed the victory of Jena, the third amidst the gloom and despondency which succeeded the carnage of Eylau. No words can do justice to the consternation which this third requisition excited amongst all classes, especially those whose children were likely to be reached by the destructive scourge. In vain the bulletins announced that victories were gained with hardly any loss. The terrific demand of three different conscriptions, amounting to no less than two hundred and forty thousand men in seven months, too clearly demonstrated the fearful chasms which sickness and the sword of the enemy had made in their ranks. The number of young men who annually attained the age of eighteen in France, which was the period selected for the conscription, was about two hundred thousand. Thus, in half-a-year, more than a whole annual generation had been required for a service which experience had now proved to be almost certain destruction. So great was the general apprehension, that the government did not venture to promulgate the order, until, by emissaries and articles in the public journals, the public mind had been in some degree prepared for the shock; and when it was announced, Régnard de Saint-Jean-d'Angely, the orator intrusted with the task, shed tears, and even the obsequious Senate could not express their acquiescence by any of the acclamations with which they usually received the imperial mandates. So powerful was the public feeling, so visible and universal the expression of terror in the capital, that it was found necessary to assuage the general grief by a clause, declaring that the new levy was at first to be merely organized as an army of

(1) Sav. iii, 42, 43. D'Abr. ix, 356, 364,

reserve for the defence of the frontier, under veteran generals, members of the Conservative Senate. These promises, however, proved entirely elusory. The victory of Friedland saved the new conscripts from the slaughter of the Russian bayonets, only to reserve them for the Caudine Forks, or the murder of the Guerrillas in the fields of Spain (1).

Meanwhile, the prodigious activity of the Emperor was employed, during the cessation of hostilities in Poland, in the most active measures to repair his losses, organize the new levies, wring the sinews of war out of the conquered provinces, and hasten forward the conscripts as fast as they joined their depots on all the roads leading to the theatre of war. All the highways converging from France and Italy to the Vistula, were covered with troops, artillery, ammunition, and stores of all sorts for the use of the army. Extensive purchases of horses in Holstein, Flanders, and Saxony, provided for the remounting of the cavalry and artillery-drivers; while enormous requisitions every where in Germany (2), furnished the means of subsistence to the unwieldy multitude who were now assembled on the shores of the Vistula. Nay, so far did the provident care of the Emperor go, and so strongly did he feel the imminent danger of his present situation, that, while his proclamations breathed only the language of confidence, and spoke of carrying the French standards across the Niemen, he was in fact making the most extensive preparations for a defensive warfare, and anticipating a struggle for life or death on the banks of the Rhine. All the fortresses on that river, and on the Flemish frontier, were armed, and put in a posture of defence, and the new levy directed to be placed in five camps, to cover the most unprotected points of the territory of the empire; while the whole veterans in the interior were called out and organized into battalions with the coast guard, to protect the coasts of Flanders and the Channel, and overawe the discontented in Brittany and La Vendée. "It is necessary," said he, "that, at the sight of the triple barrier of camps which surrounds our territory, as at the aspect of the triple line of fortresses which covers our frontier, the enemy should be undeceived in their extravagant expectations, and see the necessity of returning, from the impossibility of success, to sentiments of moderation (5)."

Neither Napoléon nor his enemies were mistaken in the estimate which they formed of the perilous nature of the crisis which succeeded the battle of Eylau; nothing can be more certain than that a second dubious encounter on the Vistula would have been immediately followed by a disastrous retreat beyond the Rhine. Metternich afterwards said to the ministers of the French Emperor, "we can afford to lose many battles, but a single defeat will destroy your master; and such, in

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 167, 169. Bign. vi. 239.

(2) The requisitions from the city of Hamburg and the Hanse Towns will give an idea of the almost incredible extent to which these exactions were carried by Napoléon at this time: and of the blind violence with which he pursued the English commerce at the very time that it had become, from his own acts, indispensable for the equipment of his own troops. By an imperial decree, in March 1807, Hamburg was ordered to furnish.

200,000 pairs of shoes;
50,000 great-coats;
16,000 coats;
37,000 waistcoats.

M. Bourrienne, the resident at Hamburg, who was charged with the execution of this order, had

no alternative but to contract with *English houses* for these enormous supplies, which all the industry of the north of Germany could not furnish within the prescribed time; and as the same necessity was felt universally, the result was, that when the Grand Army took the field in June, it was almost all equipped in the cloth of Leeds and Halifax, and that too at a time when the penalty of death was affixed to the importation of English manufactures of any sort. A full enumeration of all the contributions levied on Germany during the war of 1807 will be given in a succeeding chapter, drawn from official sources, the magnitude of which almost exceeds belief.—See BOURRIENNE, vii. 293, 294.

(3) Bign. vi. 238, 239, Ann. Reg. 1807, 3.

truth, was the situation of France during the whole reign of Napoléon. It is the precarious tenure by which power is held by all those who rest for their support upon the privilege of opinion or popular passion, whether democratic or military, which is the secret cause of their ultimate fall. Constant success, fresh victories, an unbroken series of triumphs, is indispensable to the existence of such an authority; it has no middle ground to retire to, no durable interests to rouse for its support; it has periled all upon a single throw; the alternative is always universal empire or total ruin. This was not the case in a greater degree with Napoléon than any other conqueror in similar circumstances; it obtained equally with Cæsar, Alexander, and Tamerlane; it is to be seen in the British empire in India; it is the invariable attendant of power in all ages, founded on the triumphs of passion over the durable and persevering exertions of reason and interest. It is a constant sense of this truth which is the true key to the character of Napoléon, which explains alike what the world erroneously called his insatiable ambition and his obstinate retention of the vantage ground which he had gained, which was the secret reason of his advance to the Kremlin, and of his otherwise inexplicable stay at Moscow and Dresden. He knew that, throughout his whole career, he could not retain but by constantly advancing, and that the first step in retreat was the commencement of ruin.

Ruinous
effect of the
surrender of
the Prussian
fortresses.

The Polish winter campaign demonstrates, in the most striking manner, the ruinous effects to the common cause, and in an especial manner the interests of their own monarchy, which resulted from the disgraceful capitulations of the Prussian fortresses in the preceding autumn. When the balance quivered at Eylau, the arrival of Lestocq would have given the Russians a decisive victory, had it not been for the great successes of Davoust on the left and the tardy appearance of Ney on the right; yet, if the governors of the Prussian fortresses on the Elbe and the Oder had done their duty, these two corps would have been engaged far in the rear, Ney around the walls of Magdeburg, Davoust before Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau. Saragossa, with no defence but an old wall and the heroism of its inhabitants, held out after fifty days of open trenches; Tarragona fell after as many. If the French marshals had, in like manner, been detained two months, or even six weeks before each of the great fortresses of Prussia, time would have been gained to organize the resources of the eastern provinces of the monarchy, and Russia would have gained a decisive victory at Eylau, or driven Napoléon to a disastrous retreat from the Vistula—a striking proof of the danger of military men mingling political with warlike considerations, or adopting any other line when charged with the interests of their country, than the simple course of military duty.

Observa-
tions on the
military
movements
of both par-
ties.

Benningsen's assembling of his army in silence behind the dark screen of the Johannesberg forest; the hardihood and resolution of his winter march across Poland, and his bold stroke at the left wing of the French army when reposing in its cantonments, were entitled to the very highest praise, and if executed with more vigour at the moment of attack, would have led to the most important results; his subsequent retreat in presence of the grand army, without any serious loss, and the desperate stand he made at Eylau, as well as the skill with which the attacks of Napoléon were baffled on that memorable field, deservedly place him in a very high rank among the commanders of that age of glory. Napoléon's advance to Pultusk and Golymin, and subsequently his march from Warsaw towards Königsberg, in the depth of winter, were distinguished by all his

usual skill in combination and vigour in execution ; but the results were very different from what had attended the turning of the Austrian and Prussian armies at Ulm and Jena—columns were here cut off, communications threatened, corps planted in the rear ; but no serious disasters followed ; the Russians fronted boldly and fought desperately on every side, and from the hazardous game the assailant suffered nearly as much as the retiring party ; a striking proof of what so many other events during the war conspired to demonstrate, that a certain degree of native resolution will often succeed in foiling the greatest military genius, and that it was as much to the want of that essential quality in his opponents, as his own talents, that the previous triumphs of Napoléon had been owing.

CHAPTER XLV.

DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN MEASURES OF MR. FOX'S ADMINISTRATION.

FEBRUARY 1806—MARCH 1807.

ARGUMENT.

Important Civil Changes which originated during the War—Effects of the Accession of the Whigs to Power—Their Plan for a new system for the Recruiting of the Army—Great Changes introduced in this particular—Argument in support of it by Mr. Windham—Reply of the former Ministers on the Subject—The Bill passes—Reflections on this Subject—Error of the Ministerial measure as far as regards the Volunteers—Temporary Service now in a great degree abandoned—Abolition of the Slave Trade—Argument against the Change by the West India Planters—Argument of Mr. Wilberforce and others for the Abolition—The Abolition is carried—Deplorable effects of the Change hitherto on the Negro race—but they are not chargeable on its authors, but on subsequent alterations—Lord Henry Petty's plan of Finance—Argument in favour of it—Argument against it by Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Perceval—Counter Plan proposed by them—Reflections on this Subject—Prejudicial Effect in the end of these discussions—General Character of the Whig measures at this period—Their combined humanity and wisdom—Foreign Transactions—First Expedition to South America—Capture of Monte-Video—A Second Expedition against Buenos-Ayres is resolved on—Its Failure—Court-martial on General Whitelocke, the Commander, who is cashiered—Capture of Curaçoa, and Establishment of the Republic of Hayti—State of Affairs in Turkey—Dismissal of the Waywodes of Walachia and Moldavia by Sultan Selim—Violent Remonstrances of Russia and England, which produce the Repeal of the Measure—Meanwhile the Russian armies invade the principalities—and War is declared—Rapid progress of their Troops in these Provinces—They require the aid of a Naval attack by England on Constantinople, which is agreed to—Description of the Dardanelles—Ultimatum of Great Britain, and declaration of War by Turkey—Sir John Duckworth passes the Dardanelles—The Divan resolve on submission, but are roused to exertion by General Sebastiani—The Turks negotiate to gain time and complete their preparations—The English renounce the enterprise, and with difficulty repass the Dardanelles—Blockade of those Straits, and naval action off Tenedos—Descent by the British on the coast of Egypt—which is Defeated—Great Discontents at these repeated disasters throughout Great Britain—Bill for introducing the Catholics into the army and navy brought in by Lord Howick—Argument in favour of it by Lord Howick—Argument against it by Mr. Perceval—Change of Ministry—Cause which led to it—Composition of the New Cabinet—Arguments in Parliament against the King's conduct—and in support of it by Mr. Perceval and Mr. Canning—Dissolution of Parliament—General Election, and Great Majority in favour of the New Ministry—Character of the Whig Ministry, and effects of their fall—Reflections on their Foreign Measures—Violent Irritation arising from them in Russia—Repeated and ineffectual applications which Alexander had made for aid from England during the Polish War—The Dardanelles Expedition is an exception to the general inexpediency of their foreign policy—The defeats of England during their Administration were ultimately beneficial.

Important civil changes which originated during the war.

If history were composed merely of the narrative of wars and campaigns, it would, how interesting soever to the lovers of adventure, or important to those intrusted with the national defence, be justly subject to the reproach of being occupied only with the passions and calamities of mankind. But even in the periods when military adventure appears to be most conspicuous, and battles and sieges seem to occupy exclusively the attention of the historian, great and important civil changes are going forward; and the activity of the human mind, aroused by the perils which prevail, and the forcible collision of interests and passions which is induced, is driven into new channels, and turned to the investigation of fresh objects of thought. It is the tendency of those periods of tranquillity, when

no serious concerns, whether of nations or individuals, are at stake, to induce a state of torpor and inactivity in the national mind : Mankind repose after their struggles and their dangers; the arts of peace, the social dispositions, the abstract sciences are cultivated; the violent passions, the warm enthusiasm, the enduring fortitude of former days, pass into the page of history, and excite the astonishment or provoke the ridicule of their pacific successors. Such a period is, of all others, the most conducive to general happiness; but it is far from being that in which the greatest and most original efforts of human thought are made. The age of the Antonines in ancient, the era of the Georges in modern times, were unquestionably those when the greatest sum of general happiness prevailed in the Roman and British empires; but we shall look in vain, in the authors or statesmen of either, for the original thought and vigorous expressions which characterized the stormy periods of Cæsar and Pompey, of Cromwell and Napoléon.

Effects of the accession of the Whigs to power. The accession of the Whig Ministry to the direction of affairs, was an event eminently calculated to afford full scope to the practical application, to the measures of the legislature, of those ideas of social improvement which the agitation and excitement of the preceding fifteen years had caused to take deep root among a large proportion of the thinking part of the people. The men who had now succeeded to the helm, embraced a considerable part of the aristocracy, much of the talent, and still more of the philanthropy of the state. For a long course of years they had been excluded from power; and during that time they had been led, both by principle and interest, to turn their attention to those projects of social amelioration which the French Revolution had rendered generally prevalent among the democratic classes, and which were in an eminent degree calculated to win the affections of the popular party throughout the kingdom. The period, therefore, when their leaders, by their installation in power, obtained the means of carrying their projected changes into effect, is of importance, not merely as evincing the character and objects of a party justly celebrated in English history both for their talents and achievements, but as illustrating the modification which revolutionary principles receive by falling upon the highest class of persons, long trained to the habits and speculations of a free country.

Their plan for a new system for the recruiting of the army. The composition of the army was the first matter which underwent a thorough discussion, and was subjected to a different system, in consequence of the accession of the new administration. Notwithstanding the uniform opposition which the Whigs had offered to the war, and the censures which they had in general bestowed upon all Mr. Pitt's measures for increasing the naval and military establishments of the country, it had now become painfully evident, even to themselves, that the nation was involved in a contest, which might be of very long duration, with a gigantic foe, and that the whole resources of the country might be speedily required to combat for the national existence with the veteran legions of Napoléon on the shores of Britain. The means of recruiting which can ever exist in a free country, are altogether unequal to those which are at the command of despotism, whether monarchical or democratic, unless in those rare periods of public excitement when the intensity of patriotic feeling supplies the want of powers of compulsion on the part of the executive; and accordingly, throughout the whole war, great difficulty had been experienced by the British government in providing a proper supply of soldiers for the regular army. The only method pursued was voluntary enlistment—the jealousy of a free constitution not permitting a conscription, except for the

militia, which could not legally be sent out of the kingdom—and the success of the attempt to extend this system to the raising of troops of the line, by balloting for fifty thousand men to compose the army of reserve, in 1805, had not been such as to hold out any inducements for a repetition of the attempt. Enlistment for life was the system universally pursued, it being thought that in a country where the pay of the soldier was necessarily, from the expense of the establishment, less than the wages of ordinary workmen, to allow a power of retiring after a stated period of service was over, might endanger the state, by thinning the ranks of the army at the most critical periods. To this point the attention of former administrations had frequently been directed, and a recent change had been made by Mr. Pitt, which had considerably increased the annual supply of recruits by enlistment; but the new ministry introduced at once a total change of system, by the introduction of enlistments for a limited period of service (1).

Great change in the composition of the army. Arguments in support of it by Mr. Windham.

(1) It was argued in Parliament by the supporters of this change, and especially Mr. Windham—"The fate of nations at all times, when contending with one another, has been determined chiefly by the composition of their armies. The times are past, if they ever existed, when one country contended against another by the general strength of its population, when the strength of the army was the mere amount of the physical force and courage of the individuals who composed it. Armies are now the champions on either side to which the countries engaged commit their quarrel; and when the champion falls, the cause is lost. The notion of a levy *en masse* or voluntary force, therefore, would seem to be one to which it would be wholly unsafe to trust. In how many instances has it ever happened, that when the army was defeated the contest has been restored by a contest of the people at large? The people in mass are like metal in the ore; and as all the iron that ever came from a Swedish mine would never hew a block or divide a plank till it was wrought and fashioned into the shape of a hatchet or a saw, so the strength of a people can never perhaps be made capable of producing much effect in war, till it is extracted partially, and moulded into that factitious and highly polished instrument called an army. What are the two events which more than any other two have decided the fate of the present world? The battles of Marengo and Austerlitz. Yet what were the numbers there employed, the space occupied, or the lives lost, compared to the states and kingdoms whose fate was then decided? Yet such was the fact; millions hung upon thousands; the battles were lost, and Europe submitted to the conqueror. It was not because there did not exist in those countries a brave and warlike people, animated by the strongest feelings of devotion to their sovereign, and abhorring the idea of a foreign yoke. All these were there; twenty-five millions of men, burning with patriotic ardour, were around the Emperor; but the regular armies were defeated, and submission was a matter of necessity.

"Assuming, then, the importance of regular armies, which no one denies, but every one seems disposed to forget, the question is, how are they to be obtained? above all, how are we to insure to this country, what unquestionably it has never had, a never failing and adequate supply of regular soldiers? The nature of things here yields us but the option of two things, choice or force. In the continental monarchies recourse is usually had to the latter of these modes, and undoubtedly, wherever the power of government is such that it has nothing to do but send its officers forth to seize the peasantry, and force them to become soldiers, there can be

no process so easy, effectual, and certain. But every one must be conscious that this is a mode of proceeding impracticable, except in extreme emergencies, in this country; not that the power is wanting in government of ordering such a levy, but that the measures of force we can employ are so abhorrent to public feeling, so restricted and confined by legal forms, that their effect is almost reduced to nothing. Even if it could be enforced, the real character of such a compulsory service is only that of a tax, and of the worst of all taxes, a tax by lot. We hear every day that half measures will no longer do, that something effectual must be done; but if from these generalities you descend to particulars, and propose to renew the act for the army of reserve, the feeling is immediately changed, and all declare they are decidedly against any measure of the sort. It is impossible to say to what the exigencies and necessities of the times may drive us; but unless a more urgent necessity is generally felt than exists at this moment, measures so oppressive in their immediate effects, so injurious in their ultimate results, should not be resorted to till it is proved by experience that all others have failed.

"Voluntary enlistment, therefore, is the only resource which remains to us; and yet the experience of thirteen years' warfare has now sufficiently demonstrated, that from this source, in the present state and habits of our population, it is in vain to expect a sufficient supply of soldiers. If, however, you cannot change the habits or occupations of your people, what remains to be done but to increase the inducements to enter the army? Without this, our means of recruiting must be little better than deception and artifice. We are in the state of men selling wares inferior in value to the price they ask for them; and, accordingly, none but the ignorant and thoughtless will ever be tempted to become buyers. To such a height has this arisen, that of late years our only resource has been recruiting boys; men grown up, even with all the grossness, ignorance, and improvidence incident to the lower orders, are too wary to accept our offers; we must add to the thoughtlessness arising from situation the weakness and improvidence of youth. The practice of giving bounties is decisive proof of this; whatever is bestowed in that way, shows that the service does not stand upon its true footing. Men require no temptation to engage in a profession which has sufficient inducements of its own. Never can the system of supplying the army be considered as resting upon its proper basis, till the necessity of bounties shall have ceased, and the calling of a soldier shall be brought to the level with other trades and professions, for entering into which no man receives a premium, but where, on the contrary, a premium is frequently paid for permission to enter.

The bill
passes.

The bill met with a most strenuous opposition, although the early divisions which took place upon it evinced a clear preponderance in favour of Ministers (1); but it at length passed both Houses by a decided

"The great change by which this might, at first sight, appear to be effected, is by raising the pay. But independently of the financial embarrassments which any considerable alteration in that respect would produce, there is an invincible objection to such a change in the licentious habits, inconsistent with military discipline, which an undue command of money would generate among the soldiers. Provision in sickness and old age; pensions for the wounded; honorary distinctions suited to the rank, situation, and condition of the party, are much safer recommendations; but, above all, a change in the service of enlistment from life to a limited period, is the great alteration to which we must look for elevating the attractions of the army. This is the system of service in all the states of Europe, except our own, and it is the condition of entering that large and efficient part of our own forces, now 100,000 strong, which is composed of the regular militia. That this system will have the effect of inducing men to enter, is so clear, so certain, so totally incontrovertible, that it is unnecessary to urge it. There is no man who would not prefer having an option to having none. Our immense armies in India are all raised, and that, too, without the slightest difficulty, for limited service. A system of rewards for the regular and faithful soldier should also be established; and that severity of discipline which is at present so much an object of terror to all persons of regular habits, should be materially softened; not that it will, in all probability, ever be possible to dispense entirely with corporal punishment in the army, for there are some turbulent spirits who can only be repressed by the fear of it, but the discipline may be rendered infinitely less rigorous. By this means a better description of men will be induced to enter the army; and the better men you get, the less necessity will there be for severe punishment. By these changes, also, the temptation to desertions will be greatly diminished; the great and alarming frequency of which, of late years, has been mainly owing to high bounties and bad regulations; and in legislating for this matter, it is material to invest courts-martial with a discretionary power to modify the penalty of desertion most materially, or take it away altogether, if it has been committed only in a moment of intoxication, or from the influence of bad example, or the soldier has made amends by returning to his colours.

"It is a mistake to argue that the benefits I have proposed to introduce, being for the most part prospective, and to be reaped only at the end of seven or fourteen years, will not influence the inconsiderate description of men who form the great bulk of our common soldiers. That may be true as it relates to the description of men who, under the combined influence of bounties and intoxication on the one hand, and service for life and flogging on the other, almost exclusively enter our service. But the great benefit which may fairly be expected to result from a measure of the sort now proposed is, that it will introduce a new and better description of persons into the army, not altogether so thoughtless or inconsiderate, but who are attracted by the advantages which the military service holds out. Such considerations may frequently, indeed, have little weight with the young man himself, but will they prove equally unavailing with his relations, arrived at a more advanced period of life, and familiar, from experience, with the difficulty of getting on in

every profession? What attracts young men of family into the East India Company's service, notwithstanding all the disadvantages of a lifetime spent in exile, and a climate so deadly, that not one in ten ever survives it? Not present advantages, for the pay, for the first ten years, barely equals the young man's expenses. It is ultimate benefits; the spectacle of nabobs frequently returning with fortunes; the certainty that all who survive will become entitled, after a specified period of service, to pensions considerable, with reference to the rank of life to which they belong. Such considerations may not be so decisive with the lower orders as the higher, but there is no rank to whom the sight of the actual enjoyment of the advantages of a particular profession will not speedily prove an attraction.

"To effect these objects, I propose that the term of military service should be divided into three periods, viz for 7, 14, and 21 years for the infantry, but for 10, 6, and 5 for the artillery and cavalry, in consideration of the additional time requisite to render men efficient in those branches of service. At the end of each of those periods, the soldier is to have right in his discharge. If discharged at the close of the first, he is to have right to exercise his trade or calling in any town of the kingdom; at the end of the second, besides that advantage, to a pension for life; at the end of the third, to the full allowance of Chelsea, which should be raised to 9d. and in some cases 1s. a-day. If wounded or disabled in the service, to receive the same pension as if he had served out his full time. Desertion to be punished, in the first instance, by the loss of so many years' service; in very aggravated cases only by corporal infliction.

"Great exaggeration appears to have prevailed as to the benefits to be derived from the volunteer system. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that such a force can be brought to such a state of efficiency as to be able to cope with regular forces. Essential service may be derived from such a force, but not in the line to which they have at present been directed. With a view to bring them back to their proper sphere, as they were originally constituted in 1798, it would be advisable to reduce their allowances and relax their discipline. Those corps only which are in a rank of life to equip themselves, and are willing to serve without pay, should be retained; the remainder of the population should be loosely trained, under regular officers, to act as irregular troops. It is not by vainly imitating the dress, air, and movements of regular troops, that a voluntary force can ever be brought to render effectual service. These are my fixed ideas; but as I find a volunteer force already existing, it would not be politic at once to reduce it. All I propose, in the mean time, is to reduce the period of drilling from 85 days to 26, and make other reductions which will save the nation £857,000 a-year; all future volunteers to receive their pay only, and the trained bands to receive a shilling a-day for 14 days a-year, but not to be dressed as soldiers, and not drilled or exercised as such. Rank should be taken from the volunteer officers; their holding it is monstrous injustice to the regular army." [Parl. Deb. vi. 652, 690. Ann. Reg. 1806, 48, 50.]

Reply of the former ministers on the subject. To these admirable arguments it was answered by Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning—"At no period of our history has the science, uniformity,

(1) The division which decided the principle of the bill took place on March 14, 1806, when the

numbers were—Ayes, 285; Noes, 119; Majority, 116.—*Ann. Reg.* 1806, p. 54.

majority, the numbers in the Peers being 97 to 40, giving a majority to Ministers of 57. The clauses regarding the volunteer force, however, were abandoned or modified in the ultimate stages of the discussion, the effect of the

and discipline of the army been comparable to what it is at this moment; and for these immense benefits, the profession at large are aware we are more indebted to the improvements of the present Commander-in-chief (the Duke of York), than of any other individual in existence. Under his able administration, the army is considerably superior in number to what it ever was at any former period (*). The recruiting, as it now exists, is steadily producing sixteen thousand soldiers a-year; and when the act for its future regulation is generally enforced, which is not yet the case, this number may be expected to be greatly increased. Is this a crisis to break up a system producing, and likely to produce, such results? The average tear and wear of the army is about fifteen thousand a-year; so that the present system is not only adequate to the maintenance of its numbers, but likely to lead to its increase. The proposed alteration on the term of service in the army, is one of the most momentous that Parliament can be called on to discuss; and for this above all other reasons, that the change once introduced is irreparable: be it good or be it bad in its results, it cannot be departed from; for when the soldiers have once tasted the sweets of limited, they will never submit to the restraint of unlimited service. Surely, on so vital a subject, and where a false step once taken is irretrievable, it is expedient to proceed with caution, and make the experiment on a small scale before we organize all our defenders on the new system.

"The system of enlisting for a limited period is no novelty; its application on a great and universal scale alone is so. For the last three years, our endeavours have been directed, while a superior encouragement was held out to persons entering for general service, to obtain at the same time the utmost possible number of men for limited service in the army—both in the army of reserve, and latterly under the additional force act. If, then, we have failed in obtaining an adequate supply of men even, under a limited scale, both in time and space, how can we expect to obtain that advantage by taking away one of these limitations? If, indeed, we could not, under the present system, obtain an adequate force liable to be detached abroad, there might be a necessity for some change in our system; but when we have one hundred and sixty-five thousand liable to be sent abroad, and the only check upon so employing them is the necessity of not weakening ourselves too much at home, why should we preclude ourselves from raising, by the present method, such a description of force as experience has proved, in this country at least, is most easily obtained? The expiry of the soldiers' term of service must, independent of any casualties, produce a large chasm in the army; and what security have we, that if the whole or the greater part of the army is raised in that way, a great, it may be a fatal, breach may not at some future period occur in our ranks at the very time when their service is most required? What the inconvenience of the soldiers being entitled to their discharge at the end of each period during a war is likely to prove upon experience, may be judged of by recollecting how embarrassing this system, some years back, was found to be in the militia, notwithstanding the great comparative facility of replacing men when serving at home—an embarrassment so great, that

it led, as a matter of necessity, to the extension of the service in that branch of our military system. What reason is there to suppose that the soldiers in the regular army will not be as prone as their brethren in the militia to take advantage of the option of a discharge when their title to demand it arrives? And if so, and this heavy periodical drain be added to the existing casualties of the troops, what chance have we of keeping up a force which even now wants twenty-five thousand men to complete its ranks?

"It is in vain to refer to foreign states as affording precedents in point; their situation is totally different from ours. In Russia unlimited service prevails, and the same was the case in Austria during the best days of the monarchy. In 1797 a similar regulation to the one under discussion was passed prospectively for the future, to take effect at the expiration of a certain number of years, but it has not yet, I believe, been acted upon; and if it has, the disasters of Ulm and Hohenlinden afford but little reason to recommend its adoption. Napoleon's soldiers are all raised by the conscription for unlimited service; and although, in the old French monarchy, troops in sufficient numbers were certainly obtained by voluntary enlistment for limited periods, yet the period of service was more extended than that now proposed; and the circumstances of that country, abounding in men, with few colonies to protect, and still fewer manufactures to draw off its superfluous hands, and a strong military spirit in all classes, can afford no precedent for this country, where, employment, from the prevalence of manufactures, is so much more frequent—whose population is by nearly a half less—which is burdened with a vast colonial empire, all parts of which require defence—and where the natural bent of the people is rather to the sea than the land service. Nor is the reference to our East India possessions more fortunate; for the enlistment for a limited period prevailed in the Company's European regiments for a number of years, yet their battalions raised in this way were always weak in numbers and inefficient, and were all reduced on that very account during Lord Cornwallis's first government of India. All the prepossessions of Mr. Pitt were in favour of limited service—his opinions on this subject were repeatedly stated to the house. The opinions of a great variety of military men were taken on the subject; but these opinions were so much divided, that he arrived at the conclusion that the inconveniences and risks with which the change would be attended more than counterbalanced its probable advantages.

"The proposed changes on the volunteer force appear to be still more objectionable. Admitting that it is desirable to diminish the great expense of that part of our establishment; allowing that, now that the corps have attained a considerable degree of efficiency, it may be advisable to diminish considerably the number of days in which they are to serve at the public expense, is that any reason for substituting a tumultuary array, without the dress, discipline, or habits of soldiers, for a body of men qualified not only to act together, but capable, if drafted into the militia or the line, of at once acting with regular soldiers? Will the volunteer corps exist for any length of time under so marked a system of discouragement as it is proposed to

(*) Regulars and Militia, 1st January, 1802,
— " — 1st January, 1804, .
— " — 1st March, 1806, .

242,440
231,005
267,554

bill as to them being limited to a proper restriction of the period of permanent duty. But the great principle of enlisting for a limited service, was by its passing introduced into the British army, and has never since been totally abandoned; and, considering the great achievements which it subsequently wrought, and the vast consumption of life which the new system adequately supplied, its introduction is to be regarded as a memorable era in the history of the war (1).

Reflections on the measure. If called upon to decide in favour of one or other of the able arguments urged on the opposite sides of this important question, it might, perhaps, be no easy matter to say on which the weight of authority and reason preponderated. But experience, the great resolver of political difficulties, has now settled the matter, and proved that Mr. Windham rightly appreciated the principles of human nature on this subject, and was warranted in his belief that, without any increase of pay, limited service, with additional encouragements in the way of retiring allowances and privileges, would provide a force perfectly adequate even to the most extensive military operations of Great Britain. From the official returns it appears that the rate of recruiting rose in a rapid and striking manner after the system of limited service was adopted, and before the expiration of a year from the time it was first put in force, had more than doubled the annual supply of soldiers for the army (2). Though variously modified, the same system has ever since prevailed with perfect success in every branch of the service, and to its influence, combined with the improved regulations for its discipline, pay, and retired allowances, great part of the glories of the Peninsular campaigns is to be ascribed. On examining the confident opinions expressed by many eminent and respectable military men on the impossibility of providing a supply of adequate force for the English army by such a method, it is difficult to avoid the inference, that implicit reliance is not always to be placed on the views of practical men in legislative improvements; that their tenacity to existing institu-

impose upon them, without pay, without rank, without public favour? And is this the moment, when the whole military force of the continent, with the exception of Russia, is in the hands of our enemies, to incur the hazard of substituting, 'or a voluntary disciplined, a motley array of undisciplined forces, and run the risk of exciting the dissatisfaction of the powerful hands who at the call of their sovereign have so nobly come forward in the public defence? [Parl. Deb. vi. 652, 706.]

"At the commencement of the present war we raised 80,000 men by the operation of the ballot. That system has its evils; but when it is indispensable in a given time to raise a large force for the public service, there is no alternative. In recognising this right, however, which flows necessarily from the acknowledged title of the sovereign power to call for the assistance, in times of public danger, of all its subjects, parliament has been careful to fence it round with all the safeguards which the exercise of a prerogative so liable to abuse will admit of: it is determined by lot; the person drawn has the option to provide a substitute; and this is the footing upon which the militia stands. A still further limitation exists where the call is made, not upon the individual, but the district; and the

district is allowed the option, instead of providing the man, to pay a fine; and this is the principle on which the additional force bill, at present in operation, which we are now called on to repeal, is founded. But the ballot for the militia is, by the proposed change, to cease on the termination of the war; it then ceases to be a militia, and becomes a part of the regular force raised by the Crown. The act proposed to be repealed is producing at the rate of 18,000 recruits a-year, besides the men raised by ballot for the militia. Proposing, as the Ministers now do, to abandon at once both these resources, are they prepared to show that the new measures will supply this great deficiency? Would it not be expedient first to try the experiment on a small scale, to be assured of its success, before we commit the fortunes of the state to the result of the experiment? It is an old military maxim, not to manœuvre in presence of an enemy; but the measures now in agitation do a great deal worse, for they not only change the composition of your force, but shake the loyalty and submission of the soldiers, in presence of the most formidable military power Europe has ever possessed." [Parl. Deb. vi. 967, 990.]

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 62.

(2) OLD SYSTEM.

	Recruits.
January 1, to July 1, 1805.	10,923
July 1, to January 1, 1806,	9,042
January 1, to July 1, 1806,	10,783
July 1, to January 1, 1807,	6,276

(New system in operation since January 1, 1807.)

NEW SYSTEM.

	Recruits.
January 1, to July 1, 1807,	11,412
July 1, to January 1, 1808,	7,734
Rate of recruiting from January 1, to	
April 1,	21,000
Ditto from April 1, to July 1,	24,000

—Ann. Reg. 1806, 40, 41.

tions is often as great as the proneness of theoretical innovators to perilous change; that little credit is to be given to the most eminent professional persons when they claim for the people of a particular country an exemption from the ordinary principles of human nature; and that true political wisdom is to be gathered, not by discarding the lessons of experience, but extending the basis on which they are founded, and drawing conclusions rather from a general deduction of the history of mankind, than the limited views, however respectably supported, of particular individuals.

Error of the
Ministerial
plan so far
as regards
the volun-
teers.

To these observations on Mr. Windham's military system, however, one exception must be made in regard to that part of his plan which related to the volunteers. There can be no doubt that in this particular he did not display the same knowledge of human nature which was elsewhere conspicuous. Admitting that the volunteers were very far indeed from being equal to the regular forces; that their cost was exceedingly burdensome, and that they could not be relied on as more than auxiliaries to the army; still in that capacity they were most valuable, and not only qualified to render some service by themselves, but as forming a reserve to replenish the ranks of the regular forces of incalculable importance. The campaigns of 1812 and 1815 demonstrate of what vast service such a force, progressively incorporated with the battalions of the regular army, comes to be when their ranks are thinned in real warfare, and how rapidly they acquire the discipline and efficiency of veteran troops: and in this view the tumultuary array of Mr. Windham, without the clothing, discipline, or organization of soldiers, could have been of little or no utility. Nor is it of less moment that the volunteer corps, by interesting vast multitudes in the occupations, feelings, and honour of soldiers, powerfully contribute to nourish and expand that military ardour in all ranks which is indispensable to great martial achievements. Veteran troops, indeed, may smile when they behold novices in the military art imitating the dress, manners, and habits of soldiers; but the experienced commander, versed in the regulating principles of human exertion, will not deem such aids to patriotic ardour of little importance, but willingly fan the harmless vanity which makes the young aspirant imagine that his corps has in a few weeks acquired the efficiency of regular forces. Imitation even of the uniform, air, and habits of soldiers is a powerful principle in transferring the military ardour to the breasts of civilians. Philopœmen judged wisely when he recommended his officers to be sedulously elegant in their dress, arms, and appointments. He was well acquainted with human nature who said, that to women and soldiers dress is a matter of no ordinary importance. Many nations have been saved from slavery by the passion for what an inexperienced observer would call mere foppery.

Temporary
service now
in a great
degree aban-
doned.

In later times the system of temporary service has been in some degree superseded in the British army, and the majority of recruits are now enlisted for life. And in weighing the comparative merit of these two opposite systems, it will probably be found that the plan of enlisting men for limited periods is the most advisable in nations in whom the military spirit runs high, or the advantages of the military service are such as to secure at all times an ample supply of young men for the army, and where it is of importance to train as large a portion as possible of the population to the skilful use of arms, in order to form a reserve for the regular force in periods of danger; and that enlistment for life is more applicable to those nations or situations where no national danger is apprehended, and it is the object of government to secure rather a permanent body of disciplined men, subject to no causes of decrease but the ordinary casualties of the service, for

the ordinary pacific duties, rather than spread far and wide through the nation the passion for glory or the use of arms. A provident administration will always have a system established, capable either of contraction or expansion, which embraces both methods of raising soldiers; and this, for nearly thirty years, has been the case with the British army.

Abolition of the slave trade. Important as the matter thus submitted to Parliament in its ultimate consequences undoubtedly was, when it is recollected what a great and glorious part the British army bore in the close of the struggle, it yet yielded in magnitude to the next great subject which the new Ministers brought forward for consideration. This was the ABOLITION OF THE SLAVE TRADE; a measure, which in its remote effects appears to affect the fortunes of half the human race. This great change was not finally completed till the following session of Parliament; but the preparatory steps were taken in this, and it belongs properly to the present period of English history, which treats of the measures of the Whig Administration.

Arguments against the change by the West India interest. It was urged by Mr. Hibbert and the advocates of the West India interest, both in and out of Parliament,—“That the British West India Islands were settled, and have ever been cultivated under the solemn faith of those charters and proclamations, and those acts of Parliament which have confirmed the West India Islands in the most perfect assurance that they should continue to receive supplies of negroes from Africa; that the cultivation of these colonies cannot be carried on but by means of slave labour; and the cultivation of their interior, which is indispensable to their security, cannot be promoted if the slave trade be abolished. If this bill shall pass into a law, the very worst effects may be anticipated from the change, not only to the colonies themselves, but the general interests of the empire. The commerce which the West Indies maintain, is the most important of the whole British dominions. It pays annually in duties to the public treasury upwards of L.3,000,000; employs more than 16,000 seamen; contributes one-third to the whole exports, and one-third to the imports; takes off L.6,000,000 a-year worth of domestic manufactures; and is pre-eminently distinguished above all others by this important feature, that it is all within ourselves, and not liable, like other foreign trade, to be turned to our disadvantage on a rupture with the power with whom it is conducted. This measure, however, if carried into effect, must in a few years diminish the property vested in the British West India Islands, and open the means of hastening the progress of rival colonies, to whom the advantages of a full supply of negroes will still remain open. It must forbid the supply of losses to the negro population, which originate in accident or diseases peculiar to the climate, and which the most humane and provident management is unable altogether to prevent; stop the completion of establishments already begun; and altogether prevent the extension of cultivation into the interior of the islands, without which they can never either attain a state of security or reach the degree of wealth and splendour of which they are susceptible.

“The most disastrous effects, both to individuals and the public, may be anticipated from the ultimate consequences of the measure under consideration, not to mention the confusion and ruin which it must occasion to families; the capital now sunk in cultivation which it must destroy; the calamities attendant on revolt and insurrection which it must occasion; the emigration it will induce in all who have the means of extricating themselves or their capital from so precarious a situation; the despair and apathy which it must spread through those who have not the means of escape; what incalculable

evils must it produce among the black population? The abolition of the slave trade is a question which it is at all times perilous to agitate, from the intimate connexion which it has in the minds of the negroes with the abolition of slavery itself, and the necessary effect which it must have in perpetuating the discussion of that subject in the mother country to the total destruction of all security in the planters, or repose in the minds of the slave population. From the moment that this bill passes, every white man in the West Indies is sleeping on the edge of a volcano, which may at any moment explode and shiver him to atoms. Throwing out of view altogether all considerations of interest, and viewing this merely as a question of humanity, it is impossible to contemplate without the utmost alarm the perils with which it is fraught. The existence of a black power in the neighbourhood of the most important island of the British West Indies, affords a memorable and dreadful lesson, recorded in characters of blood, of the issue of doctrines intimately, constantly, and inseparably connected with the abolition of the slave trade. It is impossible to contemplate that volcano without the deepest alarm, nor forget that its horrors were produced by well-meant but ill-judged philanthropy, similar to that which is the prime mover in the present question (1).

"It is a total mistake to suppose that the evils, enormous and deplorable as they are, of Central Africa, arise from the slave trade. These evils are the consequence of the cruel habits and barbarous manners of its inhabitants; they existed for thousands of years before the slave trade was heard of, and will continue for thousands of years after it is extinct. Civilize the interior of the vast continent—humanize their manners—abolish the savage practice of selling or putting to death captives made in war, and you indeed make a mighty step in extirpating the evils which we all lament. But as long as these savage customs prevail; as long as the torrid zone is inhabited by a thousand tribes all engaged in contests with each other, and with all of whom slavery to prisoners made in war is the only alternative for death, it is hopeless to expect that the stoppage even of the whole vent which the purchase of negroes by Europeans affords, would sensibly affect the general prevalence of the slave traffic. What are the 50,000 whom they annually transport across the atlantic, to the innumerable multitudes who are driven across the Sahara Desert, or descend to Egypt for the vast markets of the Mussulman world? But to suppose that the partial stoppage of it in the British dominions: that the prohibition to transport the fifteen thousand negroes who are annually brought to our shores could have a beneficial effect, is ridiculous. So far from producing such a result, its tendency will be diametrically the reverse: it will drive the slave trade from the superior to the inferior channel; from the great merchants of Liverpool, who have done so much—for their own interest perhaps, but still done so much—to diminish its horrors, to the Spaniards and Portuguese, who are as yet totally unskilled in its management, and treat the captives with the utmost barbarity: as our own colonies decline from the stoppage of this supply of labourers, those of the others nations who have not fettered themselves in the same way will augment; the cultivation of sugar for the European market will ultimately pass into other hands, and we shall in the end find that we have cut off the right arm of our commerce and naval strength, only to augment the extent and increase the horrors of the slave trade throughout the world (2)."

On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Wilberforce, Lord Howick, and Lord Grenville; "A higher principle than considerations of mere expedience, the

(1) Parl. Deb. vi. 831.

(2) Parl. Deb. vi. 979, 993.

Arguments
of Mr. Wil-
berforce and
others for
the aboli-
tion.

dictates of justice, require that this infamous traffic should be abolished. Were it merely a question of humanity, we might consider how far we should carry our interference; were the interests of the British empire alone involved, it might possibly be a matter of expedience to stop a little short of total abolition. But in this instance, imperious justice calls upon us to abolish the slave trade. Is it to be endured that robbery is to be permitted on account of its profits? Justice is still the same; and you are called upon in this measure, not only to do justice to the oppressed and injured natives of Africa, but to your own planters; to interfere between them and their otherwise certain destruction, and, despite their fears, despite their passions, despite their prejudices, rescue them from impending ruin. This trade is the most criminal that any country can be engaged in : when it is recollected what guilt has been incurred in tearing the Africans, by thousands and tens of thousands, from their families, their friends, their social ties, their country, and dooming them to a life of slavery and misery : when it is considered also that the continuance of this atrocious traffic must inevitably terminate in the ruin of the planters engaged in it, surely no doubt can remain that its instant abolition is called for by every motive of justice and expedience.

“ Much is said of the impossibility of maintaining the supply of negroes in the West Indies, if the slave trade is abolished. Are we then to believe that the Divine precept, ‘ Increase and multiply,’ does not extend to those islands; that the fires of youth, adequate to the maintenance and growth of the human species in all other countries and ages of the world, are there alone, in the midst of plenty, unequal to their destined end? But the fact is adverse to this monstrous supposition; and it is now distinctly proved that the slave colonies are perfectly adequate to maintain their own numbers (1). The excess of deaths above births in Jamaica is now only 1-24th *per cent*; and when it is recollected that the registers of mortality include the deaths among the negroes who are newly arrived and set to work, which always amounts, between those who perish in the harbours and shortly after being set to work, to at least 10 per cent, it is evident that the numbers of the settled Africans are more than maintained by their own increase. Nor is the argument that the importation of negroes is requisite to cultivate the waste lands in the interior of the islands, better founded. If the numbers of the Africans increase, it is altogether incredible that their labours should not be adequate to clear the wastes of those diminutive islands. According to the most moderate computation, it would require the slave trade to be continued for two centuries to cultivate the whole interior of Jamaica and Trinidad; and can it be endured that so frightful a traffic as this, fraught as it must be with the tearing of above two millions of Africans from their families and country, should be endured for such a period, for an object which, in one-fourth of the time, might by the native increase of their numbers in those islands be attained (2)?

(1) Excess of deaths above births in Jamaica from	1698 to 1730.	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
—	1730 to 1755.	2 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
—	1755 to 1769.	1 $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent.
—	1769 to 1780.	3-5ths per cent.
—	1780 to 1800.	1-24th per cent.

—*Parl. Deb.* viii. 658.

(2) It is now completely demonstrated, by an experiment on the greatest scale, that the African race, even when in a state of slavery, is not only able to maintain its own numbers, but rapidly to increase them. In the slave States of America there are 2,200,000 negroes; and from 1790 to 1830, the whites have augmented in the proportion of 80 to 100; but the blacks in that of 112 to 100.—Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, ii. 345, 346, note.

“Let us then instantly abolish this infamous traffic; and we may then with confidence look forward to the period when the slaves, become in a great degree the natives of the islands, will feel the benefits of the protection afforded them; and they may gradually be prepared for that character, when the blessings of freedom may be securely extended to them. Throughout all history we shall find that slavery has been eradicated by means of the captives being first transformed into predial labourers, attached to the soil, and from that gradually ascending to real freedom. We look forward to the period when the negroes of the West India islands, become labourers rather than slaves, will feel an interest in the welfare and prosperity of the country which has extended to them these benefits, and when they may be securely called on to share largely in the defence of those islands, in which at present they are only a source of weakness. The grand, the decisive advantage which recommends the abolition of the slave trade is, that by closing that supply of foreign negroes to which the planters have hitherto been accustomed to trust for all their undertakings, we will compel them to promote the multiplication of the slaves on their own estates; and it is obvious that this cannot be done without improving their physical and moral condition. Thus, not only will the inhuman traffic itself be prevented, in so far at least as the inhabitants of this country are concerned, but a provision will be made for the progressive amelioration of the black population in the West Indies, and that, too, on the securest of all foundations, the interests and selfish desires of the masters in whose hands they are placed.

“It is in vain to argue that, according to the barbarous customs of Africa, captives made in war are put to death, and thus if the outlet of the slave trade is closed, the reproach to humanity arising from the sale of captives will be prevented from taking place. The most recent and intelligent travellers, on the contrary, have informed us, what every consideration on the subject *a priori* would lead us to expect that the existence of the slave trade is itself, and ever has been, the great bar to the civilisation of the interior of Africa, by the temptation held out to the chiefs on the coast to engage in the traffic of negroes, and the continual encouragement thus afforded to the princes in the interior to carry on constant wars, from the vast profit with which the sale of their captives is attended. It forms, in fact, with a great many of those robber chieftains, a chief branch of revenue. If we would promote, therefore, the great and truly Christian work of civilizing Central Africa, we must first commence with abolishing the slave trade; for as long as it continues, the selfishness and rapacity of the native chiefs will never cease to chain its unhappy inhabitants to a life of violence and rapacity in the powerful, of misery and degradation in the poor.

“The argument, that if we do not carry on the slave trade some other nations will, possibly with less commiseration for the sufferings of the captives, if admitted, would shake to their foundation every principle of public and private morality. At that rate every band of robbers might plead in their justification, that if they did not knock down and plunder travellers, other banditti might do the same, and possibly superadd murder to their other atrocities, and therefore the lucrative rapine should not be discontinued. This argument, however, bad as it is, has not even the merit of being founded on fact. If we abolish the slave trade, who is to take it up? The Americans have already preceded us in the race of humanity, and fixed a period in 1808, when the traffic is immediately to cease; and a bill is at present in progress through their legislature, to affix the penalty of death to a violation of this enactment. How are France and Spain to carry it on, when they have

hardly a ship on the ocean? Sweden never engaged in it. There remains only Portugal, and where is she to get capital to carry it on?

“The dangers, so powerfully drawn, as likely to result from this measure, are really to be apprehended, not from it, but from another with which it has no connexion, viz., the immediate emancipation of the negroes. This, it is said, flows necessarily from the step now about to be taken; if you do not follow it up in this manner, you stop short half way in your own principles; in fact, the ulterior measure, if the first be adopted, cannot be averted. It is to be hoped, indeed, that this great step will, in the end, lead to the abolition of slavery in all our colonies; but not in the way or with the dangers which are anticipated. On the contrary, it is here that another of the great benefits of the measure under consideration is to be found. By the effects of this measure it is to be hoped *slavery will gradually wear out without the intervention of any positive law*, in like manner as it did in a certain degree in the States of Greece and Rome, and some parts of the states of modern Europe, where slaves have been permitted to work out and purchase their own freedom; and as has been permitted with the happiest effects in the colonies of Spain and Portugal. In America, measures for the gradual emancipation of the negroes have been adopted, and nothing could conduce more powerfully to insubordination, than if, by the continuance of the slaves, similar steps were not to be introduced in the West India islands, and the slaves there were perpetually tantalized by the sight of the superior comforts of their brethren on the main land. The dangers apprehended *would indeed be real, if immediate emancipation were to be proposed*, for that would produce horrors similar to those which have happened in St.-Domingo; but nothing of that kind is in contemplation; on the contrary, it is expressly to exclude them, and induce that gradual emancipation which is called for, alike by justice to the planters and the interests of the slaves themselves, that the measure under discussion is proposed (1).”

The abolition is carried, June 11, 1806. The latter arguments, enforced with much eloquence, and supported by the great principles of Christian charity, prevailed with the legislature. By a series of enactments, passed in the course of the sessions of 1806, the slave trade was restrained within very narrow limits; Feb. 23, 1807. and at length, in the succeeding session, it was entirely abolished, and the penalty of transportation affixed to every British subject engaged in it; the numbers were, in the Commons, 285 to 46, majority 267; in the Peers, 100 to 56, majority 54—and thus was the stain of trafficking in human flesh for ever torn from the British name (2).

Deplorable effects of the change hitherto on the negro race. There can be no question that this great step was recommended by every consideration of justice and humanity; nevertheless its effects hitherto have been in the highest degree deplorable. Never was a more striking example than this subject has afforded in its later stages, of the important truth that mere purity of intention is not sufficient in legislative measures, and that unless human designs are carried into execution with the requisite degree of foresight and wisdom, they often become the sources of the most heart-rending and irremediable calamities. The prophecy of Mr. Hlibbert and the opponents of the abolition, that the

(1) Parl. Deb. viii. 652, 666, 947, 955.
Lord Grenville concluded his speech with these eloquent words—“I cannot conceive any consciousness more truly gratifying than must be enjoyed by that eminent person (Mr. Wilberforce), on finding a measure to which he has devoted the labour of his life carried into effect—a measure so

truly benevolent, so admirably conducive to the virtuous prosperity of his country, and the welfare of mankind—a measure which will diffuse happiness among millions now in existence, and for which his memory will be blessed by millions yet unborn.”—*Parl. Deb.* viii. 664.
(2) Parl. Deb. viii. 672, 995.

slave trade, instead of ceasing, would only change hands, and at length fall into the management of desperate wretches who would double its horrors, has been too fatally verified, and to an extent even greater than they anticipated. From the returns laid before Parliament, it appears that the slave trade is now *four times* as extensive as it was in 1789, when European philanthropy first interfered in St.-Domingo in favour of the African race, and twice as great as it was when the efforts of Mr. Wilberforce procured its abolition in the British dominions. Great and deplorable as were the sufferings of the captives in crossing the Atlantic, in the large and capacious Liverpool slave-ships, they are as nothing compared to those which have since, and are still endured by the negroes in the hands of the Spanish and Portuguese traders, where several hundred wretches are stowed between decks in a space not three feet high; and in addition to the anguish inseparable from a state of captivity, they are made to endure, for weeks together, the horrors of the blackhole of Calcutta. Nearly two hundred thousand captives, chained together in this frightful manner, now annually cross the Atlantic; and they are brought, not to the comparatively easy life of the British West India Islands, but to the desperate servitude of Cuba or Brazil; in the latter of which several hundred negroes are worked, like animals, in droves together, without a single female among them, and without any attempt to perpetuate their race (1), they are worn down by their cruel taskmasters to the grave by a lingering process, which on an average terminates their existence in seven years (2)!

But they are not chargeable on its authors, but subsequent changes.

This lamentable and heart-rending result of such persevering and enlightened benevolence, however, must not lead us to doubt the soundness as well as humanity of the principles which Mr. Wilberforce so eloquently advocated, or to imagine that the general rules of morality are inapplicable to this question, and that here alone in human affairs it is lawful to do evil that good may come of it. The observation, that it was our duty to clear our own hands of the iniquity, leaving it to Providence to eradicate the evil in others at the appointed time, was decisive of the justice of the measure; the evident necessity which it imposed on the planters of attending, for their own sakes, to the comfort of the negroes, and providing means for the multiplication of their numbers, conclusive as to its expedience. It is not the abolition of the slave trade, but the subsequent continuance of ruinous fiscal exactions, and at last the irretrievable step of unqualified emancipation, which have given this deplorable activity to the foreign slave trade. The increase in the foreign slave colonies for the last

(1) Walsh's Brazil, ii. 474, 485.

Enormous (2) The number of slaves annually present ext- imported into the slave countries of the world from Africa in 1789, was somewhat under 50,000, of which about 15,000 crossed in English vessels—now the number is at least 200,000. It appears from the Consular Returns to Parliament, that in 1829, 74,653 slaves were embarked for Brazil alone from the African coast, of whom 4579 died in the short passage of one month; and in the first half of 1830 the numbers were no less than 47,258, of whom 8 per cent died on the passage. At the same period 13,000 were annually imported into the Havannah, and at least an equal number into the other slave colonies, making in the year 1830 about 130,000. [Parl. Pap. 1830, B. 82, 89, 138.] But these numbers, great as they are, have now received a vast increase from the effects of the British Slave Emancipation Act, passed in 1833. In fifteen months, ending January 1835, there sailed from the single

port of Havannah 170 slave-ships, capable of containing, on an average, each at least 400 persons; the importation of slaves into Cuba is now above 55,000 a-year, while the numbers imported into Brazil, from the stimulus given to slave labour by the anticipated decline of produce in the British islands consequent on that measure, have increased in nearly the same proportion. Nor is it surprising that, in spite of all the efforts of the British government, and all the vigilance of the British cruisers, this infernal traffic should now advance at this accelerated pace; for such is the demand for slaves, occasioned by the continual decline in the cultivation of sugar in the British West India islands, under the combined influence of heavy taxation and the Emancipation Act, that the profit on a single cargo of slaves imported into the Havannah is 180 per cent, and the adventurers cannot be considered as losers if one vessel arrives safe out of three dispatched from the coast of Africa.—Parl. Pap. 1830, A. 115—116.

twenty years, at a time when the British West India Islands were comparatively stationary, has been so rapid, that it was evident some powerful and lasting causes have been at work to occasion the difference (1). These causes are to be found, in a great measure, in the heavy duties on British colonial produce, amounting at first to 50s., then to 27s., and latterly to 24s. on each hundredweight of sugar, from which the foreign growers were exempted in the supply of foreign markets. This enormous burden, which, on an average of prices since 1820, has been very nearly 75 per cent on that species of produce, has, notwithstanding all their efforts, for the most part, if not entirely, fallen on the producers (2).

Nor is this all—the precipitate and irreticvable step of emancipation, forced on the legislature by benevolent, but incautious and perhaps mistaken, feeling, has already occasioned so great a decline in the produce of the British West Indies, and excited such general expectations of a still greater and increasing deficiency, that the impulse thereby given to the foreign slave trade to fill up the gap has been unbounded, and, it is to be feared, almost irremediable (3).

Immense increase of produce in the slave colonies of late years. (1) Twelve years ago, the only exports of Puerto-Rico were cattle and coffee, and the only sugar she received was from importation. In 1833 she exported 33,750 tons—more than a sixth of the whole British consumption. The export of sugar from Cuba was on an average of 1814, 1815, and 1816, 51,000 tons; in 1833 it had risen to 120,000 tons. In 1814, 1815, and 1816, the average exports of sugar from Brazil was 26,250 tons; in 1833, though a bad year, the exports were 70,970 tons. The increase, since the Emancipation Act passed, has been still greater—but no official accounts of these years have yet been made public.—See *Parl. Report* “on the commercial state of the West Indies,” p. 286.

Comparatively stationary condition of the British Islands. On the other hand, the produce of the British West India Islands during the same period, has been comparatively stationary. The colonial produce exported from those islands to Great Britain in the year 1812, was 124,200 tons of sugar, and 6,290,000 gallons of rum; in 1830, 185,000; and in 1833, 205,000 tons of sugar, and 7,892,000 gallons of rum; the shipping in the former period was 180,000; in the latter, 263,338 tons. The total value of the produce of the islands in the former period was L.18,516,000; in the latter, including all the colonies gained by the peace of Paris in 1814, only L.22,496,000.—PERRER, 399; COLQUHOUN, 378—341; PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, 1—124, 126.

Enormous increase of injustice to which they have been exposed. (2) There is no opinion more erroneous than that commonly entertained, that the import duties on sugar, like other taxes on consumption fall on the purchaser. There is always, indeed, a struggle between the producer and consumer, as to who should bear the burden—but it is not always in the power of the former to throw it on the latter. In this instance the attempt has almost totally failed. It appears from the curious table of prices compiled by Mr. Colquhoun, that even during the high prices of the years from 1807 to 1812, the West India proprietors paid from a third to a half of the duties on sugar, without being able to lay it on the consumers; the average of what they paid for those years being L.1,115,251 per annum. The estimated revenue of these proprietors, during these years, was under L.4,000,000; so that at that period they paid 20 per cent on their incomes to government. In addition to this, it was proved by

the documents laid before the committee of the House of Commons in February 1831, that an annual burden of L.1,023,299 was laid on the British West India Islands, in consequence of the enhancement of the price of necessary articles to which they were exposed under the restrictive system. In this way, even under the high prices from 1807 to 1812, they were paying at least 50 per cent on their incomes in taxation; and as the price, since that time, of their produce, has fallen at least two-thirds, with a reduction of only a ninth (3s.) on the import duty, it may be safely concluded, that since 1820 the West India proprietors have paid, directly and indirectly, at least seventy-five per cent on their income, to government, and in the years when prices were low, at least a hundred per cent. Nothing more is required to explain the distressed condition of these colonies, even before the Emancipation Bill was passed, which at once, without any equivalent, confiscated at least 60 per cent on their remaining property. The value of slaves was estimated by Colquhoun in 1812, at L.55 a head, but in 1833, when the Act passed, it had risen to at least L.75 over head, notwithstanding the change in the value of money; and the compensation money (L.20,000,000 on 631,000 slaves) will not, after all deductions are made, yield L.25 a head, or more than 33 per cent to the proprietors. Few such instances of the destruction of property by fiscal and legislative enactments are to be found in the history of mankind.—See PERRER, 394, and 397; COLQUHOUN, 59, 325; and *Report on West India affairs*, Commons, 7th February 1831.

It is frequently said that the increase in the produce of these colonies since the peace, is a proof that their alleged distresses are either unfounded or exaggerated. This is a complete mistake; the planters had no other way to meet the enormous fiscal burdens laid upon them, since a diminution in the cost of production was out of the question, after the abolition of the slave trade, but by making the utmost exertions to augment its quantity, and thence the increase of colonial produce, which, by perpetuating the lowness of price, rendered it totally impossible for them to lay the enormous import duty, now 100 per cent, on the consumers. Like a man sunk in a bottomless bog, all the efforts they could make for their extrication tended only to land them deeper and more irreticvably in the mire.

(3) The following table shows the decline of colonial produce exported from Jamaica under the first year of the Emancipation Act.

It is in these measures that the real cause of the lamentable increase in the foreign slave trade is to be found; it is the multitude who forced on these measures, who have frustrated all the benevolent efforts of Mr. Wilberforce and Mr. Fox, and rendered the abolition of the slave trade in the British dominions, the remote and innocent cause of boundless misfortunes to the negro race. The British slaves, since the slave trade was abolished, had become fully equal to the wants of the colonies; their numbers, without any extraordinary addition, were on the increase; their condition was comfortable and prosperous beyond that of any peasantry in Europe; and large numbers were annually purchasing their freedom from the produce of their own industry. Here then was a *stationary* negro population, rapidly approaching the condition of the most opulent feudal serfs of Europe, and from which they might, in like manner, have been emancipated singly, as they acquired property, which all had the means of earning, without either risk to themselves, injury to their masters, or increase to the demand for foreign slave labour. But now all these admirable effects of the abolition of the slave trade have been completely frustrated, and the humane but deluded inhabitants of Great Britain are burdened with twenty millions, to ruin, in the end, their own planters, consign to barbarism their own negroes, cut off a principal branch of their naval strength, and double the slave trade in extent, and quadruple it in horrors, throughout the world. A more striking instance never was exhibited of the necessity of attending, in political changes, not only to benevolent intentions, but prudent conduct; and of the fatal effect of those institutions, which, by giving the inhabitants of a particular part of the empire an undue share in the general administration, or admitting the torrent of public feeling to sway directly the measures of government, too often destroy prosperity the most extensive, and occasion calamities the most unbounded (1).

SUGAR.			RUM.		COFFEE.	
Years.	Cwts.	Hogsheads.	Puncheons.	Gallons.	Casks.	Lbs.
1834	1,525,154	79,465	30,676	3,189,949	22,384	17,859,277
1835	1,319,023	68,087	27,038	2,660,687	13,495	10,489,292
Decrease,	206,131	11,378	3,638	529,262	8,889	7,369,985

Taking an average of these various sorts of produce, it is evident that, notwithstanding an uncommonly fine season, and the vigorous exertions of the stipendiary magistrates, the produce of the island has fallen off in one year nearly a fourth of its total amount! The Parliament of Jamaica, in their address to the governor of the island on August 10, 1835, observed, "There never was a finer season or more promising appearance of canes; but, nevertheless, the crop is greatly deficient, and many British ships have in consequence returned with half cargoes, some with none at all. Our decided opinion is, that each succeeding crop will progressively become worse. In a few cases the apprentices do work for wages; but the opposite disposition so immeasurably preponderates, that no confidence whatever can be placed on voluntary labour. Knowing, as we do, the prevailing reluctance of the negroes to work of any kind, the thefts, negligencies, and outrages of every sort which are becoming of frequent occurrence; seeing large portions of our neglected cane fields overrun with weeds, and a still larger

extent of our pasture lands returning to a state of nature; seeing, in fact, desolation already overspreading the very face of the land, it is impossible for us, without abandoning the evidence of our senses, to entertain favourable anticipations, or divest ourselves of the painful conviction, that the progressive and rapid deterioration of property will continue to keep pace with the apprenticeship, and that the termination thereof must, unless strong preventive measures are applied, complete the ruin of the colony." Making every allowance for the passions and exaggerations of a tropical climate, this statement here made is too strongly borne out by the decrease in the official returns, and example of corresponding measures in St. Domingo, to leave a doubt that they are, in the main at least, founded in truth.—See *Custom Return, Kingston, Jamaica, 22d August 1835*; and *Address of Assembly, August 10, 1835*.

(1) The British Ministry who, in 1834, passed the measure of Slave Emancipation are noways answerable for these consequences; on the contrary, they

An important change in the British system of finance was also made by the same administration, which, although not brought forward till the spring of 1807, may be fitly considered now, in order not to interrupt the narrative of the important military events which at that period occurred on the continent of Europe

The foundation of this plan, which was brought forward by Lord Henry Petty on the 29th January, 1807, was, that the time had now arrived when it had become expedient to make a provision for a permanent state of warfare; that the bad success of all former coalitions had demonstrated the slender foundation on which any hopes of overthrowing the military power of France on the continent of Europe must rest, while the hostile disposition and immense power of Napoléon gave little hope that any durable accommodation could be entered into with him. "All nations," said his lordship, "that still preserve the shadow even of their independence, have their eyes fixed on us as the only means of regaining the freedom they have lost. It becomes the government of Great Britain, seeing the proud eminence on which they are placed, to take an enlarged view of their whole situation, and to direct their attention to that future, which, notwithstanding the signal deliverance they have hitherto obtained, seems still pregnant with evil. Our present permanent revenue is above L.52,000,000 a-year, being more than three times what it was at the close of the American war; and there can be no doubt that means might be found in additional taxes to pay the interest of loans for several years to come. But looking, as it is now our duty to do, to a protracted contest, it has become indispensable to combine present measures with such a regard for the future, as may give us a reasonable prospect of being enabled to maintain it for a very long period.

"In considering our resources, the two great objects of attention are the Sinking-Fund and the system of raising the supplies as much as possible within the year, which has given rise to the present amount of war taxes.

The first of these is a durable monument to Mr. Pitt's wisdom; it had the support of his illustrious political opponent, Mr. Fox; and, however widely these two great men were divided on most other subjects, it at last received that weight of authority which arises from their entire coincidence of approbation. When this system was commenced in 1786, the sinking-fund was only $\frac{1}{234}$ th part of the debt; whereas it is now $\frac{1}{63}$ of the whole debt, and only $\frac{1}{12}$ of the unredeemed portion; a result at once striking and satisfactory, more especially when it is recollected that it has been obtained in twenty years, whereof fourteen have been years of war. The war taxes, which have been raised to their present amount chiefly by the operation of the heavy direct taxes; are first, the treble assessed taxes introduced by Mr. Pitt, and more lately the property-tax which has been substituted in its room. The experience of the last year has amply demonstrated the expedience of the augmentation of that impost to ten per cent, which it was our painful duty to propose last year; for under its operation the war taxes have now reached L.24,000,000 a-year, and the sinking-fund amounts to L.8,500,000 annually.

deserve the highest credit for the courage they displayed, in opposition to the wishes of many of their supporters, in carrying through the great grant of twenty millions to the planters—a relief so seasonable and extensive, that hitherto, at least, it has, almost entirely to the persons who received it, prevented the natural consequences of the emancipation from being felt. The torrent of public feeling was irresistible; all they could do was to moderate its effects, which by the protracted period of ap-

prenticeship, and the grant to the slave-owners, was done to a very great degree. The English people must answer for the measure, be its ultimate effects on themselves and the negro race good or bad. The reflection suggested is:—What is the character of national institutions which permit a measure, likely to be attended with such cruel and disastrous consequences, to be forced against their will on a reluctant government?

“In the present state of the country our war expenses cannot be calculated at less than thirty-two millions annually. To provide for this, independent of additional war taxes, which are now so heavy that we are not warranted in calculating on any considerable addition to their amount as likely to prove permanently productive, is the problem we have now to solve. To effect this, it is proposed in this and the three following years to raise a loan of L.12,000,000; for the fourth year, or 1810, L.14,000,000; and for the ten succeeding years, if the war should last so long, L.16,000,000 annually. In each successive year in which these loans shall be raised, it is proposed to appropriate so much of the war taxes as will amount to ten per cent on the sum so raised. Out of this ten per cent the interest and charges of management are first to be defrayed, and the remainder is to constitute a sinking-fund to provide for the redemption of the capital. When the funds are at 60, or interest at five per cent, such a system will extinguish each loan in fourteen years after it was contracted. The moment this is done, the war taxes impledged for the redemption of that loan should be repealed. Thus, as the loan of L.12,000,000 will, on this supposition, be paid off by 1821, the L.1,200,000 a-year of war taxes now pledged to its redemption, will in that year be remitted. Upon examining this system, it will be found that it may be carried on for seven years, viz. from 1807 to 1814, without impledging any part of the income tax; so that if peace is thus concluded, the whole income tax may, without violating any part of the present system, be at once remitted—a most desirable object, as that is a burden which nothing but the last necessity should induce us to perpetuate beyond the continuance of hostilities.

“As, however, the ten per cent on the loan annually contracted is in this manner to be taken from the war taxes, means must be provided to supply that deficiency, which, if the war continues for a long tract of years, will, from the progressive growth of those burdens on the war taxes, become very considerable. To provide for this deficiency, it is proposed to raise in each year a small supplementary loan, intended to meet the sum abstracted for the charges of the principal loan from the public treasury, and this supplementary loan is to be borrowed on Mr. Pitt’s principle of providing by fresh taxes, laid on in the indirect form, or by the falling in of annuities for the interest of the debt, and one per cent more to create a fund for its redemption. The loan so required this year, will, from the excess of the war taxes above the war expenditure, be only L.200,000; the annual charges of which on this principle will be only L.15,555; and as annuities to the amount of L.15,000 will fall in this year, it will not be necessary, either for the principal or supplementary loan, to lay on any new taxes this year. Taking an average so as to diffuse the burden created by these supplementary loans as equally as possible over future years, and setting off against them the sums which will be gained annually by the falling in of annuities, the result is, that it will only be necessary to raise in seven years immediately subsequent to 1810, L.295,000 annually by new taxes; a sum incredibly small, when it is recollected that we are now in the fifth year of a renewed war, the most costly and momentous in which the country ever was engaged.

“Under the present system, with regard to the public debt, framed upon the acts of 1786, 1792, and 1802, no relief whatever will be experienced from the public burdens till a very distant period, probably from 1834 to 1844; and during the latter years of the operation of the sinking fund, it will throw such immense sums, not less than forty millions annually, loose upon the country, as cannot fail to produce a most prejudicial effect upon the money market; while the sudden remission of taxes to the amount of

L.50,000,000 a-year, would produce effects upon artisans, manufacturers, and holders of property of every description, which it is impossible to contemplate without the most serious alarm. In every point of view, therefore, it seems to be highly desirable to render the sinking fund more equal in its progress, by increasing its present power, and diffusing over a greater number of years those extensive effects, which would, according to the present system, be confined to the very last year of its operation. The arrangements prepared with this view are founded on the superior advantage of applying to the redemption of debt a sinking-fund of five per cent on the actual money capital, instead of one per cent on the nominal capital or amount of stock. This is to be the system applied to the loans of the first ten years; and in return for this advantage, it is proposed that, when the present sinking-fund shall have so far increased as to exceed in its amount the interest of the debt then unredeemed, such surplus shall be at the disposal of Parliament. By this means a larger sum will be annually applied to the sinking-fund from henceforward, than could have been obtained under the old system; the whole loans contracted in future during the war will be redeemed within forty-five years from the date of their creation, and without violating any of the provisions of the act 1792, establishing the present sinking-fund. Parliament, during the years of its final and greatest operation, will be enabled to administer a very great relief to the public necessities, and obviate all the dangers with which an undue rapidity in the contraction of debt would otherwise be attended (1)."

Argument
against it
by Lord
Castlereagh
and Mr. Per-
ceval.

In opposition to these able arguments, it was urged by Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Canning, and Mr. Perceval, "That the proposed plan of finance proposes gradually to mortgage for fourteen years the whole of the war taxes for the interest of loans in war, a decided departure from all our former principles, which were to preserve religiously the distinction between war and permanent taxes, and would, if carried into effect for any considerable time, deprive the nation of almost all the benefit to which it is entitled to look upon the termination of hostilities. The new plan, moreover, will require loans to a greater amount to be raised in each year, than would be required if the usual system of borrowing were adhered to. At the end of twenty years it appears, from the calculations laid before Parliament, that this excess will amount to the enormous sum of L.195,000,000. The whole machinery of the new plan is cumbersome and complicated: the additional charges arising from that circumstance will amount to a very considerable sum. The ways and means intended to prevent the imposition of new taxes in future, viz.—the expired annuities, together with the excess of the sinking-fund above the interest of the unredeemed debt, are equally applicable *pro tanto* to mitigate their increase, under any other mode of raising loans that may be decided on; and their application in this way would be more advantageous than in the other, inasmuch as it is better to avoid contracting debt than gain relief by a remission of taxation.

Counter
plan pro-
posed by
them.

"It is futile to say that the public necessities compel us to have recourse to the perilous system of mortgaging the war taxes for the interest of future loans. It is here that the great danger of the new system is to be found: it is in breaking down the old and sacred barrier between the war and peace expenses, that the seeds of inextricable confusion

(1) Parl. Deb. viii. 566, 594.

The speech of Lord Henry Petty on this occasion, is well worthy of the attention of all who wish to make themselves masters of the British Finances

during the Revolutionary War. It is the most distinct, luminous, and statesmanlike exposition on the subject, which is to be found in the whole range of the Parliamentary debates after the death of Mr. Pitt.

to our finances in future are to be found. It is quite possible, as appears from the authentic calculations before Parliament, to obtain the eleven millions a-year required for the deficiency of the war taxes below the war charges, without mortgaging the war taxes, without the immense loans required under the new system, and without any material or unbearable addition to the public burdens. The mode in which this great object is to be attained is, by resolving that when the loan of the year in war does not exceed the amount of the sinking-fund in such year, instead of making provision for the interest of such loan in the taxes, the same shall be provided for *out of the interest receivable on the amount of stock redeemed* by the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt in that year. Any excess of national expenditure above the thirty-two millions to be fixed as the average amount of war expenditure, to be provided for in the usual manner. The data laid before Parliament prove, that under this plan, in fourteen years of war, one hundred and ten millions less will be borrowed than under that proposed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer; and though doubtless the sinking-fund will be greatly impaired, yet, after making allowance for its restricted operation from the charge of future loans on its amount, yet the total debt at the expiration of that period will be upwards of forty millions above that now proposed (1). Great evils both to the stockholders and the country must arise from the adoption of the new plan, in consequence of the enormous and inordinate loans, amounting before the close of the new plan, to not less than forty or fifty millions of stock annually, which must be contracted. Such immense loans must tend powerfully to lower the value of the public securities, lead to an extensive and undue increase of the circulating medium, and a rapid depreciation in the value of money, attended with the most prejudicial effects upon many branches of industry, and a general insecurity on the part of the holders of property. Above all, the principle of *placing at the disposal of Parliament the excess of the sinking-fund above the interest of the debt unredeemed*, is calculated to lead to a much more extensive diversion of that fund from its destined purpose, than the system which Mr. Pitt had established; inasmuch as the latter only proposed to derive aid from the sinking-fund during war, and only to the precise extent of the interest of the sum redeemed within the year, leaving the fund in undiminished extent to operate upon the public debt on the return of peace; whereas the former places the surplus of the sinking-fund above the interest of the unredeemed debt, absolutely and unreservedly at the disposal of Parliament, in peace as in war, without any other limitation than that a sum equal to the debt subsisting in 1802 shall be redeemed within forty-five years from that period. It is easy to foresee that such a power of appropriating a large part of the sinking-fund will be too powerful a temptation for the virtue of future governments; and that the practical result will be, that that noble institution will be irretrievably mutilated, and the nation lose the whole benefit of the immense sacrifices for the benefit of posterity which it has made during the whole continuance of the present contest. The equiva-

(1) Lord H. Petty's plan—

War loan for 14 years, . . .	L.210,000,000
Supplementary loans for do. . .	94,200,000
	<hr/>
	L.314,200 000
War taxes rendered permanent, .	401,231,000
Unredeemed debt in 1820, at end of same time,	9,180,000
New taxes imposed,	2,051,000
New loans in 1820,	32,000,000
Sinking funds in 1820,	17,744,021

Lord Castlereagh's plan—

War loans, 11 millions a year, for 14 years,	L.154,000,000
Debt unredeemed at end of 1820, .	358,000,000
War taxes rendered permanent, .	none.
New taxes imposed,	2,547,000
New loan in 1820,	11,000,000
Sinking fund in 1820,	9,180,896
— <i>Parl. Deb.</i> viii. 1014.	

lent proposed to the fundholders of an additional five per cent sinking-fund on the war loans, is entirely deceptive; inasmuch as the depreciation of his property which must ensue from the improvident accumulation of loans in the market, with their necessary concomitant, an extensive and undue paper currency, must much more than compensate any additional value which it might acquire from this augmentation of the means of its liquidation (1)."

Budget for 1807.
March 4. The budget for the year 1807 was based on the new plan of finance; it included a loan of only £12,000,000, which was contracted on very advantageous terms, and the whole expenditure was calculated on that system of making preparations for a long and protracted struggle (2), which the disastrous issue of the Prussian war gave too much reason to apprehend awaited the country (3).

Reflections on this subject. The debates on Lord Henry Petty's able plan of finance are of little moment at this time, abandoned as his system soon was amidst the necessities and changes of future years; but the views brought forward on both sides were an essential deviation from the great principle of Mr. Pitt's financial policy, and presaged the approach of times when the provident policy so long upheld by his foresight, was to be abandoned with the common consent of both the great parties alternately intrusted with the administration of affairs. Mr. Pitt's principle was to provide the interest of each loan annually contracted, and the one per cent destined for the extinction of its principal, by means of indirect taxes which thereafter formed part of the permanent revenue of the country till the debt was extinguished; but both Lord H. Petty and Lord Castlereagh seem to have imagined that the time had now arrived when it would be difficult, if not impossible, to raise an increased revenue in this form; and accordingly the plans of both were characterised by the great and decisive step of providing for the charges of future debt, not by future and permanent taxes, but by other means imposing no additional present burden on the country, but of course, for that very reason, trenching on its ultimate resources. The former proposed to do this by mortgaging the war taxes for the charges of all the debt which might hereafter be contracted, and rendering the amount of those taxes thus mortgaged a permanent part of the peace revenue: the latter, by leaving untouched the war taxes, but appropriating to the interest of future loans part of the present sinking fund, and thereby impairing to a proportionate extent its efficiency on the return of peace. Both implied a deviation from the cardinal point of Mr. Pitt's system, the providing for the discharge of the interest of all debts out of *indirect taxes religiously set apart for that purpose*; and it is remarkable, as an example how much the fortunes and destinies of a state are often determined by the character and life of a single master-

(1) Parl. Deb. viii. 1004, 1018.

(2) Parl. Deb. viii. 1075.

(3) The budget for 1807 was stated by Lord Henry Petty as follows:—

Supply.		Ways and Means.	
Navy,	£16,997,837	Land and Malt,	£ 2,750,000
Army, ordinary,	15 465,311	Surplus of Consolidating Fund, . .	3,500,000
Extraordinaries arising,	4,333,710	War taxes,	19,800,000
Ordnance,	3,743,715	Lottery,	320,000
Miscellaneous,	1,860,000	Vote of credit,	3,000,000
Vote of credit,	3,000,000	Loans,	12,000,000
Interest of Exchequer bills, . . .	1,200,000	Surplus of 1805,	171,000
Loyalty loan,	350,000		
Deficiency of Malt tax, 1805, . . .	200,000		
			<hr/> £41,541,000
—See Parl. Deb. viii. 1075.			
For Great Britain and Ireland, . .	47,150,573		
Deduct 2-17ths for Ireland, . . .	5,545,677		
	<hr/>		
Expenditure of Great Britain, . .	£41,604,896		

spirit, that this vast change, fraught, as experience has since proved it to have been, with the ruin of our financial prospects and probable ultimate subjugation as an independent state, was simultaneously proposed by the leaders of both Whigs and Tories, the moment that great statesman and his illustrious rival were mouldering in their graves.

Had the period arrived, when it was totally impossible to provide for the charges of additional loans by progressive additions to the peace revenue, this change, however prejudicial, would not have been a matter of regret more than any other unavoidable calamity. But experience has now sufficiently demonstrated, that this was very far indeed from being the case; for, down to the very end of the war, new taxes were imposed to an extent, that *a priori* would have been thought impossible. As it was, therefore, the discussions which ensued on the rival finance projects of Lord R. Petty and Lord Castlereagh, unnecessarily gave the first rude shock to the firm and provident system of Mr. Pitt's finance, by breaking down the barrier which had hitherto kept the funds destined for the discharge of the debt sacred from the avidity and short-sighted desires of the people, and accustoming them to regard both the revenue set apart for that purpose and the war taxes during peace, as a fund to which they might have recourse to relieve the war pressure of the moment. Of the two, if it had become necessary to make choice of one or other, the system of Lord Henry Petty was the most manly and statesmanlike with reference to domestic administration: inasmuch as it was not calculated to trench upon the sinking fund, until it had become equal to the loans annually contracted, by which means the increase of the amount of the whole debt, after that period, would have been rendered impossible, and in the mean time, to pledge the war taxes for the interest and charges of the sums borrowed; whereas that of Lord Castlereagh proposed at once to lay violent hands upon the sinking funds for the charges of all future loans, and yet give the nation the full benefit of the remission of all the war taxes on the return of peace. The former system, however, though well adapted for a state of uniform and long-continued hostility, was totally unsuitable to the varying circumstances and fleeting changes which were likely to ensue in the course of the contest in which the nation was actually engaged; and by encouraging a morbid sensitiveness to any extraordinary advances at a particular time, beyond what the general system warranted, was too likely to occasion the loss of the fairest opportunities of bringing it to a successful issue. Of this unhappy tendency the issue of the war in Poland, starved out, as we shall presently see it was, by an ill-judged economy on the part of Great Britain, afforded a memorable example. And in the habit acquired by the nation in these discussions to regard the sinking fund, not as a sacred deposit set apart, like the life insurance of an individual, for the benefit of posterity, but as a resource which might be instantly rendered available to present necessities, is to be found the remote cause of the great change of 1815 in our financial policy, and the total departure from any regular system for the redemption of the public debt—a change which is perhaps to be regarded as the greatest evil entailed upon the nation by the moneyed embarrassments and democratic ascendancy in later times.

General character of the Whig measures at this period. Their combined humanity and wisdom.

Long as the preceding summary of the principal domestic measures of the Whig Administration has been, it will not in all probability be regretted by the reflecting reader. It is not as the record of mere events, but of thoughts and the progress of opinion, that history is valuable; and independent of the importance of the

changes which have been discussed upon the future history of the empire, they are in an especial manner worthy of attention, as embodying the principal domestic designs of the great party, which, after so long a seclusion from office, at that period held the reins of power; and which, besides the acknowledged ability of its leaders, embraced a large portion of the thought and learning of the State. And upon an attentive consideration of these measures, it must be obvious to the candid reader, that they were founded on just principles, and directed to important ends; that humanity and benevolence breathed in their spirit, and wisdom and foresight regulated their execution. Above all, they were characterised, equally with the measures of Mr. Pitt, by that regard for the future, and resolution to submit to present evils for the sake of ultimate advantage, which is the mainspring of all that is really great or good, both in individuals and nations. On comparing the statesmanlike measures of the Whigs at that period in England, with the frantic innovations which tore society in pieces in France on the commencement of their revolution, the difference appears prodigious, and is highly deserving of attention. Thence may be learned both the important tendency of free institutions to modify those ardent aspirations after equality, which, when generally diffused, are, of all other political passions, the most fatal to the cause of freedom, and the wide difference between the chastened efforts of a liberal spirit, when guided by aristocratic power, and modifying, not governing, the measures of government, and the wild excesses or atrocious crimes, destructive at once to the present and future generations, which spring from the surrender of the actual direction of affairs to the immediate control or the passions of the people.

Foreign transactions. It remains to detail, with a very different measure of encomium, the principal foreign policy of the Whig Administration, from the period when the Prussian war commenced on the continent of Europe.

Fresh expedition to South America. It has been already mentioned how Sir Home Popham, without authority from the British Government, proceeded from the Cape of Good Hope to Buenos Ayres with a small military force, and the disastrous issue of that expedition (1). But the general transports of joy at the brilliant prospects which this acquisition was supposed to open to British commerce, were so excessive, that Government, while they very properly brought Sir Home to a court-martial for this unauthorized proceeding, which, March 7, 1807. in March 1807, reprimanded him for his conduct, had not firmness enough to withstand the general wish that an expedition should be sent to the river La Plata, to wipe away the disgrace which had there been incurred from the British arms, and annex such lucrative dependencies to the British crown. No sooner, accordingly, had it become evident, from the failure of the negotiations for peace at Paris, that a protracted struggle was to be apprehended, than a reinforcement of three thousand men was sent to the British troops in that quarter, under the command of Sir Samuel Auchmuty. On arriving at the Rio de la Plata, he found the remnant of the English force cooped up in Maldonado, with hardly any provisions, and daily exposed to the insults of the accomplished horsemen of that country. Deeming that town unfit for being rendered a depôt and place of security for the army, Sir Samuel resolved to direct his forces against Monte Video, a fortified seaport, admirably calculated for all these purposes. After great difficulties, the troops were transported to that neighbourhood; but on commencing the siege, great and apparently insurmountable difficulties were

Oct. 1806. Capture of Monte Video. ing that town unfit for being rendered a depôt and place of security for the army, Sir Samuel resolved to direct his forces against Monte Video, a fortified seaport, admirably calculated for all these purposes. After great difficulties, the troops were transported to that neighbourhood; but on commencing the siege, great and apparently insurmountable difficulties were

encountered. The defences of the place were found to be much stronger than had been expected; the whole powder in the fleet was almost blown away in the first five days' firing; entrenching tools were wanting to make the breaches; and four thousand regular troops, with twenty pieces of cannon, a force fully equal to the besiegers', was rapidly approaching to raise the siege. Feb. 2, 1807. In these critical circumstances, he resolved to hazard an assault, though the breach could as yet scarcely be called practicable; and orders were issued for the attack an hour before daybreak. Owing to the darkness of the night the head of the column missed the breach, and remained under the ramparts for twenty minutes exposed to a heavy fire, every shot of which told in their dense ranks; but as the day dawned, it was discerned by Captain Renny of the 40th regiment, who gloriously fell as he mounted it; the troops emulated his bright example, rushed in with irresistible violence, cleared the streets of all the cannon which had been placed to enfilade them, and made prisoners all the enemy who attempted any resistance. In this glorious storm, the loss of the British was about six hundred, but twice that number of the enemy fell, and two thousand were made prisoners, besides a thousand who escaped in boats, so that the numbers of the garrison at first had been greater than that of the besieging force (1).

A second expedition against Buenos Ayres is resolved on. It would have been well for the British arms, if their attempts on South America had terminated here; but the discomfiture of Sir Home Popham's expedition to the Rio de la Plata, unhappily led both the Government and the nation to conceive, that the honour of the British arms was implicated in regaining the ground they had lost in that quarter. With this view an additional expedition, under the command of General Craufurd, consisting of four thousand two hundred men, which had been sent out in the end of Oct. 1806, destined originally to effect the conquest of Chili, on the other side of Cape Horn, was, when news arrived of the expulsion of the English from Buenos Ayres, ordered to stop short, and attempt the re-conquest of that important city. General Craufurd, agreeably June 2, 1807. to these orders, made sail for the Rio de la Plata, and effected a junction with Sir Samuel Auchmuty at Monte Video in the beginning of June. As the united force now amounted to above nine thousand men, it was deemed advisable to make an immediate attempt on Buenos Ayres; and, in pursuance of express directions from Government (2), the command of the force for this purpose was given to General Whitelocke. That officer arrived at Monte Video on the 9th May, and preparations were immediately made for the proposed enterprise (5).

Its failure. The force which set out on this expedition consisted of seven thousand eight hundred men, including eighteen pieces of field artillery. After several fatiguing marches, the whole reached Reduction, a village about nine miles from Buenos Ayres, and having manœuvred so as to deceive the enemy as to the real point of passage, succeeded in crossing the river, with very little loss, at the ford of Passo Chico. The army having been assembled on the right bank, orders were given for a general attack on the town. Great preparations for defence had been made by the inhabitants; above two hundred pieces of cannon were disposed, in advantageous situations, in the principal streets, and fifteen thousand armed men were stationed on the flat roofs

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 213, 214. See S. Auchmuty's Despatch, 652.

(2) "As it has been thought advisable," said Mr. Windham in his official orders, "that an officer of high rank, as well as talent and judgment, should be sent to take the command of his Majesty's forces in

South America, it was his Majesty's pleasure to make choice for that purpose of General Whitelocke." — Mr. Windham's Instructions to General Whitelocke, 5th March, 1807. Ann. Reg. 1807, 216.

(3) Ann. Reg. 1807, 214, 217.

of the houses to pour their destructive volleys on the columns who might advance to the attack. The measures of the English general, so far from being calculated to meet this danger, the magnitude of which is well known to all experienced military men, betrayed a fatal and overweening contempt for his opponents. The different columns of attack were directed to advance by the principal streets to the great square near the river Plata; but by an inconceivable oversight, they were not allowed to load their pieces, and no firing was permitted till they had reached the final place of their destination. The consequence was, that those brave men were exposed, as they advanced through the long streets leading to the great square, without the possibility of returning it, to a destructive shower of musketry, hand-grenades, and stones from the tops of the houses, all of which were flat, and covered with an armed and enthusiastic population; while strong barricades were drawn

July 5. at intervals across the streets, mounted by a plentiful array of heavy artillery. Notwithstanding all these obstacles, however, the formidable nature of which were so fatally experienced by Charles X in the streets of Paris in 1850, Sir Samuel Auchmuty, by a vigorous attack on the right, made himself master of the Plaza de Toros, took eighty-two pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of ammunition, and six hundred prisoners. General Whitelocke himself had gained possession of an advanced post in the centre, and the Residencia, a commanding station on the left, had also fallen into the hands of the British. But these advantages were dearly purchased, and in other quarters, the plunging fire to which the troops had been exposed, without the possibility of returning it, had proved so destructive, that three regiments were compelled to lay down their arms, and the attacking force was weakened by the loss of 2500 men. On the following mornning the Spanish general, Linieres, offered to restore all the prisoners which had been taken, on condition that the British forces should withdraw altogether from Monte Video, and all the settlements which they held on the Rio de la Plata. Such was the consternation produced by the disasters of the preceding day, and such the difficulties with which the farther prosecution of the enterprise appeared to be attended, that, notwithstanding the brilliant success of Sir July 7, 1807. Samuel Auchmuty, and the capture of so large a portion of the enemy's artillery, these terms were agreed to, and a capitulation, in virtue of which the whole British troops were withdrawn from the river Plata, was signed on the following day (1).

Court-mar-
tial on
General
Whitelocke,
who is
cashiered. The public indignation knew no bounds when the calamitous issue of this expedition was made known in Great Britain; and the outcry was the more vehement from the glorious success at Monte Video having inspired the people with an unreasonably low estimate of the South American forces. So violent was the clamour, that Government, in order to appease it, were compelled to bring General Whitelocke to trial, and the court-martial which investigated the charges brought against him, in January 1809, sentenced him to be cashiered and dismissed from his Majesty's service. No opinion, however, can be formed of the real merits of the case from this decision, whatever may have been the respectability of the officers composing it; for such was the happy ignorance which then generally prevailed in Great Britain on military subjects, that the members of the court-martial required to be told what the right bank of a river, in military language, means (2); and such is frequently the vehemence and unreasonableness of the public mind in England on such occasions, that the strength

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 219, 221.

(2) South. Pen. War, i. 73.

of scarcely any intellect is equal to withstanding the torrent. The examples of Saragossa, Gerona, and Paris also, have, since that time, abundantly demonstrated that the resistance of an insurgent population in barricaded streets and on the roofs of stone houses, is often extremely formidable, even to powerful bodies of disciplined troops. But on a calm retrospect of the transactions at this distance of time, it cannot be denied that an energetic and skilful general might, in all probability, have extricated the British army, if not with honour, at least without disgrace, from this ill-concerted enterprise. The orders to traverse the streets with muskets unloaded, after a desperate resistance was prepared and foreseen, though expressly approved of by the court-martial, seems hardly reconcilable to any rule of military policy or common sense; and, above all, the omission to take advantage of the great success of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, and the powerful train of artillery which he had captured, if not to achieve success, at least to avert dishonour, must justly be considered as a matter of reproach to the British general. Much allowance must, however, be made for the critical situation of an inexperienced officer, plunged, in his first essay in a separate command, in difficulties, under which the intellects of Marmont and Lefebvre subsequently reeled; but the same excuse cannot be made for the Government, which selected an officer unknown to fame for so important a service, where many others had proved their capacity even in the comparatively inconsiderable military operations in which England had hitherto been engaged (1). But this weight of secret Parliamentary influence is the inherent bane of a free constitution; it appeared afterwards, on a still greater scale, on occasion of the Walcheren expedition, and continued to paralyse all the military operations of England, till the commanding genius of Wellington burst through the trammels, and fixed the flickering light of its glory in a star of unquenchable lustre (2).

Jan. 1,
1807.
Capture of
Curaçoa,
and esta-
blishment of
the Repub-
lic of Hayti.

In other colonial transactions, the British arms during this Administration were more prosperous. Curaçoa, early in the year, was taken, with hardly any resistance, by a squadron of frigates under the command of Captain Brisbane; the advantages of sharing in British commerce, and obtaining the protection of the British flag, having now disposed the planters, in all the colonial possessions of other states, to range themselves under its banners. Soon after, a regular constitution was proclaimed in Hayti, by which slavery was for ever abolished; property and persons placed under the safeguard of the law; the first magistrate of the republic declared the generalissimo of its forces by sea and land; and a code established, breathing a spirit of wisdom, philanthropy, and moderation. The establishment of such a republican government, coming so soon after the heroic resistance which the negroes had opposed to the attempt at their subjugation by Napoléon, would have been a subject of the highest interest, and deserving of the warmest sympathy of every friend to humanity, were it not that experience has since abundantly proved what historical information might even then have too clearly led the well-informed to anticipate, that all such attempts at the regeneration of mankind, by immediate changes, are not only delusive, but pernicious; that to give to savages the liberty and institutions of civilisation, is to consign them to immediate suffering and ultimate slavery; and that every attempt to transfer suddenly into

(1) The appointment of General Whitlocke over the head of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, the hero of Monte Video, appears the strongest confirmation of these remarks, but in reality it is not so; for that town was stormed on Feb. 2, and General Whitlocke's appointment is dated March 5, in the same

year; so that the one was not known till the other took place. It is the overlooking the many officers who had distinguished themselves in Egypt, at Maida, and in India, which forms the real reproach to the British Government on this occasion.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 219, 224. Dum. xv. 82, 83.

one age or nation the institutions of another, is as hopeless a task as to expect in the nursery seedling the strength and solidity of the aged oak, or in the buoyancy and irreflection of childhood the maturity and perseverance of maturer years.

This untoward expedition to the shores of the La Plata, was not the only one which brought disgrace upon the arms of England at this period—enterprises equally unfortunate took place both on the shores of the Bosphorus and the banks of the Nile.

State of affairs in Turkey. It has been already mentioned that Russia (1) had unhappily selected the moment when the Prussian war, if not actually commenced, was at least obviously approaching, to invade the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia by the army of General Michelson, and we have noticed the disastrous effect which that distraction of force had upon the issue of the contest on the Vistula. This irruption, however ill-timed or imprudent, when so serious a war nearer home awaited the Russian forces, was not, however, unjustifiable; on the contrary, it was provoked by the ambition of the French Government, and the intrigues of their ambassador at Constantinople, which, by precipitating the Divan into a breach of the existing treaty with the Court of Russia, gave to that power too plausible a ground for resuming its long-established schemes of ambition on the banks of the Danube.

By the treaty of Jassy, which terminated the bloody and disastrous war which the Turks had long waged with the might of Muscovy and the genius of Suwarrow, it had been covenanted that the hospodars or governors of Wallachia and Moldavia should not be dismissed from their high functions for the space of seven years; and, by the supplementary treaty of 24th September 1802, it had been expressly stipulated that they should not be removed without the consent of Russia (2). No sooner, however, had it become evident to Napoléon that a war was impending with Prussia and Russia, than he dispatched a firm and skilful ambassador to Constantinople, with instructions to do every thing in his power to produce a rupture between the Turks and Russians, and in this manner effect a powerful diversion to the Muscovite forces on the banks of the Danube. This diplomatic agent was General Sébastiani, a military officer of great experience, and whose subtle and penetrating genius, formerly nourished in a cloister, and since matured by the experience of camps, was admirably adapted for the mingled acuteness and resolution required in the mission with which he was now intrusted. His secret instructions were, in the first instance, to endeavour to procure the dismissal of the Princes Ypsilanti and Morusi from the government of these provinces, who were in the interest of Russia, and place in their stead princes of the rival families of Suzzo and Callimachi, who it was known would incline to the French alliance (3).

Dismissal of the Waiwodes of Wallachia and Moldavia by Sultan Selim. When Sébastiani arrived at the Turkish capital, in August 1806, he found matters in a situation extremely favourable to the attainment of these objects. Sultan Selim, in his attempts to introduce the European tactics and discipline into his armies, of the need of which the recent wars with Russia had given repeated and fatal experience, of which a detailed account will be given in a future chapter (4), had become embarrassed with very serious difficulties, and found himself obstinately resisted not only by the proud and disorderly bands of the Janizaries, but

(1) *Ante*, vi. 4.

(2) Martens, v. 67. Ann. Reg. 1806, 208.

(3) Bign. vi. 177, 178. Dum. xvii. 257, 259. Hard. ix. 366. Ann. Reg. 1807, 193, 195.

(4) See below, chap. lii.

that powerful party in all the Ottoman provinces who were attached to their national and religious institutions, and regarded the introduction of European customs, whether into the army or the state, as the first step in their national ruin. In this extremity he gladly embraced the proffered counsel and assistance of the French ambassador, who represented a power which naturally connected itself with the innovating party in every other state, and whose powerful armaments, already stationed in Dalmatia, promised the only effectual aid which could be looked for from the European nations against the Turkish malecontents, whom it was well known Russia was disposed to support. The difficulty arising from the necessity, in terms of the treaty, of consulting Russia in regard to the removal of the obnoxious hospodars, was strongly felt : but the art of Sébastiani prevailed over every difficulty. At a private conference with the Sultan in person, he succeeded in persuading that unsuspecting sovereign that the clause in the convention of 1802 applied only to the removal of the waiwodes on the ground of maladministration in their respective provinces, but could not extend to a case where it was called for by the general interests of the empire : that the present was an instance of the latter description, from the notorious intrigues of those princes with the hereditary enemies of the Ottoman faith ; and, in pursuance of these representations, a hattî-scheriff appeared on the 30th August, dismissing the reigning waiwodes, and appointing Princes Suzzo and Callimachi in their room (1).

Violent remonstrances of Russia and England. This decisive step was taken by the Sublime Porte not only without the concurrence of Russia, but without the knowledge of any members of the diplomatic body at Constantinople, and as its immediate effect in producing a rupture between the Divan and the court of St.-Petersburg was distinctly foreseen, the effect produced by its promulgation was very great. The Russian ambassador, M. Italinski, loudly complained of the infraction of the treaty, in which he was powerfully supported by Mr. Arbuthnot, the minister of Great Britain, who openly threatened an immediate attack on the Turkish capital from the fleets of their respective sovereigns. Sébastiani, however, skilfully availed himself of the advantages which the course of events gave him, to secure and increase the French influence with the Divan. No sooner, therefore, did intelligence arrive of the refusal of the Russian government to ratify the treaty concluded by d'Oubril at Paris, than he renewed his efforts, and representing the cause of France as now identified with that of the Sublime Porte, loudly demanded that the Bosphorus should be closed to Russian vessels of war or transports, and announced that any continuation or renewal of alliance with England or Russia would be considered as a declaration of war against the French Emperor (2). These remonstrances proved successful ; and a few days afterwards a Russian brig, which presented itself at the mouth of the Bosphorus, Sept. 21. was denied admission. These measures irritated so violently the Russian ambassador, that he embarked on board the English frigate *Canopus*, and threatened instantly to leave the harbour, if the dismissed waiwodes were not forthwith reinstated in their possessions. In these efforts he was powerfully seconded by Mr. Wellesley Pole, who, in the absence of Mr. Arbuthnot, who was detained by fever at Bujuchdere, presented himself before the Divan in his riding-dress, with a whip in his hand, and peremptorily announced, that if the demands of Russia were not instantly acceded

(1) Dum. xvii. 257, 264. Bign. vi. 177, 179. (2) Note of 16th Sept. 1806. Harl. ix. 364, 365.

to, a British fleet would enter the Dardanelles and lay the capital in ashes. Intimidated by this bold language, and the haughty air of the person who used it, and secretly aware of the weakness of the defences of the capital on that side, the counsellors of Selim recommended a temporary concession to the demands of the Allied Powers; the waiwodes were reinstated in their governments, and ample promises made to the Russian ambassador of satisfaction for all his demands. But these conciliatory measures were only intended to gain time; and in a secret conference with Sébastiani, the Sultan informed that minister that he had only yielded to the storm till he was in a condition to brave it, and that his policy, as well as his inclinations, were inseparably united with the Emperor Napoléon (1).

Meanwhile the Russian armies invaded the principalities. Matters were now, to all appearance, accommodated between the Divan and the cabinet of St.-Petersburg; but the great distance between the two capitals brought on a rupture when all causes of irritation had ceased, at the point where their interests came into collision. As soon as intelligence of the dismissal of the waiwodes reached the Russian cabinet, they dispatched orders to General Michelson, as soon as he could get his preparations ready, to enter the Turkish territory; and when intelligence was received of their being re-instated on the 15th October, which did not arrive at the Russian capital till the beginning of November, it was too late to prevent the operations of the previous orders and the commencement of hostilities. Michelson accordingly entered Moldavia on the 25d November, and having once drawn the sword, the cabinet of St.-Petersburg had not sufficient confidence in the sincerity of this forced submission on the part of the Sublime Porte to restore it to its sheath, or possibly they were not sorry of an opportunity of extending themselves towards the Danube, and advancing their permanent schemes of conquest towards Constantinople. Notwithstanding the restoration of the hospodars, therefore, their armies continued to advance, driving the Turks before them, to the no small confusion of M. Italinski, who had uniformly declared, both in public and private, that as soon as that event was known at St.-Petersburg, their march would be countermanded. Sébastiani, meanwhile, made the best use of this now unjustifiable invasion, as well as of the consternation produced by the victories of Napoléon in Prussia, to increase the French influence at the Divan; and strongly represented that now was the time, when Russia was already hard pressed by the victorious arms of the French Emperor on the Vistula, to throw their weight into the scale, and regain, in a single successful campaign, the influence and possessions which had been wrested from them by their inveterate enemies during more than a century of previous misfortunes. Persuaded by such plausible arguments, and irritated at the continued stay of the Russian troops in the principalities after the causes which had justified their entrance into them had ceased, the hesitations of the Divan were at length overcome, and war was formally declared against Russia in the end of the year. To protect the Russian ambassador from the fury of the Mussulmans, which was now fully aroused, the Sultan stationed a guard of janizaries over his palace. Mr. Arbuthnot strongly remonstrated against his being sent, according to previous custom, to the Seven Towers. General Sébastiani had the generosity to employ his powerful influence for the same purpose, and, by their united influence, this bar-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, p. 208, 209. Bign. vi. 182, 184. Hard. ix. 364, 365.

barous practice was discontinued, and M. Italinski was permitted to embark on board the English frigate *Canopus*, by which he was soon after conveyed into Italy. Less humane, however, towards his own satraps than the ambassadors of his enemies, the Sultan dispatched his messengers with the bowstring to Prince Ypsilanti; but that nobleman, in whom energy of mind supplied the want of bodily strength, succeeded in throwing down the executioners after they had got hold of his person, and had the good fortune to escape into Russia (1).

Rapid progress of the Russians in the principalities.

Though war was thus resolved on, the Porte was far from being in a condition at the moment to oppose any effectual resistance to the powerful army of General Michelson, which had entered the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia—forty thousand Russian troops, amply provided with every necessary, were irresistible. Moldavia was speedily overrun, the victorious bands, following up their success, entered Wallachia; a tumultuary force which the Pacha of Rudehuck had raised to arrest their progress was defeated; and Bucharest, the capital of the latter province, and a city containing eighty thousand inhabitants, fell into their hands. Before the end of the year, and before war had been formally declared on either side, they were already masters of all the territory to the north of the Danube; and their outposts, preparing to cross that river, were already in communication with Czerni George, the chief of Servia, who had revolted from the Grand Seignior, defeated his forces in several encounters, and was at this time engaged in the siege of the important fortress of Belgrade (2).

The Russians require the aid of a naval attack by England on Constantinople, which is agreed to.

The rapidity and magnitude of these successes, however, was the occasion of no small disquietude to the court of St.-Petersburg; they had now felt the weight of the French troops on the Vistula; their arms had retired from doubtful and well-debated fields at Golymin and Pultusk; and they were fully sensible of the imprudence of engaging at the same time in another contest, and dispersing the troops so imperiously required for the defence of their own frontier on the banks of the Danube. Already an order had been dispatched to recall four divisions to support the extreme left of the army in Poland, whose arrival and operations under Essen, against Bernadotte at Ostrolenka, have been already noticed (3). But this was not sufficient; their diminished forces on the Danube might be exposed to serious danger from the efforts, and now fully aroused national spirit, of the Turks; and as the duration of the contest with France could not be foreseen, it was of the utmost moment to deprive the Emperor Napoléon of that powerful co-operation which he was likely to derive from the war so imprudently lighted up on the southern frontier of the empire. The naval forces of England appeared to be precisely calculated to effect this object; and as they were cruising at no great distance in the Egean sea, it was hoped that a vigorous demonstration against Constantinople might at once terminate the contest in that quarter. Application was made to the British government for this purpose, and the cabinet of St.-James's, however unwilling, under the direction of Mr. Fox's successors, to engage in any military enterprises in conjunction with the continental powers, was not averse to the employment of its naval forces in the support of the common cause, and felt the necessity of doing something, after the refusal of both subsidies and land forces to Russia, to convince that power of the sincerity of its desire, with its appropriate weapons, to maintain the contest. Orders,

(1) Hard. ix. 365. Bign. vi. 184, 189. Ann. Reg. 1806, 208, 211.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1806, 211.

(3) *Ante*, vi. p. 46.

therefore, were given to Sir John Duckworth, who, at the close of the year, was cruising off Ferrol with four ships of the line, to proceed forthwith to the mouth of the Dardanelles, where Admiral Louis was already stationed with three line-of-battle ships and four frigates; and his orders were to force the passage of these celebrated straits, and compel the Turks, by the threat of an immediate bombardment, into the relinquishment of the French and adoption of the Russian and English alliance (1).

Description of the Dardanelles. The Hellespont, which, from the days of Homer and the war of Troy to these times, has been the theatre of the most important operations in which the fate of Europe and Asia were concerned, is formed by the narrow strait through which the waters of the Black Sea discharge themselves from the lesser expanse of Marmora into the Mediterranean. Its breadth varies from one to three miles; but its course, which is very winding, amounts to nearly thirty; and the many projecting headlands which advance into the stream, afford the most favourable stations for the erection of batteries. Its banks are less precipitous and beautiful than those of the Bosphorus, which is the appellation bestowed on the still more bold and romantic channel which unites the sea of Marmora to the Euxine; but they possess, both from historical association and natural variety, the highest interest; and few persons possessed even of the rudiments of education can thread their devious way through the winding channel and smiling steepes, which resemble the shores of an inland lake rather than the boundary of two hemispheres, without recurring in imagination to the exploits of Ajax and Achilles, whose tombs still stand at the entrance of the strait, the loves of Hero and Leander, the memorable contests of which it was the theatre during the Byzantine empire, the glowing picture by Gibbon of the Latin Crusade, and the thrilling verses of Lord Byron on its classic shores.

Ultimatum of Great Britain, and declaration of war by Turkey. The fortifications of these important straits, the real gates of Constantinople, had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The castles of Europe and Asia, indeed, still stood in frowning majesty to assert the dominion of the Crescent, at the narrowest part of the passage; but their ramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismantled, and such as remained, though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the rapidity and precision of an English broadside. The efforts of Sébastiani, seconded by the spirit of the Turks, whose religious enthusiasm was now fully awakened, had endeavoured in vain to attract the attention of the Divan to the danger which threatened them in this quarter. True to the Musulman principle of foreseeing nothing and judging only of the future by the past, they bent their whole attention to the war on the Danube, and dispatched all their disposable forces to arrest the progress of the Servians and Czerni George, when a redoubtable enemy threatened them with destruction at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Duly informed of these circumstances, Mr. Arbuthnot was no sooner apprised of the arrival of Sir John Duckworth Jan. 26, 1807. off Tenedos, than he delivered the ultimatum of Great Britain, which was the immediate dismissal of M. Sébastiani; the entrance of Turkey into the alliance of Russia and Great Britain, and the opening of the Dardanelles to the vessels of Russia. These offers were peremptorily declined, and their refusal accompanied by a significant hint from General Sébastiani, that the Berlin decree, recently received at the Turkish capital, required the immediate arrest of all British subjects in all the territories of the allies of France, and that *Turkey was one of these allies*. Deeming his stay at

(1) Bign. vi. 189, 190. Jom. ii. 372. Ann. Reg. 1807, 195.

Constantinople no longer secure, Mr. Arbuthnot, under colour of going to dine with Admiral Louis, who in the *Endymion* frigate lay off Scraglio Point, withdrew from Constantinople, having first recommended his family to the care of General Sébastiani. That General honourably discharged the trust; but he was too skilful not to turn to the best advantage so unexpected an occurrence in his favour, and war was immediately declared by the Divan against Great Britain (1).

Sir John
Duckworth
passes the
Dardanelles.

Hitherto every thing had seconded, beyond his most sanguine expectations, the efforts of the French ambassador, but he was unable to persuade the Turkish government to take the requisite measures of precaution against this new enemy who had arisen. In vain he urged them instantly to put in repair the fortifications of the Dardanelles; in vain he predicted a formidable immediate attack from the fleet of England; nothing was done to give additional security to the strait, and the Divan, persuaded that the only serious danger lay on the side of the Danube, continued to send all their disposable forces in that direction. Meanwhile the squadrons of Sir John Duckworth and Admiral Louis having effected a junction off Tenedos, their united forces amounted to eight ships of the line, two frigates, and two bomb-vessels; but the *Ajax* of 74 guns having unfortunately been destroyed by fire at this critical moment, the squadron was reduced to seven line-of-battle ships. With these, however, the British Admiral resolved to force the passage. Having taken his measures with much skill, he advanced with his ships in single file at moderate intervals, and with a fair wind, on the morning of the 19th of February, entered the straits. So completely were the Turks taken by surprise, that a feeble desultory fire alone was opened upon their ships as they passed the first batteries, to which the English did not deign to reply; but when they reached the castles of Europe and Asia, where the straits are little more than a mile broad, a tremendous cannonade assailed them on both sides, and enormous balls, weighing seven and eight hundred weight, began to pass through their rigging; but the British sailors meanwhile were not idle; deliberately aiming their guns, as the ships slowly and majestically moved through the narrow channel, they kept up an incessant discharge to the right and left, with such effect, that the Turkish cannoniers, little accustomed to the rapid fire of modern times, and terrified at the crash of the shot on the battlements around them, took to flight. Following up his triumphant course, the English admiral attacked and burned the vessel of the Capitan Pacha lying at anchor in the straits; Sir Sidney Smith, the second in command, compelled four frigates to surrender, which were immediately after committed to the flames; a fifth, after an obstinate resistance, shared the same fate; and a brig, which with difficulty escaped from the conflagration, had scarcely announced the alarming tidings at Constantinople, when the British fleet, with all sails set, was seen proudly advancing, and cast anchor off the Isle of Princes, within three leagues of Scraglio Point (2).

The Divan
resolve on
submission,
but are
roused to
exertion by
General
Sébastiani.

No words can adequately paint the terror which prevailed in Constantinople, when the increasing sound of the approaching cannonade too surely announced that the defences of the straits had been forced; and shortly after, the distant light of the conflagration gave token of the rapid destruction of the fleet. This was much increased when a message was received from Admiral Duckworth, half

(1) Bign. vi. 191, 192. Dum. xvii. 271, 273.
Ann. Reg. 1807, 195.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 196. Dum. xvii. 275, 278.
Bign. vi. 194, 195. Join. ii. 374.

an hour after his arrival, which, after recapitulating all the instances of fidelity to the Turkish alliance which England had so long afforded, concluded by the declaration that if, in twenty-four hours, the demands of Great Britain were not acceded to, he would be reduced to the painful necessity of commencing hostilities. The capital was totally defenceless, not ten guns were mounted on the sea batteries, and a furious crowd was already assembled in the streets, demanding the head of the Reis Effendi and General Sébastiani, the authors of all the public calamities. The consternation was universal; the danger, from having been never anticipated, was now felt with stunning force; and the Divan, having been assembled in the first moments of alarm, sent an intimation to General Sébastiani that no defence remained to the capital; that submission was a matter of necessity, and that, as the people regarded him as the author of all their misfortunes, his life was no longer in safety, and he would do well instantly to leave the capital (1). But his answer was worthy of the great and gallant nation which he represented. Receiving the messenger of the Sultan in full dress, surrounded by all his suite, he immediately replied—"My personal danger cannot for an instant occupy my attention, when the maintenance of the French alliance and the independence of the Ottoman empire are at stake. I will not quit Constantinople, and I confidently expect a new decision more worthy of Sultan Selim and the Turkish nation. Tell your powerful monarch, that he should not for a moment think of descending from the high rank where the glorious deeds of his ancestors have placed him, by surrendering to a few English vessels a city containing nine hundred thousands souls, and abundantly provided with magazines and ammunition. Your ramparts are not yet armed, but that may soon be done; you have weapons enough; use them but with courage, and victory is secure. The cannon of the English fleet may set fire to a part of the town—granted; but without the assistance of a land army, it could not take possession of the capital, even if you were to open your gates. You sustain every year the ravages of accidental conflagration, and the more serious calamities of the plague; and do you now scruple at incurring the risk of inferior losses in defence of your capital, your country, your holy religion (2)?"

The Turks negotiate to gain time, and complete their preparations.

This noble reply produced a great effect upon the Divan; and it was resolved, that before submitting they should at least try whether, by gaining time in parleying, they could not in some degree complete their preparations. Sébastiani accordingly dictated a note

in answer to the communication from the English admiral, in which the Sultan professed an anxious desire to re-establish amicable relations with the British government, and announced his appointment of Allet-Effendi for the purpose of conducting the negotiation. The unsuspecting English admiral, who, from the illness of Mr. Arbuthnot, was intrusted with the negotiation, was no match for the wily French general in the arts of diplomacy, fell into

Feb. 21.

the snare. The British *ultimatum* was sent ashore the following morning, which consisted in the provisional cession of their fleet to England, the dismissal of Sébastiani, and the re-establishment of amicable relations with Russia and the British government. Half an hour only was allowed to the Divan, after the receipt and translation of this note, to deliberate and reply. Had this vigorous resolution been acted upon, it must have led to

(1) I have been informed by Sir Stratford Canning, the well-known and able British diplomatist at Constantinople, that a tradition prevails in the East, that Sébastiani was at first disposed to submit, and that it was the Spanish ambassador's remonstrances

which awakened him to the energetic conduct which has shed such a lustre around his name.

(2) Dum. xvii. 278, 280. Bign. vi. 197, 198. Ann. Reg. 1807, 196, 197.

immediate submission; for the batteries were not yet armed; the fleet, the arsenals, the seraglio, and great part of the town lay exposed to the fire of the English squadron, and during the terror produced by a bombardment, the greater part of the capital, which is chiefly built of wood, must have been reduced to ashes (1).

Vast energy displayed by the Mussulmans in their defence. Unfortunately, instead of doing this, Sir John Duckworth, possessed with the belief that the Sultan was sincerely desirous of an accommodation, and that the desired objects might be obtained without the horrors of a conflagration, or an irreparable breach with the Ottoman empire, imprudently gave time, and suffered himself to be drawn into a negotiation. Day after day elapsed in the mere exchange of notes and diplomatic communications; and mean-while, the spirit of the Mussulmans, now raised to the highest pitch, was indefatigably employed in organizing the means of defence. The direction of the whole was intrusted to General Sébastiani, for whom a magnificent tent was erected in the gardens of the Seraglio, and who communicated to the ardent multitude the organization and arrangement which long warlike experience had given to the officers of Napoleon. Men and women, grey hairs and infant hands, the Turks, the Greeks, the Armenians, were to be seen promiscuously labouring together at the fortifications. Forgetting, in the general transport, the time-worn lines of religious distinction, the Greek and Armenian patriarchs set the first example of a cordial acquiescence in the orders of government; Selim himself repeatedly visited the works; his commands were obeyed by two hundred thousand men, animated by religious and patriotic ardour to the greatest degree; while the French engineers, who had been sent by Marmont to aid in the war with the Russians, communicated to the busy multitude the inestimable advantages of scientific direction and experienced skill. Under such auspices, the defences of the harbour were speedily armed and strengthened; the naval arsenal furnished inexhaustible resources; in three days, three hundred pieces of cannon were mounted on the batteries—at the end of a week, their number was increased to a thousand; temporary parapets were every where formed with gabions and fascines, where regular defences were wanting; the tower of Leander was armed with heavy artillery; a hundred gun-boats were drawn across the mouth of the Golden Horn; twelve line-of-battle ships within stood apparently ready for action (2); fireships were prepared, and numerous furnaces with red-hot shot kept constantly heated, to carry into the British fleet the conflagration with which they menaced the Turkish capital (3).

The English renounce the enterprise, and with difficulty repass the Dardanelles. Although the English officers perceived, by means of their telescopes, the preparations which were going forward, and though the peril to the fleet was hourly increasing from the long continuance of a southwest wind, which rendered it impossible to repass the straits; yet nothing was done adequate to the emergency. The fleet, indeed, was brought nearer to the Seraglio, and every effort made to bring the enemy, by negotiation, to an accommodation; but the pride of the Mussulmans, now fully aroused, would not have permitted the government to come to terms, even if they had been so inclined; and the influence of Sébastiani was successfully exerted to protract the conferences till the preparations were so far

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 198, 199. Dum. xvii. 280, 282. Bign. vi. 193, 200.

(2) Journ. ii. 375, 377. Dum. xvii. 284, 286. Bign. vi. 200, 204. Ann. Reg. 1807, 198, 199.

(3) The number of guns mounted on the batteries

in six days was 917 pieces of cannon and 200 mortars—an instance of vigour and rapidity in preparing the means of defence, perhaps unparalleled in the history of the world.—See HARR. xi. 486. *Pièces Just.*

completed as to enable them to bid defiance to the enemy. Four days after the English fleet appeared off Constantinople, the coasts were so completely armed with artillery, as to render an attack eminently hazardous; in a week it was totally hopeless. The object of the expedition having failed, nothing remained but to provide for the safety of the fleet : but this was now no easy matter ; for during the week lost in negotiation, the batteries of the Dardanelles had all been armed, and the castles of Europe and Asia so strengthened as to render it an extremely hazardous matter to attempt the passage. To complete the difficulties of the English admiral, the wind, which generally blows at Constantinople from the northeast, continued, ever after his arrival, fixed in the south-west, so as to render it totally impossible for him to retrace his steps. At length, on the 1st March, a breeze having sprung up

March. 1. from the Black Sea, all sails were spread, and the fleet re-entered the perilous straits. But it was without difficulty, and with considerable hazard, that the passage was effected. A heavy fire was kept up from all the batteries ; the headlands on either side presented a continued line of smoke ; the roar of artillery was incessant ; and enormous stone balls, some of them weighing seven or eight hundred pounds, threatened at one stroke to sink the largest ships. One of these massy projectiles carried away the main-mast of the Windsor Castle, which bore the Admiral's flag ; another penetrated the

March. 2. poop of the Standard, and killed and wounded sixty men. At length the fleet cleared the straits, and cast anchor off Tenedos, in such a situation as to blockade the Dardanelles, having sustained a loss of two hundred and fifty men in this audacious expedition, which, though it proved unsuccessful from the errors attending its execution, was both boldly and ably conceived, and produced a very great impression in Europe by revealing the secret weakness of the Ottoman empire, and demonstrating how easily an adequate maritime force ; by thus bursting through its defences, and aiming a stroke at once at the vitals of the state, could subdue all the strength of Islamism, and at once compel the submission of a power, before which, in former times, all the monarchies of Europe had trembled (1).

Blockade of the Dardanelles. Naval action off Tenedos, July 1. After the departure of the English fleet, all amicable relations were, of course, suspended with the Turkish government ; the preparations of the Sultan to strengthen the batteries both of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, continued with undiminished activity ; and the influence of General Sébastiani with the Divan became unbounded. The ease, however, with which the British fleet had surmounted all the defences of Constantinople, and the imminent risk which he had run of being deprived, by one blow, of the powerful auxiliary aid of Turkey, gave the utmost uneasiness to Napoléon ; and he dispatched, without delay, orders both to Marmont in Illyria, and Eugene in Italy, to forward, instantly, a number of able officers, among whom were Colonel Haxo of the engineers, and Colonel Foy of the artillery, to co-operate in the strengthening of the defences of Constantinople ; while six hundred men were directed to be forthwith put at the disposal of the Grand Seignior, and authority given for the transmission of five thousand, with abundant supplies in money and ammunition, if required. These reinforcements, however, were not required ; for though the English fleet was shortly after joined by the Russian squadron, under Admiral Siniavin, yet they had too recently experienced the dangers of the straits to venture a second time into them, after their defences had been so mate-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 200. Sir J. Duckworth's Despatch, ib. 664. Journ. ii. 376, 377. Dum. xvii. 281, 293. Bign. vi. 204, 207.

rially strengthened as they soon were by the operations of the French engineers. Contenting themselves, therefore, with taking possession of Lemnos and Tenedos for the service of their fleet, they established a close blockade of the entrance to the straits from the Archipelago; and as a similar precaution was adopted at the mouth of the Bosphorus, the supply of the capital by water-carriage on both sides was interrupted, and before long a very great dearth of provisions was experienced. The Turkish government made the utmost efforts to man their squadron; but this was no easy matter, as the blockade by the Russians deprived them of all intercourse with the Greeks, who constituted almost exclusively the nautical portion of their population. At length, however, the scarcity became so great that serious commotions took place in the capital; and the government having at length forced an adequate number of hands on board the fleet, the Capitan Pacha ventured to leave the protection of the forts in the Dardanelles, and give battle to the Russian fleet. But the result was what might have been expected from a contest between an inexperienced body of men, for the most part unacquainted with naval affairs, and a squadron manned by seamen who yield to none in Europe in the

July 1. resolution with which they stand to their guns (1). Though the Turks fought with great gallantry, they could not withstand the superior skill and more rapid fire of their antagonists; four of their ships were early in the day drifted out of the line, and their unskilful crews were unable to bring them again into fire; the remainder, after this great loss, were surrounded, and in great part destroyed. Four ships of the line were taken with the vice-admiral, three were burnt, and the remainder driven for shelter under the cannon of the Dardanelles. So overbearing did the pressure of the Russians at sea now become, that it threatened the utmost dangers to the Ottoman government; when the blockade of the capital was raised, and a temporary respite obtained by the treaty of Tilsit, which, as will immediately appear, established a short and fallacious truce between these irreconcilable enemies (2).

Descent by
the British
on the coasts
of Egypt.

Not content with this attack on the Turkish capital, the British government, at the same time, effected a descent on the coasts of Egypt. Deeming the opportunity favourable for regaining possession of that important country, which was still warmly coveted by Napoléon, and the cession of which into the feeble hands of the Mussulmans had been long a subject of regret, the British government resolved to send an expedition to the shores of the Nile, at the same time that it threatened with bombardment the Turkish capital. The land troops, under the command of Ge-

March. 6.

neral Mackenzie, set sail from Messina on the 6th of March, and landed near Rosetta on the 18th. Alexandria speedily capitulated; Damietta was also occupied without resistance; and General Fraser detached with two thousand five hundred men to effect the reduction of Rosetta, which commands one of the mouths of the Nile, and the possession of which was deemed essential to the regular supply of Alexandria with provisions. This place, however, held out; and as immediate succour was expected from the Mamelukes, Colonel Macleod was stationed with seven hundred men at El Hammed, in order to facilitate their junction with the besieging force. This detachment was speedily surrounded by an overwhelming body of Turkish horse, and after a gallant resistance, which repelled the attacks of their numerous squadrons till the whole ammunition was exhausted, en-

(1) "Lay your ship alongside a Frenchman," said Nelson, "but try to out-manceuvre a Russian."

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 201, 202. Dum. xvii. 292, 293. Jour. ii. 376, 379.

tirely cut off; the promised Mamelukes never made their appearance; and Generat Stewart, severely weakened by so great a loss, with difficulty made good his retreat, fighting all the way, to Alexandria, where he arrived with a thousand fewer men than he had set out. The fortifications of that place, however, enabled the British to bid defiance to their desultory opponents; and it soon was found that the apprehensions of scarcity which had prompted this ill-fated expedition to Rosetta were entirely chimerical, as provisions speedily became more abundant than ever. But the British government, in

Which is defeated. whom an important change at this time took place, became sensible of the impolicy of longer retaining this acquisition at a crisis when every nerve required to be exerted to protect their shores from the forces of Napoléon. It was with lively satisfaction, therefore, that they heard of the conclusion of a convention in autumn, by which it was stipulated that all the British prisoners in the hands of the Turks should be released, and Sept. 23. Alexandria surrendered to their arms; in virtue of which the English troops set sail from the mouth of the Nile in the end of September, and were brought to Gibraltar, where they were stationed, to co-operate in the retreat of the royal family of Portugal from the Tagus, and ultimately took a share in the glories of the Peninsular campaigns (4).

Great discontent at these repeated defeats throughout Great Britain. The public dissatisfaction arising from these repeated defeats was so strong, that it seriously shook the stability of Ministers, and produced a very general impression even among that portion of the community who had hitherto supported them, that, however well qualified to direct the state during a period of profound peace, and when ample leisure was to be had for carrying into effect their projected reforms, they were not calculated for the existing crisis, in which these pacific ameliorations were of comparatively little consequence, and what was imperatively called for was the capacity of warlike combination. But room was not afforded for this growing discontent to manifest itself in the usual way, so as to affect the fortunes of the administration, from another event at this time, which brought them into collision with the religious feelings of the sovereign, and ultimately led to their retirement from office.

Measures for introducing the Catholics into the army and navy brought in by Lord Howick. It has been already mentioned that the general question of Catholic Emancipation was brought forward in the session of 1805, and supported with all the weight and eloquence of the Whig party. The ministerial leaders felt the necessity of making some effort, when in power, to redeem the pledges which they had so freely given when on the opposition benches. Lord Grenville, in particular, who had formed part of the administration which resigned in 1801, in consequence of the declared repugnance of the sovereign to those concessions to the Catholics which Mr. Pitt then deemed essential to the security of the country, considered himself called upon by every consideration, both of public policy and private honour, again to press them upon the legislature. In consequence of these impressions, Lord Howick (afterwards Earl Grey) moved, on the 5th of March 5. March, for leave to bring in a bill which should enable persons of every religious persuasion to serve in the army and navy, without any other condition but that of taking an oath specified in the bill which was repugnant to no religious opinions. By the existing law, a Catholic in Great Britain could not rise to the rank even of a subaltern, in consequence of the necessity of officers of every grade taking the Test oath; while in Ireland, under an act passed in the Irish parliament in 1795, persons of that religious persua-

sion were permitted to rise to any situation in the army, excepting Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, Master-General of the Ordnance, or General on the Staff. "Was it prudent," said Lord Howick, "when we were contending with so powerful an enemy, to prevent, in this manner, a large portion of the population of the country from concurring in the common defence? What can be more anomalous than that in one united empire so great a discrepancy should prevail, as that on one side of St.-George's Channel a Catholic may rise to the highest rank in the army, but on the other he cannot hold even an ensign's commission? It was declared in 1795, when this restriction was removed by the Irish parliament, by his Majesty's Ministers in both houses, that in two months they would grant a similar indulgence to persons of the Romish persuasion in Great Britain, but this had never yet been done, and this monstrous inconsistency continued to disgrace the laws of the United Kingdom. It may fairly be admitted that the principle of this relaxation applies equally to dissenters of every description, and that it must lead to a general admission of persons of every religious persuasion to the army and navy; but where is the danger of such liberality? The proposed measure only enables the sovereign to appoint such persons to offices of high importance. It does not compel him to do so; their appointment would still depend on the executive government, who would, of course, avoid any dangerous or improper use of their authority; and would, on the contrary, be enabled to take advantage in the common defence of the whole population of the country, without any of those restrictions which now, with a large proportion, damped the spirit or soured the affections (1)."

On the other hand it was strongly contended by Mr. Perceval—
Arguments in favour of it by Lord Howick.
Arguments against it by Mr. Perceval. "The objections to this measure, strong as they are, are not so insuperable as to the system of which it forms a part, which originates in a laxity of principle on matters of religion, which is daily increasing, and threatens in its ultimate results to involve all our institutions in destruction. If it is desirable to preserve any thing in our ancient and venerable establishments, it is indispensable to make a stand at the outset against any innovations in so essential a particular. This measure is, in truth, a partial repeal of the Test Act; if passed, it must at no distant period lead to the total repeal of that act, and with it the downfall of the Protestant ascendancy in Ireland. The advocates of the Catholics argue as if their measures were calculated to support toleration, whereas, in reality and in their ultimate effects, they are calculated to destroy that great national blessing, by subverting the Protestant establishment, by whom toleration has been always both professed and practised, and reinstating the Romish, by whom it has been as uniformly repudiated. From the arguments that are advanced at the present day, one would be inclined to imagine that there was no such thing as truth or falsehood in religion; that all creeds were equally conducive to the temporal and eternal interests of mankind; and that, provided only the existing heats and dissensions on the subject could be allayed, it mattered not to what religious tenets either a government or a people inclined. True toleration is indeed an inestimable blessing, but it consists in permitting to every man the free exercise of his religion, not in putting into the hands of the professors of a hostile creed the means of overturning what they will never cease to regard as a pestilent heresy, and resuming from its present Protestant possessors the lost patrimony of St.-Peter in these islands. In point of law, it is incorrect to say, that a Catholic who has obtained a commission in Ireland is

(1) Parl. Deb. ix, 1, 7.

liable to any penalties; the Mutiny Act authorizes the king to require in any part of his dominions the services of every man in his army, and this is of itself a practical repeal of the disability affecting Catholics; for no man can be compelled to do what would subject him to a penalty. The argument that all offices should be thrown open to persons of all religious persuasions, is inconsistent with the British constitution as settled in 1688, which is root and branch a Protestant establishment. If pushed to its legitimate length, it would throw open all offices, even the crown itself, to Catholic aspirants. What then becomes of the Act of Settlement, or the right of the House of Hanover to the throne? If this is to be the policy of our country, there is but one thing to be done; to do every thing to transfer the church lands in Ireland to the Catholics, re-establish the Catholic faith, and call over the Pretender to the throne of these realms. These are the great and dazzling objects which the Romish party have in view; it was to exclude them that all the restrictions were imposed by our ancestors on the persons professing that faith; it is to gain them that all these minor concessions are demanded by their adherents; their advances are only the more dangerous that they are gradual, unperceived, and veiled under the colour of philanthropy. The Catholics already enjoy every thing which toleration can demand; to ask more, is to demand weapons to be used against ourselves. The consequences of a storm are little to be apprehended; it is the gradual approaches which are really dangerous. If Parliament goes on allowing this accumulation, it will ultimately have that extorted from its weakness which its wisdom would be desirous to withhold (1)."

Change of ministry. Causes which led to it. March 24. The second reading of this interesting bill was adjourned from time to time, without the nation being either alive to its importance or aware of the quarter in which obstacles to its progress existed. But on the 24th March, it was suddenly announced in the newspapers that Ministers had been dismissed, and two nights after, Lord Grenville, in the House of Lords, and Lord Howick, in the House of Commons, gave a full statement of the circumstances which led to so unlooked-for a change. The draft of the bill, as usual in all matters of importance, had been submitted to his Majesty for his consideration, and it contained a recital of the Irish Act which opened the army to Catholics for every grade, with the restriction of the Master-General of the Ordnance, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces, and General of the Staff; and then provided that the services of the Catholics should be received without any restriction, and the condition only of taking the oath of allegiance. On this bill being proposed, the King manifested considerable objections, but these were at length so far overcome that Ministers were authorized to bring in the bill, and communications were made to the heads of the Catholics in Ireland, that they were to be admitted to every situation in the army without exception. The King, however, had laboured under some misapprehension as to the extent and tendency of the measure which was to be brought forward; and believed that it was not intended to enlarge the facilities of admission, created by the Act of 1793 for Ireland, but only to make that act the general law of the empire; for no sooner was its import explained in the debate which occurred on the first reading in the House of Commons, of which an abstract has already been given, than he

(1) Parl. Deb. ix. 9, 11.

Subsequent events have rendered these early debates and predictions on the effects of concession to the Catholics in the highest degree curious and interesting. Without pronouncing any decided opinion on a subject on which the light of expe-

rience is only now beginning to shine upon the world, it is the duty of the historian to point out the discussions on this subject to the attentive consideration of every candid enquirer, either into political wisdom or historic truth.

intimated to the government that he had invincible objections to the proposed change. After some ineffectual attempts at a compromise, Ministers finding the King resolute, determined to withdraw the bill altogether, and intimated this decision to his Majesty, accompanied, however, with the conditions that they should not be precluded from stating their opinions on the general policy of the measure in Parliament, and that they should be at liberty, from time to time, to bring the matter again under his Majesty's consideration. The answer of the King, after expressing regret at the difference of opinion which had arisen, rejected these conditions as inconsistent with the fundamental principle of the Constitution, that the acts of Government are to be held as those of the responsible Ministers, and that the adoption or rejection of no measure is to be laid upon his Majesty; and not less at variance with the fundamental basis of the Act of Settlement, which is rested on the exclusion of Catholics from the highest office in the realm; and it therefore required a written pledge from Ministers that they would propose no further concessions to the Catholics. This pledge Ministers, on their side, considered as inconsistent with the fundamental principle of a free constitution, which is that the King can do no wrong, and that the responsibility of all public measures must rest with his advisers, and equally repugnant to that progressive change in human affairs which might at no distant period render a repetition of the proposal a matter of necessity. They therefore declined, though in the most respectful terms (1), to give the proposed pledge, and the consequence was, that the King, in gracious terms, sent them an intimation that their services were no longer required; and on the same day the Duke of Portland, Lord Hawkesbury, and Mr. Perceval received the royal commands to form a new Administration.

Parliament, after this unexpected event, was adjourned till the 8th April, and on that day the new Ministers took their seats (2). The change of Administration, of course, formed the first and most anxious subject of debate; and the interest of the country was excited to the highest degree, by the arguments which were urged for and against that important and unwonted exercise of the royal prerogative. On the side of the former Ministers, it was urged by Sir Samuel Romilly and Lord Howick:—"The true question at issue is, whether or not it would have been constitutionally justifiable, or rather would not have been a high crime and misdemeanour, for any Minister to subscribe a written pledge that he would never in future bring a particular measure or set of measures under his Majesty's consideration. If any statesman could be found base enough to give such a pledge, he would deserve impeachment, and the House would be guilty of a dereliction of its duty, if it did not impeach a Minister who so far forgot his duty to the country. This is a matter in which the interests of the crown

(1) Lord Grenville's, Howick's, Hawkesbury's, and Mr. Perceval's Speeches, *Parl. Deb.* ix. 247, 258, 261, 278.

(2) The new Cabinet stood thus:—

Composition of the new Cabinet.	Earl Camden, President of the Council. Lord Eldon, Chancellor. Earl of Westmoreland, Lord Privy Seal.
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Duke of Portland, First Lord of the Treasury. Lord Mulgrave, First Lord of the Admiralty. Earl of Chatham, Master-General of the Ordnance. Earl Bathurst, President of the Board of Trade. Lord Hawkesbury, Home Secretary. Mr. Canning, Foreign Secretary. Lord Castlereagh, War and Colonial Secretary. Mr. Perceval, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Duchy of Lancaster.	
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Not in the Cabinet.

Mr. Robert Dundas, President of the Board of Control. George Rose, President of the Board of Trade. Sir James Pulteney, Secretary at War. Sir Vicary Gibbs, Attorney-General. Sir Thomas Plummer, Solicitor-General. Duke of Richmond, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.	
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—See *Parl. Deb.* ix. xii.

were more at stake than even those of the people : for, if the precedent is once to be allowed, that a Minister is at liberty to surrender his own private judgment to the will of the reigning sovereign, it is impossible that the legal fiction that the King can do no wrong can any longer be maintained, and the great constitutional principle, that the acts of the King are those of his responsible advisers, would be at an end. Who could, in such a view, set bounds to the dangerous encroachments of unknown and irresponsible advisers upon the deliberation of Government, or say how far the ostensible Ministers might be thwarted, and overruled by unknown and secret influence, which might totally stop the action of a constitutional Government? The danger of the measure which has been adopted is only rendered the greater by the announcement now openly made, that in this, the most important step perhaps taken in his whole reign, his Majesty had no advisers. The constitution recognises no such doctrine; the advisers of the King throughout must be held to be those who have succeeded to his councils. There is no desire to bring the sovereign to the bar of the House of Commons; it is the new Ministers who are really the objects of deliberation. The late Administration was dismissed because they refused to bind themselves by a specific pledge never to renew the subject of Catholic concession; a new Ministry have succeeded them; they must be held, therefore, to have given that pledge, and it is for the House to say, whether such a dereliction of public duty is not utterly at variance with every principle of constitutional freedom (1)."

And in support of it by Mr. Perceval and Mr. Canning. On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Perceval and Mr. Canning :—" The question, on which the imprudent zeal of the late Administration has brought them into collision with the religious scruples and political wisdom of the sovereign, is not one of trivial moment, in which the monarch may be expected to abide by the judgment of his constitutional advisers. It lies, on the contrary, at the foot of the whole constitution; it constitutes one of the foundations *non tangenda non movenda*, on which the entire fabric of our Protestant liberties has been reared. The present question regards the transference of the sword to Catholic hands; the same question on which Charles I erected his standard at Northampton—the intrusting the direction of the military force to a party necessarily and permanently inimical to our Protestant constitution, both in church and state. It is absurd to suppose this concession would do any thing towards satisfying the Catholics—it would only lead them to make fresh demands, and empower them to urge them with additional weight; and the consequence of the measure could be nothing else, in the end, but to bring Catholic Bishops into the House of Lords. Was it surprising that the King paused on the threshold of such a question, striking, as it evidently did, at the root of the tenure by which his own family held their right to the throne? In demanding a pledge that such a proposal should not be renewed, he acted without any adviser, upon the unaided dictates of his own masculine understanding, aided by the conscientious scruples of his unsophisticated heart. All the talent of the Cabinet could not blind him to the evident and inevitable, though possibly remote, consequences of such a fatal precedent as was now sought to be forced upon him. It is a palpable mistake to say he drew back in the later stages of the negotiation from what he had previously agreed to; he first gave a reluctant consent to the extension of the Irish Act of 1793 to Great Britain, in the firm belief that this was all that was required of him; so the proposed measure was explained to and understood by him, and that he was not singular in that,

(1) Parl. Deb. ix, 327, 330, 338, 341.

belief is proved by the fact, that the Irish Secretary had his doubts upon it, and that the Irish Chancellor of the Exchequer, in answer to a question as to the second reading of the bill, said there was no particular reason for the Irish members being present on that occasion, as they were already acquainted with the measure. Three Cabinet Ministers, viz., the Lord Chancellor, Lord Sidmouth, and Lord Ellenborough, refused to concur in the measure, when they understood how far it was to be carried; the Chancellor was not even summoned to the council at which it was to be discussed, though he was in a peculiar manner the keeper of the King's conscience; and even the person who was commissioned to procure the King's consent to the measure did not understand the extent to which it was to be carried. Having thus been misled, whether designedly or inadvertently, it mattered not, in so vital a particular by his Ministers, was it surprising that the King should have required from them a pledge that they would not again harass him on the same subject? Undoubtedly no Minister should give a pledge to fetter the exercise of his own judgment on future occasions; but that was not here required; for if circumstances in future might render a renewal of the measure necessary, they might at once resign. The King regarded this measure as a violation of his coronation oath, as destructive to the Protestant Church in Ireland, and in its ultimate effects likely to endanger our whole Protestant constitution. Unquestionably it was to be regretted, that on any occasion the private opinion of the Sovereign should be brought forward apart from that of his constitutional advisers: but for this evil those must answer, who, by forcing on a rash and unnecessary measure, compelled him to rely on his own judgment alone; and it is some consolation to reflect, that in proportion as the Sovereign has been made more unconstitutionally responsible in his own person, he must become better known to his people; and the soundness of judgment, promptness and vivacity of intellect, which have enabled him to bear up alone against the united weight of the Cabinet, have only evinced, in the more striking manner, how worthy he is to fill the throne which his family attained by the principle he has now so manfully defended (1)."

Upon a division, there appeared 238 for the new Ministers, and 226 for the old, leaving a majority of thirty-two for the existing Government (2).

Dissolution
of Parlia-
ment, and
great major-
ity for the
new Minis-
ters.

This majority, though sufficient to enable Ministers to conduct the public business during the remainder of that session, was not adequate to carry on the government during the arduous crisis which awaited them in the administration of foreign affairs. They resolved, therefore, to strengthen themselves by a dissolution of Parliament; and the event decisively proved that the King had not miscalculated the loyalty and religious feeling of the English people on this trying emergency. Parliament was prorogued on the 27th April, and soon after dissolved by royal proclamation. The utmost efforts were made by both parties on this occasion to augment their respective forces; to the usual heats and excitement of a general election being superadded the extraordinary passions arising from the recent dismissal of an administration from office, and consequent elevation of another in their stead. All the usual means of exciting popular enthusiasm were resorted to without scruple on both sides; the venality and corruption of the Tories, so strikingly evinced in their recent elevation of Lord Melville, after the stain consequent on the Tenth Report of the Commissioners, were the subject of loud declamation from the Whigs: the scandalous attempt to force the King's conscience, and induce a Popish ty-

(1) Parl. Deb. ix. 314, 321, 342, 346.

(2) Ibid. ix. 348.

ranny on the land, yet wet with the blood of the Protestant martyrs, was as vehemently re-echoed from the other : "No Peculation," "No Popery," were the war-cries of the respective parties ; and amidst banners, shouts, and universal excitement, the people were called on to exercise the most important rights of free citizens. To the honour of the empire, however, this great contest was conducted without bloodshed or disorder in any quarter ; and the result decisively proved, that, in taking his stand upon the inviolate maintenance of the Protestant constitution, the King had a great majority of all classes throughout the empire on his side. Almost all the counties and chief cities of Great Britain returned members in the interest of the new ministry : defeat after defeat in every quarter told the Whigs how far they had miscalculated the spirit of the age : and on the first division in the ensuing Parliament they were defeated by a great majority in both Houses ; that in the Peers being 97, in the Commons no less than 195 (1).

Character of the Whig Ministry, and effects of their fall. On reviewing the external measures of the Whig Administration, it is impossible to deny that their removal from office at that period was a fortunate event for the British empire in its ultimate results, and proved eminently favourable to the cause of freedom throughout the world. Notwithstanding all their talent—and they had a splendid array of it in their ranks—notwithstanding all their philanthropy, and their domestic measures were generally dictated by its spirit—they could not at that period have long maintained the confidence of the English people ; and their unfortunate shipwreck on the Catholic Question only accelerated a catastrophe already prepared by many concurrent causes. External disaster, the reproaches of our allies, the unbroken progress of our enemies, must ere long have occasioned their fall. The time was not suited, the national temper not then adapted for those domestic reforms on which the wishes of their partisans had long been set, and which in pacific times were calculated to have excited so powerful a popular feeling in their favour. The active and ruling portion of the nation had grown up to manhood during the war with France ; the perils, the glories, the necessities of that struggle were universally felt ; the military spirit had spread with the general arming of the people to a degree unparalleled in the British islands. Vigour in the prosecution of the contest was then indispensably necessary for general support ; capacity for warlike combination the one thing needful for lasting popularity. In these particulars the Whig Ministry, notwithstanding all their talents, were eminently deficient ; and the part they had taken throughout the contest disqualified them from conducting it to a successful issue. They had so uniformly opposed the war with France, that they were by no means equally impressed with the nation either with its dangers or its inevitable character : they had so strenuously on every occasion deprecated the system of coalitions, that they could hardly, in consistency with their former principles, take a suitable part in that great confederacy by which alone its overgrown strength could be reduced. Their system of warfare, accordingly, was in every respect adverse to that which the nation then desired : founded upon a secession from all alliances, when the people passionately desired to share in the dangers and glories of a continental struggle ; calculated upon a defensive system for a

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 238, 239.

The numbers were—

In the Peers for the Whigs,	67
For the Tories,	164
Majority,	97

In the Commons for the Whigs,	155
For the Tories,	350

195

—Ann. Reg. 1807, 238-239.

long course of years, when the now aroused spirit of the empire deemed it practicable, by a vigorous and concentric effort, to bring the contest at once to a successful termination.

Reflections
on their
foreign mea-
sures.

The foreign disasters which attended their military and naval enterprises in all parts of the world profoundly effected the British people, more impatient than any in Europe of defeat in warlike adventure. The capitulation at Buenos Ayres, the flight from the Dardanelles, the defeat in Egypt, succeeding one another in rapid succession, were felt the more keenly that they occurred on the theatres of our greatest triumphs by land and sea, or blasted hopes the most extravagant of commercial advantage. And yet it is now abundantly evident that defeat on the shores of the la Plata and the banks of the Nile, was more to be desired than victory; and that no calamity could have been so great as the successful issue of these expeditions. They were framed in the most inconsiderate manner, and aimed at objects which, if gained, would have paralysed the strength of the empire. At the moment when the armies of Napoléon were crossing the Thuringian forests, ten thousand English soldiers embarked for South America: when the scales of war hung even on the fields of Poland, five thousand men were sent to certain destruction amidst the cavalry of Egypt. Their united force, if thrown into the scale at Eylau, would have driven the French Emperor to a disastrous retreat across the Rhine, and induced, seven years before they occurred, the glories of Leipsic and Waterloo. What could be more impolitic than, after Russia had given such decisive proof of its extraordinary resolution and devotion to the cause of Europe, in February, 1807, to send out a miserable little expedition to Alexandria in March following, too large for piracy, too small for conquest, and the success of which could have no other effect but that of riveting the hostility of Turkey to Russia and its allies, and thereby securing to Napoléon the inestimable advantage of a powerful diversion on the

Violent irri-
tation aris-
ing from it
in Russia.

side of the Danube? What more impolitic than, when the finances of that great power were exhausted by the extraordinary expenses of the contest, to refuse to the Emperor not only a subsidy, but even the British guarantee to a loan which he was desirous of contracting in the British dominions, unless accompanied by the cession of customhouse duties in Russia in security; dealing thus with the greatest potentate in Europe, at the very moment when he was periling his very crown in our cause, as well as his own, in the same manner as a Jewish pawnbroker does with a suspicious applicant for relief? The battle of Eylau should have been the signal for contracting the closest alliance with the Russian government; the instant advance of loans to any amount; the marching of sixty thousand English soldiers to the nearest points of embarkation. This was the crisis of the war: the imprudent confidence of Napoléon had drawn him into a situation full of peril; for the first time in his life he had been overmatched in a pitched battle, and hostile nations, besetting three hundred leagues of communication in his rear, were ready to intercept his retreat. No effort on the part of England could have been too great in order to turn to the best account so extraordinary a combination of favourable circumstances; no demonstration of confidence too unreserved to an ally capable of such sacrifices. Can there be a doubt that such a vigorous demonstration would at once have terminated the hesitations of Austria, revived the spirit of Prussia, and by throwing a hundred thousand men on each flank of his line of communication, driven the French Emperor to a ruinous retreat? Is it surprising that when, instead of such co-operation, Alexander, after the sacrifices he had made, met with nothing but refusals in his applications for assistance, and

saw the land force of England wasted on useless distant expeditions, when every bayonet and sabre was of value on the banks of the Alle, he should have conceived a distrust of the English alliance, and formed the resolution of extricating himself as soon as possible from the hazardous conflict in which he was now exclusively engaged (1)?

The Dardanelles expedition is an exception to the general inexperience of their foreign policy. To these general censures on the foreign policy of England at this juncture, an exception must be made in the case of the expedition to the Dardanelles. It was ably conceived, and vigorously entered upon. The stroke there aimed by England was truly at the heart of her adversary; the fire of Duckworth's broadsides was concentric with that of the batteries of Eylau; if successful, they would have added forty thousand men to the Russian standards. This object was so important that it completely vindicates the expedition; the only thing to be regretted is, that the force put at the disposal of the British admiral was not such as to

Repeated and (1) "In the Foreign office," said ineffectual Mr. Canning, when Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1807, "are to be found not one but twenty letters from the Marquis of Douglas, Ambassador to the Whigs at St Petersburg, intimating, during the war, in the strongest terms, that unless effectual aid was sent to the Emperor of Russia he would abandon the contest." Ample proofs of this exists, in the correspondence relating to that subject which was laid before Parliament. On 28th November, 1806, the Marquis wrote to Lord Howick, afterwards Earl Grey, from St Petersburg,—"General Budberg lately told me that his Imperial Majesty had expressly directed him to urge the expediency of partial expeditions on the coasts of France and Holland, for the purpose of distracting the attention of the enemy, and impeding the march of the French reserves. The extraordinary expenses arising from the disasters of Prussia have rendered a loan of six millions sterling indispensable, which his Imperial Majesty is exceedingly desirous should be negotiated in England." On 18th December, 1806, he again wrote,—"At court this morning his Imperial Majesty again urged, in the strongest terms, the expediency of a diversion on the enemy in the north of Europe, by a powerful expedition to the coasts of France or Holland." On 2d January, 1807,—"I have again heard the strongest complaints that the whole of the enemy's forces are directed against Russia, at a moment when Great Britain does not show any disposition to diminish the danger by a diversion against France and Holland." On January 14th,—"I must not conceal from your Lordships that the silence of his Majesty's government respecting a military diversion on the coast of France has not produced a favourable impression either on the ministry or people of this country." On January 26th,—"Baron Budberg has again complained of the situation in which Russia has

now been placed, having been left alone against France, without either support on one side or diversion on the other." On February 4th,—"During this interview, General Budberg seized every opportunity of complaining that the Russians were left without any military assistance on the part of Great Britain." On February 15th,—"I cannot sufficiently express the extreme anxiety felt here that some expedition should be undertaken by Great Britain to divert the general concentration of the enemy's forces on the banks of the Vistula." Notwithstanding these and numberless similar remonstrances, and urgent calls for aid, the British government did nothing; they declined to guarantee the loan of six millions which was indispensable to the equipment of the Russian militia and reserves; they sent neither succours in men, money, nor arms, grounding their refusal on the necessity of husbanding their resources for a protracted contest, or a struggle on their own shores. On Jan. 13, Lord Howick wrote,—"In looking forward to a protracted contest, for which the successes and inveterate hostility of the enemy must oblige this country to provide, his Majesty feels it to be his duty to preserve as much as possible the resources to be derived from the affections of his people." It is difficult to find in history an example of a more ill-judged and discreditable parsimony; "husbanding," as Mr. Canning afterwards said, "your muscles till you lose the use of them."

The infatuation of this conduct appears in still more striking colours, when the vast amount of the disposable force then lying dormant in the British Islands is taken into account. Notwithstanding the useless or pernicious expeditions to Buenos-Ayres and Alexandria, England had still a disposable regular force of eighty thousand men in the British Islands. Her military force, Jan. 1807, was as follows:—

Regulars.		Militia.		Volunteers.	
Cavalry at home, .	20,041	In Great Britain, .	53,810	Infantry, . . .	254,544
Infantry ditto, .	61,447	In Ireland, . . .	24,180	Cavalry, . . .	25,342
				Artillery, . . .	9,420
Total ditto, . .	81,488		77,990		289,306
Infantry abroad, .	93,114				
Cavalry ditto, . .	6,274				
Total,	180,876				
Total in arms in the British Isles—of whom 81,488 were regulars, 448,784					

But of this immense force, lying within a day's sail of France and Holland, and including eighty thousand regulars, certainly seventy or eighty thousand might without difficulty have been sent to the Continent. In fact, in 1809, England had about seventy thousand regular soldiers at one time in

Spain and Holland. Little more than half this force conquered Napoleon at Waterloo. Thrown into the scale in March or April 1807, it would at once have decided the contest.—See *Parl. Paper*, July 18, 1807; *Parl. Deb* ix. 111; *Appendix*.

have rendered victory a matter of certainty. As it was, however, it was adequate to the object; and this bold and well-conceived enterprise would certainly have been crowned with deserved success, but for the extraordinary talents and energy of General Sébastiani, and the unfortunate illness of Mr. Arbuthnot, which threw the conduct of the negotiation into the hands of the British admiral, who, however gallant in action, was no match for his adversary in that species of contest, and wasted in fruitless efforts for an accommodation those precious moments which should have been devoted to the most vigorous warlike demonstrations.

These defeats were ultimately beneficial.

After all, the unsuccessful issue of these expeditions, and the severe mortification which their failure occasioned to the British people, had a favourable effect on the future stages of the contest. It is by experience only that truth is brought home to the masses of mankind. Mr. Pitt's external policy had been distracted by the number and eccentric character of his maritime expeditions; but they were important in some degree, as wresting their colonial possessions from the enemy, and overshadowing by their grandeur and extent his continental confederacies. Now, however, the same system was pursued when hardly any colonies remained to be conquered, and continental combination was abandoned at the very time when sound policy counselled the vigorous and simultaneous direction of all the national and European resources to the heart of the enemy's power. The absurdity and impolicy of this system, glaring as they were, might have long failed in bringing it into general discredit; but this was at once effected by the disasters and disgrace with which its last exertions were attended. The opinion, in consequence, became universal, that it was impolitic as well as unworthy of its resources for so great a nation to waste its strength in subordinate and detached operations: England, it was felt, must be brought to wrestle hand to hand with France before the struggle could be brought to a successful issue: the conquerors of Alexandria and Maida had no reason to fear a more extended conflict with land forces; greater and more glorious fields of fame were passionately desired; and that general longing after military glory was felt, which prepared the nation to support the burdens of the Peninsular war, and share in the glories of Wellington's campaigns.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CAMPAIGN OF FRIEDLAND AND TILSIT.

ARGUMENT.

Negotiations and Treaties between the Allies for the vigorous prosecution of the War—Treaties between Prussia and Russia at Bartenstein, to which England accedes—But too late to prevent the irritation of Russia—Unwise refusal of military succour by England—Violent Irritation which it occasioned in the breast of Alexander—Negotiations of Napoléon during the same period—Auxiliary Force obtained under Romana from Spain—Operations in Pomerania, and Views of Napoléon regarding Sweden—Armistice between the Swedes and French—Sweden again reverts to the Alliance—Formation of an Army of Reserve on the Elbe—Negotiation with Turkey and Persia by Napoléon—Jealousy excited in the Divan by the summoning of Parga—Measures taken to organize the military strength of Poland—Winter Quarters of the French Army—Cantonments of the Russians—Combat of Guttstadt—Great Views of Napoléon at this period for the interior of his empire—He fixes on a design for the Madeleine at Paris—Finances of France during this period—Receipts and Expenditure of the year—Statutes of the Grand Sanhedrim of the Jews at Paris—Progress of the sieges in Silesia during the interval of hostilities—Fall of Schweidnitz—and of Neiss—and Glatz—Siege of Dantzic—Description of that fortress—First Operation of the besieging force—Capture of the Isle of Nehrung—Progress of the siege—Unsuccessful attempt of the Allies to raise it—Growing Difficulties of the besieged, and Fall of the place—Reinforcements which arrived to the Russian Main Army—Its Strength and Position—Strength and Distribution of the French army—Defensive Measures previously adopted by the Russians—Design on Ney's corps—and Plan of Operation—Feigned Assault on the bridge of the Passarge, and real Attack on Marshal Ney—Napoléon concentrates his army, and the Russians fall back—and, pursued by the French, retire to Heilsberg—Different Plans of Operations which present themselves to Napoléon—His Advance upon Heilsberg—Description of the Position and Entrenched Camp of the Russians—Battle of Heilsberg, which is unsuccessful to the French—Fresh attack by Lannes, which is also repulsed—Violent explosion between Lannes, Murat, and Napoléon in consequence—Frightful appearance of the slain after the battle—Napoléon turns the Russian flank and compels them to evacuate Heilsberg—Movements of the two armies before the battle of Friedland—Description of the Field of battle—Benningesen resolves to attack Lannes' corps—Its Situation—He crosses the Alle and attacks the French Marshal—No decisive success is gained on either side, before the arrival of the other French corps—Preparatory Disposition of forces by Napoléon—Battle of Friedland—Splendid Attack by Ney's corps—Gallant Charge of the Russian Guard nearly regains the day—Progress of the action on the Russian centre and right—Measures of Benningesen to secure a retreat—Immense Results of the Battle—The Russians retire without molestation to Allenberg and Wehlaw—Capture of Konigsherg—Movements of Napoléon, and retreat of the Russians to the Niemen—The Emperor Alexander proposes an Armistice—Reasons which made Napoléon rejoice at that step—Considerations which rendered the Russians also desirous of an accommodation—Conclusion of an Armistice—Napoléon's Proclamation there on to his troops—Interview on the Raft at Tilsit between the two Emperors—Commencement of the Negotiations at that town—Napoléon's Interviews with the Queen of Prussia—Napoléon's Character of the Queen of Prussia—Convivialities between the Russian and French officers—Napoléon's admiration of the Russian Imperial Guard—Treaty of Tilsit—Its leading Provisions—Creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw and Kingdom of Westphalia—Treaty with Prussia—Immense Losses of that Power by this Treaty—Secret Treaty for the Partition of Turkey—and regarding England and all Neutral Fleets—and the Dethronement of the Princes of the Spanish Peninsula—Decisive Evidence of these Projects of Spoliation which exists both from the Testimony of the French and Russian Emperors—Measures of Napoléon to follow up his anticipated Turkish acquisitions—Convention regarding the Payment of the French Contribution in Prussia—Noble Proclamation of the King of Prussia to his lost subjects—Enormous Losses sustained by the French during these Campaigns—Memorable Retribution for the Partition of Poland, which was now brought on the Partitioning Powers—Terrible Punishment that was approaching to France—Evil Consequences of the Treaty of Tilsit in the end to Napoléon—His disgraceful

Perfidy towards the Turks—No Defence can be made for it, in consequence of the Revolution at Constantinople—Mutual Projects of the two Emperors for the Spoliation of the other European Powers—Napoléon's leading object in the Treaty was the humbling of Great Britain—But England could not complain of its Conditions—It was ultimately fortunate for Europe that the War was prolonged.

THE change of ministry in England was attended with an immediate alteration in the policy pursued by that power with respect to continental affairs. The men who now succeeded to the direction of its foreign relations had been educated in the school of Mr. Pitt, and had early imbibed the ardent feelings of hostility with which he was animated towards the French Revolution, and to the insatiable spirit of foreign aggrandizement to which the passions springing from its convulsions had led. Mr. Canning and Lord Castlereagh were strongly impressed with the disastrous effects which had resulted from the economical system of their predecessors, and the ill-judged economy which had led them to starve the war at the decisive moment, and hold back, at a time when, by a vigorous application of their resources, it might at once have been brought to a triumphant conclusion. No sooner, therefore, were they in possession of the reins of power, than they hastened to supply the defect, and take measures for bringing the might of England to bear on the contest in a manner worthy of its present greatness and ancient renown. An immediate advance of L.100,000
Negotiations and treaties between the Allies for the vigorous prosecution of the war.
 April 2, 1807. was made to the King of Prussia; arms and military stores were furnished for the use of his troops to the amount of L.200,000; and negotiations set on foot for concluding with the cabinets of St.-Petersburg, Berlin, and Stockholm, conventions for concerted operations and a vigorous prosecution of the war. In April, the cabinet of Vienna interposed its good offices to effect an adjustment of the differences of the Allied Powers; but Mr. Canning, while he accepted the offer of a mediation, did so under the express condition of its being communicated to the other belligerent Powers, and their accession to its condition. But, as they had already concluded engagements for the active prosecution of the contest, the proposed negotiation never took place; and England, under the guidance of its new administration, instead of entering into terms with France, reverted, in the most decided manner, to Mr. Pitt's system of uncompromising hostility to its ambition.
April 3, 1807.
 April 25. A treaty was signed at Bartenstein, in East Prussia, in the end of the same month, between Russia and Prussia, for the future prosecution of the war. By this convention it was stipulated that neither of the contracting parties should make peace without the concurrence of the other; that the Confederation of the Rhine, which had proved so fatal to the liberties of Germany, should be dissolved, and a new confederacy, for the protection of its interests, formed, under the auspices of its natural protectors, Austria and Prussia; that the latter power should recover the dominions which it had held in September 1805, and that Austria should be requested to accede to it, in order to recover its possessions in Tyrol and the Venetian provinces, and extend its frontier to the Mincio. Finally, Great Britain was formally invited to accede to this convention, by furnishing succours in arms, ammunition, and money to the belligerent Powers, and the debarkation of a strong auxiliary force at the mouth of the Elbe, to co-operate with the Swedes in the rear of the enemy, while Austria should menace his communications, and the combined Russian and Prussian armies should attack him in front (1).

(1) Lucches. ii. 297, 300. Parl. Deb. x. 103, 104. Hard. ix. 401, 402. Bign. vi. 234.

April 20.

To this convention Sweden had already given its adhesion by the signature of a treaty, six days before, for the employment of an auxiliary force of twelve thousand men in Pomerania; and England hastened to unite itself to the same confederacy. By a convention signed at London on the 17th June, England gave its accession to the treaty of Bartenstein, and engaged to support the Swedish force in Pomerania by a corps of twenty thousand British soldiers, to act against the rear and left flank of the French army, while, by a relative agreement on the 25d, the Swedish auxiliary force in British pay was to be raised to eighteen thousand men, and the provisions of the fundamental treaty of alliance in April 1805, were again declared in force against the common enemy. Shortly after, a treaty was signed at London between Great Britain and Prussia, by which a subsidy of a million sterling was promised to the latter power for the campaign of 1807, and a secret article stipulated for succours yet more considerable, if necessary, to carry into full effect the purposes of the convention of Bartenstein. Thus, by the return of England to the principles of Mr. Pitt's foreign policy, were the provisions of the great confederacy of 1805 again revived in favour of the northern Powers; and it is not the least honourable part, as Mr. Canning justly observed, of these transactions to Great Britain, that the treaty with Prussia was signed when that power was almost entirely bereft of its possessions, and agreed to by Frederick William in the only town that remained to him of his once extensive dominions (1).

But too late
vi. to prevent
the irritation
of Russia.

But it was too late: the succours of England came too late to counterbalance the disasters which had been incurred, the change of system too tardy to assuage the irritation which had been produced. By withholding these at an earlier period (2), the former Ministry had not only seriously weakened the strength of the Russian forces, by preventing the arming of the numerous militia corps which were crowding to the imperial standards, but left the seeds of irreconcilable dissatisfaction in the breast of the Czar (3), who, not aware of the total change of policy which the accession of the Whig ministry had produced in the cabinet of St.-James's, and the complete revolution in that policy which had resulted from their dismissal, was actuated by the strongest resentment against the British government, and loudly complained that he was deserted by the ancient ally of Russia at the very moment when, for its interests even more than his own, he was risking his empire in a mortal struggle with the French Emperor (4). Such was the state of destitution to which the ill-judged parsimony

(1) Schoell. ix. 141. Lucches. ii. 302, 303. Bign. vi. 234. Dum. xviii. 216, 217. Hard. ix. 402, 405. Parl. Deb. ix. 974; and x. 102, 103.

(2) It is the most signal proof of the obstinacy with which the British government, under the direction of Lord Howick, adhered to their ill timed system of withdrawing altogether from continental affairs, that they clung to it even after the account of the battle of Eylau had arrived in London, and it was universally seen over Europe that a crisis in Napoléon's fate was at hand. In the end of February 1807, earnest applications were made by the cabinets of St.-Petersburg and Berlin for the aid of a British auxiliary force to menace the coasts of France and Holland, and land on the coast of Pomerania. The advantage was pointed out of "dispatching, without a moment's delay, on board the swiftest ships of Great Britain, a strong British auxiliary land force to co-operate with the army of Gustavus Adolphus, and thereby compel the French

to retreat. They were engaged in the siege of Stralsund, and in laying waste that province; and if the British force did not arrive in sufficient time to dislodge them, they might steer for some harbour in the Baltic, from whence their junction with the allied armies could certainly be effected." Lord Howick replied on the 10th March—"The approach of spring is doubtless the most favourable period for military operations; but in the present juncture the Allies must not look for any considerable aid from the land force of Great Britain."—See LUCCHES ii. 295, 296, and *Despatches between England and Russia in 1806 and 1807*. London, 1808, p. 130.

(3) Hard. ix. 417.

(4) These angry feelings are very clearly evinced in General Budberg's answer to Lord Leveson Gower's (the British ambassador at St Petersburg) remonstrance on the conclusion at Tilsit of a separate peace by Russia with France. "The firmness and perseverance with which his Majesty, during eight months, maintained and defended a

of the late administration had reduced the British arsenals, and such the effect of their total dismissal of transports in the royal service, that it was found impossible by their successors to fit out an expedition for the shores of the Baltic for several months after their accession to office; and, in consequence, the formidable armament under Lord Cathcart, which afterwards achieved the conquest of Copenhagen, and might have appeared with decisive effect on the shores of the Elbe or the Vistula at the opening of the campaign, was not able to leave the shores of Britain till the end of July, a fortnight after the treaty of Tilsit had been signed, and the subjugation of the continent, to all appearance, irrevocably effected (1).

Negotiations
of Napoléon
during the
same period.
Auxiliary
forces ob-
tained under
Romana
from Spain.

While the Allies were thus drawing closer the bonds which united their confederacy, and England, rousing from its unworthy slumber, was preparing to resume its place at the head of the alliance, Napoléon on his side was not idle, and from his camp at Finken-stein carried on an active negotiation with all the powers in Europe. In his addresses to the French Senate, calling out the additional conscription of 80,000 men, which has been already mentioned, he publicly held out the olive branch; the surest proof of the magnitude of the disaster sustained at Eylau, and the critical situation in which he felt himself placed, with Austria hanging in dubious strength in his rear on one side, and Great Britain preparing to organise a formidable force on the other. "Our policy is fixed," said he: "we have offered to England peace before the fourth

cause common to all sovereigns, are the most certain pledges of the intentions which animated him, as well as of the loyalty and purity of his principles. Never would his Imperial Majesty have thought of deviating from that system which he had hitherto pursued, if he had been supported by a real assistance on the part of his allies. But having, from the separation of Austria and England, found himself reduced to his own resources; having to combat with his own means the immense military forces which France had at her disposal, he was authorized in believing, that, in continuing to sacrifice himself for others, he might ultimately come to compromise the fate of his own empire. The conduct of the British government in later times has been of a kind completely to justify the determination which his Majesty has now taken. The diversion on the continent which England so long promised, has not to this day taken place; and even if, as the latest advices from London show, the British government has at length resolved on sending ten thousand men to Pomerania, that succour is noways proportioned either to the hopes we were authorized to entertain, or the importance of the object to which these troops were destined. Pecuniary succours might, in some degree, have compensated the want of English troops; but not only did the British government decline facilitating the loan the Imperial court had intended to negotiate in London, but when it did at length resolve upon making some advances, it appeared that the sum destined for this purpose, so far from meeting the exigencies of the Allies, would not even have covered the indispensable expenses of Prussia. In fine, the use which, instead of co-operating in the common cause, the British government, during this period, has made of its forces in South America and in Egypt, the latter of which was not even communicated to the Imperial cabinet, and was entirely at variance with its interests, at a time when, by giving them a different destination, the necessity of maintaining a Russian army on the Danube might have been prevented, and the disposable force on the Vistula proportionally increased, sufficiently demonstrates that the Emperor of Russia

was virtually released from his engagements, and had no course left but to attend to the security of his own dominions." It is impossible to dispute the justice of these observations.—*Note*, General BUNBERG to Lord LEYBON GOWER, *Tilsit*, 30th June, 1807; *Parl. Deb.* x. 111, 112.

(1) *Parl. Deb.* ix. 1035, 1036. *Hard.* ix. 425. *Ann. Reg.* 1807, 22, 23.

"When the present ministers came into office," said Mr. Canning, then Foreign Minister, on July 31, 1807, "they found the transport department totally dismantled. This originated in the economical system of Lord H. Petty; but it was a false parsimony, evidently calculated, at no distant period, to render necessary a profuse expenditure. The mandate of dismissal came from the Treasury, and was applicable to all transports but those necessary to maintain the communication with Ireland, Jersey, and Guernsey. The saving produced by this order did not amount to more than £4000 a-month, and it dispersed 60,000 tons of shipping which was left to the late ministry by their predecessors. Ministers thus, in the beginning of April last, had not a transport at their disposal; and from the active state of trade at the same time, it required several months before they could be collected. If they had existed, a military force would in that very month have been sent out, and twenty thousand British troops would have turned the scale at Friedland. This ill-judged economy was the more criminal, that, by having a fleet of transports constantly at command, and threatening various points, twenty thousand men could easily paralyse three times that force on the part of the enemy. The Whigs had apparently parted with this transport force for no other purpose but that of registering their abandonment of the Continent." The facts here alleged, Mr. Windham, on the part of the late government, did not deny, alleging only "the absurdity of sending British forces to the Continent; which required no reply!"—a curious argument from so able a man, when it is recollected that the nation was on the verge of Wellington's career.—*See Parl. Deb.* x. 1035-1038.

coalition ; we repeat the offer : we are ready to conclude a treaty with Russia on the terms which her ambassador subscribed at Paris : we are prepared to restore its eight millions of inhabitants and capital conquered by our arms to Prussia." There was nothing said now about making the Prussian nobility so poor that they should have to beg their bread ; nor of the Queen, like another Helen, having lighted the fires of Troy. But amidst these tardy and extorted expressions of moderation, the Emperor had nothing less at his heart than to come to an accommodation ; and his indefatigable activity was incessantly engaged in strengthening his hands by fresh alliances, and collecting from all quarters additional troops to overwhelm his enemies. The imprudent and premature proclamation has been already mentioned, by which the Prince of Peace (1) announced, on the eve of the battle of Jena, his preparations to combat an enemy which no one could doubt was France. Napoléon dissembled for a while his resentment, but resolved to make this hostile demonstration the ground for demanding fresh supplies from Spain ; and accordingly great numbers of the Prussian prisoners were sent into the Peninsula to be fed and clothed at the expense of the court of Madrid, while an auxiliary force was peremptorily demanded from that power to co-operate in the contest in the north of Europe. Trembling for its existence, the Spanish government had no alternative but submission ; and accordingly sixteen thousand of the best troops of the monarchy, under a leader destined to future celebrity, the MARQUIS DE ROMANA, crossed the Pyrenees early in March, and arrived on the banks of the Elbe in the middle of May. Thus was the double object gained of obtaining an important auxiliary force for the grand army (2), and of securing, as hostages for the fidelity of the Court of Madrid, the flower of its troops in a remote situation, entirely at the mercy of his forces.

Operations
in Pome-
rania, and
views of
Napoléon
regarding
Sweden.

Sweden was another power which Napoléon was not without hopes, notwithstanding the hostile disposition of its Sovereign, of detaching, through dread of Russia, from the coalition. Immediately after the battle of Eylau he began to take measures to excite the court of Stockholm against the alliance (3). "Should Swedish blood," said he, in the bulletin on the 25d April, "flow for the defence of the Ottoman empire, or its ruin? Should it be shed to establish the freedom of the seas, or to subvert it? What has Sweden to fear from France? Nothing. What from Russia? Every thing. A peace, or even a truce with Sweden, would accomplish the dearest wish of his Majesty's heart, who has always beheld with pain the hostilities in which he was engaged with a nation generous and brave, linked alike by its historic recollections and geographical position to the alliance with France." In pursuance of these instructions, Mortier inclined with the bulk of his forces towards Colberg, to prosecute the siege of that town, leaving only General Grandjean with a weak division before Stralsund. Informed of that circumstance, General Essen, the governor of the fortress, conceived hopes of capturing or destroying the presumptuous commander who maintained a sort of blockade with a force so much inferior to

(1) Ante, V, 350.

(2) Bign. vi. 239, 242.

(3) March 5. In furtherance of this design, early in March, he explained to Marshal Mortier, who was intrusted with the prosecution of the war in Pomerania, that the real object of hostilities in that quarter was not to take Stralsund, nor inflict any serious injury on Sweden, but to observe Ham-burg and Berlin, and defend the mouths of the Oder. "I regret much what has already happened," said

he, "and most of all that the fine suburbs of Stral-sund have been burned. It is not our interest to inflict injury on Sweden, but to protect that power from it. Hasten to propose an armistice to the go-vernor of Stralsund, or even a suspension of arms, in order to lighten the sufferings of a war which I regard as criminal, because it is contrary to the real interests of that monarchy."—72 *Bulletin, Camp. en Saxe et en Pologne*, iv. 243, 246.

April 3. that which was assembled within its walls. Early in April, accordingly, he issued from the fortress, and attacked the French with such superior numbers, that they were compelled to retire, first to Anelam, where they sustained a severe defeat, and ultimately to Stettin, with the loss of above two thousand men. No sooner did he hear of this check, than Mortier assembled the bulk of his troops, about fourteen thousand strong, under the cannon of that fortress, and prepared for a serious attack upon the enemy. The Swedes, though nearly equal in number, were not prepared for a conflict with forces so formidable, and, retired to Stralsund with the loss of above a thousand prisoners, and three hundred killed and wounded : among the latter of whom was General Arnfeld, the most uncompromising enemy of France in their councils (1).

Armistice
between the
Swedes and
French.

After this repulse, Mortier renewed his secret proposals of a separate accommodation to the Swedish generals, and on this occasion he found them more inclined to enter into his views. The Swedish government at this period was actuated by a strong feeling of irritation towards Great Britain for the long delay which had occurred in the remittance of the stipulated subsidies; and its generals at Stralsund were ignorant of the steps which were in progress, since the change of ministry in England, to remedy the defect. Deeming themselves, therefore, deserted by their natural allies, and left alone to sustain a contest in which they had only

April 18. a subordinate interest, they lent a willing ear to Mortier's proposals, and concluded an armistice, by which it was stipulated that hostilities should cease between the two armies — that the Islands of Usidom and Wollin should be occupied by the French troops — the lines of the Peene and the Trebel separate the two armies — no succours, direct or indirect, should be forwarded through the Swedish lines either to Dantzic or Colberg — and no debarkation of troops hostile to France take place at Stralsund (2). The armistice was not to be broken without ten days' previous notice, which period was, by a

April 29. supplementary convention on the 29th April, extended to a month. No sooner was this last agreement signed, than Mortier in person resumed the blockade of Colberg, while a large part of his forces was dispatched to aid Lefebvre in the operations against Dantzic, and took an important part in the siege of that fortress, and the brief but decisive campaign which immediately ensued. The conditions of the new treaty between England and Sweden, signed at London on the 17th June, came too late to remedy these serious evils, and thus, while the previous ill-timed defection of the cabinet of London from the great confederacy for the deliverance of Europe, had sown the seeds of irreconcilable enmity in the breast of the Emperor Alexander, it entirely paralysed the valuable force in the rear of Napoléon, which, if thrown into the scale at the decisive moment, and with the support of a powerful British auxiliary force, could not have failed to have had the most

(1) Dum. xviii. 108, 117. Bign. vi. 244, 245.

(2) In the letter of Napoléon, which Mortier dispatched to Essen on that occasion, he said—"I have nothing more at heart than to re-establish peace with Sweden. Political passion may have divided us; but state interest, which ought to rule the determinations of sovereigns, should reunite our policy. Sweden cannot be ignorant that, in the present contest, she is as much interested in the success of our arms as France itself. She will speedily feel the consequence of Russian aggrandizement. Is it for the destruction of the empire of Constantinople that the Swedes are fighting? Sweden is not less interested than France in the diminution of the enormous

maritime power of England. Accustomed by the traditions of our fathers to regard each other as friends, our bonds are drawn closer together by the partition of Poland and the dangers of the Ottoman empire; our political interests are the same: why, then, are we at variance?" And in the event of the Swedish general acceding to these propositions, the instructions of Mortier were—"instantly to send to Dantzic and Thorn all the regiments of foot and horse which can be spared; to resume without delay the siege of Colberg, and at the same time hold himself in readiness to start with the whole blockading force, at a moment's warning, either for the Vistula or the Elbe."—JOURNAL, ii, 389, 391.

important effects, both upon the movements of Austria and the general issue of the campaign (1).

Sweeden again reverts to the alliance. In justice to the Swedish monarch, however, who, though eccentric and rash, was animated with the highest and most romantic principles of honour, it must be noticed, that no sooner was he informed of the change of policy on the part of the cabinet of London, consequent on the accession of the new administration, and even before the conclusion of the treaty of 17th June, by which efficacious succours were at length promised on the part of great Britain, than he had manifested the firm resolution to abide by the Confederacy, and even pointed to the restoration of the Bourbons as the condition on which alone peace appeared practicable to Europe, or a curb could be imposed on the ambition of France. Early in June he wrote to the King of Prussia with these views, and soon after refused to ratify the convention of 29th April for the extension of the period allowed for the denouncing the armistice with France, in a conversation with Marshal Brune, successor to Mortier; so curious and characteristic as to deserve a place in general history (2).

Not content with thus drawing to the northern contest the force of the monarchy of Charles V, and neutralizing the whole forces of Sweden with the important *point d'appui* for British co-operation in his rear, Napoléon, at the same time, directed the formation of a new and respectable army on the banks of the Elbe. The change of ministry in England had led him to expect a much more vigorous prosecution of the war by that power; the descent of a large body of English troops in the north of Germany was known to be in contemplation; and with his advanced and critical position in Poland, the preservation of his long line of communication with France was an object of vital importance. To counteract any such attempt as might threaten it, two French divisions, under Boudet and Molitor, were summoned from Italy, and, united with Romana's corps of Spaniards and the Dutch troops with which Louis Bonaparte had effected the reduction of the fortresses of Hanover, formed an army of observation on the Elbe, which it was hoped would be sufficient at once to avert any danger in that quarter, hold in respect Hamburg and Berlin, and keep up the important communications of the Grand Army with the banks of the Rhine (3).

Formation of an army of reserve on the Elbe. With a view still further to strengthen himself in the formidable contest which he foresaw was approaching, Napoléon, from his headquarters at Finkenstein, opened negotiations both with Turkey and Persia, in the hope of rousing those irreconcilable enemies of the Muscovite empire to a powerful diversion in his favour on the Danube and the Caucasus. Early in March a magnificent embassy was received by the Emperor at Warsaw, both from the Sublime Porte and the King of Persia. A treaty,

(1) Dum. xviii. 118, 121. Bign. vi. 245, 246. *Jom.* ii. 388, 392.

(2) "Nothing," said he, in his letter of 2d June to the King of Prussia, "would gratify me more than to be able to contribute with you to the establishment of general order and the independence of Europe; but to attain that end I think a public declaration should be made in favour of the legitimate cause of the Bourbons, by openly espousing their interests, which is plainly that of all established governments. My opinion on this point is fixed and unalterable, as well as on the events which are passing before our eyes." And two days afterwards the following conversation passed between the King of Sweden and Marshal Brune:—"Do you forget, Marshal, that you have a lawful sovereign, though

he is now in misfortune?"—"I know that he exists," replied the Marshal.—"He is exiled," rejoined the King; "he is unfortunate; his rights are sacred; he desires only to see Frenchmen around his standard."—"Were is that standard?"—"You will find it wherever mine is raised."—"Your Majesty then regards the Pretender as your brother?"—"The French should know their duties without waiting till I set them an example."—"Will your Majesty then consent to the notification of ten days before breaking the armistice?"—"Yes, but if a month should be secretly agreed on—"—"You know me little if you deem me capable of such a deception."—See *HARD.* ix. 411—412: and *DUM.* xix. 139.

(3) *Jom.* ii. 393, 394.

May 7. offensive and defensive, was speedily concluded between the courts of Paris and Teheran, by which mutual aid and succour was stipulated by the two contracting parties; and the better to consolidate their relations, and turn to useful account the military resources of the Persian monarchy, it was agreed that a Persian legation should reside at Paris, and General Gardanne, accompanied by a skilful body of engineers, set out for the distant capital of Persia. Napoléon received the Turkish ambassador, who represented a power whose forces might more immediately affect the issue of the combat, with the utmost distinction, and lavished on him the most flattering expressions of regard. In a public audience given to that functionary at Warsaw on the 28th May, he said, "that his right hand was not more inseparable from his left than the Sultan Selim should ever be to him." Memorable words! and highly characteristic of the Emperor, when his total desertion of that potentate in two months afterwards, by the treaty of Tilsit, is taken into consideration. In pursuance, however, of this design, at that time at least sincerely conceived, of engaging Turkey and Persia in active hostilities with Russia, he wrote to the Minister of Marine:—"The Emperor of Persia has requested four thousand men, ten thousand muskets, and fifty pieces of cannon—when can they be embarked, and from whence? They would form a rallying point, give consistency to eighty thousand horse, and would force the Russians to a considerable diversion. Send me without delay a memoir on the best means of fitting out an expedition to Persia." At the same time he conceived the idea of maritime operations in the Black Sea, in conjunction with the Ottoman fleet; and in a long letter to the Minister of Marine enumerated all the naval forces at his disposal and on the stocks, in order to impress him with the facility with which a powerful squadron might be sent to the Bosphorus, in order to co-operate in an attack upon Sebastopol (1).

Still more extensive operations were in contemplation with land forces; orders were sent to Marmont to prepare for the transmission of twenty-five thousand men across the northern provinces of Turkey to the Danube; and a formal application was made at Constantinople for liberty to march them through Bosnia, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. In these great designs, especially the missions of General Gardanne to Persia, more important objects than even a diversion to the war in Poland, vital as it was to his interests, were in the contemplation of the Emperor; the appearance of the ambassadors of Turkey and Persia at his head quarters when five hundred leagues from Paris, on the road to Asia, had strongly excited his imagination; his early visions of Oriental conquest were revived, and the project was already far advanced to maturity of striking, through Persia, a mortal stroke at England in her Indian possessions.

These extensive projects, however, which the rapid succession of events on the Vistula prevented from being carried into execution, were wellnigh interrupted by a precipitate and ill-timed step on the part of the Governor of the Ionian Islands, Cæsar Berthier. The consent of the Divan had just been given to the march of the French troops across the northern provinces of the empire, when intelligence was received that the towns of Parga, Previso, and Butrin, on the coast of the Adriatic, though then in the possession of the Turks, had been summoned in the most peremptory manner by that officer, as dependencies of the Venetian States, out of which the modern republic of the Seven Islands had been framed, with the threat to employ force if they were not immediately surrendered. This

Jealousy
excited in
the Divan
by the sum-
moning of
Parga.

May 29.] intelligence excited the utmost alarm at Constantinople; the Turks recollected the perfidious attack which, under the mask of friendship, the French had made on their valuable possessions in Egypt, and anticipated a similar seizure of their European dominions from the force for whom entrance was sought on the footing of forwarding succours to the Danube. Napoléon, though this step was taken in pursuance of orders emanating from himself, expressed the utmost dissatisfaction at their literal execution at so untimely a crisis; the Governor was recalled, and the utmost protestations of friendship for the Sultan made. But the evil was done, and was irreparable: Turkish honesty had conceived serious suspicions of French fidelity; the passage of the troops was refused, and the foundations laid of that well-founded distrust which, confirmed by Napoléon's desertion of their interests in the treaty of Tilsit, subsequently led to the conclusion of a separate peace by the Osmanlis with Russia in 1812, and the horrors of the Beresino to the grand army (1).

Measures to
organize the
military
strength of
Poland. A nearer and more efficacious ally was presented to Napoléon in the Polish provinces. The continuance of the war in their neighbourhood, the sight of the Russian prisoners, the certainty of the advance of the French troops, and the exaggerated reports every where diffused of their successes, had, notwithstanding the measured reserve of his language, excited the utmost enthusiasm for the French Emperor in the gallant inhabitants of that ill-fated monarchy. Of this disposition, so far as it could be done without embroiling him with Austria, he resolved to take advantage. His policy towards that country uniformly was to derive the utmost aid from the military spirit of its subjects which could be obtained, without openly proclaiming its independence, and thereby irrevocably embroiling him with the partitioning powers. In addition to the Polish forces organized under former decrees, and which now amounted to above twenty thousand men, he took into his pay a regiment of light horse raised by Prince John Sulkowski; subsequently decreed the formation of a Polish-Italian legion, and the incorporation of one of their regiments of hussars with his guards; and authorized the provisional government at Warsaw to dispose of royal domains in Polish Prussia to the extent of eighteen millions of francs, and Prussian stock to the extent of six millions. His cautious policy, however, shortly after appeared in a decree, by which the commissary-general at Warsaw was enjoined to limit his requisitions to the territory described by the original decree establishing his powers, which limited them to Prussian Poland. By these means, though he avoided giving any direct encouragement to rebellion in the Russian and Austrian shares of the partitioned territory, he succeeded in generally diffusing an enthusiastic spirit, which, before the campaign opened, had brought above thirty thousand gallant recruits to his standards. This disposition was strongly increased by two decrees which appeared early in June, on the eve of the resumption of hostilities, by the first of which Prince Poniatowski was reinstated in a starosty of which he had been dispossessed by the Prussian cabinet; while, by the second, the provisional government at Warsaw was directed to set apart 20,000,000 of francs (L.800,000) as a fund to recompense those who should distinguish themselves in the approaching campaign (2).

Winter
quarters of
the French
army.

The headquarters of Napoléon in the first instance had been fixed at Osterode, on the margin of one of the lakes which form the feeders of the Drewentz; but, on the representations of the learned

(1) Bign. vi. 248, 250.

(2) Bign. vi. 252, 253.

and humane Larrey, that that situation was low and unhealthy for the troops, he moved to Finkenstein, where all the important negotiations which ensued in that cessation of active hostilities were conducted. The guard were disposed around the Emperor's residence; and not only that select corps, but the whole army, were lodged in a more comfortable manner than could have been anticipated in that severe climate. After a sharp conflict in the end of February, the important fortified post of Braunsberg, at the entrance of the river Passarge into the Frisch-Haff Sea, was wrested from the Prussians by Bernadotte, and the *tête-de-pont* there established secured all the left of the army from the incursions of the enemy. On the left bank of that river no less than four corps of the army were cantoned, while all the passes over it were occupied in such strength as to render any attempt at a surprise impossible. Secure behind this protecting screen, the French army constructed comfortable huts for their winter quarters, and all the admirable arrangements of the camp at Boulogne were again put in force amidst the severity of a Polish winter. The streets in which they were disposed resembled in regularity and cleanliness those of a metropolis. Constant exercises, rural labours, warlike games, and reviews, both confirmed the health and diverted the minds of the soldiers; while the inexhaustible agricultural riches of Old Prussia kept even the enormous multitude, which was concentrated over a space of twenty leagues, amply supplied with provisions. Immense convoys constantly defiling on all the roads from the Rhine, Silesia, and the Elbe, provided all that was necessary for warlike operations; while the numerous conscripts, both from France and the allied states, and the great numbers of wounded and sick who on the return of spring were discharged from the hospitals, both swelled the ranks and reassured the minds of the soldiers. The magnitude of the requisitions by which these ample supplies were obtained, and the inflexible severity with which they were levied from the conquered states, was indeed spreading the seeds of inextinguishable animosity in his rear; but the effects of that feeling were remote and contingent, the present benefits certain and immediate; and the Russians had too much reason to feel their importance, in the numbers and incomparable discipline of the troops by whom they were assailed upon the opening of the campaign (1).

Winter
quarters of
the Rus-
sians.
Combat of
Guttstadt.

The Russian army was far from being equally well situated, and the resources at its disposal were by no means commensurate to those which were in possession of the French Emperor. The bulk of the Allied army was cantoned between the Passarge and the Alle, around Heilsberg, where a formidable entrenched camp had been constructed. The only contest of any moment which took place while the army occupied this position, was in the beginning of March at Guttstadt, which was attacked and carried by Marshal Ney, with the magazines which it contained; but the French troops having imprudently advanced into the plain beyond that town, several regiments were surrounded by the Cossacks, pierced through and broken; so that both parties were glad to resume their quarters without boasting of any considerable advantage. Headquarters were at Bartenstein, and the advanced posts approached to those of Marshal Ney, on the right bank of the Passarge. These cantonments, with the great commercial city of Königsberg in their rear, were very comfortable, and the army was daily receiving important accessions of strength from the sick and wounded who were leaving the hospitals. Thirty thousand fresh troops, also, including the Grand Duke Constantine, with the remainder of the guard, and

(1) Dum, xviii. 75, 85, 206, 207, and xix. 436, 442. Wilson, 118.

several batteries of light artillery, joined the army while they lay in their winter quarters; and in the end of March the Emperor Alexander left St.-Petersburg and arrived at Bartenstein, where the King of Prussia had already taken up his headquarters, and where the imperial and royal courts were established (1). But although the Russian and Prussian governments both made the utmost efforts to recruit their forces and bring up supplies from their rear, yet the succours which they were enabled to draw from their exhausted provinces were very different from what Napoléon extracted from the opulent German states which he held in subjection; and the addition to the respective forces which the cessation of hostilities occasioned was in consequence widely different. Now was seen how immense was the advantage which the French Emperor had gained by having overrun and turned to his own account the richest part of Europe; as well as the magnitude of the error which the British government had committed, in refusing to the northern powers, now reduced to their own resources, and with nine-tenths of Prussia in the hands of the enemy, the supplies by which alone they could be expected to maintain the contest (2).

March 7. Great de- signs of Napoléon at this time for the interior of his empire. During the pause in military operations which took place for the three succeeding months, the active mind of Napoléon resumed the projects which he had formed for the internal ameliorations of his immense empire. Early in March he wrote to the Minister of the Interior as to the expedience of granting a loan, without in-

terest, to the mercantile classes, who were labouring under distress, on the footing of advancing one-half of the value of the goods they could give security over; and he announced his design of establishing a great bank in connexion with the state, for the advance to manufacturers or merchants in difficulties, of sums on the security of their unsold property. Orders, were sent to the French ambassadors at the Courts of Madrid and Constantinople, to use their endeavours to obtain the removal of certain restrictions which existed on French manufactures, and which, in the mortal commercial struggle between France and England, it might be of importance to have recalled.

April 14. The bridge recently built in front of the Champ-de-Mars received the name of Jena, an appellation destined to bring that beautiful structure

March 17. to the verge of destruction in future times; a statue was ordered to be erected to D'Alembert, in the hall of the Institute; the prize formerly

May 7. promised to the ablest treatise on galvanism was directed to be paid to the author who had deserved it; the important and difficult subject

April 19. of the liberty of the press, occupied his serious thoughts and engrossed much of his correspondence with the Minister of the Interior (3); the

(1) Dum. xviii. 203, 207. Wilson.

(2) Dum. xviii. 86, 94, 203, 207. Wilson, 122, 133.

While occupying these cantonments, a truce in hostilities, as usual in such cases, took place between the advanced posts of both armies, and this led to an incident equally characteristic of the gallantry and honourable feelings of both. The Russian and French outposts being stationed on the opposite banks of a river, some firing, contrary to the usual custom, took place, and a French officer advancing, reproached the Russians with the discharge, and a Russian officer approaching the Frenchman, requested him to stop the firing of his people, in order that, if necessary, they might determine by single combat who was most courageous. The French officer assented, and was in the act of commanding his men to cease firing, when a Russian ball pierced him to the heart. The Russian officer instantly rushed forward, and cried

out to the French soldiers—"My life shall make reparation for this accident—let three marksmen fire at me as I stand here;" and turning to his own soldiers, ordered them "to cease firing upon the French, whatever might be his fate, unless they attempted to cross the river." Already a Frenchman had levelled his piece, when the French subaltera next in command struck it down with his sword, and running to the Russian took him by the hand, declaring that no man worthy of the name of Frenchman would be the executioner of so brave a man. The French soldiers felt the justice of the sentiment, and confirmed the feeling by a general acclamation. See Wilson, 120. With truth did Montesquieu say that honour was, under a monarchical government, the prevailing feeling of mankind.

(3) "An effective mode of encouraging literature," said Napoléon, "would be to establish a journal, of which the criticism is enlightened, ac-

project for establishing an university for literary and political information, was discussed (1): a prize of twelve thousand francs (L.4800), announced for

June 4. the best treatise on the best means of curing the croup, which at that period was committing very serious ravages on the infants of France, and of which the child of the Queen of Holland had recently died; a daily correspondence was carried on with the Minister of Finance, and long calculations, often erroneous, but always intended to support an ingenious opinion, transmitted to test the accuracy and stimulate the activity of the

March. 24. functionaries in that important department (2); and the great improvement of keeping accounts by double entry was adopted from the example of commerce, first by the recommendation of the Emperor, and after its advantages had been fully demonstrated by experience, formally enforced

Jan. 8, 1808. by a decree of the government. Nor, amidst weightier cares, were the fine arts neglected; the designs for the Temple of Glory, ordered by the decree of 9th November, from Posen, were submitted to the Emperor's consideration, and that one selected which has since been realized in the beautiful peristyle of the Madeleine; while all the departments of France were ordered to be searched for quarries of granite and marble capable of furnishing materials of durability and elegance for its interior decorations, worthy of a monument calculated for eternal duration (3).

tuated by good intentions, and free of that coarse brutality which characterises the existing newspapers, and is so contrary to the true interests of the nation. Journals now never criticise with the intention of repressing mediocrity, guiding inexperience, or encouraging rising merit; all their endeavour is to wither, to destroy. I am not insensible to the danger, that in avoiding one rock you may strike upon another. It may doubtless happen, that if they dare not criticise, they may fall into the still greater abuse of indiscriminate panegyric; and that the authors of those books with which the world is inundated, seeing themselves praised in journals which all are obliged to read, should believe themselves heaven-born geniuses, and by the facility of their triumphs, encourage still more despicable imitation. Articles should be selected for the journals where reasoning is mingled with eloquence; where praise for deserved merit is tempered with censure for faults. Merit, however inconsiderable, should be sought for and rewarded. A young man who has written an ode worthy of praise, and which has attracted the notice of the minister, has already emerged from obscurity; the public is fixed; it is his part to do the rest."—*NAPOLEON'S Letter, 19th April, 1807, to the Minister of the Interior*; *BIGN.* vi. 262, 264.

(1) "You should occupy yourself with the project of establishing an university for literature, understanding by that word, not merely the belles lettres, but history and geography. It should consist of at least thirty chairs, so linked together as to exhibit a living picture of instruction and direction, where every one who wishes to study a particular age should know at once whom to consult, what books, monuments, or chronicles to examine; where every one who wishes to travel should know where to receive positive instructions, both as to the government, literature, and physical productions of the country which he is about to visit. It is a lamentable truth, that in this great country a young man who wishes to study, or is desirous of signaling himself in any department, is obliged for long to grope in the dark, and literally lose years in fruitless researches, before he discovers the true repositories of the information for which he seeks. It is a lamentable fact, that in this great country we have no depot for the preservation of knowledge,

on the situation, government, and present state of different portions of the globe, but the student must have recourse either to the office of Foreign Affairs, where the collections are far from complete, or to the office of the Minister of Marine, where he will with difficulty find any one who knows any thing of what is asked. I desire such institutions; they have long formed the subject of my meditation, because in the course of my various labours I have repeatedly experienced their want."—*NAPOLEON to Minister of Interior, 19th April, 1807*; *BIGN.* vi. 267, 269.

(2) "The good order which you have established in the affairs of the Treasury, and the emancipation which you have effected of its operations from the control of bankers, is an advantage of the most important kind, which will eminently redound to the benefit of our commerce and manufactures."—*NAPOLEON to the Minister of Finance, Osterode, 24th March, 1807*. In truth, however, what the Emperor here called the emancipation of the Treasury from the bankers, arose, not so much from the regulations of the minister of that department, as from the extraneous sources from whence the chief supplies for the army were now derived, and which rendered the anticipation of revenue by discounting long dated Treasury bills at the bank of France unnecessary. He admitted this himself in the same letter—"I am now discharging the arrears of the army from the beginning of October 1806 to the end of February 1807; we shall see hereafter how this will be arranged with the Treasury; *in the mean time, the payment comes from Prussia*, and that will put us greatly at ease." The pay thus extracted from the conquered states amounted to the enormous sum of 3,300,000 francs, or L.132,000 a month, supposing 150,000 men only so maintained, which for these five months alone was no less than 16,500,000 francs, or L.660,000 sterling.—*See BIGN.* iv. 274, 276.

(3) *BIGN.* vi. 257, 278.

Napoleon fixes on a design for the Madeleine at Paris. "After having attentively considered," said Napoleon, "the different plans submitted to my examination, I have not felt the smallest doubt on that which I should adopt. That of M. Vignon alone fulfilled my wishes. It is a temple which I desire, and not a church. What could you erect as a church which could keep its ground

The finances of France during this year. The finances of France during this year exhibited the most flattering prospect : but the exposition published was entirely fallacious, so far as the total expenditure was concerned, because a large portion of the supplies were drawn by war contributions from foreign states, and upwards of half the army were quartered for all its expenses on the vanquished territories. The revenue of the empire, as exhibited in the budget, amounted to 683,057,953 francs, or L.25,507,000, and its expenditure to 777,850,000 francs, or L.52,000,000 (1); but the Emperor did not reveal to the public, what was not less true, that the sums levied on the countries lying between the Rhine and the Vistula, between the 14th October, 1806, when the war commenced, and the 14th June, 1807, when it terminated, amounted to the enormous, and if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of 604,227,922 francs, or L.24,000,000; that above a million annually was levied on the kingdom of Italy (2); that the arrears paid up by Austria for the great war contribution of 1805 were double that sum; that the war subsidies extracted from Spain and Portugal, in virtue of the treaty of St.-Ildefonso, were above L.3,000,000 yearly. Finally, that the grand army, two hundred thousand strong, had, since it broke up from the heights of Boulogne, in September 1805, been exclusively fed, clothed, lodged, and paid at the expense of the German states (3). The revenues of France, therefore, did not furnish more than half the total sum required by the expensive and gigantic military establishment of the Emperor; while its inhabitants received almost the whole benefit from its expenditure; a state of things which at once explains the necessity under which he lay of continually advancing to fresh conquests; the extraordinary attachment which the French so long felt to his government; the vast internal prosperity with which it was attended, and the grinding misery as well as inextinguishable hatred with which it soon came to be regarded in foreign states (4).

Early in March a grand convocation of the Jews assembled in Paris, in pursuance of the commands of Napoléon, issued in the July preceding.

against the Panthéon, Notre-Dame, or above all, St.-Peter's at Rome? Every thing in the Temple should be in a chaste, severe, and durable style; it should be fitted for solemnities at all times, at all hours; the Imperial Throne should be a curule chair of marble, seats of marble for the persons invited, an amphitheatre of marble for the performers. No furniture should be admitted but cushions for the seats; all should be of granite, of marble, and of iron. With this view, searches should be made in all the provinces for quarries of marble and granite. They will be useful, not merely for this monument, but for others, which I have it in view to construct at future times, and which by their nature will require thirty, forty, or fifty years for their construction. Not more than 3,000,000 of francs (L.120,000) should be required, the temples of Athens having not cost much more than the half of that sum; fifteen

millions have been absorbed, I know not how, in the Panthéon, but I should not object to an expenditure of five or six millions for the construction of a temple worthy of the first city in the world." —NAPOLÉON to the Minister of Interior; *Finkinstein*, 18th April, 1807; *Bien*. vi. 270, 272. It was from this determination of the Emperor that the present exquisite structure of the Madeleine took its rise; but his real design in the formation, on so durable and gigantic a scale, of this noble monument was, as already mentioned, still more extensive than the honour of the Grand Army; and he in secret intended it as an expiatory monument to Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, and the other victims of the Revolution.—*Vide Ante*, vi., and *Las Cas*. i. 370, 371.

(1) *Gaeta*, i. 305.

(2) *Daru's Report*, *Dun*. xix. 464. *Pièces Just*.

(3) *Journ*. ii. 437.

(4) The receipts and expenditure of France, as exhibited in the Budget of the Minister of Finance for this year, were as follows :—

Receipt.		Francs.	
Receipts and expenditure of the year.			
Dutch Taxes,	311,840,685	or L.12,040,000
Register and Crown Lands,	172,227,000	6,900,000
Customs,	90,115,726	3,360,000
Lottery,	12,233,837	369,000
Post-Office,	9,968,134	400,000
Excise,	75,808,358	3,032,000
Salt and tobacco,	6,900,000	276,000
Salt Mines of Government,	3,230,000	130,000

682,323,740 fr. L.26,507,000

Statutes of
the Grand
Sanhedrim
of the Jews
at Paris.
March. 9.

Seventy-one doctors and chiefs of that ancient nation attended this great assembly; the first meeting of the kind which had occurred since the dispersion of the Israelites on the capture of Jerusalem. For seventeen hundred years the children of Israel had sojourned as strangers in foreign realms; reviled, oppressed, persecuted, without a capital, without a government, without a home; far from the tombs of their forefathers, banished from the land of their ancestors; but preserving unimpaired, amidst all their calamities, their traditions, their usages, their faith; exhibiting in every nation of the earth a lasting miracle to attest the verity of the Christian prophecies. On this occasion the great Sanhedrim, or assembly, published the result of their deliberations in a variety of statutes and declarations, calculated to remove from the Israelites a portion of that odium under which they had so long laboured in all the nations of Christendom; and Napoléon, in return, took them under his protection, and, under certain modifications, admitted them to the privileges of his empire. This first approach to a re-union and settlement of the Jews, impossible under any other circumstances but the rule of so great a conqueror as Napoléon, is very remarkable. The immediate cause of it, doubtless, was the desire of the Emperor to secure the support of so numerous and opulent a body as the Jews of Old Prussia, Poland, and the southern provinces of Russia, which was of great importance in the contest in which he was engaged, but it is impossible not to see in its result a step in the development of Christian prophecy. And thus, from the mysterious manner in which the wisdom of Providence

Expenditure.

Public Debt,	Fr. 105,959,000	or L. 4,240,000
Civil List,	28,000,000	1,120,000
Public Justice,	22,012,000	880,000
Foreign Ministers,	10,379,000	420,000
Interior Ministers,	54,902,000	2,170,000
Finance do,	25,624,000	1,652,000
Public Treasury,	8,571,000	335,000
War,	195,895,000	7,900,000
Ordnance,	147,654,000	5,850,000
Marine,	117,307,000	4,900,000
Public Worship,	12,342,000	550,000
General Police,	708,000	34,000
Roads and Bridges,	38,215,000	1,800,000
Incidental Charges,	10,252,000	410,000

Frances, 777,850,000 L. 32,241,000

But as the Grand Army, 200,000 strong, was solely maintained, paid, and equipped at the expense of Germany, this table exhibited a most fallacious view of the real expenditure and receipts of Napoleon during the year. Without mentioning lesser contributions, the following table exhibits the enormous

sums which, by public or private plunder, during the same period, to extract from the tributary or conquered states, and their application to the expenses of the war or otherwise:—

Receipts.

War contribution levied on Germany from October 1806, to July 1807,	Fr. 604,227,922	or L. 24,090,000
Tribute from Italy,	30,000,000	1,200,000
— from Spain,	72,000,000	2,880,000
— from Portugal,	16,000,000	640,000
War contribution from Austria, arrears of 1805,	50,000,000	2,000,000

Fr. 772,227,922 or L. 30,810,000

Expended.

Costs of the Grand Army from October 1806, to July 1807,	Fr. 228,944,363	or L. 9,130,000
Leaving to be applied to the internal service of France in this or succeeding years,	543,282,559	21,740,000

Fr. 772,227,922 L. 30,870,000

—DARU'S *Report on the Finances of 1806*; DOM, xix, 464, 465; BIGN. vii, 279, 280; GÆTA, i, 305; *Ante*. v. 73, 74.

makes the wickedness and passions of men to work out its great designs for the government of human affairs, did the French Revolution, which, nursed in infidelity and crime, set out with the abolition of Christian worship, and the open denial of God by a whole nation, in its secondary results lead to the first great step which had occurred in modern Europe to the reassembling of the Jews, so early foretold by our Saviour; and in its ultimate effects is destined, to all human appearance, by the irresistible strength which it has given to the British navy, and the vast impulse which it has communicated to the Russian army, to lead to the wresting of Jerusalem from the hands of the infidels, and the spread of the Christian faith alike over the forests of the New and the deserts of the Old World (1).

Sieges in
Silesia dur-
ing the
interval of
hostilities.

The two grand armies, in their respective positions on the Passarge and the Alle, remained for nearly four months after the sanguinary fight of Eylau in a state of tranquillity, interrupted only by skirmishes at the outposts, followed by no material results, and too inconsiderable to deserve the attention of the general historian. Both parties were actively engaged in measures to repair the wide chasms which it had occasioned in their ranks, and preparing for the coming struggle which was to decide the great contest for the empire of Europe. But Napoléon felt too strongly the imminent risk which he had run of total ruin by a defeat on the frontiers of Russia, before the fortresses in his rear were all subdued, to incur it a second time, until his right flank was secured by the reduction of the remainder of the powerful chain of fortresses in Silesia, which still hoisted the Prussian colours, and his left by the surrender of the great fortified emporium of Dantzic. To these two objects accordingly his attention was directed during the cessation of active hostilities in the front of the Grand Army; and his operations in these quarters were not only great in themselves, but had the most important effect upon the future fortunes of the campaign (2).

Fall of
Schweid-
nitz.

Schweidnitz and Neiss were invested about the same time, in the end of January; but serious operations were not attempted against the latter fortress, which was the chief stronghold of the province, till the former was reduced. The siege accordingly was carried on with great activity of the former, and with such success, that it capitulated, after a feeble resistance, in the middle of February. The reduction of the capital of Silesia was of the highest importance, not merely as putting at the disposal of Napoléon a powerful fortress, commanding a rich territory, but giving him a supply of extensive stores in ammunition and artillery, which were forthwith forwarded to Dantzic and Neiss, and proved of the utmost service in the siege of both these towns. The resources of Silesia, now almost entirely in the hands of Vandamme, were turned to the very best account by that indefatigable and rapacious commander; heavy requisitions for horses, provisions, and forage, followed each other in rapid succession, besides grievous contributions in money, which were so considerable, and levied with such severity on that opulent province, that before the end of March 4,500,000 francs (L.60,000) was regularly transmitted once *a-week* to the headquarters of Napoléon, and this plentiful supply continued undiminished till the end of the war (3).

And of
Neiss.

No sooner was the besieging force before Neiss strengthened by the artillery, and reinforcements which were forwarded from

(1) D'Ab. ix. 218. Eign. vi. 269, 270.

(2) Jom. ii. 399. Daun. xviii. 86, 87.

(3) Marten's Sup. 417. Daun. xviii. 98, 99. Jom. ii. 399.

Schweidnitz, than the operations of the French for its reduction were conducted with more activity. This fortress, originally situated exclusively on the right bank of the river, which bears the same name, was extended by Frederick the Great to the left bank, where the principal arsenals and military establishments were placed. The works surrounding the whole were extensive, but in some places not entirely armed, or clothed with masonry; but a garrison of six thousand men, great part of which occupied an entrenched camp without the fortress, promised to present a formidable resistance. Finding, however, that the trenches had been opened, and that the place was hard pressed, an

attempt to relieve it was made by General Kleist with four thousand men, drawn from the garrison of Glatz. Their effort, which took place on the night of the 20th, was combined with a powerful sortie from the walls of the place; but though the attack at first was attended with some success, it was finally defeated by the opportune arrival of Jérôme Bonaparte with a powerful reinforcement, who had received intelligence of the projected operation, and arrived in time to render it totally abortive. The defeated troops took refuge in Glatz, after sustaining a loss of seven hundred men. Immediately after, the bombardment was resumed with fresh vigour, the town was repeatedly set on fire in many different places; the outwork of the Blockhausen was carried by assault; already the rampart was beginning to be

shaken by the breaching batteries; and the explosion of one of their magazines spread consternation through the garrison, when the governor offered to capitulate on the same conditions as the other fortresses of Prussia. This offer was agreed to; and on the 16th June, this great stronghold, with three hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, 200,000 pounds of powder, a garrison still above five thousand strong, but entirely destitute of provisions, fell into the hands of the enemy (1).

And of
Glatz.
June 14.

Glatz alone remained to complete the reduction of the province, and it did not long survive its unfortunate compeers. Prince Jérôme commanded the attacking force, and though the garrison was numerous, it was so much discouraged by the bad success of the besieged in all the other fortresses of the province, that it made but a feeble resistance. The entrenched camp which communicated with the town having been attacked and carried, this last bulwark of Silesia capitulated on the 14th June, the very day when the battle of Friedland was fought. Thus were all the strongholds of this province, so long the bulwark of Prussia, reduced, by a force hardly equal to the united strength of their garrisons, and Vandamine, with a corps not exceeding twenty-five thousand men, had the glory of wresting from the enemy six first-rate fortresses, containing above twelve hundred pieces of cannon. The defence which they made did little credit to the Prussian arms, as not one of them had resolution enough to stand an assault, and almost all lowered their colours while the rampart was still unbreached (2).

Siege of
Dantzic.
Description
of that for-
tress.

The siege of Dantzic was an operation of more difficulty, and of much more immediate influence upon the fate of the campaign. Napoléon felt the imminent danger which he would have run if Benningsen's army, during the irruption which preceded the battle of Eylau, had succeeded in throwing a powerful reinforcement into that fortress; thirty thousand men, resting on its formidable ramparts, and amply supplied with every necessary from the sea, would have paralysed all the movements of the Grand Army. This important city, formerly one of the most flourishing of the Hanse Towns, had fallen to the lot of Prussia on occasion of the last par-

(1) Dum, xviii. 100, 105. Jum, ii. 399.

(2) Dum, xviii. 105, 106. Jom, ii. 399.

tition of Poland in 1794; and though it had much declined in wealth and population since the disastrous era when it lost its independence, yet it was still a place of great importance and strength. Its situation at the mouth of the Vistula gave it a monopoly of all the commerce of Poland: it served as the great emporium of the noble wheat crops which, in every age, have constituted almost exclusively the wealth of that kingdom; and imported, in return, the wines, fruits, dress, and other luxuries which contributed to the splendour of its haughty nobles, and the rude garments which clothed the limbs of its unhappy cultivators. The river Mottaw, a tributary stream to the Vistula, traverses the whole extent of the city, and serves as a canal for the transport of its bulk in merchandise, while its waters fill the wet ditches, and contribute much to the strength of the place. Previous to the war its fortifications had been much neglected, as its remote situation seemed to afford little likelihood of its being destined to undergo a siege; but after the battle of Jena, General Manstein, the governor, had laboured indefatigably to put the works in a good posture of defence; and such had been the success of his efforts, that they were in March all armed and in a condition to undergo a siege. It was surrounded in all places by a rampart, wet ditch, and strong palisades, in most by formidable outworks; the fort of Weischelmunde, in its vicinity, commanding the opening of the Vistula into the sea, required a separate siege for itself, and was connected with the town, from which it was distant four miles, by a chain of fortified posts. But the principal defence of the place consisted in the marshy nature of the ground in its vicinity, which could be traversed only on a few dykes or chaussées; and the power which the besieged had, by the command of the sluices of the Vistula, the waters of which, from their communication with the Baltic, are almost always at the same level, of inundating the country for several miles in breadth round two-thirds of the circumference of the walls. The garrison consisted of twelve thousand Prussians and five thousand Russians, under the command of Field-marshal Kalkreuth, a veteran whose intrepid character formed a sufficient guarantee for a gallant defence (1).

First operations of the besieging forces.

To form the besieging force, Napoléon had drawn together a large body of Italians, Saxons, Hessians, troops of Baden, with a division of Polish levies, and two divisions of French, in all, twenty-seven thousand men. The most inefficient part of this motley group was employed in the blockade of Colberg and Graudentz; and the flower of the troops, consisting of the French divisions, a Saxon brigade, and the Baden and Polish hussars, amounting to about twenty thousand men, was destined to the more arduous undertaking of the siege of Dantzic. The artillery was commanded by the gallant General Lariboissière, the engineers under the able directions of General Chasseloup; Marshal Lannes, with the grenadiers of the Guards, formerly under Oudinot, who was confined by sickness, formed in the rear of the Grand Army the covering force; and he was in communication with Masséna, who had superseded Savary in the command of the corps which had combated at Ostrolenka (2), and was reinforced by the warlike Bavarian grenadiers of Wrede. Thus, while twenty thousand men were assembled for the siege, thirty thousand, under the most experienced marshals of France, were stationed so as to protect the operations against any incursions of the enemy.

Capture of the Isle of Mehrung.

So early as the middle of February, the advanced posts of the besiegers had begun to invest the place, and on the 22d of that month, a sanguinary conflict ensued between the Polish hussars, who composed their

(1) Dum. xviii. 124, 126, 141. Jom. ii. 397. Ann. Reg. 1807, 23.

(2) Jom. ii. 396, 397. Dum. xviii. 126, 129. Ann. Reg. 1807, 23.

vanguard, and a body of fifteen hundred Prussians, at Dirschau, which terminated, after a severe loss on both sides, in the retreat of the latter under the cannon of the ramparts. After this check, General Manstein no longer endeavoured to maintain himself on the outside of the walls; and as the French troops successively came up, the investment of the fortress was com-
March 18. pleted. The first serious conflict took place on the island or peninsula of Nehrung, the well-known tongue of land which separates the waters of the salt lake, called the Frische-haff, and the Vistula from the Baltic sea.

It is twelve leagues in length, but seldom more than a mile or two in breadth, composed of sand hills thrown up by the meeting of the river with the ocean, in one part of which the waves have broken in and overflowed the level space in its rear, which now forms the Frische-haff; and as it communicates with Dantzic, which stands at its eastern extremity, the approaches to the town on that side could not be effected until it was cleared of the enemy. Sensible of its value, the besieged had spared no pains to strengthen themselves on this important neck of land, and the besiegers were equally resolute to dislodge them from it, and thereby complete the investment of the fort-
March 20. ress. Early in the morning of the 20th March, a French detachment crossed the Frische-haff in boats, and surprised the Prussian posts on the opposite shore; fresh troops were ferried over in rapid succession, and the besiegers, before evening, established themselves in such force in the island, that though Kalkreuth despatched a body of four thousand men out of the place to reinforce his posts in that quarter, they were unable to dislodge the enemy, who not only kept their ground, but progressively advancing
March 22. two days afterwards, entirely cleared the peninsula of the Prussians, and completed the investment of the town on that side. By this success the communication of Dantzic with the land was entirely cut off; but the besieged, by means of the Island of Holm and Fort of Weischelmunde, with the entrenched camp of Neufahrwasser, which commands the entrance of the Vistula into the Baltic, had still the means of deriving succour from the seaside (1).

Progress of the siege. After full deliberation among the French engineers, it was determined to commence the siege by an attack on the fort of Hagelsberg, which stands on an eminence without the rampart on the western side of the town, which was the only one entirely free from inundations. The first parallel having been completed, a heavy fire was opened on the works
April 2. in that quarter on the night of the first of April, though at the distance of eight hundred toises; a fortnight after, the second parallel was also finished, notwithstanding several vigorous sorties from the garrison; and by the 25d, amidst snow and sleet, the batteries were all armed and ready to play on the ramparts at the distance only of sixty toises. On
April 23. the following night, a tremendous fire was opened from fifty-six pieces of heavy cannon and twelve mortars, which, notwithstanding the utmost efforts on the part of the garrison, soon acquired a marked superiority over the batteries of the besieged. For a week together this cannonade continued without intermission night and day; a brave sortie was unable
April 26. to arrest it more than a few hours: but although the city was already on fire in several places, and the artillery on the ramparts in part dismounted, yet, as the exterior works were faced with earth, not masonry, little progress was made in injuring them, and no practicable
May 2. breach had been as yet effected. Finding themselves foiled in this species of attack, the French engineers had recourse to the more

(1) Dum. xviii. 133, 141. Bign. vi. 284, 285. Wilson, 129.

certain, but tedious method of approach by sap; the besieged countermined with indefatigable perseverance, but notwithstanding their utmost efforts, the mines of the French were pushed to within eighteen yards of the salient angle of the outermost works of Hagelsberg. At the same time a separate expedition against the Island of Holm, which formed the western extremity of the peninsula of Nehrung, from whence it was separated only by one of the arms of the Vistula, proved successful; the garrison, consisting of five hundred men with fifteen pieces of cannon, was made prisoners, and the city by that means deprived of all the succour which it had hitherto obtained by the mouths of that river (1)."

Invested now on all sides, with its garrison weakened by the casualties of the siege, and the enemy's mines ready to blow its outworks, on the side assailed, into the air, Dantzic could not be expected to hold out for any length of time. Not deeming himself in sufficient strength to attempt the raising of the siege by a direct attack upon the enemy's cantonments on the Passarge, Benningsen, with the concurrence of the Emperor Alexander, had resolved to attempt the relief of the fortress by a combined attack by land and sea, from the peninsula of Nehrung and the mouths

of the Vistula. The preparations made with this view were of the most formidable kind, and had wellnigh been crowned with success. General Kamenskoi, with five thousand men, was embarked at Pillau, under convoy of a Swedish and English man-of-war and landed at Neufahrwasser, the fortified post at the mouth of the Vistula, distant four miles from Dantzic; while two thousand Prussians were to co-operate in the attack, by advancing along the peninsula of Nehrung, and the Grand Army was to be disquieted and hindered from sending succours by a feigned attack on Marshal Ney's corps; and at the same time General Tutschakoff, who had succeeded Essen in the command of the troops on the Narew and the Bug, was to engage the attention

of Masséna's corps in that quarter. All these operations took place, and, but for an accidental circumstance, would, to all appearance, have proved successful: the proposed feints were made with the desired effects on the side of Guttstadt and the Narew; but unfortunately, the delay of the Swedish man-of-war, which had twelve hundred men on board, rendered it impossible for Kamenskoi to commence his attack before the 15th inst. In the meanwhile Napoléon, who had received intelligence of what was in preparation, and was fully aware of the imminent danger to which Lefebvre was exposed, had time to draw a large body of troops from Lannes' covering corps by the bridge of Marienswerder to the scene of danger. This great reinforcement, comprising among other troops the grenadiers of the guard under Oudinot, turned the scale, which at that period quivered on the beam. Early on the morning of the 15th, Kamenskoi marched out of the trenches of Neufahrwasser, and after defiling over the bridge of the Vistula into the peninsula of Nehrung, advanced with the utmost intrepidity to the attack of the strong fortifications which the enemy had erected to bar their advance among the hills and copsewoods of that sandy peninsula. Their first onset was irresistible. The entrenchments were carried in the most gallant style, and all

(1) Dum. xviii. 146, 169. Bign. vi. 285, 286. Wilson, 129, 130

A remarkable incident occurred on this occasion, highly characteristic of the heroic spirit with which both parties were animated. A chasseur of the 12th regiment of French light infantry, named Fortunus, transported by the ardour of the attack, fell, in the dark, into the midst of a Russian detachment, and

in a few minutes that detachment itself was surprised by the company to which the French soldier belonged. The Russian officers exclaimed, "Do not fire, we are French;" and threatened the chasseur with instant death if he betrayed them. "Fire instantly," exclaimed the brave Fortunus, "they are Russians;" and fell, pierced by the balls of his comrades.—DUMAS, xviii. 169.

their cannon taken : success appeared certain, as the defeated Saxons and Poles were flying in great disorder out of the woods into the sandy hills which lay between them and the town of Dantzic, when the victors were suddenly assailed in flank, when disordered by success, by Marshal Lannes, at the head of Oudinot's formidable grenadiers of the guards. Unable to resist so vehement an onset, the Russians were in their turn driven back, and lost the entrenchments ; but rallying again with admirable discipline, they renewed the assault and regained the works ; again they were expelled with great slaughter ; a third time, stimulated by desperation, they returned to the charge, and routed the French grenadiers with such vigour that Oudinot had a horse shot under him, and fell upon Marshal Lannes ; and both these valiant chiefs thereafter combated on foot in the midst of their faithful grenadiers. But fresh reinforcements from the left bank were every moment received by the enemy : Kalkreuth, confining himself to a heavy cannonade, had made no sortie to aid this gallant effort to cut through the lines ; and to complete Kamenskoi's misfortune, he received intelligence, during the action, that the Prussian corps of two thousand men, which was advancing along the Nehrung to co-operate in the attack, had been assailed by superior forces at Karlsberg, and routed with the loss of six hundred men and two pieces of cannon. Finding the undertaking, in these circumstances, hopeless, the brave Russian, at eight at night, ordered his heroic troops to retire, and they regained the shelter of the cannon of Weischelmunde without being pursued, but after sustaining a loss of seventeen hundred soldiers ; while the French had to lament nearly as great a number of brave men who had fallen in this desperate conflict (1).

Growing
difficulties
of the be-
sieged, and
fall of the
place.

No other serious effort was made by the Allies for the relief of Dantzic. The besieged had provisions enough, but it was well known that their ammunition was almost exhausted, and that without a speedy supply of that indispensable article, the place must ere long capitulate. An English brig of 22 guns, under Captain Strachey, with one hundred and fifty barrels of powder on board, made a brave attempt to force its way up the river, though the Vistula is a rapid stream, not more in general than sixty yards broad, and the passage was both defended by numerous batteries and a boom thrown across the channel ; but a cannon-shot having struck the rudder, and the rigging being almost entirely cut to pieces by the French fire, she was forced to surrender. Meanwhile, the operations against the Hagelsberg were continued without intermission ; the springing of several mines, though not attended with all the ruin which was expected by the besiegers, had the effect of ruining and laying open the outworks, and preparations were already made for blowing the counterscarp into the ditch. In vain a sortie from the ramparts was made, and at first attended with some success, to destroy these threatening advanced works of the enemy ; the besieged were at length driven back, and on the next day the arrival of Marshal Mortier with a large part of his corps from the neighbourhood of Stralsund and Colberg, nearly doubled the effective strength of the enemy. Kalkreuth, however, was still unsubdued, and the most vigorous preparations had been made on the breaches of the ramparts to repel the assault which was hourly expected, when a summons from Lefebvre offered him honourable terms of capitulation. The situation of the brave veteran left him no alternative ; though his strength was unsubdued, his ammunition was exhausted, and nothing remained but submission. The

May 20.

May 21.

(1) Wilson, 131, 133. Bign. vi. 285, 287. Dum. xviii. 173. 183.

May 24. terms of capitulation were without difficulty arranged; the garrison was permitted to retire with their arms and the honours of war, on condition of not serving against France or its allies for a year, or till regularly

May 27. exchanged; and on the 27th this great fortress, containing nine hundred pieces of cannon, but hardly any ammunition, was taken possession of by the French troops. The garrison, now reduced to nine thousand men, was marched through the peninsula of Nehrung to Königsberg: Kamenskoi, unable to render any assistance, set sail from Fort Weischelmunde with his own division (1), and its original garrison and a few invalids only remained on the 26th to open its gates to the enemy.

While this desperate struggle was going on round Dantzic, the Russians were making the utmost efforts to reinforce their principal army; but the time which they had was not sufficient to bring up from its immense extent the distant resources of their empire, and though men were in abundance in the nearer provinces, both money and arms were wanting to equip them for the field. In the end of March and beginning of April, however, reinforcements to a considerable amount arrived on the Alle, among which were chiefly to be noticed the superb corps of the guards under the Grand Duke Constantine, consisting of thirty battalions and thirty-four squadrons, full twenty thousand men, the flower of the Imperial army. A powerful reserve, drawn from the depôts in the interior of the empire, of thirty thousand men, was also advancing under Prince Labanoff; but it was so far in the rear, that it could not arrive at the scene of action before the end of June, and was, therefore, not to be relied on for the early operations of the campaign. The whole army which Benningesen had at his command, on the resumption of hostilities, was only one hundred and twenty thousand men, including in that force the detached corps of sixteen thousand Prussians and Russians in front of Königsberg under Lestocq, and the left wing on the Narew under Tolstoy, which was fifteen thousand strong; so that the force to be relied on for the immediate shock on the Alle or the Passarge was scarcely ninety thousand. These were, however, all veterans inured to war, and animated in the highest degree both by their recent success at Eylau (2), and the presence of their beloved Emperor, who, since the end of March, had been at the headquarters of the army (5).

By incredible exertions Napoléon had succeeded in assembling a much greater force. Notwithstanding the immense losses of his bloody winter campaign in Poland, such had been the vigour of his measures for recruiting his army, and such the efficacy of the continued influence of terror, coercion, military ardour, and patriotic spirit, which he had contrived to bring to bear upon the warlike population of France, Germany, and Poland, that a greater host than had ever yet been witnessed together in modern Europe, were now assembled round his eagles. Exclusive

(1) Dum. xviii. 180, 181. Bign. vi. 287, 289. Wils. 134, 135. Marten's Sup. iv. 420.

(2) Dum. xviii. App. Table iii. and p. 220, 221. Jom. ii. 400. Wilson, 135, 136.

(3) The Russian army, when the campaign opened, was as follows:—

Centre under Benningsen on the Alle, at Arensdorff, Neuhoft, Bergfried, and Bevern,	88,000
Right wing under Lestocq, near Königsberg and at Pillau,	18,000
Left wing on the Narew under Tolstoy,	15,800

121,800

—See Dum. xviii. 220, 221, and Wils. 136.

The militia, which the patriotic ardour of the Russians led them to raise, were unable to march from want of arms and ammunition, which the ill-timed parsimony of England withheld. One hundred and sixty thousand muskets, sent out in haste by

the British government after the change of ministry, arrived at Königsberg in June, just in time to be seized by the French after the battle of Friedland.—HARD. iv. 417.

of the army of observation on the Elbe, and the garrisons and blockading corps in his rear, no less than a hundred and fifty thousand infantry, and thirty-five thousand horse, were ready for immediate action on the Passarge and the Narew. Nor was it merely from its nominal strength that this immense force was formidable; its discipline and equipment had attained the very highest perfection; the requisitions, enforced by the terrors of military execution, had wrenched out of Germany all the supplies of which it stood in need; the cavalry were remounted, the artillery waggons and carriages repaired and in the best condition; the reserve parks and pontoon trains fully supplied; the return of spring had restored numbers of the veterans to their ranks, the never-failing conscription filled up the chasms produced by Pultusk and Eylau; while the recent successes in Silesia and at Dantzic, had revived in the warlike multitude that confidence in themselves and in their renowned leader which the disasters of the winter campaign had much impaired, but which has ever been found, even more than numbers or skill, to contribute to military success (1). Vast as the resources of Russia undoubtedly are, when time has been afforded to collect into one focus its unwieldy strength, it was now fairly overmatched by the banded strength of western Europe on its own frontier (2); and though Alexander might possibly have combated on equal terms with Napoléon on the Wolga or the Dneister, he was inadequate to the encounter on the Alle or the Narew.

Defensive
measures of
the Rus-
sians.

The Emperor Alexander had arrived at the headquarters of his army on the 28th March, and resided since that time with the King of Prussia at Bartenstein, a little in the rear of the cantonments of the soldiers. There they had, for two months, carried on a sort of negotiation with the French Emperor by means of confidential agents; but this shadow of pacific overtures, which were only intended on either side to give time and propitiate Austria, by seeming to listen to her offers of mediation, was abandoned in the middle of May, and both parties prepared to determine the contest by the sword. To compensate for his superiority of force, and provide a point of support for his troops, even in the first line, Benningsen had, with great care, constructed a formidable entrenched camp, composed of six great works regularly fortified, and sixteen lunettes or armed ravelins, astride on the opposite banks of the river Alle. Thither he proposed to retire, in the event of the enemy bringing an overwhelming force to bear upon his columns; but he did not conceive himself sufficiently strong until the reinforcements under Prince Labanoff arrived, to commence any serious offensive movement against the French army, and in consequence allowed the

(1) The composition and distribution of this force previous to the resumption of hostilities, was as follows:—

	Infantry.	Cavalry.	Stationed at
First Corps, Bernadotte,	23,547	3,744	Braunsberg and Spandau.
Fourth do, Soult,	30,199	1,366	Liebstadt and Alkin.
Sixth do., Ney,	15,883	1,117	Guttstadt and the right of the Passarge.
Third, Davoust,	28,445	1,125	Osterode and Allenstein.
Imperial Guard, Bessières,	7,319	1,808	Finckenstein.
Reserve Cavalry, Murat,		21,428	Passarge and Lower Vistula.
Reserve Corps, Lannes,	15,090	250	Marienberg.
Eighth Corps, Mortier,	14,000	1,000	Lower Vistula.
Second Corps, Masséna,	17,580	2,604	Narew.
	152,063	34,442	

Exclusive of officers, which made the force at least 155,000 infantry and 35,000 cavalry. The corps of Lefebvre, after the capture of Dantzic, was melted down and divided between those of Lannes and Mortier and the garrison of the place; the second corps was in Dalmatia, under Marmont; the ninth

in Silesia, under Vandamme. Augereau's corps was divided among the other corps after its terrific losses in the battle of Eylau.—Dun., xviii. 222-223; *Pièces Just.* No. 3, and *Jom.* i. 403.

(2) Dun. xviii. 220, 221. Wilson, 136. *Jom.* ii. 401. Bigu. vi. 294.

siege of Dantzic, as already mentioned, to be brought to a successful issue, without any other demonstration for its relief than the cannonade against Ney's corps, intended as a diversion in favour of Kamenskoi's attack. The army, though so much inferior in numerical strength to the French, was animated with the best spirit, and the great magazines and harbour of Königsberg supplied it with every necessary; although the situation of that city, without fortifications, and with its back to the gulf of the Curishé, from whence retreat was impossible, rendered it a situation extremely ill adapted, as the event proved, for the stores on which its operations depended (1).

Designs of
the Rus-
sians on
Ney's corps.

After the fall of Dantzic, and when the French army was reinforced by full thirty thousand men from the covering and besieging force, Benningsen was seduced, by the exposed situation of Marshal Ney's corps at Guttstadt, on the right bank of the Passarge, midway between the two armies, to hazard an attack on that insulated body. He had been stationed there by Napoleon, expressly in order to serve as a bait to draw the Russian generals into that perilous encounter; and the event proved

June 4.
Russian plan
of opera-
tions.

with perfect success. Early in June all the corps of their army were put in motion, in order to envelope the French marshal. For this purpose, he proposed to make a feint of forcing the passage of the Passarge, at the two points of Spandau and Lomitten, and at the same time assail Ney in his advanced position at Guttstadt, in front and both flanks. If, by these means, the corps which he commanded could be destroyed, it was intended on the following day to renew the attack on the bridges in good earnest, and fall with the whole centre of the Russian army on the corps of Soult, cantoned behind the Passarge, and at such a distance from that of Davoust, as to afford some ground for hope that it, too, might be seriously injured before the remainder of the French troops could advance to its relief. Should this daring attack fail, it was always in their power to retire to the fortified central position of Heilsberg (2), and there endeavour to arrest the enemy, as Kray had done with Moreau at Ulm, till the great reinforcements, under Labanoff, should enable them to resume the offensive.

Feigned
attacks on
the Bridges
of the Pas-
sarge, and
real attack
on Marshal
Ney.

June 5.

Early on the morning of the 5th June, the whole Russian army was put in motion for the execution of this well conceived enterprise. The feigned attacks, intended to distract the enemy's attention, on the two fortified bridges of Spandau and Lomitten,

took place at the prescribed time, and perfectly answered the object in view. The Prussians at the former point, and the Russians at the latter, pressed the enemy so severely, and with forces so considerable, that they supposed the forcing of the bridges was really intended, and in consequence, when they drew off in the evening, with the loss of several hundred killed and wounded, from each of these places, represented their retreat as evidence of a repulse. Bernadotte, who commanded at Spandau, and had collected his whole corps to defend that important passage, was wounded by a musket-ball on the head, during the heat of the action, and replaced in command by General Dupont. Meanwhile the real attack was directed against Ney's corps, in its advanced position at Guttstadt, full seven miles to the right of the Passarge, and so completely in the midst of the Russian army, now that their advanced columns were assailing the bridges over that river, that its destruction appeared inevitable. In effect, the Marshal was taken so completely by surprise, that if Benningsen had pressed the retiring

(1) Jom. ii. 401, 402. Wilson, 136, 137. Dum. xviii. 211, 217.

(2) Jom. ii. 403. Wilson, 136. Dum. xviii. 231.

columns with any thing like the vigour which Napoléon would have exerted on a similar occasion, they must inevitably have been destroyed. But, unfortunately, orders had been issued for the different corps to delay the onset till they were in a condition to render assistance to each other; and as some were impeded in the march by unforeseen accidents, the serious attack on Guttstadt did not take place till two o'clock in the afternoon. It was then carried by assault, and four hundred prisoners, with considerable magazines and several guns, were taken; but after having thus made themselves masters of his headquarters, the Russians, though more than double in number to the enemy, exerted so little activity in following up their success, that Ney, who displayed on this trying occasion all his wonted skill and firmness, was enabled to effect his retreat, with comparatively little loss, to Ankendorf and Heilighenthal, where he passed the night. On the following morning he resumed his march, though pressed on all sides by greatly superior forces; imposed on the enemy in the middle of it by a bold and well-conceived return to Heilighenthal, which gave time for his artillery and horse to defile over the bridge in his rear; and at length passed the Passarge at Dippen, with the loss, in the whole of his retreat, of only a thousand killed and wounded, and an equal number made prisoners. On arriving at the heights of Dippen, as the rearguard of Ney was defiling over, the Russians had the mortification of discovering that the bridge was not only altogether unprotected by a *tête-de-pont*, but completely commanded by the heights on which they stood on the right bank; so that if they had exerted ordinary vigour in the attack of the preceding day, the negligence of Napoléon had given them the means of totally destroying the exposed corps of his gallant lieutenant (1).

Napoléon
concentrates
his army,
and the Rus-
sians fall
back.

This sudden and unfortunate attack on the centre of his position, very much disconcerted the Emperor Napoléon, the more especially as he received intelligence, the same day, of the passage of the Alle by Platoff, at the head of his Cossacks, and the surprise of five hundred men who were made prisoners (2), and also of a regiment of Cossacks having swum the Passarge, and cut to pieces an escort of cavalry, and captured some artillery and baggage. He instantly commenced the concentration of his army. The corps of Ney, escaped from so serious a danger, was united to that of Lannes, which had suffered no loss; the guard and reserve cavalry under Murat commanded to assemble and support him with the utmost expedition; Mortier was ordered up by forced marches by June 7. Mohrunen; the corps of Bernadotte, which, since his wound, was intrusted to the directions of Victor, ordered to concentrate itself for the protection of Elburg; and Soult, who had assembled his corps at Leibstadt, enjoined to force the passage of the Passarge at Wolfendorf, in order to threaten the communications of the enemy with their entrenched camp at Heilsberg; while Davoust connected himself by the right with Ney, and formed an imposing mass behind the Passarge, against which, it was hoped, all the efforts of the enemy would be shattered. But these great preparations were

(1) Wilson, 136, 137. Dum. xviii. 230, 246. Jom. ii. 403, 405.

(2) The French officer in command owed his life to the fortunate incident of his giving the Russian commander the freemasons' sign when seizing his hand just as a lance was about to pierce his breast. — Wilson, 138 — In reviewing Sir Robert Wilson's work, the Edinburgh Review says, this is an anecdote so incredible, that no amount of testimony could make them believe it; but this only shows the

critic's ignorance. The same fortunate presence of mind, in making use of the freemasons' sign, saved the life of a gallant officer, the author's father-in-law, Lieutenant-Colonel Tytler, during the American war, who, by giving one of the enemy's officers the freemasons' grip when he lay on the ground with a bayonet at his breast, succeeded in interesting the generous American in his behalf, and saving his life.

suitable rather to the confidence which Napoléon felt in himself than that with which his adversaries were inspired. Having failed in his original and well-conceived project of cutting off the corps of Marshal Ney in its advanced position close to his cantonments, Benningsen had no intention of hazarding his army by commencing offensive operations against a force so greatly superior, with a few bridges over the Passarge for his only retreat in ease

June 8. of disaster. On the morning of the 8th, the increasing forces which the enemy displayed at Dippen, and the vivacity of their cannonade at that point, prognosticated some decisive movements, and about noon the loud shouts of the soldiers announced the arrival of Napoléon in person. Soon after, General Havoiski, with a body of Cossacks, part of the army opposed to Soult, surprised three regiments of horse, the advanced guard of Soult's corps, which had obeyed its orders by crossing the river at Wolfendorf, and made three hundred prisoners, besides killing a still greater number. But these partial successes were insufficient to arrest the progress of the enemy, whose masses, now rapidly arriving on its banks, gave him a decided superiority; and Benningsen resolved to fall back to the entrenched camp at Heilsberg, while Bagration covered the retreat on the left with five thousand foot and two thousand horse, and Platoff with three thousand Cossacks on the right (1).

The Russians, pursued by the French, fall back to Heilsberg. June 9. The retreat, however, which was now commenced, was far more hazardous than that which they had just effected with such skill, for it was to be made in presence of Napoléon and a hundred thousand men. No sooner had the Russian carriages begun to defile to the rear, than the French crossed the Passarge in great strength at all points; the guards and cavalry, with the Emperor at their head, at Elditten, and the other Marshals at Spandau, Lomitten, and Dippen. Their immense masses converged from all these different points towards Guttstadt and Altkirch, whither the Russian army had retired in one compact body, following the direct road to their entrenchments at Heilsberg. The great bulk of the army was so far advanced as to be beyond the reach of danger; but the rearguard, under Bagration and Platoff, was exposed to the most imminent hazard; especially when, towards evening, it became necessary to halt and arrest the enemy, in order to give time to the numerous carriages and guns in their rear to defile over the Alle by the four bridges by which alone Heilsberg could be reached. The brave Russian, however, took post at Glottaw, and sent forth the cavalry of the Imperial Guard and Cossacks into the plain to check the advance of his pursuers. The French infantry instantly halted and formed squares, while twelve thousand of Murat's dragoons rushed upon the rearguard at full speed, threatening to annihilate them by their thundering charge. Such, however, was the steadiness and intrepidity of the Russian horse, that they successfully combated against the fearful odds by which they were assailed: several brilliant charges took place without any decisive result on either side; but not one square of the retreating rearguard was broken, not one squadron dispersed; and after a sanguinary conflict Bagration, having gained time for the whole artillery and carriages in his rear to defile over the bridge, withdrew to the other side of the Alle, abandoning Guttstadt, with no greater loss in killed and wounded than he had inflicted upon the enemy:—a rare example of intrepidity and skill in such trying circumstances, even more remarkable than the retreat of Marshal Ney two days before, as his own force was much less, and the pursuing host

(1) Wilson, 438, 439. Jom. ii. 405. Dum. xviii. 248, 258.

incomparably greater. At the same time, Platoff on his side, also gained the river, and crossed the bridges in safety, having, in order to give an example of coolness to his men, dismounted from his horse, and, with the tranquillity of parade exercise, withdrawn his forces in small bodies, with large intervals between them, which so effectually imposed upon the enemy, that he sustained no serious molestation in his retreat (1).

Different
plans of
operation
which pre-
sented them-
selves to
Napoleon.

Having thus succeeded in throwing the river Alle between themselves and the French army, and broken down all the bridges over that river, the Russians were enabled without farther molestation, to withdraw all their troops into the entrenched camp at Heilsberg, where they stood firm under the cover of most formidable field-works. Napoleon had now one of two courses to follow. In his front was the great fortified camp of the enemy, by storming which he might hope to terminate the war in a single bloody battle; a little to his left was the city of Königsberg, containing the whole magazines and reserve stores of their army. The most obvious course would have been, to have executed a general movement with the right in front, passing Heilsberg, so as to establish the French lines between that place and Bischofstein, with the right extending towards Bartenstein, and the left reaching to Guttstadt; repeating thereby the circuitous sweep round the enemy's position, which his great numerical superiority so easily gave him the means of effecting, and which had proved so fatal to the Austrians at Ulm, and the Prussians at Jena; the second was to advance with the main body of the army straight against their entrenchments at Heilsberg, and in the event of their proving so strong as to defy open force, threatening to turn them by the advance of fifty thousand men on the left towards Eylau, so as to menace the communications of the enemy with his magazines at Königsberg. The first plan offered the most decisive results, as the Russian army, if cut off from its own frontier, by being turned on the right, would have been exposed to total destruction in the event of being thrown, after a defeat, upon Königsberg and the *cul-de-sac* of the Curishé; but the second was most easy of immediate execution, from its avoiding the difficult and intricate country into which an advance upon Bischofstein would have led the army; and, notwithstanding the obvious risk to which his left wing would be exposed by advancing between a superior mass of the enemy and the sea, Napoléon flattered himself that he would so engage his attention in front as to prevent him from taking advantage of the chances thus offered in his favour (2).

Advance
upon Heils-
berg.
June 10.

On the 10th June, accordingly, preparations were made for a front attack upon the entrenched camp of Heilsberg, while Davoust and Mortier moved forward on the French left to turn its right flank, and menace the enemy's communication with Königsberg. For this purpose the cavalry of Murat led the advance against the Russian entrenchments, which were about ten miles distant; bridges were speedily thrown across the Alle at various points; they were immediately followed by the corps of Soult, Lannes, Ney, and the infantry of the guard, who pursued on both sides of that river to Heilsberg, which is situated farther down its course. As long as Bagration was pursuing his way through the broken ground on the other side of Guttstadt, he was enabled to keep the enemy tolerably at bay; but when he was obliged to evacuate that favourite cover, and enter upon the open plain which extended on both sides of the Alle to Heilsberg, his task of covering the retreat became much more difficult. In vain the Russian cavalry, by repeated char-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 171. Wilson, 440, 443. Dum. xviii. 258, 264. Jam. ii. 405.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 171. Jom. ii. 468. Dum. xviii. 263, 264.

ges, strove to retard the advance of their indefatigable pursuers : in vain the infantry retired by echelon in alternate lines to sustain by continued fire their retrograde movements : the French cavalry and horse artillery incessantly pressed on ; by degrees the losses of the Russians became more severe, and they were beginning to fall into confusion, when the opportune arrival of fifteen squadrons of Prussian cavalry, with a troop of horse artillery which Benningsen sent to his succour, gave him great relief, and by their gallant bearing enabled Bagration to maintain the fight, though with serious loss, till six at night, when the whole allied army had got within its lines. Then, on the word given, the Russian and Prussian cavalry withdrew by their flanks, exposing to view within half-cannon shot the formidable entrenchments, bristling with bayonets, and armed in this part with one hundred and fifty pieces of artillery. Instantly a fire of grape of extraordinary severity was opened upon the enemy, which speedily swept off all the squadrons who could not escape from its fury ; and though Murat brought up several batteries of cannon, and swarms of tirailleurs occupied every thicket and kept up an incessant rattle along the whole front of the lines, yet they produced no impression, and the superiority of the Russian fire was very apparent (1).

Description of the position and entrenched camp of Heilsberg. The position of Heilsberg, however, was too important for Napoléon to relinquish the prospect of making himself master of it by main force without a struggle. Situated on a clustre of heights on both banks of the Alle, of which the town covered a part, it commanded the three roads of Wormditt, Mohlsack, and Landsberg, which intersected each other within the entrenched camp, and in this way blocked up the access to Eylau and Königsberg. As long as the Russians held this important position, and at the same time maintained the course of the lower Passarge towards Braunsberg, their line might be considered unassailable. But from the moment that they were driven from the latter ground, and the enemy's columns began to interpose between the entrenched camp and the sea, threatening Eylau and Friedland, its advantages were at an end, because it was cut off from its communication with the very dépôts which it was designed to protect. Its weakest side was that on the left bank of the Alle, which was connected with the redoubt on the other side by four bridges. Nearly eighty thousand men were here assembled, under the cover of above five hundred pieces of cannon, in nine divisions ; of whom seven, under the Grand Duke Constantine, occupied the left bank of the river, and two, under Prince Gortchakoff, the right bank ; while Kamenskoi was stationed in the redoubts which covered the front of the position (2).

Battle of Heilsberg. Napoléon having collected forty pieces of artillery, under the command of General Dulauloy, on his left, pushed them forward, and by the vivacity of their fire, in some degree weakened that of the enemy. The divisions of St.-Cyr and Legrand, part of Soult's corps, with Murat's cavalry, advanced about seven in the evening, by the villages of Lauden, Langwiesse, and Bewernicken, to the attack of the enemy's redoubts on the right bank of the river. These brave men had no sooner quitted the cover of the ravine which for some time sheltered them from the enemy's fire, than they rushed forward with such vigour that, in the first onset, they carried the principal redoubt of the Russians in that quarter, with all the guns which it contained ; while St.-Hilaire, with his division, penetrated between that entrenchment and the neighbouring works. The moment was critical, and the least wa-

(1) Wilson, 144, 146. Jom. ii. 409. Dum. xviii. 264, 266, 272.

(2) Wilson, 145, 146. Dum. xviii. 266, 268. Bign. vi. 298.

Which is unsuccessful to the French. vering would have exposed the Russians to total ruin, for a line of redoubts broken in upon at one point is wellnigh lost; but Benning-sen was at the head of men who were equal to any emergency. Prince Gortchakoff, who commanded the Russian right wing, instantly ordered the divisions under his command to charge; the animating hurrahs of his men demonstrated that he had not calculated in vain on their intrepidity at that trying crisis: on they rushed with fixed bayonets, and the two regiments which occupied the redoubt were almost totally destroyed, and their eagles taken. Following up their success, the Russians burst out into the plain between the wood and the redoubts, and forced Soult's divisions to give ground. With the steadiness of discipline, however, they retired in hollow square by echelon, which vomited forth an incessant rolling fire upon their pursuers: the approach of night gave these moving citadels the appearance of being encircled with flame, while the intrenchments represented a line of volcanoes in vehement irruption. At length, the retreat of Legrand and St.-Cyr obliged St.-Hilaire, who had penetrated to the very foot of the redoubt, and had borne without flinching their terrible discharge of grape, also to retire: Savary, with two regiments of the guard and twelve guns, came up to cover his retreat; he, in his turn, however, was surrounded. The French at all points retired to the cover of the woods, and narrowly escaped being made prisoners by the allied cavalry; and at length, grievously shattered, the victorious Russians were again withdrawn into their entrenchments (1).

Fresh attack by Lannes, which also proves unsuccessful. The vehement cannonade which had so long illuminated the heavens now ceased, and the cries of the wounded, in the plain at the foot of the entrenchments, began to be heard above the declining roar of the musketry. At eleven at night, however, a deserter came into the Russian lines, and announced that a fresh attack was preparing. Suitable arrangements were accordingly made; and hardly were they completed, when dark masses of the enemy were seen, by the uncertain twilight of a midsummer night, to issue from the woods, and advance with a swift pace across the bloody plain which separated them from the redoubts. Instantly the batteries opened on the moving masses; they staggered under the discharge, but still pressed on, without returning a shot; but when they arrived within reach of the musketry, the fire became so vehement that the heads of the columns were entirely swept away, and the remainder driven back in great disorder, after sustaining a frightful loss. At length, at midnight, after twelve hours' incessant fighting, the firing entirely ceased, and nothing was heard in the narrow space which separated the two armies but the groans of the wounded, who, anticipating a renewal of the combat in the morning, and

(1) Wilson, 145, 146. Dum. xviii. 272, 277. Bign. vi. 299. Savary, iii. 53.

"I had on this occasion," says Savary "an exceedingly warm altercation with the Grand Duke de Berg (Murat), who sent to me, in the very thickest of the action, orders to move forward and attack; I bade the officer who brought the order go to the devil, asking, at the same time, if he did not see how we were engaged. That Prince, who would have commanded every where, wished that I should cease firing, at the hottest period of the fight, to march forward; he would not see, that if I had done so, I should infallibly have been destroyed before reaching the enemy. For a quarter of an hour I exchanged grape with the enemy—nothing enabled me to keep my ground but the rapidity of my

fire. The coming on of night was most fortunate—while every one slumbered, the Emperor sent for me. He was content with my charge, but scolded me for having failed in the support of Murat. When defending myself, I had the boldness to say he was a fool, who would some day cause us to lose a great battle; and that it would be better for us, if he was less brave and had more common sense. The Emperor bade me be silent, saying I was in a passion, but did not think the less of what I had said. Next day he was in very bad humour; our wounded were as numerous as in a pitched battle."—SAVARY, iii. 54. "He was particularly angry at the cavalry, saying, they had done nothing he had ordered."—WILSON, 149.

tortured by pain, implored removal, relief, or even death itself, to put a period to their sufferings (1).

Frightful
appearance
of the slain
after the
battle.

Heavy rain fell in the early part of the night, which, though it severely distressed the soldiers who were unhurt, in their bivouacs, assuaged the thirst and diminished the sufferings of the host of wounded of both armies who lay mingled together on the plain. With the first dawn of day the Russians again stood to their arms, expecting every moment to be attacked; but the morning passed over without any movement on the part of the enemy. As the light broke, the French were descried on the skirts of the wood in order of battle; but, more even than by their well appointed battalions and squadrons, the eyes of all were riveted on a spectacle inconceivably frightful between their lines and the redoubts. This space, about a quarter of a mile broad and above a mile in length, presented a sheet of naked human bodies, the greater part dead, but some showing by their motions that they preserved consciousness or implored relief. Six thousand corpses were here lying together as close as they had stood in their ranks, stript during the night of every rag of garment by the cupidity of the camp-followers of either army, ghastly pale, or purple with the blood which was still oozing from their wounds. How inured soever to the horrors of a campaign; the soldiers of both armies, even while they loathed it, felt their eyes fascinated by this harrowing spectacle, which exhibited war, stript of all its pomp, in its native barbarity; and, by common consent, the interval of hostilities was employed in burying the dead, and removing the shivering wounded to the rear of the armies (2).

Napoléon was extremely disconcerted by this repulse, and vented his ill-humour in violent sallies of passion against his generals. The butchery had been worse than useless—it had been hurtful. The Russians still held, in unshaken strength, their entrenchments; twelve thousand French had fallen around their redoubts, without having gained at the close of the day the mastery of one of them; the ditches were filled with their dead bodies, but no part of them had been crossed. Eight thousand Russians also were killed and wounded; and this loss, though less than that of their opponents, from their having fought in part under cover, was still greater perhaps in proportion to the relative strength of their army. The French Emperor, however, had felt too severely the strength of the enemy's position to venture upon a renewal of the attack, and therefore he resolved to compel the Russians to evacuate it by manœuvring on their flank.

(1) Wilson, 146, 147 Dum. xviii. 276, 278. Bign vi. 299 Sav. iii. 53, 54.

Violent explosion of Lannes. Murat, and Napoleon in consequence. The bad success of the attack on Heilsberg gave rise to a furious altercation between Lannes and Murat, and an explosion of the former, who was subject to ungovernable fits of passion, even with the Emperor himself. It is thus narrated, with dramatic power, by the Duchess of Abrantes:—"Your brother-in-law is a mountebank, Sire—a tight-rope dancer, with his white dancing plume."—"Come now, you are joking," answered Napoléon, in good humour: "is he not brave?"—"And who is not so in France? We point with the finger at a coward, Soult and I have done our duty: we refuse to allow the honour of the day to your brother-in-law—to his Serene and Imperial Highness Prince Murat! Truly these titles make one shrug his shoulders! The maia of Royalty has seized him also; and it is to tack his mantle to your own, that you wish to rob us of our glory. You have only to speak: we have enough remaining—we will willingly give it to him."

"Yes!" exclaimed Napoléon, no longer able to contain himself; "I will bestow or take away glory as I please: for, hear ye! it is I ALONE who give you both glory and success."—On this, Lannes became pale with rage; and with a voice quivering with passion, he exclaimed, "Yes! yes! because you have marched up to the aukles in gore in this bloody field, you think yourself a great man; and your fine emplumed brother-in-law crows on his own dunghill, I will have no more of this. And this fine victory of yours—a great triumph truly!—twelve thousand corpses lying on the plain to keep the field for your honour, where you can only trace the French uniform by fractures and mutilation: and yet to deny to me—to me, Lannes—my due share in the honours of the day!"—"D'ABRANTES, ix. 369, 372. The lively Duchess, with her usual inaccuracy on military details, recounts this scene as relating to the battle of Eylau: but that is impossible, as Lannes was not in that battle at all, but sick in the rear,—*Vide ante*, vi. 36.

(2) Wilson, 147. Sav. iii. 54.

JUNE 11. For this purpose, he took advantage of the arrival of Marshal Davoust's corps to push it forward at noon on the Lansberg road toward Eylau and Königsberg. This movement alarmed Benningsen, who, though not apprehensive of being forced in his entrenched position, was extremely afraid of being cut off from his supplies at Königsberg, on which the army depended for its daily subsistence; and at the same time, an order of Napoléon to Victor was intercepted, which contained commands to attack Lestocq and the right wing of the Allies at all points, and push on for Königsberg. Seeing the movement of the enemy to turn his right flank and threaten his magazines now clearly pronounced, the Russian general gave orders to retreat; the entrenched camp was evacuated at nightfall, and the army marched all the night of the 11th, and established themselves, at break of day, in a position in front of Bartenstein, headquarters being transferred to that town. Though great part of this operation was performed after daybreak on the 12th, in sight of the enemy, yet such was the respect produced by the battle of Heilsberg, that they made no attempt whatever to molest the retreat (1).

Movements
of the two
armies be-
fore the
battle of
Friedland.

No sooner was this retrograde movement perceived by the French Emperor, on the morning of the 12th, than he detached Murat's dragoons to follow upon the traces of the enemy, and he himself, moving forward his whole army, established his headquarters in the evening on the bloody fields of Preussich-Eylau. It was no longer a shivering scene of ice and snow; green fields were to be seen on all sides; clear and placid lakes gave variety and animation to the landscape; woods, resplendent with the early green of summer, fringed the rising grounds; and numerous white villages, with handsome spires, rose above their summit, attesting the industry and prosperity of the inhabitants under the paternal government of Old Prussia. The French soldiers could hardly recognise, in the gay and smiling objects around them, the frightful scene of devastation and blood which was imprinted in such sombre colours in their recollection during the preceding winter. Meanwhile General Lestocq resolved to break

JUNE 12. up from Braunsberg and the Lower Passarge, and retire by the margin of the Frischaff towards Königsberg, a measure which had become indispensable to prevent his being entirely cut off from his communication with the main army, and thrown back without resource on the margin of the sea. Kamenskoi was also directed by Benningsen to march upon Königsberg; but on arriving at Mulhausen, on the road to that city, he found it already occupied by the advanced guard of Davoust, and only reached the object of his destination by making a very long circuit. During the night of the 12th, the Russians resumed their march through Schippenheil, and on the following morning had reached the banks of the Alle. On arriving there, however, Benningsen received information that the French had, by the rapidity of their movements, and by following the chord of the arc which led to Königsberg, while his own troops were traversing the circumference, anticipated him in his march upon that city, and were already so far advanced on the road that

JUNE 13. they could not be overtaken. Murat and Victor were in full advance from Eylau to Königsberg. Soult was marching on Creutzburg; Napoléon himself, at the head of the corps of Lannes, Ney and Mortier, was approaching to FRIEDLAND by Domnau, at which latter place the Imperial Guard was already arrived. A glance at the map must be sufficient to show that by these different movements, not only was the bulk of the French Army interposed between the Russian general and Königsberg, where all his magazines

(1) Wilson, 149, 151. Dum xvi. 279, 283. Jom. ii. 409.

were placed, but Napoléon was in a situation, by a rapid advance upon Wehlau, to threaten his line of retreat to the Russian frontier. In these circumstances, no time was to be lost; and though the troops were dreadfully fatigued, orders were given to continue the march all day, and by great exertions the army reached Friedland, where headquarters were established in the evening (1).

Description
of the field
of Fried-
land.

Friedland, which has acquired immortal celebrity by the memorable battle of which it was the theatre, is a considerable town situated on the left bank of the river Alle, which there flows in a

northern direction towards the Baltic Sea. It is situated between the river and a large artificial lake or fish-pond, which lies to the north, and has been formed by damming up a rivulet called the Mill Stream, which flows from the high grounds to the westward near Posthenen into the Alle, and falls into it at right angles. The windings of the Alle serve as a natural wet ditch round Friedland on the south and east; the artificial lake protects it on the north; in a military point of view, therefore, it is only accessible on the western side, where it is approached by the road from Eylau, which the French were pursuing, and from which side also set out the roads to Königsberg to the north, and Wehlau and Tilsit on the north-west. In that direction there is a large open space, dotted with villages and cultivated ground, neither hill nor plain, but an undulated surface, intersected only along its whole extent, by the ravine formed by the Mill Stream, which is very deep, with rugged sides, and in many places, from the reflux waters, scarcely fordable. At the distance of two miles from Friedland as a centre, the cultivated plain to the westward is bounded by a semicircle of woods, which fringe the higher grounds and form the horizon when looking in that direction from the town. The banks of the Alle on the eastward are very steep; and though there are three bridges over that river, two of which were formed by the Russians with pontoons at the town itself, in other quarters it could be passed only at a few fords, which were unknown to the Allies till late in the evening, and at that period, from the recent heavy rains, were scarcely practicable (2).

Benning-
resolves to
attack Lan-
nes' corps.
Situation of
that corps.

In the night of the 15th, Benningesen received information that the corps of Lannes, which had suffered so severely at Heilsberg, was lying at Posthenen, a village about three miles from Friedland on the road to Königsberg. The exposed situation of that corps,

which formed the vanguard of the French army, and the well-known losses which it had sustained at Heilsberg, inspired the Russian general with the hope, that by a sudden attack it might be destroyed before the main body of Napoléon's forces could advance to its relief. This resolution was taken at two in the morning of the 14th; orders were immediately dispatched, and at four the Russian vanguard was already defiling over the bridge of Friedland. The opportunity was tempting, and to all appearance the corps of Lannes was placed in a situation of great danger; it consisted now of only twelve thousand infantry and three thousand horse; and though the corps of Mortier, Ney, and Victor, with great part of the cavalry of Murat, might be shortly expected to arrive at the scene of action, yet some hours must elapse before the foremost of these powerful auxiliaries could be relied on; and in the meanwhile this detached body was exposed to the shock of above fifty thousand veteran troops who, by proper exertion, might be directed against it. Here, in short, as at Marengo, the French army was to be attacked when

(1) Wilson, 150, 152. Dum. xviii. 280, 287. (2) Wilson, 152, 153. Dum. xix. 6. Rel. de la
Jom. ii. 410, 411. Sav. iii. 54. 55. Bign. vi. 299, Camp. par un Témoin oculaire, 74.
309.

on a line of march in echelon, by the concentrated masses of the enemy, who fell first on the leading corps; but there was this essential distinction between its position on these two memorable days, that on the former occasion the army was stationary or retreating, so that the distant corps could not arrive till late on the field of battle, whereas, here it was advancing, and consequently, unless decisive success were gained in the outset, the assailants would have the whole hostile body upon their hands (1); and in case of defeat could retreat only by the bridge of the Alle, which was wholly inadequate to afford an issue to so large a force.

He crosses
the Alle,
and attacks
the French
marshal.

No sooner were the advanced posts of the Russians descried by the videttes of Lannes' corps, than a sharp fire of musketry began, which was soon increased to a heavy cannonade as the dark masses of infantry and cavalry were seen swiftly advancing through the grey twilight of the summer morning. The French tirailleurs fell back, skirmishing, however, sharply as they retired; the alarm was speedily communicated to the rear, and the whole corps stood to arms. A single Russian division had at first been passed over, but the enemy's troops were so constantly fed from the rear, and the resistance opposed so considerable, that Benningsen soon found himself under the necessity of passing over another to its support; three pontoon bridges were constructed to facilitate the passage, and by degrees, as the increasing masses of the enemy showed that other corps had arrived to the support of Lannes, the whole army was brought across. Thus was the Russian general, who at first contemplated only a partial operation, insensibly drawn into a general action, and that too in the most disadvantageous of all possible situations, with a superior force of the enemy in front, and a deep river traversed only by a few bridges in his rear (2).

Disposition
and arrange-
ment of the
Russian
army.

The corps of Mortier arrived to the support of Lannes in a short time after the firing commenced, and both corps withdrew to the heights stretching from Posthenen to Heinrichsdorf, about three miles to the westward of the river Alle. Deeming these the only forces with which he had to contend, and considering himself adequate to their destruction, Benningsen drew up his whole forces as they successively arrived on the field from the bridges, in the narrow plain, backed by Friedland and the Alle, facing towards the westward, about half a mile in front of that town. The Mill Stream, flowing in a perpendicular direction to his line, nearly cut it in two equal parts; the right wing extended from the rivulet to the Alle, through the wood of Domerauer; the left, which was less considerable in length, stretched in a southerly direction also to the Alle, across the wood of Sortlack, and barring the roads of Eylau, Bartenstein, and Schippenheil, nearly at the point where they intersected each other. The whole army was drawn up in two lines facing to the west; the first and third battalions of each regiment, in battle array, composing the first line; the second, in close columns behind the intervals between them, forming the second. Thus the Russians stood on the arc of the segment of a circle formed by the river Alle in their rear. Only one division, of nine regiments and twelve squadrons of horse, remained on the right bank. Gortchakoff commanded the right wing, Bagration the left; Uvaroff and Gallitzin the cavalry of the right, Kollagriboff the horse on the left. After taking into view the losses in the preceding actions, and the large detachment under Kamenskoi to the right, to the support of Lestocq, the whole force of the Russians, on both sides of the river,

(1) Wilson, 152, 153. Jom. ii. 411, 412. Bign, vi. 312, 313. Dum. xix. 3, 9.

(2) Wilson, 152, 153. Dum. xix. 7, 10. Jom. ii. 412, 413.

did not exceed fifty-five thousand men, of whom about ten thousand were cavalry. They were all brave and experienced soldiers, but exhausted by fatigue and want of sustenance for several days; and every man in the array was entirely exposed to fire, and every movement distinctly seen, while that of the enemy was for the most part concealed or sheltered by the woods and rising grounds which fringed the plain to the westward, and bounded the horizon on that side (1).

No decisive
success is
gained on
either side
before the
arrival of
the other
French
corps.

Even with this comparatively inconsiderable force, however, the Russian general might, at least in the earlier part of the day, have gained considerable, perhaps decisive success, against the corps of Lannes and Mortier, which alone had come up to the field of battle, had he acted at once with the vigour and decision which the opportunity afforded, and the critical circumstances in which he was placed imperatively required. But, unfortunately, he was so prepossessed with the idea that he had no other antagonist to expect than the two corps actually on the spot, that the precious hours, big with the fate of Europe and the world, were allowed to elapse without any decided movement being attempted. Lannes gradually fell back from the place in front of Friedland, as the successive divisions of the enemy crossed the bridges, and established themselves on the left bank of the river; skilfully availing himself, however, of every advantage which the inequalities of the ground afforded to retard the advance of the enemy, and covering his movements with a cloud of light troops, whose incessant fire concealed the real amount of his force. A severe action took place on the right, while a body of thirty French squadrons tried to turn the Russian right in front of Heinrichsdorf, and at first with some success; but the advance of some fresh regiments compelled the assailants to give ground in that quarter. Soon after a column of three thousand men advanced straight against Friedland; they were permitted to approach close to the Russian cannon without a single shot being fired, when suddenly the whole opened with grape, and with such effect, that in a few minutes a thousand men were struck down, the column routed, and an eagle was taken. Encouraged by this success, the Russians advanced their left wing, and drove back the French right with such vigour, that it was thought they were retiring altogether towards Eylau; but this success was of short duration—fresh reinforcements arrived to the enemy—the lost ground was regained, and a tremendous cannonade along the whole line announced that the other corps were arriving, and that a general battle was at hand (2).

Preparatory
dispositions
and forces of
Napoleon.

Napoléon was at Domnau, ten miles distant, when the first sound of distant cannon was heard. He immediately mounted on horseback, and rode rapidly forward to the front, where the increasing cannonade and the quick rattle of musketry announced that a serious conflict was already engaged, dispatching, at the same time, orders for the corps in the rear to hasten their march. About one o'clock in the afternoon he arrived on the heights behind Heinrichsdorf, which overlook the field of battle, and immediately sent out the officers of his staff in different directions to observe the motions of the enemy. Savary speedily returned with information that the march of troops over the bridge of Friedland was incessant; that none were retracing their steps, that three additional bridges had been constructed to facilitate the passage, and that the masses in front were every minute increasing and extending themselves. "'Tis well," replied the Emperor; "I

(1) Wilson, 153, 155. Dum. xix. 9, 11. Jom. ii. 411, 413.

(2) Dum. xix. 12, 14. Jom. ii. 412. Wilson, 154, 456.

am already prepared; I have gained an hour upon them, and since they wish it, I will give them another: this is the anniversary of Marengo: the battle could not have been fought on a more propitious day." Orders were dispatched for all the corps of infantry, as they came up, to concentrate themselves in the immense woods behind Heinrichsdorf, on the skirts of which Marshal Lannes was combating; the artillery alone was placed on the great roads leading from Eylau and Domnau; the cavalry in the large apertures which had been cut for objects of agriculture in these extensive forests. The firm countenance and dense masses of the enemy, who appeared even more numerous than they really were, as seen from the heights of Heinrichsdorf, at first made the Emperor doubtful whether he should not postpone the attack till the following day, when the remainder of the cavalry of Murat and the corps of Davoust might be expected to join from the side of Königsberg (1); but the successive arrival of the corps of Ney and Victor (2), with the infantry and cavalry of the Guard and part of Murat's dragoons, at two and three o'clock, joined to the obvious and flagrant disadvantages of the enemy's position, induced him not to lose a moment in bringing matters to a decisive issue. Orders were accordingly dispatched for all the troops to prepare for action in an hour. Meanwhile the soldiers were ordered to sit down and rest themselves, while the most minute inspection took place in the ranks, to see that the firelocks were in good condition, and the cartridge-boxes amply supplied. The order of battle was soon fixed. Ney occupied the right, directly in front of Friedland; next stood Mortier, on the extreme right of Lannes. In the second line Victor's corps was stationed immediately behind Ney; the Imperial Guard, with a numerous brigade of fusileers, under the orders of Savary; and the cavalry, under Grouchy, Latour-Maubourg, and Nansouty, behind the centre and right. The whole army was directed to advance in echelon, with the right in front and the left slightly thrown back; thus Ney would be first engaged; and the artillery received orders to redouble their fire along the whole line as soon as the heads of their columns were seen emerging from the woods. By four o'clock seventy thousand infantry and ten thousand horse were assembled, in the highest spirits and the finest state of discipline and equipment; while Benningsen, who, from seeing the formidable accumulation of forces in his front, had deemed it necessary to detach six thousand men to his rear to secure the bridge of Wehlau over the Pregel, had not more than thirty-eight thousand foot and eight thousand horse to oppose to their attack (3).

Battle of
Friedland,
June 14.

The cessation of any serious attack for some hours after noon led the Russian general, who had long since abandoned his original project of surprising Lannes, and was desirous only of maintaining his ground till the approach of night gave him the means of regaining, without molestation, the right bank of the Alle, to indulge a hope that nothing further would be undertaken during that day: but he was soon painfully undeceived. At five o'clock, on a signal given by a discharge of twenty pieces of cannon

(1) Accordingly, at one o'clock, he wrote to that general from the field—"The enemy is in battle array in front of Friedland, with all his army. At first he appeared desirous of moving on by Stöcklein on Königsberg; but now he appears only desirous of receiving battle on the ground he has chosen. I hope that by this time you have entered Königsberg: and as the corps of Soult is sufficient for the protection of that city, you will without doubt retrace your steps as rapidly as possible with the remainder of the cavalry and Davoust's corps towards Friedland. It is the more necessary that you should

do so, as very possibly the affair may be protracted till to-morrow. Use your utmost efforts, therefore, to arrive here by one o'clock in the morning. If I perceive in the outset of the action that the enemy is in such strength as to render the result doubtful, it is possible that I may engage only in a cannonade to-day, and await your arrival before commencing serious operations."—JOMINI, ii. 414.

(2) Formerly of Bernadotte, who had been wounded at Spandau.

(3) Sav. iii. 56, 58. Wilson, 155, 156. Jom. ii. 413, 415. Dum. xix. 10, 17. Bign. vi. 301, 302.

from the French centre, the whole army stood to their arms, and immediately the heads of Marshal Ney's column were seen emerging from the woods behind Posthenen and rapidly advancing straight upon Friedland. On all sides the enemy's forces at once were seen; from the steeples of Friedland, through the interstices of the trees, or in the openings of the forest, they were descried in masses of enormous power and depth. From the plain, the horizon appeared to be bounded by a deep girdle of glittering steel. At one glance the most inexperienced could see the imminence and magnitude of the danger, for no preparations to cover the retreat over the Alle had been made, and the enemy's force appeared at least double that of the Russians.

Splendid
attack by
Ney's corps.

But there was no time for consultation or defensive measures. On came Ney's column with the fury of a tempest, driving before them, like foam before the waves, the Russian chasseurs of the guards and several regiments of cavalry and Cossacks who were placed in advance, and had endeavoured to check their progress. Some regiments of militia, stationed on the low grounds near the Alle, also broke and fled towards the bridges, spreading confusion and alarm through the whole rear of the army. At the same time Victor's corps, placed at first in the second line, advanced to the ground originally occupied by Ney; and its artillery, consisting of forty pieces, under the command of General Senarmont, pushed on four hundred paces farther, and, from a rising ground, thundered over the whole Russian line, and effectually prevented any succours being sent to the distressed left. That portion of their army was now every where shaken; the loud shouts of Ney's column were heard along the whole line; their advanced guards were close to Friedland, and, encouraged by this rapid and splendid success (1), they were already preparing to storm the town and complete the ruin of the enemy by gaining possession of the bridges in his rear.

Gallant
charge of
the Russian
Guard near-
ly regains
the day.

At this instant the Russian Imperial Guard, which was placed in reserve behind the artificial lake to the north of Friedland, was ordered to advance. They rushed forward with fixed bayonets, but not in compact order, yet with such vigour, that the leading divisions of Ney's corps, assailed in front and flank, were pierced through, trodden down, and driven back with prodigious slaughter. Such was the change produced by this vehement onset, that the day seemed all but regained; they were repulsed to a considerable distance, and the Russian left wing in its turn became the assailants. Then it was, that the six thousand men detached in the forenoon to Weblau, might have changed the destinies of Europe. But the Russian guards, being unsupported by any further reserve, could not singly maintain the contest with the overwhelming odds which were directed against them. As they hurried on in pursuit of Ney, they came upon the reserve under Victor, which had advanced to his support; and one of his divisions, under Dupont, charged them so opportunely in flank, while disordered by the vehemence of their pursuit, that they were in their turn repulsed to the edge of the town. Encouraged by this turn of fortune, Ney's soldiers now returned to the charge. Dupont's division, emulating the deeds of its old comrades in the camp of Boulogne, pressed on in hot pursuit; Senarmont's terrific battery advanced, playing without intermission on the crowded ranks of the retiring Russians, and soon the confusion and press in Friedland appeared so great, that the leading French divisions were tempted to hazard an assault (2). After an obstinate resistance, the streets were forced; some of

(1) Sav. iii. 58, 59. Dum. xix. 17, 19. Wilson, Wilson, 159, 160. Sav. iii. 58, 59. Jom. ii. 418. 159, 160. Jom. ii. 417, 418. Bign. vi. 303, 304. Dum. xix. 19, 21.

(2) Saalf, Gesch. der Krieg von Nap. i. 644-7.

the principal buildings in the town took fire; in the first moments of consternation the fugitives applied the torch to the bridges over the river—in a few minutes they were wrapped in flames, and the volumes of smoke which rolled over the whole field of battle, spread a dismal feeling in the breasts of the soldiers.

While this decisive success was gaining on the left, the centre and right of the Russians kept their ground with undaunted firmness under a dreadful cannonade, which told with fatal effect on the dense masses, which, from the limited extent of the ground, were there accumulated between the front and the river. They had even gained considerable success; for some battalions, having broken their array in crossing the deep ravine of the Mill Stream, with which they were unacquainted, were charged before they could re-form by the Russian cavalry, and cut to pieces. But when the retreat of the left wing and the Guards had uncovered their flank, the infantry in the centre were exposed to the most serious danger, and must have given way, had not the Russian cavalry galloped forward at full speed, and charged the corps who threatened them, who were the left of Oudinot's grenadiers, with such vigour that they were in a few minutes trampled under foot and destroyed. Encouraged by this success, the infantry of the centre also moved forward, and threw in so destructive a flanking fire, as effectually covered the retreat of their horse; but at this moment the flames of Friedland and the bridges were seen to arise, and the vast clouds of black smoke which darkened the atmosphere, told too plainly that their retreat was cut off, and that success was hopeless. Then indeed their hopes fell, and despair took possession of every heart. Still, however, the Russian courage was unshaken; uniting the fronts of battalions, closing the ranks of the soldiers, they presented, in circumstances which seemed well-nigh desperate, an unbroke front to the enemy. In vain the artillery, approaching to half cannon-shot distance, ploughed through their dense array—in vain the French infantry threw in a destructive fire with ceaseless vigour—in vain the grenadiers of their guard charged repeatedly with the shouts and confidence of victory; not one square was broken—not one gun was taken. Slowly and in solid order they retired, leisurely retracing their steps towards the river, keeping up an incessant rolling fire from the rear, which faced the enemy, and charging with the bayonet whenever hard pressed by their pursuers (1). Whoever witnessed the conduct of that devoted host during these trying hours, must have felt that Russia, if adequately directed, was destined in the end to take the lead in the deliverance of Europe.

Benning-
sen's mea-
sures to
secure a
retreat.

Benningesen, meanwhile, without losing his presence of mind in the general wreck, did all that prudence could suggest to repair the consequences of the error into which he had been drawn in the earlier part of the day. His first care was to discover a ford for the cannon,

(1) Wilson, 160, 161. Sav. iii. 59. Jom. ii. 418, 419. Dum xix. 20, 21. Saalf. i. 646.

"But yet, though thick the shafts as snow,
Though charging knights like whirlwinds go,
Though bill-men ply the ghastly blow,
Unbroken was the ring;

Each stepping where his comrade stood,
The instant that he fell.

No thought was there of dastard flight;
Link'd in the serried phalanx tight,
Groom fought like noble, squire like knight,
As fearlessly and well;

Till utter darkness closed her wing
O'er their thin host and wounded King.

Then skill'd Napoleon's sage commands
Led back from strife his shatter'd bands;
And from the charge they drew,
As mountain-waves, from wasted lands,
Sweep back to ocean blue.

Then did their loss his foemen know:
Their chiefs, their lords, their mightiest low,
They melted from the field, as snow,
When streams are swollen and south winds blow,
Dissolves in silent dew.

Alle's echoes heard the ceaseless plash,
While many a broken band,
Disorder'd through her currents dash,
To gain the Russian land."

Marmion. Canto VI.

as Friedland was in the hands of the enemy, and the bridges were no longer passable by friends or foes. Happily some peasants pointed out one where the great park of artillery might be got across; and it was in the first instance withdrawn, with the exception of a few pieces which fell into the enemy's hands, while the firm countenance of the infantry warded off the assault of his impetuous columns; but the water came up to the horses' middles, and what remained of the ammunition was utterly spoiled. A hundred guns were immediately after the passage planted on the right bank to retard the enemy; but so closely were the columns on the opposite sides intermingled, that it was dangerous to fire lest the balls should fall in the Russian lines. Meanwhile two of their divisions, impatient of the slow progress at the ford, and unable to endure any longer the incessant showers of musketry and grape, threw themselves, sword in hand, into Friedland, and endeavoured to open a passage with fixed bayonets to the bridge. A desperate struggle ensued with the troops of Ney and Victor in the streets, but the despair of the Russians prevailed over the enthusiasm of the French, and they made their way through the burning houses to the water's edge. There, however, they found the bridges destroyed; and these brave men, after having so heroically cut their way through the hostile ranks, found themselves stopped by an impassable barrier, while the increasing masses of the enemy now enclosed them, amidst fire and darkness, on every side. Still, however, no one thought, even in circumstances all but desperate, of surrender; with heroic courage they fought their way back, though with prodigious slaughter, to the ford, and during the darkness of the night plunged into the stream. The water was breast-high, and many missing the fords were drowned; several guns were abandoned, from the impossibility of dragging them through the press; but such was the unconquerable valour of the rearguard to the very last, that not one battalion capitulated, and, with the exception of five thousand wounded, few prisoners fell into the enemy's hands (1).

Immense
results of
the battle.

Such was the disastrous battle of Friedland, which at one blow dissolved the great confederacy which the genius and foresight of Mr. Pitt had formed for the coercion of Napoléon's ambition, and left Great Britain alone to maintain the contest with the whole force of the Continent arrayed under his banners. Grievously, then, was felt the want of British aid, and woful were the consequences of the ill-timed parsimony which had withheld all subsidies from Russia during this desperate struggle; thirty thousand of the militia, whom even a small loan would have clothed and armed, might have averted the catastrophe; twenty thousand British auxiliaries would have converted it into a glorious victory, and thrown Napoléon back upon the Vistula and the Elbe. The losses of the Russians, though nothing like what they had experienced in the decisive overthrow of Austerlitz, were still very severe. Seventeen thousand men had fallen, either killed or wounded, and five thousand of the latter had been made prisoners; but of those unhurt not more than five hundred had become captives; no colours were taken, but seventeen guns remained in the enemy's power. The French had lost eight thousand men, and two eagles wrested from them in fair combat. Nothing

(1) Saalf, i. 647, 648. Wilson, 159, 161. Jom. ii. 419, 421. Dum. xix. 19, 23. Sav. iii. 69. Bign. vi. 304, 305.

In describing this battle, Lord Hutchinson, who witnessed it, stated, in his official despatches to the British government—"I want words sufficiently strong to describe the valour of the Russians, and which alone would have rendered their success un-

doubted, if courage alone could secure victory; but whatever may be the event, the officers and men of the Russian army have done their duty in the noblest manner, and are justly entitled to the praise and admiration of every person who was witness of their conduct."—Lord Hutchinson's *Despatch*, June 15, 1807; Sir Robert Wilson, 162.

can illustrate more clearly the desperate resistance made by the Russians than the small number of guns taken, under circumstances when, with less steady troops, the whole artillery would have been abandoned. (1).

The Russians retreat without molestation to Allenberg and Wehlau. June 15.

During the evening, the right wing of the Russians and part of the cavalry retired by the left bank of the Alle, and crossed without molestation at the bridge of Allenberg. Thither, on the morning after the battle, the remainder of the army retired by the other bank, without being at all harassed on the march; indeed, it is a remarkable and unaccountable circumstance, that though fifteen thousand French horse were in the field, they were little engaged in the action after Napoléon arrived on the spot, nor once let loose in the pursuit (2). On the day following they reached Wehlau, where the Alle and the Pregel unite in the midst of a marshy plain, traversed by a single chaussée. By that defile, not

only the artillery and carriages of the main army, but the immense baggage and ammunition train, which had evacuated Königsberg, had to pass; and although no enemy was in sight, yet such was the confusion produced by the enormous accumulation of cannon and chariots on a single chaussée, and such the apprehensions inspired by the evident dangers which would ensue if the rearguard were to be attacked, that on a few muskets being accidentally discharged, a general panic took place, and horse, foot, and cannon rushed tumultuously together to the bridge, and the strongest throwing down and trampling under foot the weaker, broke through and spread in the wildest disorder into the town. Such was the uproar and consternation which ensued, that it was with the utmost difficulty that order could be restored by the personal efforts of Sir Robert Wilson and a few Russian officers who happened to be on the spot; and it inspired these gallant chiefs with the melancholy conviction, that if Napoléon had followed up his success with his wonted vigour, the Russian host would have been utterly annihilated (3). But on this occasion, as on many others in the memorable campaign of 1812, it was apparent that the vigour of the Emperor in following up his victories was by no means proportioned, either to what it had been in the German or Italian wars, or to the successes which he claimed at the moment: a circumstance for which his panegyrists find it impossible to offer any explanation, but which in truth is susceptible of a very easy solution, when the desperate nature of the resistance opposed to him in these northern latitudes, and the consequent magnitude of his losses, is taken into consideration (4).

Capture of Königsberg. June 16.

The catastrophe at Friedland, and subsequent retreat of the Allies behind the Pregel, rendered the city of Königsberg, which was situated considerably in advance of that river on the left bank or front of its course, no longer tenable. General Lestocq had, with his wonted ability,

(1) Wilson, 163. Dum. xix. 21, 23. Jom. ii. 420, 421. 79th Bull. Camp. de Saxe, iv. 334. Sav. iii. 59, 60.

The French say, in the bulletins, that they took 80 pieces of cannon, and that the Russians had 18,000 killed, and that they lost on their own side only 500 killed and 3000 wounded. Berthier estimated the real loss at Tilsit to Sir R. Wilson at more than 8000; and that officer makes the Russian loss only 12,000 men. The latter estimate, however, is obviously too low, as the peace which immediately followed demonstrated; the account in the bulletin was, as usual, from a third to a fourth of its real amount.—79th Bulletin; Camp. de Saxe, iv. 334; and Wilson, 163.

(2) "The Russians had on their right 22 squadrons of cavalry, who covered the retreat; we had

more than 40 with which we should have charged them; but, by a fatality without example, these forty squadrons received no orders, and never so much as mounted their horses; they remained during all the battle on foot behind our left; on seeing that, I lamented that the Grand Duke of Berg had not been there: if he had, these forty squadrons would certainly have been employed, and not a Russian would have escaped."—Savary, iii. 60.

(3) Et si continuo victorem ea cura subisset, Ultimus ille dies bello gentique fuisset.

In the first alarm, the Cossacks crowded down to the right bank of the Alle, and swimming the river, advanced on the opposite side and discharged a volley of arrows with considerable effect at the enemy.—Wilson, 163, 165.

(4) Wilson, 164, 165. Dum. xix. 34, 35.

conducted the retreat of his little army with very little loss, till he was joined on the 12th, in front of Königsberg, by the corps of Kamenskoi. Even their united forces, however, not more than twenty-four thousand strong, could hardly hope to save that town without the assistance of the main army, when they were attacked by the corps of Soult and Davoust, and the greater part of the cavalry under Murat, amounting to full fifty thousand men, of whom above twelve thousand were horse in the finest condition. Notwithstanding this overwhelming odds, however, Lestocq made the attempt, and by the firm countenance which he assumed, and the devoted heroism of his rearguard in the retreat from the Lower Passarge, succeeded in so far retarding the enemy, as to gain time for the evacuation of almost all the magazines and stores in the city, even by the narrow and crowded defile of Wehlau. But this great object was not gained without sustaining a considerable loss.

June 14. A battalion was surrounded and made prisoners which had been left to defend the passage of the Frisching; and on the following day a column

June 15, of twelve hundred men, which was enveloped by St.-Cyr's division and Murat's cavalry, was, after a gallant resistance, compelled to surrender. Weakened by these losses, Lestocq, however, still maintained his ground in Königsberg, repeatedly repulsed the attempts to storm it which were made by the Brandenburg gate, and remained there all the day, putting the mouldering fortifications in a respectable posture of defence, and

June 16, pressing the evacuation of the magazines; but on the day following, having received accounts of the battle of Friedland, he ordered the garrison to be under arms, under pretence of making a sally; and when evening approached, the whole took the direction of Labian and the Pregel, leaving General Sutterheim with two battalions of light infantry to man the walls. He also evacuated the place at midnight, and on the following morning the magistrates sent the keys of the city to Marshal Soult. Three thousand sick or wounded fell into the hands of the enemy; but such was the activity of General Lestocq, and the skill with which Sutterheim conducted his measures, that no magazines or stores of any importance were taken, and the rearguard, though frequently molested, effected its retreat, without any serious loss, to Wehlau, where they joined the main army as it was defiling over the bridge (1).

(1) Wilson, 167, 169. *Dun.* xix. 33, 36.

Napoléon, with his usual mendacious policy, gave out, in his 79th bulletin, that he had taken in Königsberg not only twenty thousand prisoners and immense public magazines, but 160,000 British stand of arms! It appeared a happy stroke to make the Parisians believe that the tardy succours of Great Britain had arrived just in time to arm the French troops. "This assertion," Sir R. Wilson justly observes, "is a falsehood of the most extravagant character, and which finds no parallel but in the catalogue of their own compositions." In truth, the British arms escaped by a circumstance more discreditable to England than the falsehood which Napoléon asserted; they had not yet arrived. The cannon, ammunition, and arms for Prussia were sent by Lord Hutchinson, after the armistice, to a Swedish port; those for Russia were landed at Riga, and delivered to the Russian troops.—*Parl. Returns*, 1807; *Parl. Hist.* ix. App.; and Wilson, 167. The falsehood in regard to the stores taken at Königsberg appeared in the bulletin giving the details of the battle of Friedland, dated Wehlau, June 17, the very day on which that town was taken by the French troops. He there said, "Marshal Soult has entered Königsberg; where we found many hundred thous-

and quintals of wheat, more than 20,000 Russians and Prussians wounded, and all the military stores which England had sent out; among the rest, 160,000 muskets, still on shipboard." This fabrication was made at Wehlau on the 17th, which is thirty miles from Königsberg, before it was possible that any thing further than the bare capture of the city could have been heard of by the French Emperor. The falsehood in the first bulletin, which corresponded to his wishes rather than the reality, was so gross, that it could not be repeated in the succeeding one, dated Tilsit, 19th June, which, after recapitulating the successes of Soult and the fall of Königsberg, said, "In fine, the result of all these affairs has been, that 4000 or 5000 prisoners and 15 pieces of cannon have fallen into our hands. Two hundred Russian vessels, and great stores of subsistence, wine, and spirits, have been found in Königsberg." Yet so little do the French writers attend to accuracy in their detail, that the enormous falsehood in the first bulletin, even when abandoned by the second, has been adopted by all their historians, even Jomini and Dumas, whose accuracy is in general so praiseworthy.—*See Dun.* xiv. 33; and *Jom.* ii. 422; and 79th and 80th *Bullet. Camp. de Saxe*; iv. 338, 342 and *Bien.* vi. 308; and *Norvins*, iii. 27.

Measures of
Napoléon,
and retreat
of the Rus-
sians to the
Niemen.

Meanwhile Napoléon, after his usual custom, rode on the following morning over the field of battle. It presented a ghastly spectacle, second only to the terrific field of Eylau in circumstances of horror. Then might be seen evident proofs of the stern and unconquerable valour with which the Russians had combated : the position of the squares of infantry could be distinctly traced by the dead bodies of the men, which still preserved their regular array : the station of the cavalry was seen by the multitude of horses, which lay dead as they had stood in squadrons or battalions on the field. In the pursuit, however, he exerted none of his usual vigour, and threw away, in the prosecution of a minor object, the fairest opportunity he had ever enjoyed of destroying the Russian army. Intent only on cutting the enemy off from Königsberg, and securing to himself that noble prize of victory, he totally neglected the following up of his success on the right bank of the Alle, and suffered the disorganized and shattered Russian army to retire without molestation through the narrow defile that penetrated the marshes of Wehlau and over the single bridge of the Pregel, when a little additional vigour in the pursuit would at least have compelled them to abandon, at the entrance of these passes, the greater part of

June 18. their baggage and artillery. On the evening of the 18th, the allied army, which had united at Wehlau with the troops under Kamenskoi and Lestocq, falling back from Königsberg, reached Tilsit on the Niemen, and early on the following morning the mighty array began to defile over the bridge. For forty hours successively the passage continued without inter-
June 19. mission ; horse, foot, cannon, baggage-waggons, store-chariots, succeeding each other in endless array : it seemed as if the east was swallowing up the warlike brood which had so long contended with the west for the mastery of Europe. Still, though a hundred thousand men, flushed with victory, were hardly a day's march in the rear, no attempt was made by Napoléon to molest their passage. A few cannon-shots alone were exchanged between the Cossacks and the horse-artillery of Murat (1), which, on the morn-
June 20. ing of the 20th, approached the town of Tilsit, which was shortly evacuated by Bagration with the Russian rearguard, who withdrew without molestation across the river, and burned the bridge.

The Em-
peror Alex-
ander pro-
poses an
armistice.

In truth, hostilities were no longer either required or expedient. Disheartened by the defeat which he had experienced ; chagrined at the refusal of succours either in men or money from England ; irritated at the timid policy of Austria, when the fairest opportunity that ever yet had occurred was presented for her decisive interposition ; foiled in the objects for which he had originally begun the war, and deserted by those for whose advantage, more than his own, it had been undertaken, the Emperor Alexander had taken his resolution. He deemed it unnecessary and improper to risk the independence of Russia in a quarrel not directly affecting its interests, and from which the parties immediately concerned had withdrawn. On the 18th, therefore, General Benningsen wrote a letter to Prince Bagration, desiring him to make known to the French generals the Emperor's
June 19. desire for an armistice ; this was accordingly communicated to Murat on the forenoon of the following day, and orders were immediately transmitted for hostilities to cease at all points. Thus was this mighty conflagration, which originally commenced on the banks of the Danube, finally stilled on the shores of the Niemen (2).

(1) Wilson, 168, 170. Dum. xix. 35, 40. Bign. vi. 508, 509.

(2) Wilson, 170, 171. Dum. xix. 42, 44.

During this desperate struggle between the Passarge and the Niemen, a conflict of some importance, but overlooked amidst the shock of such mighty

Reasons which made Napoléon rejoice at this step. These proposals on the part of the Russian Emperor gave the highest satisfaction to Napoléon. It had ever been his policy to offer peace to his enemies during the first tumult and consternation of defeat; and more than once, by such well-timed advances, he had extricated himself from a situation of the utmost peril. To be anticipated in this manner in his desires, and have the public demonstration afforded of the reality of his victory by the enemy proposing an armistice, was a circumstance, of all others the most gratifying, which raised him at once to the highest point of glory. He was not ignorant that here, as at Leoben and Austerlitz, a further continuance of the contest might be attended with very serious dangers. England, it is true, had hitherto, in an unaccountable manner, kept herself secluded from the struggle: but a change had taken place in her councils; a close alliance had been contracted with Prussia; powerful succours in arms and ammunition were on their route, and the greatest military expedition she had ever sent forth was preparing to hoist the flag of a national war on the banks of the Elbe. The dubious policy of Austria rendered it more than probable that in such an event she would throw off the mask; and that eighty thousand armed mediators might suddenly make their appearance under the walls of Dresden, and totally intercept the communications of the Grand Army with France. Russia, it was true, was defeated; the army of Bagration was little more than half its former amount; but thirty thousand men were advancing, under Prince Labanoff, to repair its losses; and if its frontiers were invaded, and a national resistance aroused, there were four hundred thousand militia enrolled, who would speedily fill the ranks of the regular army. Napoléon, indeed, could collect, notwithstanding the losses of the short campaign, a hundred and fifty thousand men on the Niemen; but even this mighty host appeared hardly adequate to the task of subduing an empire whose dominions on this side of the Ural Mountains exceeded all the rest of Europe put together. How were the conquered provinces to be kept in subjection; how the fortresses taken garrisoned; how the immense lines of communication kept up when the war was to *commence* at the distance of nearly a thousand miles from the Rhine, and the Scythian monarch, if resolute on preserving his independence, might retreat a thousand miles farther without coming to the verge of his European dominions (1)?

Considerations which rendered the Russians also desirous of an accommodation. Nor were the considerations less powerful which induced Alexander to desire an-accommodation. By engaging in the war on this desperate principle indeed, and drawing the enemy into the heart of his dominions, he had every chance of defeating the invasion of this second Darius into the deserts of Scythia; but this could only be done by great sacrifices, and at the hazard of throwing back for a long period the internal improvement of his rising dominions. For what object were these sacrifices to be made? For the preservation of Prussia? She was already crushed, and a few inconsiderable forts, with the town of Graudentz, were all

hosts, took place on the banks of the Narrew. Tolstoy had there gained some successes over Massena, and in particular made himself master of the entrenched camp of Borki; but the French having attacked it some days after with increased forces, it again fell into their hands, and the Russians, following the retreat of their principal army, had retired from Ost. olenka towards Ticoizin, when the armistice of Tilsit put a period to their operations. — DUMAS, xix. 41, 43.

(1) Hurd. ix. 426.

The following regular forces, exclusive of 400,000 militia, were still at the command of the Russian government:—

Remains of the army which fought at Friedland,	28,000
Kamenskoi's corps,	9,000
Reinforcements which joined at Tilsit, or on march,	9,000
At Olita half of Labanoff's corps,	15,000
Prussians retired with Lestoeq,	18,000
Tolstoy's corps on the Narrew,	18,000
On march from Wilna,	15,000
Total regulars,	112,000

— WILSON, 176.

that remained to Frederick William of the dominions of his illustrious ancestors. For the safety of England? She was sufficiently protected by her invincible fleets; and the interests she had evinced in the struggle had not been such as to render it imperative on the Czar, either in honour or policy, to continue the contest on her account (1). For the sake of the balance of power? That was an object, however important, which could not be brought about by the unaided efforts of a single empire; and if Austria, whose interests were more immediately concerned in its preservation, was not inclined to draw the sword in the conflict, it did not appear that Russia, whose independence had never yet been seriously threatened, was called upon to continue it unaided for its restoration. Now was an opportunity when the war might be terminated, if not with advantage, at least without dishonour: in the fields of Pultusk, Eylau, and Heilsberg, the Russians had sufficiently vindicated their title to military glory; and objects of immediate importance were to be gained nearer home, both on the Danube and the Neva (2), amply sufficient to indemnify the empire for a temporary withdrawal from the general theatre of European strife.

Conclusion
of an armistice,
June 22.

When such were the dispositions on both sides, there was little difficulty in coming to an understanding. France had nothing to demand of Russia except that she should close her ports against England: Russia nothing to ask of France but that she should withdraw her armies from Poland, and permit the Emperor to pursue his long-cherished projects of conquest in Turkey. The map of Europe lay before them, out of which these two mighty potentates might carve at pleasure ample indemnities for themselves, or acquisitions for their allies. No difficulty, in consequence, was experienced in settling the terms of the armistice: the Niemen separated the two armies; the headquarters of Napoleon were fixed at Tilsit, on the left bank of the river; those of Alexander at Piktupohnen, a mile distant on the right bank. A friendly intercourse was immediately established between the officers and men of the two armies: they had felt each other's valour too strongly not to be inspired with sentiments of mutual respect; while Napoleon, in eloquent terms, addressed his soldiers on this glorious termination of their labours, in one of those proclamations which made Europe thrill from side to side (3).

Interview
on the raft
at Tilsit.

An armistice having been thus concluded, it was agreed that the two Emperors should meet to arrange, in a private conference, the

(1) The secret motives which induced the Emperor Alexander to conclude the treaty of Tilsit, were the refusal by Lord Howick (now Earl Grey) to guarantee the Russian subsidies, and that too in a manner peculiarly painful to the feelings of the Emperor; a refusal the more inexplicable, as that minister was the very person who had, after the catastrophe of Jena, warmly solicited the Czar to fly to the succour of Prussia; the delay in the arrival of the troops promised by England in the island of Rugen; the tardiness of the new administration in furnishing the promised supplies in money, arms, and ammunition; circumstances which had warmly irritated him against the English government; the refusal of Austria to accede to the convention of Carstenstein, or take any part in the contest; as well as the exhaustion of his own finances, the penury of arms and ammunition, the famishing state of the troops, and the risk of total overthrow to which they were exposed.—HARDENBERG, ix. 425; and LUCCHESI, i. 322, 323.

(2) Boulourin, Camp. de 1812, i. 21, 22. Hard. ix. Lucchesi, i. 322, 323.

(3) Bign. vi. 308, 312. Dam. xix. 44, 50.

Napoleon's "Soldiers!—On the 5th June, we proclaimed—were attacked in our cantonments by the Russian army: the enemy mistook his troops, understood the cause of our inactivity. He has learned, when it was too late, that our repose was that of the lion; he now repents having forgotten it. In the days of Guttstadt, of Heilsberg, in the ever-memorable field of Friedland, in a ten days' campaign, in short, we have taken 120 pieces of cannon, 7 standards, killed or wounded 60,000 Russians, wrested from the enemy's army all its magazines and hospitals, the fortress of Königsberg, with three hundred vessels which it contained, loaded with ammunitions of war of all sorts, and especially 160,000 muskets sent by England to arm our enemies. From the shores of the Vistula we have arrived on those of the Niemen with the rapidity of the eagle. You celebrated at Austerlitz the anniversary of my coronation; but you have this year worthily commemorated that of Marengo, which terminated the war of the second coalition. Frenchmen, you are worthy of yourselves, and of

destinies of the world. It took place, accordingly, on the 25th, under circumstances eminently calculated to impress the imagination of mankind.

June 25. By the direction of the French general of engineers, Lariboisière, a raft of great dimensions was constructed on the river Niemen; *the raft of Tilsit*, which will be recollected as long as the cage of Bajazet or the conquests of Alexander. It was moored in the centre of the stream, and on its surface a wooden apartment, surmounted by the eagles of France and Russia, framed with all the possible magnificence which the time and circumstances would admit. This was destined for the reception of the Emperors alone; at a little distance was stationed another raft, less sumptuously adorned, for their respective suites. The shore on either side was covered with the Imperial guard of the two monarchs, drawn up in triple lines, in the same firm and imposing array in which they had stood on the fields of Eylau and Friedland. At one o'clock precisely, amidst the thunder of artillery, each Emperor stepped into a boat on his own side of the river, accompanied by a few of his principal officers; Napoléon was attended by Murat, Berthier, Bessières, Duroc, and Caulaincourt: Alexander by the Grand Duke Constantine, General Benningsen, Prince Labanoff, General Ouvaroff, and Count Lieven; the numerous and splendid suite of each monarch followed in another boat immediately after. The bark of Napoléon, rowed by the marines of his Guard, advanced with greater rapidity than that of Alexander. He arrived first at the raft, entered the apartment, and himself opened the door on the opposite side to receive the Czar, while the shouts of the soldiers on either shore drowned even the roar of the artillery. In a few seconds Alexander arrived, and was received by the conqueror at the door on his own side: their meeting was friendly; and the very first words which he uttered bespoke both the lacerated feelings occasioned by the conduct of the government of Great Britain during the war, his deep penetration, and clear perception of the ruling passion of Napoléon—"I hate the English," said he, "as much as you do, and am ready to second you in all your enterprises against them." "In that case," replied Napoléon, "every thing will be easily arranged, and peace is already made." The interview lasted two hours, during which Napoléon exercised all the ascendant which his extraordinary talents and fortune, as well as singular powers of fascination gave him, while the Russian Emperor gave proof of the tact and finesse, as well as diplomatic ability, by which his nation beyond any other in Europe is gifted. Before they parted, the outlines of the treaty were arranged between them—it was not difficult to come to an understanding—the world afforded ample room for the aggrandizement of both (1).

Commence-
ment of the
negotiations
in Tilsit.
June 26.

On the day following, a second interview took place at the same town, at which the King of Prussia was present; the first had been arranged, and the preliminary terms agreed to, without any con-

me. You will return to your country covered with laurels, and after having gained a peace which will be its own guarantee. It is time that our country should live in repose, sheltered from the malignant influence of England. My benefactions to you shall testify the large measure of my gratitude, and the whole extent of the love which I bear you." Already was to be seen, not merely in Napoléon's thoughts, but in his words, a return to the celebrated maxim of Louis XIV, "L'état c'est moi."—BIGN. vi. 341, 342.

(1) Sav. iii. 76, 77. BIGN. vi. 345, 346. DUM. xix. 53, 55.

Savary, who had been nominated governor of Königsberg, received orders, when the French army

first approached the Niemen, to get ready a pontoon train, which had been left in the arsenal of that city, for immediate operation. Next day, however, he received the following significant note from Talleyrand:—"Be in no hurry with your pontoons; what would we gain by passing the Niemen? what is there to be acquired beyond that river? The Emperor must abandon his ideas in regard to Poland; that nation is fit for nothing; disorder alone is to be organized out of its inhabitants. We have another far more important matter to settle; here is a fair opportunity of terminating the present dispute; we must not let it escape." Already the Spanish invasion had entered into the calculations of the rulers of Europe on the Niemen.—SAVARY, iii. 76.

cert with that unhappy prince. He was no longer in a situation to stipulate any conditions; bereft of his dominions, driven up into a corner of his territories, destitute of every thing, he had no alternative but submission to the stern law of the conqueror (1). As it was now evident that an accommodation was about to take place, arrangements were made for conducting it with more convenience to the exalted personages concerned. Part of the town of Tilsit was declared neutral, and allotted to the accommodation of the Emperor of Russia and his suite; thither he repaired, on the afternoon of the same day, and was received with all imaginable courtesy by Napoléon himself, upon landing on the left bank of the river from his boat. Amidst discharges of artillery, and the acclamations of a vast multitude of spectators whom the extraordinary spectacle had collected together, did these two Sovereigns, whose hostility had so lately dyed the fields of Poland with blood, ride side by side, to the quarters prepared for the Czar, through a triple line of the French Imperial Guard. The attention of Napoléon descended to the most minute particulars; the furniture in the Emperor of Russia's rooms was all sent from the French headquarters; a sumptuous train of cooks and other attendants were in readiness to make him forget the luxuries of St.-Petersburg; even his couch was prepared in a camp bed of the French Emperor's, which he had made use of in his campaigns. The King of Prussia also arrived, two days after, in Tilsit, with his beautiful and unfortunate Queen; and the ministers on both sides, Talleyrand on the part of France, and Prince Kourakin on that of Russia, and Marshal Kalkreuth on that of Prussia; but they were of little service, for such was the extraordinary length to which the intimacy of the two Emperors had gone, that not only did they invariably dine and pass the evening together, but almost all the morning conferences, during which the destinies of the world were arranged, were conducted by themselves in person (2).

Napoléon's interviews with the Queen of Prussia. "Had the Queen of Prussia arrived earlier at our conferences," says Napoléon, "it might have had much influence on the result of the negotiations; but happily, she did not make her appearance till all was settled, and I was in a situation to decide every thing in twenty-four hours. As soon as she arrived I went to pay her a visit; she was very beautiful, but somewhat past the first flower of youth. She received me in despair, exclaiming, 'Justice! justice!' and throwing herself back with loud lamentations. I at length prevailed on her to take a seat; but she continued, nevertheless, her pathetic entreaties. 'Prussia,' said she, 'was blinded in regard to her power; she ventured to enter the lists with a hero, oppose herself to the destinies of France, neglect its fortunate friendship! She has been well punished for her folly—the glory of the Great Frederick, the halo his name spread round our arms, had inflated the heart of Prussia—they have caused her ruin.'" Magdeburg, in an especial manner, was the object of her entreaties; and when Napoléon, before dinner, presented her with a beautiful rose, she at first refused it, but immediately after took it with a smile, adding at the same time, "Yes! but at least with Magdeburg."—"I must observe to your Majesty," replied the Emperor, "that it is I who give, and you only who must receive." Napoléon had the talents of Cæsar, but not the chivalry of Henry IV. "After all," said he, "a fine woman and gallantry are

(1) At this period he wrote to the King of Sweden — "Immediately after the armistice, my imperial ally concluded peace on his own account, alone. Abandoned in this manner, and left without support on the great theatre of war, I found myself forced, how painful soever to my feelings, to do the same,

and to sign a peace, though its conditions were to the last degree hard and overwhelming."—SCHÖELL, viii. 410; and LUCENES, i. 328.

(2) SAV. iii. 77, 78. BIGN, vi. 316, 317. DUNN, xix. 55, 57.

not to be weighed against affairs of state." He had frequently, during the repast, found himself hard pressed by the talent and grace of the Queen, and he resolved to cut the matter short. When she had retired, he sent for Talleyrand and Prince Kourakin, arranged the few remaining points of difference, and signed the treaty. The Queen was violently affected next day when she learned that all was concluded; she refused to see the Emperor, and loudly protested she had been deceived by him, an assertion which he positively denies, and which his selfish intellectual character rendered highly improbable. At length she was prevailed on by Alexander to be again present at dinner; and when Napoléon conducted her down stairs after it was over, she stopped in the middle, pressed his hand as he bade her farewell, and said, "Is it possible that, after having had the good fortune to be so near the Hero of the Age, he has not left me the satisfaction of being able to assure him that he has attached me to him for life." "Madame," replied the Emperor, "I lament, if it is so; it is the effect of my evil destiny;" and they separated, never again to meet in this world (1).

Convivialities between the Russian and French officers.

The Russians at Tilsit did not consider themselves as vanquished; on the contrary, they felt, after all their misfortunes, much of the exultation of victory. Proud of having so long arrested the progress of the conqueror of the world, glorying even in the amount of their losses and the chasms in the ranks, which told the desperate strife in which they had been engaged, they mingled with their recent enemies with feelings unlacerated by the humiliation of defeat. It was obvious that peace was equally necessary to both Emperors; it was soon whispered that it was to be concluded on terms eminently favourable to the Russian empire. The utmost cordiality, in consequence, soon prevailed between the officers and soldiers of the two armies; fêtes and repasts succeeded one another in rapid order, given by the warriors so recently hostile to each other. In these entertainments, the officers of the two Imperial Guards, and in particular Prince Murat and the Grand Duke Constantine, were peculiarly cordial and complimentary to each other. On one of these occasions, to such a length did the effusions of mutual respect and regard proceed, that the officers of the two Guards, amidst the fumes of wine and the enthusiasm of the moment,

(1) Las Cas. iv. 224, 228.

Napoleon's character of the Queen of Prussia. " 'The Queen of Prussia,' said Napoleon, ' unquestionably possessed talents, great information, and singular acquaintance with affairs; she was the real sovereign for fifteen years. In truth, in spite of my address and utmost efforts, she constantly led the conversation, returned at pleasure to her subject, and directed it as she chose; but still with so much tact and delicacy that it was impossible to take offence. And in truth it must be confessed, that the objects at stake were of infinite importance; the time short and precious. One of the high contracting parties frequently repented to me, that I should forgive every thing or nothing at all; but I answered that I had done every thing in my power to put things in such a train. The King of Prussia requested an interview that very day to take leave: I put it off for twenty-four hours, at the secret solicitation of Alexander: he never forgave me that postponement. I discovered in all our conversations that the violation of the territory of Anspach, during the advance to Ulm, had been the original cause of his irritation. In all our subsequent interviews, how great soever may have been the interests of the moment, he abandoned them, without hesitation, to prove to me that I had really violated his territory on that occasion. He was wrong; but still I must allow his indignation was that of an honest man.' "

“Almost every day at Tilsit the two Emperors and the King of Prussia rode out together; but this mark of confidence led to no good result. The Prussians could not conceal how much they suffered at seeing it; Napoleon rode in the middle between the two sovereigns, but the King could hardly keep pace with the two Emperors, or deemed himself *de trop* in their *tele-à-tele*, and generally fell behind. When we returned, the two Emperors dismounted in a moment; but they had generally to wait till the King came up, which caused them to be frequently wet, to the great annoyance of the spectators, as the weather was rainy at the time. That incident was the more annoying, as Alexander's manners are full of grace, and fully on a level with the highest elegance which the saloons of Paris can exhibit. He was sometimes fatigued with his companion, whose chagrin was so evident that it damped our satisfaction. We broke up in consequence our dinner parties at an early hour, under pretence of business at home; but Alexander and I remained behind to take tea together, and generally prolonged the conversation till past midnight.” — LAS CASES, iv. 228, 230. Every thing conspires to indicate, that at this period the Emperor Alexander was completely dazzled by the grandeur and fascinations of Napoleon, and that, under the influence of these feelings, he entirely forgot the interests and misfortunes of his unfortunate ally. — SAVARY, iv. 92, *Note*.

mutually exchanged their uniforms; French hearts beat under the decorations won amidst the snows of Eylau, and Russian bosoms warmed beneath the orders bestowed on the fields of Austerlitz: last and most singular effect of civilized life and military discipline, to strengthen at once the fierceness of national passions and the bonds by which they are to be restrained, and join in fraternal brotherhood, one day, those hands which, on another, had been dyed by mutual slaughter, or lifted up in relentless hostility against each other (1).

Napoléon's
admiration
of the Rus-
sian Impe-
rial Guard.

In the course of their rides together, the two Emperors had frequent opportunities of observing the flower of their respective armies. Napoléon afterwards acknowledged that he had never seen any thing which impressed him so much as the appearance of one of the regiments of the Russian Guard. Albeit noways an admirer of the rigid formality of German tactics, and trusting rather to the effect of proclamations on the spirit of his troops than the influence of discipline on their movements, he was inexpressibly struck with the military aspect of its soldiers, and could not avoid the conclusion, that an army thus constituted would be the first in the world, if to the firmness and precision which it had already attained, it should come to unite the fire and enthusiasm of the French. The docility with which they submitted to the orders they received, whatever they were, struck him as particularly admirable. "My soldiers," said he, "are as brave as it is possible to be; but they are too much addicted to reasoning on their positions. If they had the impassible firmness and docility of the Russians, the world would be too small for their exploits. The French soldiers are too much attached to their country to play the part of the Macedonians (2)."

Treaty of
Tilsit. Its
leading pro-
visions.
July 7 and 9.

After a fortnight of conference, the treaty of Tilsit, which had been agreed on in the leading articles in the first four days after the armistice, was formally signed and published to the world. The first treaty between France and Russia was signed on the 7th; the second between France and Prussia, on the 9th of July. By the first, the emperor Napoléon, as a mark of his regard for the *Emperor of Russia*, agreed to restore to the King of Prussia Silesia, and nearly all his German dominions on the right bank of the Elbe, with the fortresses on the Oder and in Pomerania. The provinces which, prior to the first partition in 1772, formed part of the king-

Art. 5.

Art. 9.

Creation of
the Grand
Duchy of
Warsaw,
and King-
dom of
Westphalia.

dom of Poland, and had since been annexed to Prussia, were detached from that monarchy and erected into a separate principality, to be called the GRAND DUCHY OF WARSAW, and bestowed on the King of Saxony, with the exception of the province of Bialystock, containing two hundred thousand souls, which was ceded to *Russia*, which thus participated, in the hour of misfortune, in a share, small indeed, but still a share, of the spoils of its ally. Dantzic, with a limited

Art. 6.

portion of territory around it, was declared a free and independent city, under the protection of the Kings of Prussia and Saxony, which was in effect declaring it, what it immediately after became, a frontier town of France. A right to a free military road was granted to the King

Art. 7.

of Saxony across the Prussian states, to connect his German with his Polish

Art. 8.

dominions; the navigation of the Vistula was declared free to Prussia, Saxony, and Dantzic; the Dukes of Oldenburg and Mecklenburg were

Art. 12.

reinstated in their dominions, but under the condition that their harbours should all be occupied by French troops, so as to exclude the introduction of English merchandise. The mediation of the Emperor of Russia

Art. 13.

was accepted with a view to the arrangement of a general peace;

the Kings of Naples and Holland, with the Confederation of the Rhine, were recognised by the Emperor of Russia; a new kingdom, to be called the

Art. 19. KINGDOM OF WESTPHALIA, was erected in favour of Jerome Bonaparte, the Emperor's brother, composed of the whole provinces ceded by Prussia on the left bank of the Elbe, which was recognised by the Emperor

Art. 20. of Russia. Hostilities were to cease between Russia and the Otto-

Art. 21. man Porte, and the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to be

Art. 22. evacuated by the Russian troops, but not occupied by those of the Sultan till the ratification of a general peace; the Emperor of Russia accepted

Art. 23. the mediation of Napoléon for the conclusion of his differences with

Art. 25. Turkey; the Emperors of Russia and France mutually guaranteed their respective dominions, and agreed to establish commercial relations with each other on the footing of the most favoured nations (1).

Treaty with By the second treaty, concluded two days after, between France
Prussia and Prussia, the King of Prussia recognised the Kings of Naples, Holland, Westphalia, and the Confederation of the Rhine, and concluded peace with the sovereigns of those respective states, as well as with the Em-

Art. 9 and 10. peror of France: he ceded to the kings or princes who should be designed by the Emperor Napoléon, all the dominions which at the commencement of the war he possessed between the Rhine and the Elbe, and engaged to offer no opposition to any arrangement in regard to them which his Im-

Art. 12. perial Majesty might choose to adopt: the King of Prussia ceded, in addition, to the King of Saxony, the circle of Gotha, in Lower Lusatia: he

Art. 13. renounced all right to his acquisitions in Poland subsequent to 1st

Art. 14. January 1772, and to the city and surrounding territory of Dan-

Art. 15. tzic; and consented to their erection into a separate duchy in favour of the King of Saxony, as well as to the military road through his domi-

Art. 18. nions to connect the Polish with the German possessions of the latter sovereign: he agreed to the extension of the frontiers of Russian Poland, by the cession of the provinces of Bialystock: consented, till the conclu-

Art. 28. sion of a general maritime peace, to close his harbours without exception to the ships and commerce of Great Britain; and concurred in the formation of a separate convention, having for its object the restoration of the strongholds of Prussia at certain fixed periods, and the sums to be paid for their civil and military evacuation (2).

Immense The losses of Prussia by this treaty were enormous. Between the
losses of states forming part of her possessions ceded to the Grand Duchy of
Prussia by Warsaw and those acquired by the Kingdom of Westphalia, she lost
this treaty 4,256,048 inhabitants, or nearly a half of her dominions, for those retained
contained only 5,054,504 souls (5). But overwhelming as these losses were,

(1) Mart. Sup. iv. 436, 444. Dum xix. 58, 64.

(2) Mart. Sup. iv. 444, 451. Dum xix. 64, 71.

(3) She lost on the east of the river Elbe: —

	Souls.
Circle of Kottbus.	33,500
Of Western Prussia.	262,236
Southern Prussia, Old Poland.	1,282,189
New Eastern Prussia.	904,518
	<hr/>
	2,482,493

On the west of the Elbe: —

	Carry.	Souls.
Circle of Old Munich and Pregnitz.		2,482,493
Duchy of Magdeburg.		112,000
Halberstadt.		250,039
Hildesheim.		148,230
Ecclesfeld and Erfurth.		130,069
Maiden and Ravensberg.		164,690
Paderborn, Munster, Leugen, and Teck-		159,776
lemberg.		268,542
La Marche, Essen, Elten, and Wreden.		162,101
East Friedland.		219,803
Bayreuth.		238,305
		<hr/>
		4,236,048

they constituted but a small part of the calamities which fell on this ill-fated monarchy by this disastrous peace. The fortresses left her, whether in Silesia or on the Oder, remained in the hands of France, nominally as a security for payment of the war contributions which were to be levied on the impoverished inhabitants, but really to overawe its government, and entirely paralyse its military resources. A garrison of twenty thousand French soldiers was stationed in Dantzic—a frontier station of immense importance, both as hermetically closing the mouths of the Vistula, giving the French authorities the entire command of the commerce of Poland, and affording an advanced post which, in the event of future hostilities, would be highly serviceable in a war with Russia. The newly established kingdoms of Westphalia and Saxony, with the military road through Prussia, terminating in the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, gave the French Emperor the undisputed control of Northern Germany; in effect, brought up the French frontier to the Niemen, and enabled him to commence any future war with the same advantage from that distant river as he had done the present from the banks of the Rhine. At the same time enormous contributions, amounting to the stupendous, and, if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of *six hundred millions of francs*, or twenty-four millions sterling, were imposed on the countries which had been the seat of war between the Rhine and the Niemen; a sum at least equal to a hundred millions sterling in Great Britain, when the difference in the value of money and the wealth of the two states is taken into consideration. This grievous exaction completely paralysed the strength of Prussia (1), and rendered her for the next five years totally incapable of extricating herself from that iron net in which she was enveloped by the continued occupation of her fortresses by the French troops (2).

Important as the changes introduced by these public treaties of Tilsit were to the political interests of Europe, they were far inferior in daring

(1) Harb. ix. 490, 491.

(2) This war contribution on the north of Germany was so prodigious a burden, and in its first effects was so instrumental in increasing the power of France, and in its ultimate results in occasioning

its overthrow, that the particulars of it are here given, taken from the authentic archives of Count Daru, the chief commissioner intrusted by Napoleon with its collection, as one of the most instructive and curious monuments of the revolutionary wars.

War contributions imposed since the 15th October, 1806, and levied

before the 1st January, 1808,	Fr. 474,352,650	or L.19,000,000
Remaining still to recover,	39,391,759	1,600,000
Contributions levied in kind,	90,483,511	3,600,000
	<hr/> 604,227,920	<hr/> L.24,200,000

—See DARU's *Report to NAPOLEON*, 1st Jan. 1808; DUM. xix. 462, 463; *Pièces Just.*

In the Prussian estimate, the amount is stated considerably higher—even in so far as it was levied on the Prussian states alone. It stood thus:—

War contributions, in specie,	Fr. 220,000,000	or L.8,800,000
Maintenance of the fortresses,	40,000,000	1,600,000
Contributions in kind, without counting the balloting of soldiers,	316,800,000	14,600,000
Miscellaneous losses,	8,000,000	320,000
Losses sustained in the local taxes,	75,000,000	3,000,000
Ditto in the general revenue,	50,000,000	2,000,000
	<hr/> 739,800,000	<hr/> L.30,320,000

—See SCHOELL, vi. 518.

When it is recollected that the whole revenues of Prussia were only about L. 6,000,000; that money at that period was at least of twice the value there that it was in England; and that the monarchy was already exhausted by the immense efforts made for the campaign of 1806, either of these estimates must appear among the most enormous instances of military exaction on record in history.

In addition to all this, Napoleon and his generals, with disgraceful rapacity, carried off from the dif-

ferent palaces in Prussia no less than 127 paintings, most of them by first rate masters, and 238 marbles or statues, besides all the manuscripts, curiosities, and antiquities they could lay their hands on. The movables thus carried away contrary to all the laws of war, were worth above L. 300,000. They were all re-claimed and got back by the Prussians on the capture of Paris in 1815.—See the *Official List* in SCHOELL, vi. 261, 289.

Secret
treaty for
the partition
of Turkey.

and magnitude to the provisions of the secret conventions concluded at the same place between the French Emperor and the Russian Autocrat. These two mighty potentates, who so lately had been ac-

tuated by the strongest hostility against each other, deeming themselves invincible when they had united their arms together, had conceived, beyond all question, the project of dividing the world between them. To Russia was assigned, with hardly any limitations, the empire of the East : France acquired absolute sway in all the kingdoms of the West ; both united in cordial hostility against the maritime power of Great Britain. Turkey, in consequence, was abandoned almost without reserve to the Russian Autocrat. To the cession of Constantinople alone, Napoléon never would agree, and rivalry for the possession of that matchless capital, itself worth an empire, was one of the principal causes which afterwards led him into the desperate changes of the Moscow campaign. The clause on this subject was in the following

Art. 8.
Secret
treaty.

terms :—" In like manner, if in consequence of the changes which have recently taken place in the government of Constantinople, the Porte shall decline the intervention of France ; or, in case, having accepted it, the negotiation shall not have led to a satisfactory adjustment in the space of three months, France will make common cause with Russia against the Ottoman Porte, and the two high contracting parties will unite their efforts to wrest from the vexations and oppression of the Turkish empire, all its provinces in Europe, Romelia and Constantinople alone excepted (1) ".

Secret
articles
regarding
England
and all neu-
tral fleets.

The abandonment of all Turkey, with the exception of its capital and the small adjacent province, to the ambition of its hereditary and inveterate enemies, called for a similar concession to the leading objects of French ambition. This was provided for in the

articles regarding the prosecution of the war against England, and the cession of the Spanish Peninsula to the French Emperor. In regard to the first object, it was provided, that in case the proffered mediation of France to adjust the differences with the cabinet of St.-James's should not be accepted, Russia should make common cause with France against England, with all

Art. 4.

its forces, by sea and land ; or " if, having accepted it, peace was not concluded by the 1st November, on terms stipulating that the flags of every power should enjoy a perfect and entire equality on every sea, and that all the conquests made of French possessions since 1803 should be restored ; in that case also, Russia shall demand a categorical answer by the 1st December, and the Russian ambassador shall receive a conditional order to quit London." In the event of the English Government not having made a satisfactory answer to the Russian requisition, " France and Russia shall jointly summon the three courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Lisbon, to close their harbours against English vessels, recall their ambassadors from

Art. 7.

London, and declare war against Great Britain." Hanover was to be restored to England in exchange for the whole colonies she had conquered during the war ; Spain was to be compelled to remain in the alliance against Great Britain ; and the Emperor of France engaged to do nothing tending to augment the power of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, or which might lead to the re-establishment of the Polish monarchy (2).

(1) Bign. vi. 339, 340. Hard. ix. 430.

(2) Bign. vi. 336. Hard ix. 431. Jom. ii. 434, 435. Art. 5.

These secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, which are of such moment, both as illustrating the general character of Napoléon's policy, and affording an unanswerable vindication of the Copenhagen expe-

dition, have been literally transcribed from Bignon's work. As that author was not only for long the French ambassador at Berlin, but was also nominated by Napoléon in his testament as the author to whom was committed, with a legacy of 100,000 fr., the task of writing a history of his diplomacy, which he has executed with great ability, it is im-

Secret
agreement
between the
Emperors
about Spain
and Italy.

This was the whole extent to which the formal secret treaty of Tilsit went; but, extensive as the changes which they contemplated were, they yet yielded in magnitude to those which were also agreed on, in a convention still more secret, between the two Emperors. By this, which may literally be called spoliating, agreement, the shares which the two imperial robbers were to have respectively in the partition of Europe, were chalked out. The mouths of the Cattaro, which had been ostensibly at least the original cause of the rupture, were ceded by Russia to France, as well as the seven Ionian islands. Joseph Bonaparte was to be secured in the possession of Sicily as well as Naples; Ferdinand IV., the reigning King of Sicily, was to receive an indemnity in the Isle of Candia, or some other part of the Turkish empire; the dominions of the Pope were to be ceded to France, as well as Malta and Egypt; the *Sovereigns of the houses of Bourbon and Braganza, in the Spanish Peninsula, were to be replaced by princes of the family of Napoleon*; and when the final partition of the Ottoman empire took place, Wallachia, Moldavia, Servia, and Bulgaria were to be allotted to Russia; while Greece, Macedonia, Dalmatia, and all the sea-coasts of the Adriatic, were to be enjoyed by France, which engaged in return to throw no obstacles in the way of the acquisition of Finland by the Russian Emperor (1).

possible to quote them from a more unexceptionable authority; and he himself says he has given them "textuellement." They are not yet to be found in any diplomatic collection.—BIGNON, vi. 342.

(1) BIGNON, vi. 347, 348. HARD, ix. 431, 432.

Decisive evidence of these projects of spoliation which exists both on the testimony of the French and Russian Emperors. As the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit are given chiefly on the authority of M. Bignon, as a chosen partisan of Napoleon, and therefore a valuable unwilling witness, it is proper to mention that he does not admit the express signature of a convention regarding the dethroning of the Spanish and Portuguese sovereigns, and the partition of the Turkish empire, but says that "these projects were merely sketched out in the private conferences of the two Emperors, but without being actually reduced to writing,"—while the author of Prince Hardenberg's Memoirs, whose accuracy and extent of secret information are in general equally remarkable, asserts that they were embodied in an express treaty.—See BIGNON, vi. 345, and HARD, ix. 433. It is of little importance whether they were or were not embodied in a formal convention, since there is no doubt that they were verbally agreed on between the two Emperors. We have the authority of the Emperor Alexander that Napoleon said to him at Tilsit, "I lay no stress on the evacuation of Wallachia and Moldavia by your troops; you may protract it if you desire. It is impossible any longer to endure the presence of the Turks in Europe; you are at liberty to chase them into Asia; but observe only, I rely upon it that Constantinople is not to fall into the hands of any European power."—HARD, ix. 432. Napoleon, in conversation with Fœdoquitz at Bayonne in the following year, said, "the Emperor Alexander, to whom I revealed at Tilsit my designs against Spain, which were formed at that period, approved of them, and gave me his word of honour he would throw no obstacle in the way."—ESCOFFÉ. This coincides with what Savary affirms, who says,—"The Emperor Alexander frequently repeated to me, when I was afterwards ambassador at St Petersburg, that Napoleon had said to him that he was under no engagements with the new Sultan, and that the changes which had supervened in the world inevitably changed the relations of states to

each other. I saw at once that this point had formed the subject of their secret conference at Tilsit; and I could not avoid the conviction that a mutual communication of their projects had taken place, because I could not believe that we would have abandoned the Turks without receiving some compensation in some other quarter. I have strong reasons for believing that the Spanish question was brought under discussion at Tilsit. The Emperor Napoleon had that affair strongly at heart, and nothing could be more natural than that he should frankly communicate it to the Czar: the more especially as he had on his side a project of aggrandisement, in which, without previous concert, France might be disposed to throw obstacles. I was the more confirmed in this opinion by observing the conduct and language of the Emperor Alexander, when the Spanish war broke out."—SAVARY, iii. 98, 99. And Napoleon said at St. Helena—"All the Emperor Alexander's thoughts are directed to the conquest of Turkey. *We have had many discussions about it, and at first I was pleased with his proposals*, because I thought it would enlighten the world to drive those brutes, the Turks, out of Europe. But when I reflected upon its consequences, and saw what a tremendous weight of power it would give to Russia, on account of the number of Greeks in the Turkish dominions who would naturally join the Russians, I refused to consent to it, especially as Alexander wanted to get to Constantinople, which I would not allow, as it would have destroyed the equilibrium of power in Europe. I reflected that *France would gain Egypt, Syria, and the islands*, which would have been nothing in comparison with what Russia would have obtained."—O'MEARA, i. 382. "Was there," says Bignon, "any express treaty assigning to each Emperor his share of the Turkish dominions? No; but that there was an agreement on that subject between the two Emperors is beyond a doubt; but no formal treaty." We shall find numberless proofs of this, in the sequel of this work, in the language used by the Emperor Alexander, and the actions of Napoleon. They had even gone so far as to assign a portion also to the Emperor Francis—"Something," in Alexander's words, "to Austria, to soothe her vanity rather than satisfy her ambition."—BIGNON, vi. 343.

Measures of
Napoléon to
follow up
his antici-
pated Turk-
ish acqui-
sitions.

Napoléon was not long of taking steps to pave the way for the acquisition of his share of the Ottoman dominions. On the day after the secret treaty with Russia was signed, he dispatched a letter to the King of Naples, informing him of the cession of Corfu to France, and directing him to assemble, in the most secret manner, four thousand men at Otranto and Tarentum, to take possession of that island, and of the mouths of the Cattaro (1). On the same day he enjoined Eugene, Viceroy of Italy, to send a force of six thousand men into Dalmatia (2), while Marshal Marmont, who commanded in that province, was directed, instead of attacking the Montenegrins, as he was preparing to do, to do every thing in his power to make these mountaineers receive willingly the French government, beneath which they would soon be placed; and at the same time, to transmit minute information, both as to the resources, population, and revenue of Bosnia, Thrace, Albania, Macedonia, and Greece, and what direction two European armies should follow; entering that country, one by Cattaro,

July 9. the other by Corfu (3). At the same time Count Guilleminot was dispatched from Tilsit on a double mission; the first, open and ostensible, to General Michelson's army on the Danube, the other, secret, to General Sébastiani at Constantinople; in the course of which he was to acquire all the information he could on the subject of the population, riches, and geographical position of the country through which he passed (4). Finally, to General Sébastiani himself he fully explained the whole design, which was, as stated in his letters, that, as no European power would be permitted to possess Constantinople and the Hellespont, the first thing to be done was "to draw a line from Bourgas, on the Black Sea, to the Gulf of Enos in the Archipelago; and all to the eastward of that line, including Adrianople, was to remain to Turkey; Russia was to obtain Moldavia, Wallachia, and all Bulgaria, as far as the left bank of the Hebrus; Servia was to be allotted to Austria; and Bosnia, Albania, Epirus, Peloponnesus, Attica, and Thessalia to France (5)". Sébastiani at the same time received orders to prepare and transmit without delay to the French Emperor a memorial, containing exact details, to define the geographical boundaries of the acquisitions of the three powers interested in the partition.

Convention
regarding
the pay-
ment of the
French con-
tribution on
Prussia.

While Napoléon and Alexander were thus adjusting their differences at Tilsit, by the spoliation of all the weaker powers in Europe, partitioning Turkey, and providing for the dethronement of the sovereigns in the Spanish peninsula, the chains were drawn yet more closely round unhappy Prussia. In the treaty with that power it had been provided that a subsidiary military convention should be concluded, regarding the period of the evacuation of the fortresses by the French troops, and the sums of money to be paid for their ransom. Nominally, it

(1) Nap. to Murat, Tilsit, 8th July.

(2) Nap. to Eugene, 8th July.

(3) To Marmont Napoléon wrote, on July 8, from Tilsit—"Set to work as vigorously as possible to obtain, by officers whom you shall send forward with that view, or in any other way, and address directly to the Emperor, in order that he may know, by confidential officers, both geographically and civilly, all the information you can acquire regarding Bosnia, Macedonia, Thrace, Albania, etc. What is the gross amount of its population, what resources in clothing, provisions, or money those provinces would furnish to any European power which might possess them? In fine, what revenue could be drawn from them at the moment of their occupation, for the principles of their occupation are at present without any proper foundation. In a second memoir state, in a military point of view, if

two European armies could enter these provinces at once, the one by Cattaro and Dalmatia into Bosnia, the other by Corfu, what force would be required for each to ensure success; what species of arms would be most advantageous; how could the artillery be transported; could horses for its transport be found in the country; could recruits be raised there; what would be the most favourable times for military operations? All these reports should be transmitted by confidential persons in whom you have perfect reliance. Keep on good terms with the Pacha of Bosnia; but nevertheless gradually let your relations with him become more cold and reserved than formerly."—*NAPOLÉON TO MARMONT, Tilsit, July 8, 1807; Dum. xix. 341, 342.*

(4) Nap. to Count Guilleminot, 9th July.

(5) Bign. vi. 344, 345. Dum. xix. 337, 344. Which contains Pièces Just.

was provided that they should be evacuated by the 1st October, with the exception of Stettin, which was still to be garrisoned by French troops; but, as

Art. 4. it was expressly declared as a *sine qua non*, that the whole contributions imposed should be paid up before the evacuation commenced, and that the King of Prussia should levy no revenue in his dominions till these exactions were fully satisfied, and that the Prussians, meanwhile, should

Art. 5. feed, cloth, and lodge all the French troops within their bounds, the French Emperor had in reality the means of retaining possession of them as long as he chose, which he accordingly did. In addition to the enormous

Note, p. 142. war contributions already mentioned, of which 515,744,000 francs, or L.20,500,000, fell on Prussia alone, further and most burdensome com-

Nov. 10 and Dec. 10 missions were forced on Prussia in the end of the year, in virtue of which Count Daru, the French collector-general, demanded 154,000,000 francs, or L.6,160,000 more from that unhappy and reduced state; an exaction so monstrous and utterly disproportioned to its now scanty revenue, which did not exceed L.5,000,000 sterling, that it never was or could be fully discharged; and this gave the French a pretence for continuing the occupation of the fortresses, and wringing contributions from the country till five years afterwards, when the Moscow campaign commenced (1).

Noble proclamation by the King of Prussia to his lost provinces

Bereft by this disastrous treaty of half his dominions, nothing remained to the King of Prussia but submission; and he won the hearts of all the really generous in Europe by the resignation and heroism with which he bore so extraordinary a reverse of fortune.

In a dignified proclamation, which he addressed to the inhabitants of his lost provinces upon liberating them from their allegiance to the Prussian throne, he observed, "Dear inhabitants of faithful provinces, districts, and towns! My arms have been unfortunate. The efforts of the relies of my forces have been of no avail. Driven to the extreme boundary of my empire, and having seen my powerful ally conclude an armistice, and sign a peace, no choice remained to me but to follow his example. That peace imposed on me the most painful sacrifices. The bonds of treaties, the reciprocal ties of love and duty, the fruit of ages of labour, have been broken asunder. All my efforts, and they have been most strenuous, have proved in vain. Fate ordains it. A father is compelled to depart from his children. I hereby release you from your allegiance to me and my house. My most ardent prayers for your welfare, will always attend you in your relations to your new sovereigns. Be to them what you have ever been to me. Neither force nor fate shall ever sever the remembrance of you from my heart (2)."

Enormous losses sustained by the French during the campaign.

Vast as had been the conquests, unbounded the triumphs of France during the campaign, the consumption of life to the victors had been, if possible, still greater: and it was already apparent that war, conducted on this gigantic scale, was attended with a sacrifice of human beings, which for any lengthened time would be insupportable. The fearful and ominous call for eighty thousand conscripts, *thrice repeated* during the short period of eight months, had already told the French people at what cost, of their best and their bravest, they followed the car of victory; and the official details which have since come to light, show that even the enormous levy of two hundred and forty thousand men in that short period was not disproportioned to the expenditure of the campaign. Authentic documents prove that the number of sick and wounded who were received

(1) Daru's Report, Dum. xix. 85, and Hard. ix. 453, 454.

(2) Scott's Nap. v. 411, 412.

into the French hospitals during the campaign, from the banks of the Saale to those of the Niemen, amounted to the stupendous number of FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND; of whom, at an average, not more than a ninth were prisoners taken from the Allies (1)! If such were the losses to the victors, it may readily be believed that those of the vanquished were still greater; and putting the two together, it may fairly be concluded that, from the 1st October 1806, to the 31st June 1807, that is, during a period of nine months, a million of human beings were consigned to military hospitals, of whom at least a hundred thousand perished, independent of those slain in battle, who were at least as many more! The mind finds it impossible to apprehend such enormous calamities; like the calculations of the distance of the sun, or the fixed stars, they elude the grasp of the most vivid imagination; but even in the bewildering impression which they produce, they tend to show how boundless was the suffering then occasioned by human ambition, how awful the judgment of the Almighty then executed upon the earth (2)!

Memorable
retribution
for the par-
tition of
Poland on
the parti-
tioning
powers.

Nor is it difficult to discern what were the national sins which were thus visited with so terrible a punishment. Fourteen years before, Austria, Russia, and Prussia had united their armies to partition Sarmatia, and Suwarrow had entered Warsaw while yet reeking with Polish blood. In the prosecution of this guilty object, they neglected the volcano which was bursting forth in the west of Europe; they starved the war on the Rhine to feed that on the Vistula, and opened the gates of Germany to French ambition. Prussia, in particular, first drew off from the European alliance, and after the great barrier of frontier fortresses had been broken through in 1795, and revolutionary France stood, as Napoléon admits, "on the verge of ruin," allowed her to restore her tottering fortunes, and, for ten long years, stood by in dubious and selfish neutrality, anxious only to secure or increase her ill-gotten gains. And what was the result? Poland became the great theatre of punishment to the partitioning powers; her blood-stained fields beheld the writhing and the an-

(1) The following are the details of this enormous catalogue of human suffering :—

In hospital of the army on 1st October, 1806,	403
Admitted till 31st October, 1807,	421,416
Total treated in the hospital	421,819
Of whom died there,	31,916
Dismissed cured,	370,473
Sent back to France,	11,455
Remained in hospital on 17th October, 1808,	7,975
	421,819

The average stay of each patient in the hospital was 29 days. The proportion of maladies out of 200 was as follows :—

Fevers,	105
Wounded,	47
Venercal,	31
Various,	17

200

This is a striking proof how much greater the mortality occasioned by fevers and the other diseases incident to a campaign, is, than the actual number killed or wounded in the field. Applying these proportions to the total number of 420,000, we shall have the whole numbers nearly as follows :—

Fevers,	210,000
Wounded,	100,000
Venercal,	62,000
Miscellaneous,	48,000

420,000

The immense number of wounded being at least *five times* what the bulletins admitted, demonstrates, if an additional proof were wanting, the total falsehood in the estimate of losses by which these reports were invariably distinguished. The great number of venercal patients is very curious, and highly characteristic of the French soldiers.—DARU'S *Report to NAPOLEON*; *Dum.* xix. 486, 487.

It appears from Savary's report of the number of sick and wounded in the great hospital at Königsberg, of which city he received the command after the battle of Friedland, that at the end of June 1807, they amounted to the immense number of 27,376. Preparations were made for the reception of 57,000; but the sudden conclusion of the peace at Tilsit rendered them in a great degree unnecessary.—Nevertheless, the whole hospitals of the army were again overflowing in spring 1808, in every part of the north of Germany.—SAVARY, *iii.* 66, 69.

(2) Daru's *Report to Napoléon*, in *Dum.* xix. 486. *Pièces Just.*

guish of the victors. Pierced to the heart by hostile armies, driven up to a corner of her territory, within sight almost of the Sarmatian wilds, Austria saw her expiring efforts for independence overthrown on the field of Austerlitz. Rest of her dominions, bound in chains for the insult of the conqueror, with the iron driven into her soul, Prussia beheld her last hopes expire on the shores of the Vistula. Banished almost from Europe, conquered in war, sullied in fame, Russia was compelled to sign the ignominious peace on the banks of the Niemen, the frontier of her Lithuanian spoils. The measure of her retribution is not yet complete; the Grand Duchy of Warsaw is to become the outwork of France against Muscovy; the tide of war is to roll on to Red Russia; the sacred towers of Smolensko are to be shaken by Polish battalions, the sack of Praga is to be expiated by the flames of Moscow. That Providence superintends the progress of human affairs, that the retributions of justice apply to political societies as well as single men, and that nations, which have no immortality, are destined to undergo the punishment of their flagrant iniquities in this world, was long ago announced in thunders from Mount Sinai, and may be observed in every subsequent page of civilized history. But it is often on the third and fourth generation that the retribution descends, and in the complicated thread of intervening events, it is sometimes difficult to trace the connexion which we know exists between the guilty deeds and deserved suffering. In the present instance, however, the connexion was immediate and palpable; the actors in the iniquitous spoliation were themselves the sufferers by its effects; it was the partition of Poland which opened the gates of Europe to France; it was the partitioning powers that sunk beneath the car of Napoléon's ambition.

And was France, then—the instrument of this terrible dispen-
 sation—to escape herself the punishment of her sins? Was she,
 stained with the blood of the righteous, wrapt in the flames of
 the church, marked with the sign of the miscreant, to be the besom of destruction to others, and to bask only in the sunshine of glory herself?—No! the dread hour of her retribution was steadily approaching; swift as was the march of her triumphant hosts, swifter still was the advance of the calamities which were to presage her fall. Already to the discerning eye was visible the handwriting on the wall which foretold her doom. At Tilsit she reached the highest point of her ascendant; every subsequent change was a step nearer to her ruin. True, the Continent had sunk beneath her arms; true, Austria, Prussia, and Russia had successively fallen in the conflict: true, she had advanced her eagles to the Niemen, and from the rock of Gibraltar to the Baltic Sea, no voice dared to breathe a whisper against her authority; still the seeds of destruction were implanted in her bosom. Her feet were of base and perishable clay. The resources of the empire were wasting away in the pursuit of the lurid phantoms which its people worshipped; its strength was melting under the incessant drains which the career of victory demanded; a hundred and fifty thousand men were annually sacrificed to the Moloch of its ambition. They saw it not—they felt it not: joyfully its youth, “like reapers, descend to the harvest of death.” “They REPENTED NOT of their sins, to give glory to the Lord (1).” But the effect was not the less certain, that the operation of the circumstances producing it was not perceived; and among the many concurring causes which at this period were preparing its fall, a prominent place must be assigned to that very treaty of Tilsit which apparently carried its fortunes to their highest elevation.

Evil consequences of the treaty of Tilsit in the end to Napoleon.

In this treaty were to be discerned none of the marks of great political capacity on the part of the conqueror; in the harshness and perfidy with which it was accompanied, the foundation was laid for the most powerful future alliances to the vanquished. The formation of the kingdom of Westphalia, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, with three or four millions of souls, each connected only by a military road across the impoverished and indignant remaining dominions of Frederick William, could not be supposed to add, in any considerable degree, to the strength of the French empire. The indignities offered to Prussia, the slights shown to her beautiful and high-spirited Queen, the enormous contributions imposed upon her inhabitants, the relentless rigour with which they were levied, the forcible retention of her fortresses, the tearing away of half her dominions, were injuries that could never be forgiven. Her people, in consequence, imbibed the most unbounded horror at French oppression; and though the fire did not burst forth for some years in open conflagration, it smouldered incessantly in all ranks, from the throne to the cottage, till at length its force became irresistible. And what allies did Napoleon rear up on the Vistula by the arrangements of Tilsit, to prove a counterpoise to the deadly hostility of Prussia, thus gathering strength in his rear? None equal to the enemies whom he created. Saxony, indeed, was made a faithful ally, and proved herself such in the hour of disaster as well as the day of triumph; but the hopes of the Poles were cruelly blighted, and that confidence in the restoration of their empire by his assistance, which might have rendered their warlike bands so powerful an ally on the shores of the Vistula, for ever destroyed (1). Instead of seeing their nationality revived, the ancient line of their princes restored, and their lost provinces again re-united under one sceptre, they beheld only a fragment of their former empire wrested from Prussia, and handed over, too weak to defend itself, to the foreign government of the house of Saxony. The close alliance with Russia, and still more the extraordinary intimacy which had sprung up between the two Emperors, precluded all hope, that the vast provinces of Lithuania would ever again be restored to the dominion of the Jagellons or the Sobieskis. The restoration of Poland thus seemed farther removed than ever, in consequence of the successful efforts which a portion of its inhabitants had made for their liberation; they appeared to have now as much to fear from the triumphs of the French as the Russian arms. Thus, the treaty of Tilsit irrevocably alienated Prussia, and at the same time extinguished the rising ardour of Poland; and, while it broke down the strength of all the intervening states, and presaged a future desperate strife between the despots of the East and the West on the banks of the Niemen, laid no foundation in the affections of mankind for the moral support by which its dangers were to be encountered.

Disgraceful perfidy of Napoleon towards the Turks.
Jan. 2 1807. But if the treaty of Tilsit involved serious errors in policy, so far as Poland and Prussia were concerned, much more was it worthy of reprehension when the provisions for the immediate partition of Turkey are taken into consideration. Six months had not elapsed since he had written to Marmont "to spare no protestations or assistance to

(1) "The treaty of Tilsit," says Oginski, "spread consternation through all the Polish provinces. Numbers in Lithuania and Wolhynia had left their homes to join the army raised under the auspices of Napoleon, and knew that their safety was compromised. Those who waited only for his passage of the Niemen to declare themselves, were disappoint-

ed. Universally, the treaty was regarded as the tomb of all the hopes which had been entertained of the restoration of the ancient monarchy, and from that moment, the confidence of all the Poles in the good intentions of the Emperor Napoleon, were irrecoverably weakened."—OGINSKI, *Mém. sur la Pologne*, ii. 345.

Turkey, since she was the faithful ally of the French empire (1).” Seven months had not elapsed since he had publicly declared at Posen “that the full and complete independence of the Ottoman empire will ever be the object most at heart with the Emperor, as it is indispensable to the security of France and Italy: he would esteem the successes of the present war of little value if they did not give him the means of reinstating the Sublime Porte in complete in-

On 28th May,
1807.

dependence (2):” *one month* had not elapsed since he had said to the Turkish ambassador, in a public audience at Finkensteen, that *his right hand was not more inseparable from his left* than the Sultan Selim should ever be to him (3).” In consequence of these protestations, Turkey had thrown itself into the breach: She had braved the whole hostility of Russia, and defied the thunders of England when her fleets were anchored off the Seraglio Point. And what return did Napoléon make to these faithful allies for the exemplary fidelity with which they had stood by his fortunes when they were shaking in every quarter, and Europe, after the battle of Eylau, was ready to start up in fearful hostility in his rear? The return he made was to sign a convention with Alexander for the partition of all their European dominions; and, not content with assuring the Czar that he was at perfect liberty to chase the Ottomans into Asia, provided only he did not lay violent hands on Constantinople, he stipulated for the largest share of the spoils, including Thrace, Albania, Dalmatia, Epirus, and Greece, for himself; while the consent of Austria was to be purchased by the acquisition of Servia! A more iniquitous and shameless instance of treachery is not to be found even in the dark annals of Italian perfidy; and it is sufficient to demonstrate, what so many other circumstances conspire to indicate, that this great man was as regardless of the sanctity of treaties as he was of the duty of veracity: that vows were made by him only to be broken, and oaths intended to be kept only till it was for his interest to violate them; and that in prosperous equally as adverse fortune, no reliance could be placed upon his feelings of gratitude, if a present interest was to be served by forgetting them.

No defence
can be made
for it in
consequence
of the Re-
volution at
Constanti-
nople.

The excuse set up for this monstrous tergiversation by the French writers, viz., that a few weeks before the battle of Friedland an insurrection of the Janizaries had taken place at Constantinople, and the ruling powers there had been overturned by open violence, is totally without foundation. The deposition of one sultan—no unusual occurrence in Oriental dynasties—had made no change whatever in the amicable disposition of the Divan towards France, or their inveterate hostility to the ancient and hereditary rivals of the Mahomedan faith: on the contrary, the party of the Janizaries which had now gained the ascendant, was precisely the one which has ever been inclined to prosecute hostilities with Russia with the most fanatical fervour. It ill became France to hold out a revolution in the seraglio as a ground for considering all the existing obligations with Turkey as annulled, when her own changes of government since the Revolution had been so frequent, that Talleyrand had already sworn allegiance to *ten* in succession. And, in truth, this violation of public faith was as shortsighted as it was dishonourable; the secret articles soon came to the knowledge of the British government—they were communicated by their ambassador to the Divan, and produced an impression which was never forgotten. Honest and sincere, without foresight equally as deceit, the Turks are as incapable of betraying an ally as they are of forgetting an act of trea-

(1) Ante, vi. 9.

(2) Ante, vi. 9.

(3) Ante, vi. 102.

chery committed to themselves. The time will come in this history when the moment of retribution arrives, when Napoléon, hard pressed by the storms of winter and the arms of Russia, is to feel the bitterness of an ally's desertion, and when the perfidy of Tilsit is to be awfully avenged on the shores of the Berezina (1).

Towards the other powers of Europe the conduct of the two Imperial despots was alike at variance with every principle of fidelity to their allies, or moderation towards their weaker neighbours.—France abandoned Finland to Russia, and Alexander felt no scruples at the prospect of rounding his territories in the neighbourhood of St.-Petersburg by wresting that important province from his faithful ally the King of Sweden; and even went the length of advancing his western frontier, by sharing in the spoils of his unhappy brother the King of Prussia; while Russia surrendered Italy to France, and engaged to shut her eyes at the appropriation of the Papal States by Napoléon, who had resolved upon seizing them, in return for the condescension of the head of the Church in recently travelling to Paris to place the imperial crown on his head. The rulers of the Continent drew an imaginary line across Europe, and mutually gave each other *carte blanche* in regard to spoliations, how unjustifiable soever, committed on their own side of the division. Napoléon surrendered half the European territories of Turkey to Alexander, and appropriated the other half to himself; while Alexander engaged to throw no obstacles in the way of the dethronement of the sovereigns of the Spanish Peninsula, to make way for the elevation of princes of the Bonaparte family. Both appear to have conceived that in thus suddenly closing their deadly strife, and turning their irresistible arms against the secondary states in their vicinity, they would gain important present objects, and mutually find room for the exercise of their future ambition, without encroaching on each other; forgetting that the desires of the human heart are insatiable; that the more powerful empires become, the more ardently do they pant after universal dominion; and that the same causes which arrayed Rome against Carthage in ancient, and brought Tamerlane and Bajazet into fierce collision in modern times, could not fail to become more powerful in their operation from the mutual aggrandizement which their gigantic empires received. “Nec mundus,” said Alexander the Great, “duobus solibus regi potest, nec duo summa regna salvo statu terrarum potest habere (2).”

(1) The perfidious conduct of Napoléon towards Turkey has been almost overlooked by the liberal writers of Europe, in the vehemence of their indignation at him for not re-establishing the kingdom of Poland. Without doubt, if that great act of injustice could have been repaired by his victorious arm, and a compact, powerful empire of sixteen millions of souls re-established on the banks of the Vistula, it would have been alike grateful to every lover of freedom, and important as forming a barrier against Muscovite aggrandizement in Europe. But was it possible to construct such an empire, to form such a barrier, out of the disjointed elements of Polish anarchy? That is the point for consideration; and if it was not, then the French Emperor would have thrown away all the advantages of victory, if for a visionary and impracticable scheme of this description he had incurred the lasting and indelible animosity of the partitioning powers. With the aid of two hundred thousand brave men, indeed, which Poland could with ease send into the field, he might for a season have withstood the united armies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia; but could he rely on their tumultuary assemblies sustaining the steady and durable efforts requisite for permanent suc-

cess? What made Poland originally fall a victim to the coalesced powers, once little more than provinces of its mighty dominion? “The insane ambition,” as John Sobieski said, “of a plebeian noblesse;” the jealousy of six hundred thousand electors, incapable alike of governing themselves or of permitting the steady national government of others. Was this fatal element of discord eradicated from the Polish heart? Is it yet eradicated? Was it possible, by re-establishing Poland in 1807, to have done any thing, but, as Talleyrand well expressed it, “organized anarchy?” These are the considerations which then presented and still present an invincible obstacle to a measure, in other points of view recommended by so many considerations of justice and expedience. It is evident that the passions of the people, their insane desire for democratic equality, were so powerful, that if re-established in its full original extent, it would speedily have again fallen under the dominion of its former conquerors; the same causes which formerly proved fatal to its independence would, without doubt, again have had the same effect.

(2) Quint. Curtius, lib. iv. cap. 11.

“It cannot admit of a doubt,” says Bignon,

Napoléon's leading object in the treaty was the humbling of Great Britain.

The great and ruling principle which actuated Napoléon in the negotiations at Tilsit, was the desire to combine all Europe into a cordial union against Britain. For this end, he was willing to forego or postpone his rivalry with Russia; to permit her to emerge, apparently crowned with the laurels of victory, from defeat; and derive greater advantages from the rout of Friedland, than she had reaped even from the triumph of Pultowa or the sack of Ismael. All these sources of aggrandizement to his great continental rival were to Napoléon as nothing, provided they only led to the overthrow of the maritime power of England. That accomplished, he anticipated little comparative difficulty even with the colossal strength of the Scythian monarch. In yielding to his seductions, Alexander appears to have been impressed with a belief that he was the man of destiny, and that in continuing the combat, he was striving against fate (1).

England could not complain of its conditions.

Nor had England any great cause of complaint against him for violating his engagements to her, whatever Sweden or Turkey might have for the ambitious projects entertained at their expense. The Cabinet of St.-James's had themselves receded from the spirit as well as the letter of the confederacy; the subsidies promised by Mr. Pitt had disappeared; the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg had been drawn, for the interest of Germany and England, into the contest; and both had withdrawn or been overthrown, leaving Russia alone to maintain it. So circumstanced, Great Britain had no reason to be surprised if Alexander took the first opportunity to extricate himself from a struggle, in which the parties chiefly interested no longer appeared to take any share; nor could she complain if she was left alone to continue a contest which she seemed desirous of reducing to a mere maritime quarrel. Deeply did England and Austria subsequently suffer from this infatuated and ill-timed desertion of the confederacy, at the very moment when the scales hung nearly even, and their aid might have been thrown in with decisive effect upon the balance. They might have stood in firm and impregnable array beside the veterans of Russia on the Vistula or the Elbe; they were left to maintain singly the contest on the Danube and the Tagus; they might have shared in the glories of Pultusk and Eylau, and converted the rout of Friedland into the triumph of Leipsic; and they expiated their neglect in the carnage of Wagram and the blood of Talavera.

It was ultimately fortunate for Europe that the war was prolonged.

But though the timidity of Austria, when her forces were capable of interfering with decisive effect on the theatre of European contest, and the supineness of England, when she had only to appear in adequate force to conquer, were the causes to which alone we are to ascribe the long subsequent continuance, multiplied disasters, and unbounded ultimate bloodshed of the war, yet for the developement of the great moral lesson to France and mankind, and the illustration of the glories of patriotic resistance, it was fortunate that, by protracting it, opportunity was afforded for the memorable occurrences of its later years. But for that circumstance, the annals of the world would have lost the strife in the Tyrol,

"that in the treaty of Tilsit, as in all the actions of his life, it was the desire to force England to conclude peace, that was the sole, the only principle of Napoléon's actions. A prolonged state of war with Russia, or even the conclusion of a treaty which would have only put a period to the bloodshed, would not have satisfied him. It was necessary, not merely that he should have an enemy the less; he required an ally the more. Russia, it is true, had ceased to combat his army, but he required that she should enlist herself on his side; that she should enter into the strife with England, if not with arms,

at least by joining in the continental blockade, which was to aim a deadly thrust at her power. All his lures held out to Alexander were calculated for that end; it is with reference to that object that all the minor arrangements to which he consented are to be regarded."—BIGNON, vi. 351-352.

(1) "Sire," said one of the Russian counsellors to Alexander at Tilsit, "I take the liberty of reminding you of the fate of your father, as the consequence of French alliance." "Oh my God!" replied the Emperor, "I know it; I see it; but how can I withstand the destiny which directs me!"—SAYAN, iii. 92.

the patriotism of Aspern, the siege of Saragossa, the fields of Spain. Peace would have been concluded with France as an ordinary power; she would have retained the Rhine for her boundary, and Paris would have remained the depositary of revolutionary plunder; the Moscow campaign would not have avenged the blood of the innocent, nor the capture of their capital entered like iron into the soul of the vanquished. The last act of the mighty drama had not yet arrived; it was the design of Providence that it should terminate in yet deeper tragedy, and present a more awful spectacle of the Divine judgments to mankind. England would have saved three hundred millions of her debt, but she would have lost Vittoria and Waterloo; her standards would not have waved in the Pass of Roncesvalles, nor her soldiers entered in triumph the gates of Paris; she would have shared with Russia, in a very unequal proportion, the lustre of the contest, and to barbaric force, not freeborn bravery, future ages would have awarded the glory of having struck down the Conqueror of the World.

CHAPTER XLVII.

CONTINENTAL SYSTEM AND IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT OF NAPOLEON.

JULY 1807—AUGUST 1812.

ARGUMENT.

Change in Napoleon's Projects for the Subjugation of England—Plan of uniting all Europe in the Continental System—And getting the Command of and Concentrating their Fleets in the French and Flemish Harbours—Object of the Berlin Decree—Its Provisions and vigorous Execution—First Order in Council by the British Government, Jan. 7, 1807—Reasons which led to a Further and more Rigorous Measure—Order in Council of 11th Nov. 1807—Import of these Orders—Milan Decree of 17th Dec. 1807, published by Napoleon—Argument in Parliament against the Orders in Council—Reply of their Supporters in both Houses—Able Note of Lord Howick on this Subject to the Danish Minister—Reflections on this Debate, and the Justice of the Orders—Comparative Blame attaching to each Party—Reflections on their Policy—Jesuits' Bark Bill in England—Vast ultimate Effects of the Continental System—Introduction of the License System—Evasions of the Decrees on both Sides by the great Extension of this System—Universal Joy at Napoleon's Return to Paris—Unbecoming Adulation of the Orators in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies—Grand Fête in Honour of the Grand Army—Suppression of the French Tribunalate—Slavish Submission with which the Change was received in France—Establishment of a Censorship of the Press—Identity of the Imperial Tyranny of Napoleon and the Democratic tyranny of the United States—Banishment of Madame de Staël and Madame Récamier—The Judges are rendered removable at pleasure—Severe Decrees against any Connivance at English Commerce—Rapid Progress of the System of Centralization in France under the Imperial Government—Policy of the Emperor in this particular—He Re-establishes Titles of Honour—Principles on which the Change was founded—Re-establishment of Hereditary Titles in addition to Personal ones—Speeches on the Subject in the Legislative Body—Address of the Senate to the Emperor on the occasion—Endowment of the new Peers with Revenue drawn from foreign States—List of the Revenues bestowed from the Electorate of Hanover—System of fusion which Napoleon pursued of the Ancient and Modern Noblesse—Total Departure thus made from the Principles of the Revolution—Rapid Progress of Court Etiquette at Paris—Great Internal Prosperity of France under the Empire—Its Revenues from 1808 to 1813—Vast Effects of the Foreign Plunder and Contribution on its Industry—Striking Account of the Public Works in progress in August 1807, by the Minister of the Interior—General Delirium which it produced—French Finances under the Empire—Budget of 1808—Despotic Character of the new Law of High Treason—Decree Establishing Eight State Prisons in the French Empire—Extraordinary Assemblage of Persons who were brought together in them—Slight Causes for which Prisoners were immured—Vast Extent of Napoleon's Power, and great Aggravation it was of his Persecution—Universal and Slavish Obedience to his Authority—Enormous Consumption of Human Life under his Foreign wars, and the System of the Conscription—Excessive Rigour of the Descriptive Laws—System of the Imperial Education—Ecclesiastical Schools, Lyceums, and Military Academies—Formation of the Imperial University, Lyceums, or Military Academies—Their Constitution and great importance—Rapid Transition in France from Republican to Despotic Ideas—Remarkable Difference between the English and French Revolutions in this respect—Its Causes—Superior Violence and Injustice of the French Convulsion—But this alone will not explain the difference—It was not the love of freedom, but the desire for Individual Elevation which was the ruling Principle in France—The Principles of Freedom never were attended to in the French Revolution—General Corruption of Public Opinion which it produced—Rapid Growth of Centralization in this state of Public Feeling—But this, how great soever an evil, was unavoidable in the state in which France was on the termination of the Revolution—Striking Opinion of M. de Tocqueville on this Subject—Ability with which Napoleon took advantage of these circumstances to establish Despotic Power—Ultimate Effect to General Freedom of the resistance to Democracy in England, and its Triumph in France.

Change in
Napoleon's
projects for
the subjugation of Eng-
land.

WHEN the battle of Trafalgar annihilated the prospect of invading England, and extinguished all his hopes of soon bringing the maritime war to a successful issue, Napoleon did not abandon the contest in despair. Quick in perception, he saw at once that the vast

preparations in the Channel must go for nothing; that the flotilla at Boulogne would be rotten before a fleet capable of protecting its passage could be assembled; and that every successive year would enable England now exclusively to engross the commerce of the world, and banish his flag more completely from the ocean. But he was not on that account discouraged. Fertile in resources, indomitable in resolution, implacable in hatred, he resolved to change the method, not the object of his hostility; and indulged the hope that he would succeed, through the extent and terror of his continental victories, in achieving the destruction of England, by a process, more slow indeed, but in the end, perhaps, still more certain. His design in this view consisted of two parts, both essential to the success of the general project, and to the prosecution of which his efforts, during the whole remainder of the war, were directed (1).

Plan of uniting all Europe in the Continental System. The first part of his plan was to combine all the continental states into one great alliance against England, and compel them to exclude, in the most rigid manner, the British flag and British merchandise from their harbours. This system had long obtained possession of his mind; he had made it the conditions of every treaty between a maritime state and France, even before he ascended the Consular throne (2). The adroit flattery which he applied to the mind of the Emperor Paul, and the skill with which he combined the northern powers into the maritime confederacy in 1800, were all directed to the same end; and, accordingly, the exclusion of the English flag from their harbours was the fundamental condition of that alliance (3). The proclamation of the principles of the armed neutrality by the northern powers at that crisis, filled him with confident expectations that the period had then arrived when this great object was to be attained; but the victory of Nelson at Copenhagen dissolved all their hopes, and threw him back to the system of ordinary warfare, so cruelly afterwards defeated by the battle of Trafalgar. The astonishing results of the battle of Jena, however, again revived his projects of excluding British commerce from the Continent; and thence the BERLIN DECREE, to be immediately considered, and the anxiety which he evinced at Tilsit to procure, by any sacrifices, the accession of Alexander to the confederacy.

And getting hold of and concentrating their fleets in the French and Flemish harbours. The second part of the plan was, to obtain possession, by negotiation, force, or fraud, of all the fleets of Europe, and gradually bring them to the great central point near the English coast, from whence they might ultimately be directed, with decisive effect, against the British shores. By the Continental System, he hoped to weaken the resources of England, to hamper its revenue, and by the spread of commercial distress, break up the unanimity which now prevailed among its inhabitants. But he knew too well the spirit of the ruling part of the nation to expect that, by the spread of commercial distress alone, he would succeed in the contest. He was desirous of reducing its strength by a long previous

(1) Las Cas. v. 8, 15.

(2) *Ante*, iv, 216.

(3) The Directory had previously adopted the system of compelling the exclusion of English goods from all the European harbours; but the multiplied disasters of their administration prevented them from carrying it into any general execution. By a Jan. 18, 1768, decree, issued on 18th January, 1798, it was declared, "That all ships having for their cargoes, in whole or in part, any English merchandise, shall be held good prize, whoever is the proprietor of such merchandise, which should be held contraband from the single circumstance of its coming from England, or any of its foreign settle-

ments; that the harbours of France should be shut against all ships having touched at England, except in cases of distress - and that neutral sailors found on board English vessels *should be put to death*." *Nap. Feb. 9, 1800* - poléon, soon after his accession to the Consular throne, issued a decree, revoking this and Jan. 28, 1800. all other decrees passed during the Revolution; and reverting to the old and humane laws of the monarchy in this particular; but in the *Ante*, iv, 235. exultation consequent on the battle of Jena, he very nearly returned to the violence and barbarity of the decree of the Directory. — *Vide Ann. Reg.*, 1800, 54, 55; and 1807, 226, 227.

blockade, but it was by an assault at last that he hoped to carry the day. In order to prepare for that grand event, he was at the utmost pains to increase his naval force; amidst all the expenditure occasioned by his military campaigns, he proposed to construct, and to a certain extent actually did construct, from ten to twenty sail of the line every year, while vast sums were annually applied to the great naval harbours at Antwerp, Flushing, Cherbourg, and Brest. The first, from its admirable situation and close proximity to the British shores, he considered as the great outwork of the Continent against England; he regarded it, as he himself has told us, as "itself worth a kingdom;" and but for the invincible tenacity with which he held to this great acquisition, he might with ease have obtained peace in 1814, and have left his family at this moment seated on the throne of France (1). But it was not with the fleets of France alone that he intended to engage in this mighty enterprise; those of all Europe were to be combined in the attempt; the navies of Denmark and Portugal in virtue of the secret article in the treaty of Tilsit (2), were to be required from their respective sovereigns, and seized by force, if not voluntarily surrendered; that of Russia was to come round from the Black Sea and the Baltic to Brest and Antwerp, and join in the general crusade, until at length a hundred ships of the line and two hundred thousand men were prepared, on the coasts of the Channel, to carry to the shores of England the terrors of Gallic invasion. "When in this manner, said Napoléon, "I had established my ground, so as to bring the two nations to wrestle, as it were, body to body, the issue could not be doubtful, for we had forty millions of French against fifteen millions of English. I would have terminated by a battle of Actium (3).

Object of
the Berlin
Decree.

It was therefore no momentary burst of anger or sudden fit of exultation, occasioned by his unparalleled triumphs, which induced Napoléon, by his celebrated decree from Berlin, to declare the British islands in a state of blockade. It was the result of much thought and anxious deliberation, of a calm survey of the resources at his disposal, and the means

(1) Las Cas. v. 8, 15.

(2) *Ante*, vi. 143.

(3) Las Cas. v. 8, 14. *Jom.* ii. 449.

Napoléon's projects in regard to the maritime war against England, have been already explained [*Ante*, v. 62] but this is a point of such vital importance to the future security of the British empire, that it will well bear a second note from an additional authority. "He said," says Las Casas, "that he had done much for Antwerp, but nothing to what he proposed to have done. By sea, he proposed to have made it a mortal point of attack against the enemy; by land, he wished to render it a sure resource in case of great disasters—a true point of refuge for the national safety; he wished to render it capable of containing an entire army in its defeat, and of resisting a year of open trenches, during which the nation might have risen in a mass for its relief. The world admired much the works already executed at Antwerp—its numerous dockyards, arsenals, and wet docks; but all that, said the Emperor, was nothing—it was but the commercial town; the military town was to have been on the other bank, where the land was already purchased; three-deckers were to have been there constructed, and covered sheds established to keep the ships of the line dry in time of peace. Every thing there was planned on the most colossal scale. Antwerp was itself a province. That place, said the Emperor, was the chief cause of my having been here; for if I could have made up my mind to give up Antwerp, I might have concluded peace at Chatillon in 1814."—LAS CAS., vii. 43, 44.

Gigantic as these designs for Antwerp were, they were but a part of what Napoléon meditated or had constructed for his grand enterprise against England. "Magnificent works," says Las Casas, "had been set agoing at Cherbourg, where they had excavated, out of the solid rock, a basin capable of holding fifteen ships of the line and as many frigates, with the most splendid fortifications for their protection; the Emperor intended to have prepared that harbour to receive thirty more line-of-battle ships of the largest size. Innumerable works had been prepared to receive and protect the flotilla which was to be immediately concerned in the invasion of England; Boulogne was adapted to hold 2000 gunboats; Vimereux, Etaples, and Ambleteuse, 1000 more. The harbour of Flushing was to have been rendered impregnable, and enlarged so as to hold twenty of the largest ships of the line; while dockyards for the construction of twenty line-of-battle ships were to be formed at Antwerp, and constantly kept in full activity.—So immense were the preparations on the French coast for the invasion of England! The Emperor frequently said that Antwerp was to him an entire province; a little kingdom in itself. He attached the greatest importance to it, often visited it in person, and regarded it as one of the most important of all his creations."—LAS CAS., vii. 51, 57.—It is not a little curious that, within twenty years after his fall, the English government should have united its forces to those of France to restore this great outwork against British independence to the dominion of Belgium, and the rule of the son-in-law of France.

of resistance which yet remained to his antagonists. The treaty of Tilsit gave the English government ample room for serious reflection on the danger which now beset them. The accession of Russia to the continental league was thereby rendered certain; the secret articles of the treaty, of which, by great exertions, they soon obtained possession (1), made them acquainted with the intention of France and Russia, not only to unite their forces against Great Britain, but to compel Denmark and Portugal to do the same. In addition to having their flag proscribed, from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Gulf of Bothnia, they had the prospect of seeing all the maritime forces of Europe arrayed against their independence. The assistance of Sweden could not much longer be relied on, pressed as she would soon be by her colossal neighbour; the harbours of South America were still closed to her adventure; the neutrality of North America was already more than doubtful, and would certainly be soon abandoned to range the United States by the side of France, in open enmity with Great Britain. Thus had England, proscribed from all civilized commerce over the whole world, and weakened in her resources by the internal suffering consequent on such a deprivation, the prospect of soon being compelled to maintain a contest with all the naval and military forces of Europe, directed by consummate ability, and actuated by inveterate hostility against her independence and renown. A clear and constant perception of this prospect, is indispensable both to the formation of a just opinion on the measures to which she was speedily driven in her own defence, and of the character of the illustrious men who, called to the direction of her councils and armies in such a gloomy situation, speedily raised her fortunes to an unparalleled pitch of glory and prosperity.

Berlin Decree of 21st Nov. The English government, in 1806, after the occupation of Hanover by the Prussian troops, had issued an order, declaring the coasts of Prussia in a state of blockade. That the English navy was amply adequate to establish an effectual blockade of the two rivers which constitute the only outlet to Prussian commerce, cannot be doubted (2). This blockade, how-

(1) They were obtained by the agency of the Count D'Autraigues.—HARD. ix. 431, *note*.—In the King's speech, on 21st January, 1808, it was said—"We are commanded by his Majesty to inform you, that no sooner had the result of the negotiations at Tilsit confirmed the influence and control of France over the powers of the Continent, than his Majesty was apprised of the intention of the enemy to combine those powers in one general confederacy, to be directed either to the entire subjugation of this kingdom, or to the imposing upon his Majesty an insecure and ignominious peace. That for this purpose it was determined to force into hostility against this country, states which had hitherto been allowed by France to maintain or to purchase their neutrality; and to bring to bear upon different points of his Majesty's dominions the whole of the naval force of Europe, and specifically the fleets of Denmark and Portugal. To place those fleets out of the power of such a confederacy, became, therefore, the indispensable duty of his Majesty." The complete accuracy of these assertions has been abundantly proved by the quotations from the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, already given; and ample confirmation of them will appear in the sequel of this chapter. Ministers, in the course of the debates which ensued on the Copenhagen expedition, were repeatedly called upon to produce their secret articles, or specify what private information they had received; but they constantly declined doing so, and in consequence it became a very general opinion at the time, that there, in reality, were no such secret articles, and that this assertion was put forward

without foundation in the King's speech, to palliate an aggression which, on its own merits, was indefensible. It is now proved, however, that they had the secret information, and that they had the generosity to hear this load of obloquy rather than betray a confidence which might prove fatal to persons high in office in the French government. This was fully explained, many years afterwards, when the reasons for concealment no longer existed, by Lord Liverpool in Parliament.—See *Parl. Deb.* x. 1.

April 5, 1806. (2) As this Order in Council is referred to by the French writers and their supporters in this country, as a vindication of the Berlin Decree, its provisions merit attention. It proceeds on the narrative, "that the Prussian government has, in a forcible and hostile manner, taken possession of the Electorate of Hanover, and has also notified that all British ships shall be excluded from the ports of the Prussian dominions, and from certain other ports in the north of Europe, and not suffered to enter or trade therein;" and then declares, "That no ship or vessel belonging to any of his Majesty's subjects be permitted to enter or clear from any ports of Prussia, and that a general embargo or stop be made of all Prussian ships and vessels whatever, now within, or hereafter which shall come into, any of the ports, harbours, or roads, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, together with all persons and effects on board the said ships and vessels; but that the utmost care be taken for the preservation of the cargoes on board of the said ships or vessels, so that no damage or embezzlement whatever be

ever, and one at the same time declared, of the coasts of the Channel, gave Napoléon an excuse for the famous Berlin Decree against English commerce, which, on the narrative, "that the British government had violated the law of nations, so far as regarded neutral vessels; that it regards as enemies every individual belonging to a hostile state, and, in consequence, makes prize, not merely of the crews of merchant vessels equipped as privateers, but also those of such vessels when merely engaged in the transport of merchandise that it extends to the ships and the objects of commerce that right of conquest which does not properly belong but to public property; that it extends to commercial cities and harbours, and mouths of rivers, the hardships of blockade which, on the best interpretation of the law of nations, is applicable only to fortified places; that it declares blockaded harbours, before which it has not a single ship of war, although a place cannot be considered as blockaded till it is in such a manner beset that entry cannot be obtained without imminent danger; that it even declares blockaded places, which all its naval forces are inadequate to blockade, as entire coasts and a whole empire; that this monstrous violation of the law of nations has no other object but to obstruct the communications of other people, and elevate the industry and commerce of England upon the ruins of that of the Continent; that this being the evident design of England, whoever deals on the Continent in British merchandise, by that very act favours its designs, and becomes participant in them; that this conduct of England, worthy of the first barbarous ages, has hitherto turned to its own great profit and the detriment of all other states; and that the law of nature entitles every belligerent to oppose its enemy with the arms with which it combats, and the mode of hostility which it has adopted, when it disregards every idea of justice and liberality, the result of civilisation among mankind;" therefore it declared:—

Its provisions.

"1. The British islands are placed in a state of blockade. 2. Every species of commerce and communication with them is prohibited; all letters or packets addressed in English, or in the English characters, shall be seized at the post-office, and interdicted all circulation. 3. Every British subject, of what rank or condition whatever, who shall be found in the countries occupied by our troops, or those of our allies, shall be made prisoners of war. 4. Every warehouse, merchandise, or property of any sort, belonging to a subject of Great Britain, or coming from its manufactories or colonies, is declared good prize. 5. Commerce of every kind in English goods is prohibited; and every species of merchandise belonging to England, or emanating from its work-shops or colonies, is declared good prize. 6. The half of the confiscated value shall be devoted to indemnifying those merchants whose

sustained."—*Ann. Reg.* 1806, 677. This was followed, upon 16th May, 1806, by an Order in Council, signed by Mr. Fox, which, "considering the new measures adopted by the enemy for the obstruction of British commerce, declared the whole coasts, harbours, and rivers, from the Elbe to Brest inclusive, as actually blockaded; provided always that this blockade shall not extend to neutral vessels having on board merchandise *not belonging to the enemies of his Majesty*, and not contraband of war; excepting, however, the coast from Ostend to the mouth of the river Seine, which is hereby declared subject to a blockade of the strictest kind [*Mart. Sup.*, v. 437.]" There can be no doubt that the coasts thus declared in a state of blockade were, in the strictest sense, subject to such declaration, when the peril of leaving the harbours they contained was such, that not one of the enemy's armed vessels ventured to incur it. This decree, such as it was, was repealed as to

all ports from the Elbe to the Ems inclusive, by a British Order in Council of 25th September, 1806.—*See* MARTENS, v. 469, *Sup.* These Orders in Council, thus providing only for the blockade of harbours and coasts, which it was at the moment in the highest degree perilous to enter, or for the *interim detention* of the Prussian cargoes, in retaliation for the unprovoked invasion of Hanover by the Prussian troops, and exclusion of British commerce, in pursuance of the offers of Napoléon already detailed, was clearly within the law of nations, as admitted by the French Emperor himself, and, in truth, a most moderate exercise of the rights of war [*Ante*, v. 326, 327.] They afford, therefore, no excuse or palliation whatever for the Berlin Decree—*See Ann. Reg.* 1806, 677. And see the *previous* Prussian proclamation excluding British trade on 28th March, 1806, *Ibid.* 692, and MARTENS, *Sup.* v. 435.

vessels have been seized by the English cruisers for the losses which they have sustained. 7. No vessel coming directly from England, or any of its colonies, or having touched there since the publication of the present decree, shall be received into any harbour. 8. Every vessel which, by means of a false declaration, shall have effected such entry, shall be liable to seizure, and the ship and cargo shall be confiscated as if they had also belonged to England. 9. The prize court of Paris is intrusted with the determination of all questions arising out of this decree in France, or the countries occupied by our armies; that of Milan, with the decision of all similar questions in the kingdom of Italy. 10. This decree shall be communicated to the kings of Spain, Naples, Holland, and Etruria, and to our other allies, whose subjects have been the victims, like our own (1), of the injustice and barbarity of English legislation. 11. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of War, of Marine, of Finance, and of Justice, of Police, and all postmasters, are charged, each in his own department, with the execution of the present decree (2)."

Such was the famous Berlin Decree against English commerce, ^{Its rigorous execution.} which was only an extension to all Europe of the declaration and order that all English merchandise should be liable to confiscation, which had been issued by Napoléon at Leipsic on the 18th of October preceding, and at Hamburg on the 3d November (3). It was not allowed an instant to remain a dead letter. Orders were dispatched in all directions to act upon it with the utmost rigour; and with undisguised reluctance, but trembling hands, the subject monarchs and prefects prepared to carry the stern requisition into execution. So strongly was its unjust character and ruinous tendency felt in Holland, that Napoléon's own brother Louis, King of that country, at first positively refused to submit to its injustice; and at length could only be prevailed on, in the first instance, to promulgate it in the foreign countries occupied by the Dutch troops, reserving its execution in his own dominions till it should be ascertained whether the measures already in force should prove insufficient (4). So strongly did this opposition on the part of

(1) Ann. Reg. 1806, 201. Schoell. ix. 344. and Dum. xvii. 46, 47.

(2) Two days after the publication of the Berlin Decree, Napoléon wrote the following highly characteristic letter to Junot, then governor of Paris:—"Take especial care that the *ladies* of your establishment take Swiss tea; it is as good as that of China. Coffee made from chicorie is noways inferior to that of Arabia. Let them make use of these substitutes in their drawingrooms, instead of amusing themselves with talking politics, like Madame de Staël. Let them take care also that no part of their dress is composed of English merchandise; tell that to *Madame Junot*: if the wives of my chief officers do not set the example, whom can I expect to follow it? It is a contest of life or death between France and England; I must look for the most cordial support in all those by whom I am surrounded."—*NAV. to JUNOT*, 23d Nov. 1806; *D'ARRANTES*, ix. 287, 288.

(3) *Ante*, v. 373.

(4) "This decree," says Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland, "was as unjust as it was impolitic. The command that it should be obeyed by the Kings of Spain, Holland, Naples, and Etruria, was the commencement of universal empire, if it had any meaning; if not so intended, it was senseless. The ground of justification put forth in the decree, viz. 'that England applies the right of blockade, not only to fortified places and the mouths of rivers, and whole coasts, when the law of nations only authorizes that rigour in the case of places so closely invested that they cannot be entered or quitted without danger,' is itself its chief condemnation; for a nation whose

vessels can proceed to a distance from its frontiers, even to the waters of the countries belonging to its enemies, is undoubtedly better entitled to say that it blockades coasts and ports, than a nation without a navy to say that it blockades an island surrounded by numerous fleets. In this last case, it is the continental power which voluntarily places itself in a state of blockade. Besides, wrong cannot authorize wrong, nor injustice injustice. The 4th and 5th articles of the Berlin Decree are atrocious. What! because the English seize merchants travelling from one place to another, and subject the vessels of individuals to ill treatment, shall we, in an age of reason, dare to seize every Englishman, and whatever of their property we can lay hold of? This was augmenting and justifying the injury of the English government. The 6th article is barbarous, the 8th still worse. Here, by a single stroke of the pen, the property of all Frenchmen who, up to that period, had traded in English goods, is taken from them: vessels even thrown on the coast by tempests, are to be refused admission into any port. Enough has been said to justify the extreme repugnance of the King of Holland to carry this decree into execution: it threw him into the utmost consternation; he felt at once, that it would speedily prove the ruin of Holland, and afford a pretext for oppressing it. This measure appeared to him as singular and revolutionary as denationalizing. He ventured to write to the Emperor that he believed this gigantic measure to be imposed, and calculated, to effect the ruin of France and all commercial nations connected with it, before it could ruin England. Obligated,

his brother irritate Napoléon, that he declared, in a fit of ill-humour, "that if Louis did not submit to his orders, he would cause domiciliary visits to be made through the whole of Holland." Nevertheless, as Louis perceived, what every person in the country knew, that this rigorous decree, if fully acted upon, would occasion the total ruin of his dominions, it was enforced in a very loose manner in the United Provinces. In the north of Germany, however, it was not only most rigorously put in force, but the decree was made a pretence for a thousand iniquitous extortions and abuses, which augmented tenfold its practical oppression. An army of locusts, in the form of inspectors, customhouse-officers, comptrollers, and other functionaries, fell upon all the countries occupied by the French troops, and made the search for English goods a pretext for innumerable frauds, vexations, and iniquities. "They pillaged, they plundered," says Bourrienne, "in a systematic manner, in all the countries of the north of Germany to which my diplomatic mission extended. Rapine was in a manner established by law, and executed with such blind fury, that often the legalized robbers did not know the value of the articles they had seized. All the English merchandise was seized at Hamburg, Lubeck, Bremen, and the other Hanse Towns; and Berthier wrote to me, that in that way I should obtain ten millions of francs for the Emperor. In point of fact, I compounded with the proprietors for twenty millions (L.800,000); and yet, such was the demand for these useful articles, that when exposed to sale by the proprietors, after paying this enormous ransom, their advanced prices brought them a very handsome profit (1)."

First Order
in council
by the Bri-
tish govern-
ment
Jan. 7. 1807

The English government replied to the Berlin Decree, in the first instance, by an Order in Council of 7th January, 1807, issued by Lord Howick, which, on the preamble of the French decree, and the right of retaliation thence arising to Great Britain, declared, "That no vessel shall be permitted to trade from one port to another, if both belong to France or her allies, and shall be so far under her control as that British vessels are excluded therefrom; and the captains of all British vessels are hereby required to warn every neutral vessel coming from any such port, and destined to such other port, to discontinue her voyage; and any vessel, after being so warned, or after having had a reasonable time allowed it for obtaining information of the present Order in Council, which shall, notwithstanding, persist in such voyage to such other port, shall be declared good prize." The spirit of this order was to deprive the French, and all the nations subject to their control, which had embraced the Continental System, of the advantages of the coasting trade in neutral bottoms; and, considering the much more violent and extensive character of the Berlin Decree, there can be no doubt that it was a very mild and lenient measure of retaliation. This order was relaxed soon after as to vessels containing grain or provisions for

however, to carry it into effect, under the penalty of a complete rupture with France, he only endeavoured to do so in the least illegal and most independent manner possible." — LOUIS BONAPARTE, *Documents sur la Hollande*, i, 294, 307, 308.

(1) Bour. vii. 265, 326, 327. Louis Bonaparte Dec. sur la Hollande, i. 295, 309.

A striking instance occurred, a few months after the promulgation of the Berlin Decree, of the utter impossibility of carrying such a monstrous system of legislation into execution. Shortly after the Berlin Decree had been issued, there arrived at Hamburg a thundering order for the immediate furnishing of 50,000 greatcoats, 200,000 pairs of shoes, 16,000 coats, 37,000 waistcoats, and other articles

in proportion. The resources of the Hanse Towns were wholly unequal to the supply of so great a requisition in so short a time; and after trying in vain every other expedient, Bourrienne, the French diplomatic agent, was obliged to contract with *English houses* for the supply, which speedily arrived; and while the emperor was denouncing the severest penalties against the possession of English goods, and boasting, that by the Continental System he had excluded British manufactures from the Continent, his own army was clothed with the cloth of Leeds and Halifax, and his soldiers would have perished amidst the snow of Prussia-Eylan but for the seasonable efforts of British industry. — See BOURRIENNE, vii. 292, 291.

Great Britain, and as to all vessels whatever belonging to the Hanse Towns, if employed in any trade to or from the dominions of Great Britain (1).

Reasons
which led to
a further
and more
rigorous
measure.

After the treaty of Tilsit, however, had completely subjected the Continent to the dominion or control of the French Emperor, it soon appeared that some more rigorous and extensive system of retaliation was called for. A few months' experience was sufficient to show that the Berlin Decree, while it rigorously excluded every species of British manufacture or colonial produce from the ports of the continent, by no means inflicted a proportional injury upon the inhabitants of the countries where its provisions were put in force; and that, in truth, it opened up a most lucrative commerce to the industry and colonies of neutral powers, at the expense of the vital interests of the British empire. By prohibiting, under the penalty of confiscation, the importation of every species of British produce, it necessarily left the market of the Continent open to the manufacturing industry and colonial produce of other states; and this in the end could not but prove highly injurious to English industry. The obvious and direct retaliation would have consisted, in prohibiting the importation into the British dominions of the produce of France, or its dependencies which had embraced the Continental System, whether in their own or neutral bottoms; but it was extremely doubtful whether this would have been by any means a retribution of equal injury. England was essentially a commercial state. The resources from which she maintained the contest were in great part drawn from the produce of her colonies or manufactories; and the general cessation of commercial intercourse, therefore, could not fail to be felt with more severity in her dominions than in the continental nations. What to them, considered as a whole, was secondary, to her was vital; the suffering which with them would be diffused over a wide circle, to her would be concentrated in the narrow space of a few counties. In these circumstances, some measure seemed indispensable which should inflict upon the enemy not merely the same *injustice*, but the same *suffering* which he had occasioned; and by causing his own subjects to feel in their own persons the consequences of his aggression, produce that general discontent which might arm them against his authority, or render necessary a return to more equitable measures.

Orders in
Council of
11th Nov.
1807.

Under the influence of these ideas, the celebrated Orders in Council of 11th November, 1807, were issued, which, on the preamble of the British islands having been declared by the Berlin Decree in a state of blockade, and of all importation of British merchandise having been absolutely prohibited, and of the mitigated measure of retaliation adopted in the Order in Council of 7th January, 1807, having proved inadequate to the object of effecting the repeal of that unprecedented system of warfare, declared that from henceforth "all the ports and places of France and her allies, from which, though not at war with his Majesty, the British flag is excluded, shall be subject to the same restrictions, in respect of trade and navigation, as if the same were *actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner*; and that all trade in articles the produce or manufacture of the said countries or colonies, shall be deemed to be unlawful, and all such articles declared good prize; declaring always that nothing herein contained shall be construed to extend to capture or detention, of any vessel or cargo which shall belong to a country not declared by this order subject to a strict blockade, which shall have cleared out with such cargo from such port to

(1) Parl. Deb. x. 127, 130. Ann. Reg. 1807, 671, 672.

which she belongs, either in Europe or America, or from some free port in the British colonies, under circumstances in which such trade from such free port is permitted, direct to some port or place in the colonies of his Majesty's enemies, or from those colonies direct to the countries to which such vessel belongs, or to some free port in his Majesty's colonies; nor to any vessel or cargo belonging to a country not at war with his Majesty, which shall have cleared out from some port in this kingdom, and shall be proceeding direct to the port specified in her clearance; nor to any vessel or cargo belonging to any country not at war with his Majesty, which shall be coming from any port or place in Europe declared by this order to be subject to a strict blockade, destined to some port or place in Europe belonging to his Majesty, and be on her voyage direct thereto." All vessels contravening this order are declared good prize. "And whereas countries not engaged in the war have acquiesced in the orders of France, and have given countenance and effect to these prohibitions by obtaining from agents of the enemy certain documents styled 'certificates of origin,' therefore if any vessel, after having had reasonable time to receive notification of the present order, shall be found carrying any such certificate, it shall be declared good prize, together with the goods on board (1)."

Import of
these orders.

Divested of the technical phraseology in which, for the sake of legal precision, these orders are couched, they in effect amount to this : Napoléon had declared the British islands in a state of blockade, and subjected all goods of British produce or manufacture to confiscation, within his dominions, or those of the countries subjected to his control, and prohibited all vessels from entering any harbour which had touched at any British port; and the English government, in reply, proclaimed France and all the Continental states in a state of blockade, and declared all vessels good prize which should be bound for any of their harbours, excepting such as had previously cleared out from, or touched at, a British harbour. Thus France prohibited all commerce with England, or traffic in English goods, and England prohibited all commerce between any of the states which had embraced the continental system and each other, unless in vessels bound for some British harbour.

Milan Decree, 17th Dec. 1807, published by Napoléon.

Napoléon was not slow in replying to these Orders in Council. By a decree dated from Milan on 17th December, 1807, he declared—
1. That every vessel, of whatever nation, which shall have submitted to be searched by British cruisers, or paid any impost levied by the English government, shall be considered as having lost the privileges of a neutral flag, and be considered and dealt with as English vessels.—2. Being so considered, they shall be declared good prize.—3. The British islands are declared in a state of blockade. Every vessel, of whatever nation, and with whatever cargo, coming from any British harbour, or from any of the English colonies, or from any country occupied by the English troops, or bound for England, or for the English colonies, or for any country occupied by the English troops, is declared good prize (2).—4. These rigorous measures shall cease in regard to any nations which shall have caused the English government to respect the

(1) Parl Deb x. 134, 138.

Additional Orders in Council, 25th Nov. 1807, and 18th Dec. 1807.

ships;" and by a more material one, passed six

weeks afterwards, it was provided, "that nothing in the order of 11th November, shall be construed so as to permit any vessel to import any produce or manufactures of the enemy's colonies in the West Indies, direct from such colonies to any port in the British dominions." [Ibid. x. 148.]

(2) Mart. Sup., v. 453. Ann. Reg. 1807, p. 779. State Papers.

rights of their flag, but continue in regard to all others, and never be released till Great Britain shows a disposition to return to the law of nations as well as those of justice and honour."

It may safely be affirmed, that the rage of belligerent powers, and the mutual violation of the laws of nations, could not go beyond those furious manifestoes. They produced, as might have been expected, most important effects, both on the Continent and the British isles, and gave rise to memorable and luminous debates in Parliament, in which all that could be advanced, both for and against the justice and expedience of these measures, was fully brought forward.

Arguments
in Parlia-
ment
against the
Orders in
Council.

On the one hand, it was strongly urged by Lord Grenville, Lord Howick, and Lord Erskine—"Let the case at once be stated in the manner which has produced the whole controversy. France, on the 21st November, issued her decree, which announced the intention to distress this country in a way unauthorized by the public law; subjecting to confiscation the ships and cargoes of neutrals with British merchandise, or going to or coming from Great Britain, with their accustomed trade. Such a decree undoubtedly introduced a rule which the law of nations forbids, as being, even as between belligerents, and much more as with neutrals, an aggravation of the miseries of war, and unauthorized by the practice of civilized states. If carried into execution, it would vest the suffering belligerent with the right of retaliation; and indeed, as between the belligerents only, it may be admitted that the mere publication of such a decree would authorize the nation so offended to disregard the law of nations towards the nation so offending. But that is not the present question; the point here is, not whether we would have been justified in retaliating upon France the injury she has inflicted upon us, but whether we are justified in inflicting, in our turn, a new and still more aggravated species of injury on *neutral* states. If A strikes me, I may retaliate by striking him, and neither law nor reason will weigh very nicely the comparative severity of the blow given, from that at first received. But it is a new application of the term retaliation, to say, that if A strikes me, I may retaliate by striking B. If the interdiction of a neutral from trading with us is submitted to by him from favour to the belligerent, he directly interposes in the war, and his character of a neutral is at an end; if he does so from terror or weakness, in that case too he ceases to be a neutral, because he suffers an unjust pressure to be affixed upon us. But admitting that, the question remaining, what right have we to retaliate upon a neutral upon whom the decree has never been executed; who in no shape has been made either the instrument or the victim of oppression by the enemy?

"Now that is the real question, and the only question here. America, the only great maritime power which has not now taken a decided part in the contest, was virtually excluded from its operation. The air was white with her sails; the sea was pressed down with her shipping, nearly half as numerous as our own, bringing her produce into every port of England, and carrying our commodities and manufactures into every corner of Europe. Up to the date of the Orders in Council, she continued to take, without the least devaluation, ten millions of our manufactures, and she carried to other nations what was beyond her own consumption. She carried on this traffic, in the face of the French decree of 21st November, when we could not have done it for ourselves. She did this, it is true, from no feeling of friendship towards us, but from self-interest to herself; but Providence has so arranged human affairs, that by a wise pursuit of self-interest, every thing is full and stands in its proper place. We had so much the start of other nations, that we had

only to lie by, and they, for their own purposes, came to our relief. America smuggled our goods into France for her own interest, and France bought them for hers. The people cheered the Emperor at the Tuileries every day, but they broke his laws every night. The Berlin Decree, in fact, had become a dead letter, either from the connivance or the licenses for contraband trade issued by the French government; she had no ships to carry her decrees into effect; and the barbarous system of the enemy was rapidly falling into that neglect in which Mr. Pitt, with great sagacity, left the corresponding decree of the Directory in 1798.

"Such was the state of matters, when, in an evil hour, our own government interfered, and gave a helping hand to the enemy. The Orders in Council were the real executors of the Berlin Decree. Under it we employ our own shipping to stop our own trade upon the sea; we make prisons of our own ports to terrify away the neutral seaman, who otherwise would carry on our traffic, and find a vent for our manufactures; and, playing the very game of France, by throwing neutral powers into her arms instead of our own. And this, it seems, is retaliation! Can we, who do such things, object to the Irish rebels who burned the notes of an obnoxious banker to ruin his trade? Our Orders in Council have thrown the mistake of the ignorant Irish into the shade.

"The order of 7th January, 1807, was liable to none of these objections. It introduced or adopted no new or illegal principle; it merely reprobated the illegal decree of France, and asserted the right of retaliation by actual blockade—a restriction which, it is admitted on all hands, neutrals must submit to. But the order of 11th November stands in a very different situation. Sir William Scott has told us, in the case of the *Maria, Robinson*, i. 154, that no blockade can be made by the law of nations, unless force sufficient is stationed to prevent an entry. Can this be predicated of all Europe put together? Is every harbour and river, from Hamburg to Cadiz, so closely watched that no vessel can enter any of them without evident risk of capture? Such a proposition is clearly out of the question; and therefore government has issued an Order in Council, which its own prize courts, if adjudicating in conformity with their former principles, must declare to be contrary to the law of nations, and therefore refuse to execute.

"Nor is it in this view only that these orders are illegal. They purported to interrupt the commerce of neutral and unoffending nations, carrying on their accustomed traffic in innocent articles, between their own country and the ports of our enemies not actually blockaded, and even between their own country and our allies; they compel neutrals, under the pain of confiscation, to come to our ports, and there submit to regulations, restrictions, and duties, which will expose them to certain destruction the moment they approach the enemy's shore; they declare all vessels good prize which carry documents or certificates declaring that the articles of the cargo are not the produce of his Majesty's dominions, contrary alike to the law of nations and the rights and liberties of the people of this realm—such a monstrous system of aggression never was, and never should be, successful. Let us leave to our enemies the guilt of discord and bloodshed, and seek to support our country by the virtues of beneficence and peace (1).

"The idea that you can starve the enemy into submission, or the adoption of a more reasonable mode of hostility, is founded on an essential and fatal mistake in regard to the relative situation of Great Britain and the continen-

tal states in the contest. The former must of necessity be the greatest sufferer. The continental nations will lose only articles of luxury, but the British will be deprived of those of necessity; sugar may rise to an extravagant price in Germany, but the manufacturers will be deprived of their daily bread in England. The greatest calamity which could befall this country in her present predicament, would be a war with America, both as depriving her of the chief vent for her manufactured industry, and of the advantage of neutral carriers, who would contrive, for their own profit, to elude every continental blockade, in order to introduce them into the continental states. And surely the present moment, when we have all Europe, from the North Cape to Gibraltar, arrayed against us, is not that when it is expedient, gratuitously and unnecessarily to withdraw so beneficial a customer from our markets, and add his forces to those of the enemy."

Reply of
the sup-
porters of
the Orders
in both
Houses

On the other hand, it was argued by Lord Hawkesbury, the Advocate-General, and Lord Chancellor Eldon—"It is in vain to refer to the law of nations for any authority on this subject, in the unprecedented circumstances in which this country is now placed.

What usually passes by that name, is merely a collection of the *dicta* of wise men who have devoted themselves to this subject in different ages, applied to the circumstances of the world at the period in which they wrote, or circumstances nearly resembling them; but none having the least resemblance to the circumstances in which this country is now placed. Such as they are, however, they all admit, what indeed common sense dictates, the right of retaliation, or of resisting an enemy by the same means by which he attacks ourselves. Nothing can be more expedient in the general case, than to adhere, with scrupulous exactness, to the law of nations; but if one belligerent commences a violation of them, it is sometimes indispensable, in order to put an end to the enormity, to make the enemy feel its effects. In some cases the most civilized nations have been driven to the melancholy necessity of putting prisoners to death to terminate a similar practice on the part of their enemies; doubtless, in the general case, quarter should be given, but during the fury of a charge, or the tumult of an assault, it is universally felt by the experience of mankind, that a less humane rule must be followed. Every belligerent should usually adhere to the ordinary instruments of human destruction; but if your enemy fires red-hot shot, you are entitled to do the same. Russia herself acted on this principle in repelling, when still a neutral power, the aggressions of France; she authorized the seizure of all ships proceeding to France.—Lord Howick himself, in his letter to the Danish Minister, in relation to the Order of 7th January, clearly vindicated the justice, not only of his own measure (1), but of the more extensive measure, based on the same principles, which was ultimately adopted (2).

(1) Parl. Deb. x. 674, 971, and 975.

Able note of Lord Howick on this subject to the Danish Minister. government, in adopting a measure at once so violent in itself, and so unjust in its consequences, committed a manifest act of aggression, though immediately levelled at Great Britain, against the rights of every state not engaged in the war, which, if not resisted on their part, must unavoidably deprive them of the privilege of a fair neutrality, and suspend the operation of treaties formed for the protection of their rights in relation to Great Britain. The injury which would be sustained by

England, if she suffered her commerce with foreign nations to be thus interdicted, while that of the enemy with them should remain unmolested, is so manifest, that it can require no illustration. It never could have been supposed that his Majesty would submit to such an injury, waiting in patient acquiescence till France might think proper to attend to the slow and feeble remonstrances of neutral states, instead of resorting immediately to steps which might check the violence of the enemy and retort upon him the evils of his own injustice. Other powers would have had no right to complain, if, in consequence of this unparalleled aggression, the King had proceeded immediately to declare *all the countries occupied by the enemy in a state of blockade, and to prohibit all trade in the produce of those coun-*

"The Berlin Decree of 21st November is at once the foundation and the justification of the present proceeding. That decree declared the British Islands in a state of blockade, and prohibited all commerce, even in neutral ships, in the produce or manufactures of this country—it went so far as even to exclude the possibility of one neutral nation trading in safety with another. But it is said that this threatened blockade was not, in point of fact, carried into effect; and that, in some other less exceptionable mode, its consequences might have been avoided. But it is immaterial whether it was executed at sea or not; unquestionably it received execution, and the most rigorous execution, at land. Foreign ships were only enabled to come to this country with their foreign produce; they were not permitted, under the pain of confiscation, to take away our goods in return—and can it be said, that this is not a real execution?

"The French government justify, in the preamble of their decree, their proceedings on the previous proclamation of the late Administration in April 1806, which declared the coasts of the Channel in a state of blockade. But that is a mistake in point of fact, for in no one single instance did they declare either a harbour, or a coast containing several harbours, in a state of blockade, without having previously invested it. The coasts of the Channel, it is well known, when this blockade was declared, were so closely blockaded that not a praam could venture to leave the range of their own batteries without incurring the most imminent risk of capture. The French government, on the other hand, in their decree, declared this country in a state of blockade, not only without making any attempt to invest it, but without being able to send out a single vessel to endanger the neutral vessels who might attempt to violate their blockade. Therein lay the difference, the vital difference between the proceedings of the two countries: the British government declared coasts and rivers blockaded when their maritime force was so great, and so stationed, that the enemy themselves evinced their sense of the reality of the investment, by never venturing to leave their harbours; the French declared an imaginary blockade on the seas, and acted upon it in their condemnations on land, when they not only had not a single vessel at sea to maintain it, but their enemies were insulting them daily in their very harbours. Such a proceeding was as absurd as if England, without having a soldier on the continent, were to declare Bergen-op-Zoom or Lisle in a state of blockade, and act upon this order by seizing all goods belonging to citizens of those towns, wherever she could find them in neutral bottoms on the high seas.

"But it is said the neutral nations did not acquiesce in these decrees, and therefore we were not justified in retaliating in such a way as would affect their interests. Where then did they result? What followed the Berlin decree—did the three nations, whose next decree materially affected Denmark, Portugal, and America, either remonstrate or take up arms to compel its repeal? Not one of them did so. The Danish government, indeed, complained in strong terms of the British Order of 7th January 1807, but were com-

tries; for, as the French Decree itself expresses it, the law of nature justifies the employment against our enemies of the same arms which he himself makes use of. If third parties suffer from these measures, their demand for redress must be directed against that country which first violates the established usages of war, and the rights of neutral states. Neutrality, properly considered, does not consist in taking advantage, for the neutral profit, of every

situation between the belligerents whereby emolument may be made, but in observing a strict and honest impartiality, so as not to afford advantage in the war to either, and particularly in so far restraining its trade to its accustomed trade in time of peace, as to prevent one belligerent escaping the effect of the other's hostilities."—*Lord Howick's Letter to Mr. Riser, 17th March, 1807. Parl. Deb.* x. 403, 406.

pletely silent on the previous and far stronger Berlin Decree of 21st November 1806, to obviate which alone it was issued. This temper savoured pretty strongly of the principle of the armed neutrality, which it has ever been the anxious wish of the Danish government to establish as the general law of the seas. Portugal was not to be blamed because she had no force at her command to make any resistance; and accordingly the port of Lisbon was made the well-known *entrepôt* for violating our Orders of 7th January, and restoring to the enemy, under neutral colours, all the advantages of a coasting trade. But America was completely independent of France, and has she done any thing to evince a repugnance to the French decree? When the corresponding decree of the French Directory was issued in 1798, it was noticed in the President's speech as highly injurious to the interests of the United States, and such as could not be allowed to exist without subverting the independence of their country. What has America now done in relation to the Berlin Decree? Nothing; and that too although Napoléon himself announced his resolution to make no distinction between the United States and other neutrals in this particular, and acted upon this resolution in the Spanish decree issued on the 17th February, which contained no exception whatever in favour of the Transatlantic states. Having acquiesced in the violation of the law of nations in favour of one belligerent, America is bound, if she would preserve her neutral character, to show a similar forbearance in regard to the other.

“But it is said these orders are injurious to ourselves, even more than our enemies, and that they exclude us from a lucrative commerce we otherwise might have carried on in neutral bottoms, either by connivance or licenses with our enemies. Let it be recollected, however, that when these orders were issued, we were excluded from every harbour of Europe except those of Sweden and Sicily; and these answered what trade we could have carried on with the continental states, or what we can have lost by our retaliatory orders. It is in vain to pretend that these orders were never meant to be acted upon by Bonaparte, and that, but for our Orders in Council, they would have sunk into oblivion. Such a dereliction of a great object of settled policy is entirely at variance with the known character of the French Emperor and his profound hostility to this country, the ruling principle of his life. It is contradicted by every newspaper, which, before the Orders were issued, were full of the account of the seizure of English goods in every quarter of Europe; and by his unvarying state policy, which, in every pacification, and especially at Tilsit, made the rigorous exclusion of British goods the first step towards an accommodation (1).”

Upon a division, both Houses supported Ministers, in the upper by a majority of 127 to 61; in the lower by 214 to 94 (2).

In endeavouring, at the distance of thirty years, to form an impartial opinion on this most important subject, it must at once strike the most cursory observer, that the grounds on which this question were debated in the British Parliament, were not those on which its merits really rested, or on which they were placed by Napoléon at the time, and have been since argued by the continental historians. On both sides in England it was assumed that France was the first aggressor by the Berlin Decree, and that the only question was, whether the Orders in Council exceeded the just measure of retaliation, or were calculated to produce more benefit or injury to this country? Considered in this view, it seems impossible

Reflections
on this de-
bate and the
justice of
the Orders
in Council.

(1) Parl. Deb. x. 666, 673.

(2) Ibid. x. 684, 976.

to deny that they were at least justifiable in point of legal principle, whatever they may have been with reference to political expedience. The able argument of Lord Howick to the Danish Minister is invincible on this subject (1). If an enemy adopts a new and unheard-of mode of warfare, which affects alike his opponent and neutral states, and they submit without resistance to this novel species of hostility, either from a feeling of terror or a desire of profit, they necessarily contract the obligation to be equally passive in regard to the measures of retaliation which the party so assailed may think it necessary to adopt. If they act otherwise, they lose the character of neutrality, and become the disguised, but often the most effective and the most valuable allies of the innovating belligerent.

But was the Berlin Decree the origin of the commercial warfare; or was it merely, as Napoléon and the French writers assert, a retaliation upon England, by the only means at the disposal of the French Emperor, for the new and illegal species of warfare which, in the pride of irresistible maritime strength, they had thought fit to adopt? That is the point upon which the whole question really depends; and yet, though put in the foremost rank by Napoléon, it was scarcely touched on by either party in the British Parliament. Nor is it difficult to see to what cause this extraordinary circumstance was owing; both the great parties which divide that assembly were desirous of avoiding that question; the Whigs, because the measure complained of by Napoléon, and on which the Berlin Decree was justified by the French government, had been mainly adopted by Mr. Fox, and subsequently extended by Lord Howick; the Tories, because they were unwilling to cast any doubt on the exercise of maritime powers, in their opinion of essential importance to this country, and which gave them the great advantage of having their political adversaries necessarily compelled to support the general principle on which the measures in question had been founded.

Compara-
tive blame
attaching to
each party.

History, however, must disregard all these temporary considerations, and in good faith approach the question, whether, in this great debate, England or France was the real aggressor. And on this point, as on most others in human affairs, where angry passions have been strongly excited, it will probably be found, that there were faults on both sides. Unquestionably the most flagrant violation of the law of nations was committed by Napoléon; as, without having a ship on the ocean, or a single harbour of England invested, he took upon himself to declare the whole British islands in a state of blockade—a proceeding similar to what it would have been, had England proclaimed a strict blockade with her men-of-war of Strasburg or Magdeburg. Most certainly, also, the resolution of the French Emperor to reduce England, by means of a Continental System, had been formed long before the blockade of the French coasts in April 1806, by Mr. Fox; inasmuch as it had been announced and acted upon eight years before, on occasion of the conquest of Leghorn, and had formed the first condition of his pacification with every maritime state since that period. But still the British historian must lament, that the English government had given him so plausible a ground for representing his measures as retaliatory only by issuing, in May 1806, the blockade of the French coasts of the Channel. True, this was any thing rather than a mere paper blockade; true, it was supported by the greatest maritime force in existence; true, it was so effective, that not a French ship of war could venture, without imminent risk, out of the protection of their batteries: still, the declaration of a whole coast, several hundred

(1) *Ante*, vi. 166.

miles in length, in a state of blockade, was a stretch unusual in war; and which should, in an especial manner, have been avoided in a contest with an antagonist so unscrupulous in the measure in return which he resorted to, and so dexterous at turning any illegal act to good account, as the French Emperor.

Reflections on their policy. In regard to the policy of the Orders in Council, there is perhaps less difficulty in forming a decided opinion. It was foretold at the time, what subsequent experience has since abundantly verified, that in the mutual attempt to starve each other out, the manufacturing state, the commercial emporium, would of necessity be more exposed to suffering than the nations with whom she carried on mercantile transactions, on the same principle on which a besieged town must, in the end, be always reduced by the concentric fire of a skilful assailant. The ruin and suffering on the one side is accumulated on a single spot, or within a narrow compass; on the other it is spread over an extensive surface; the sum total of distress may be, and probably will be equal on both sides; but how wide the difference between the garrison which sustains it all on a single breach, or a few hospitals, and the army without, which repairs its losses by the resources of a great empire. Sound policy, therefore, recommended, on the commencement of this novel and dangerous species of hostility, the adoption of a system on the part of Great Britain which should bind more closely the cords which united her to the few remaining neutrals of the world; and which, by opening up new markets for her produce in states beyond the reach of the French Emperor, might enable her to bid defiance to the accumulated hostility of all the nations who were subjected to his control. This important subject, however, will more properly come under consideration in a subsequent volume, when the practical operation of the Continental System, and the Orders in Council for several years, is to be developed; and the able arguments on the part of the English Opposition are recounted, which, together with the multiplied complaints of the neutral powers, and the abandonment of the Continental System by Napoléon, at length brought about their repeal.

Jesuits' Bark bill in England. April 7, 1808. There is one measure on the part of the British government connected with commercial transactions, however, on which, from the very outset, a decided opinion may be hazarded. This is the bill introduced by Mr. Perceval, and which passed both Houses of Parliament (1), for prohibiting the exportation of Peruvian bark to the countries occupied by the French troops, unless they took with it a certain quantity of British produce or manufactures. This was a stretch of hostility unworthy of the character of England, and derogatory to the noble attitude she had maintained throughout the war. No excess of intemperance, or violence on the part of the enemy, should have betrayed the British government into such a measure, which made war not on the French Emperor, but the sick and wounded in his hospitals. How much more dignified, as well as politic, was the conduct of the Duke of York in 1794, who, when the French Committee of Public Safety had enjoined their troops to give no quarter, issued the noble proclamation already noticed (2), which commanded the British soldiers to deviate in no degree from the usages of civilized warfare (5). But such was the exasperation now produced on both sides, by the long continuance and desperate character of the contest, that the feelings of generosity and the dictates of prudence were alike forgotten, and an overwhelming, and in some in-

(1) In the Lords, by a majority of 110 to 44; in the Commons, by 92 to 29.—*Parl. Deb.* x. 1170 and 1325.

(2) *Ante*, ii. 254.

(3) *Parl. Deb.* x. 1323-5, 1168-70.

stances, mistaken feeling of state necessity led men to commit many actions foreign alike to their usual principles and previous conduct.

Vast ultimate effects of the Continental System. Long as the preceding disquisition on the Continental System and the Orders in Council has been, it will not, to those who consider the importance of the subject, appear misplaced. It relates to the ruling principle, the grand object of Napoléon's life; one which he pursued with a degree of perseveranee with which no other object was followed, and which, by imposing on him the necessity of general obedience, left him no other alternative but universal empire or total ruin. As such, it is closely linked with the attack on Spain and Portugal, and the long-continued carnage of the Peninsular war; the seizure of the Roman States, and incorporation of the ecclesiastical dominions by the successor of Charlemagne; the incorporation of the ephemeral kingdom of Holland with the great empire; in fine, the grand invasion of Russia in 1812, and the unspeakable horrors of the Moscow campaign. In the history of Napoléon, more perhaps than that of any other man that ever existed, the close connexion between one criminal act and another, and the irresistible force of the moral law by which the audacious in wickedness are impelled from one deed of darkness to those which succeed it, till a just retribution awaits them in the natural consequences of their own iniquities, is clearly evinced. The lustre of his actions, the bright effulgence of his glory, has shed an imperishable light over every step of his eventful career; and that mysterious connexion between crime and punishment, which in most men is concealed by the obscurity of their lives, and can only be guessed at from the result, or believed from the moral laws of the universe, is there set forth, link by link, in the brightest and most luminous colours (1). The grandeur of his intellect precludes the idea of any cause having co-operated in his fall but the universal and irresistible laws of nature; and the first capacity of modern times was subjected to the most memorable reverse, as if to demonstrate the utter inability of the greatest human strength to combat the simple law which brings upon the impassioned prodigal the consequences of his actions.

Introduction of the system of licenses. It is observed by Dr. Johnson, that no man ever rose to supreme power among men, in whom great qualities were not combined with certain meannesses which would be deemed inconceivable in ordinary men. Never was the truth of this singular but just remark more clearly evinced than by Napoléon on this great subject of the Continental System. While it was the great object of his life from this period—while it was the secret key to all his negotiations, all his wars, and all his conquests—while, to enforce its rigorous execution, he put all the forces of Christendom in motion, and hurled the strength of the south in desperate fury at the power of the north, he himself was the first to set the example of the evasion of his own decrees, and for a temporary profit to himself to establish a system which, in a great degree, subverted the whole objects for which these mighty risks and sacrifices were undergone. Many months had not elapsed, after the publication of the Berlin decree, before it was discovered that a lucrative source of revenue might be opened up, by granting, at exorbitant prices, licenses to import British colonial produce and manufactures; and though this was done under the obligation of exporting French or continental produce to an equal amount, this condition soon became illusory. Old silks, satins, and velvets, which had completely gone out of fashion, were bought

(1) Quanto vita illius praeclarior ita socordia rum gloria posteris lumen est, neque bona neque flagitiosior est. Et profecto ita se res habet, majorum gloria posteris lumen est, neque bona neque mala eorum in occulto patitur.—*Sall. Bel. Jug.*

up at fictitious prices, and when the vessels which took them on board were clear of the French coasts, thrown into the sea, and rich cargoes of English goods brought back in return; and such were the exorbitant prices at which they were sold, that they yielded a very handsome profit to the merchants, an enormous ransom to the Emperor for the licenses, and defraying the cost of all the French goods which were lost to give a colour to the transactions. British manufactures and colonial produce rose to an extravagant height, and as a natural consequence, they became the fashion and the object of universal desire. A pair of cotton stockings were sold for six or seven shillings, and worn by ladies, and in dress, in preference to the finest silk; sugar was soon five shillings, coffee ten shillings a-pound. Such enormous prices excited the cupidity alike of those who were engaged in promoting, and those whose duty it was to repress, the contraband traffic; the vast profits of such cargoes as could be sold, on any terms, compensated the loss of several in the perilous undertaking; and fiscal corruption, taking example from the open sale of licenses at the Tuileries, seized every opportunity of realizing a temporary profit from the sufferings of the people (4).

England was not slow in following the example thus set by the French Emperor. Even more dependent than her great antagonist on the disposal of the national produce, the British government gladly availed themselves of a system which promised to mitigate, in so important a particular, the severity of the continental blockade, and restore, under the safeguard of Imperial licenses, the wonted encouragement of European wealth to British industry. Thence arose a system on both sides, the most extraordinary and inconsistent that ever existed upon earth. While the two governments were daily carrying on their commercial warfare with increased virulence; while Napoléon was denouncing the punishment of *death* against every government functionary who should connive in any way at the introduction of British merchandise (2); and consigning to the flames all the bales of English manufactures that could be discovered by fiscal cupidity in all the extensive dominions subjected to his control; while these terrible severities were carried into rigorous execution wherever his influence reached, and piles of British goods were frequently burnt in the public market-places of all the chief continental cities, and unhappy wretches shot for conniving at the lucrative contraband traffic in the forbidden articles (5); while the English Court of Admiralty was daily con-

(1) Bour. vii. 232. 237.
The following instance will illustrate the mode in which the love of gain, in all the Imperial functionaries, from the highest to the lowest, counteracted all the state objects of the Berlin Decree. The English, in the summer of 1807, had made themselves masters of Heligoland, from whence enormous quantities of British produce were smuggled into Holstein, from whence they were conveyed, at a charge of from 33 to 40 per cent, within the French custom-house line. This regular traffic being well known to the Imperial authorities, and probably secretly connived at by them for a share of its enormous profits, Bourrienne, then the French resident at Hamburg, represented to Napoleon, that he had much better at once authorize the trade on these terms, and realize for himself this contraband profit. Napoleon adopted the proposal, and, in consequence, 60,000,000 worth of English produce (1,2,400,000) was, in 1811, imported openly into that town alone, at a profit of 33 per cent to the Emperor? The same system was soon after adopted in Prussia, but notwithstanding this relaxation, the legions of dou-

niers and coast-guards who were quartered on the country were so prodigious that they were of necessity in part lodged in the public prisons and hospitals, and the unhappy captives and patients crowded into confined and unhealthy corners.—See BOURRIENNE, vii. 237, 238, 240

(2) The Imperial Decree November 18, 1810, created provost-marsbals for the summary punishment of all customhouse officers, carriers, coach-guards, tide-waiters, and others engaged in representing illicit commerce, and authorized them to pronounce and carry into instant execution the most severe and infamous punishments, including death, without appeal or respite of any kind.—*Moniteur*, 18th Nov. 1810 and MONTGAILLARD, vii. 54.

(3) At Hamburg, in 1811, under the government of Davoust, an unhappy father of a family was shot, for having introduced into his house a little sugar loaf, of which his family stood in need; and at that very moment, perhaps, Napoléon was signing a license for the importation of a million such loaves. Smuggling on a small scale was punished with death, and the government carried it on on the

demning merchant vessels which had contravened the Orders in Council, and issuing the strictest injunctions to its cruisers to carry them into full execution, both governments were the first to set the example of the open and undisguised violation of the very decrees, to which they required such implicit obedience in others. British licenses were openly sold at the public offices in London, and became the vehicles of an immense commerce with the Continent; and Napoléon at length carried the system of authorizing this illicit traffic to such a height, that by a decree issued from Antwerp in July 23, 1810. July 1810, it was expressly declared, "subsequent to the first August no vessel shall issue from any of our ports, bound for any foreign port, without being furnished with a license, signed with our own hand (1)." Thus the Continental System, and the retaliatory measures of the Orders in Council, were mutually abandoned by the government, on both sides, though rigorously exacted as the first of public duties from their subjects; the whole prohibitions of the Orders in Council disappeared before the magic of a writing from Downing Street, and the boasted *grande pensée* of Napoléon degenerated into a mere pretext for exacting, under the name of licenses, an immense annual profit for the behoof of the Great Imperial Smuggler in the Tuileries. To such a height was this practice carried by the French Emperor, that it opened up new channels of commerce to British industry, quite equal, on the continent of Europe, to those his Decree had destroyed; and the suffering experienced in England during the continuance of the Continental System was almost entirely owing, not to this Berlin Decree, but to the loss of the great North American market, which the Orders in Council ultimately closed against British industry. Thus, in this the greatest measure of his life, on which he staked his influence, his fame, his throne, the mighty intellect of Napoléon was governed by the same regard to inferior interests which prompted the Dutch, in former times, to sell ammunition and provisions at an exorbitant rate to the inhabitants of a town besieged by their armies; resolved, at all events, to make profit by their hostilities, and if they could not reduce their enemies to subjection, at least realize an usurious profit from their necessities. To such a length did the license system proceed under the Imperial government, that it constituted a principal source of the private revenue of the Emperor; and we have the authority of Napoléon himself for the assertion, that the treasure thus accumulated, in hard specie, in the vaults of the Tuileries, amounted, at the opening of the Russian war in 1812, to the enormous and unprecedented sum of four hundred million francs, or above sixteen millions sterling (2).

The return of Napoléon to Paris, after the glorious termination of the Polish campaign, diffused an universal enchantment. Never, since the commencement of the Revolution, had the triumph of their arms been so glorious, and never had the French people such universal cause for exultation. No commercial crisis had brought the treasury to the brink of ruin, as at the close of the campaign at Austerlitz; no

greatest scale; the same regulations filled the European prisons with victims, and the Imperial coffers with riches.—BOHRIENNE, vii. 233-234.

(1) Mart, Sup., v. 512.

(2) Las Cases, iv. 115.

The accounts and details of this immense treasure were all entered in a little book kept by the Emperor's private treasurer; and no part of them appeared in the public accounts of the nation or the armies. The greater part of it was drawn out and applied to the necessities of the state during the disasters of 1813 and 1814, and in this resource is to

be found one great cause of the stand made by him against the forces of combined Europe in those memorable years. As the expenses of the state always exceeded the income under Napoléon's government, and the contributions levied by the armies, how vast soever, were all absorbed in the cost of their maintenance, this secret fund must have been chiefly, if not entirely, realized from the sale of licenses, and its great amount furnishes an index to the extent to which that traffic was carried.—See LAS CASES, iv. 115.

gloomy presentiments of a future desperate war in the North, as at Jena, alloyed the buoyancy of their present transports. The great contests appeared to be over; the forces of the South and the North had been brought into collision, and the latter had been discomfited; the strength of Russia, instead of an inveterate antagonist, had been converted into the firmest support of the French empire; and, emerging from all the gloom and darkness of a Polish winter, the star of Napoléon again appeared resplendent in the zenith. Their standards had been advanced in triumph to the Niemen; the strength of Prussia was to all appearance irrevocably broken; Austria had been throughout overawed; Russia at last defeated. No power of the Continent seemed to be longer capable of withstanding the French Emperor; for the forces of Sweden, far removed from the theatre of European strife, would soon, it was foreseen, be compelled to yield to the domineering influence of Alexander. England alone maintained, with unconquerable resolution, the maritime contest: but the very greatness of the triumphs of the two hostile powers on their respective elements precluded, to all appearance, the possibility of their being brought into collision; and, like land and sea monsters, the Colossus of the earth and of the deep regarded each other with fruitless rage and impotent fury (1).

Slavish adulation of the orators in the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. So unprecedented a series of triumphs might have turned the heads of a nation less passionately devoted than the French to military glory, and it will excuse much in the way of flourishing declamation. But the oratorical effusions of the public bodies in France, went beyond every allowable limit. Theirs was not the exultation of freemen, but the adulation of slaves; and the classical scholar recognised with pain, in their studied flowers, the well-known language of Byzantine servitude. Already it had become evident that the passions of the Revolution, withdrawn from their original objects, had become wholly centred on military aggrandizement; and that the generous glow of freedom, chilled by suffering or extinguished by disappointment, was wholly absorbed in selfish ambition—the grave in every age of durable liberty. “We cannot adequately praise your Majesty,” said Lacépède, the President of the Senate: “your glory is too dazzling; those only who are placed at the distance of posterity can appreciate its immense elevation.” “The only *éloge* worthy of the Emperor,” said the President of the Court of Cassation, “is the simple narrative of his reign; the most unadorned recital of what he has wished, thought, and executed, of their effects (2), past, present, and to come.” “The conception,” said Count de Fabre, a senator, “which the mother of Napoléon received in her bosom, could only have flowed from *Divine inspiration*.”

Great fête in honour of the Grand Army, 25th Nov. Shortly after the return of the Emperor, a military spectacle of the most animating and imposing kind took place in the French capital. The Imperial Guard made its entry in state into Paris, amidst an enthusiasm and transport, which can hardly be imagined by any but those, who were cyewitnesses to the vehemence of the military ardour which in France had succeeded to the passions of the Revolution. A triumphal arch was erected on the road to Mayence, at a considerable distance from Paris, from which, to the capital, the way was thronged by innumerable spectators: in brilliant order and proud array the Guard marched, through a double file of soldiers, by the Port St.-Martin to the Tuileries, where they defiled under the new triumphal arch, opened for the first time on that day.

(1) Savary, iii. Dum. xix. 138. Mont. vi. 273. Bign. vi. 400.

(2) Montg. vi. 275.

There they deposited their eagles in the Palace—they piled their arms, and then passed through the gardens of the Tuileries to the Champs-Élysées, when they sat down to a repast laid with ten thousand covers. The animating strains of the military bands, which made the air resound along the whole length of this magnificent procession; the majestic aspect of the soldiers, who were almost all picked men, bronzed by service, but undaunted in aspect; the admirable discipline which they preserved, and the recollection of their recent glorious exploits, with the renown of which the world resounded, filled every heart with transport. In the evening the theatres were all opened gratis; universal delirium prevailed. It was spectacles of this heart-stirring kind, intermingled with the astonishing external triumphs which he achieved, which gave Napoléon his magical influence over the French people, and makes them still look back to his reign, notwithstanding the numberless calamities with which it was at last attended, as a brilliant spot in existence, the recollection of which obliterates all the remembrance of later times, and fixes every eye by a glow of almost insupportable brightness (1).

Suppression of the French Tribunate, 16th Aug. Napoléon, seeing his advantage, took the favourable opportunity which this burst of enthusiastic feeling afforded, to eradicate the last remnants of popular institutions from the constitution. In the speech which he addressed to the Legislative Body on his return from Poland, he announced his intention “of simplifying and bringing to perfection the national institutions.” It soon appeared what was in contemplation: the “simplifying” consisted in the destruction of the only remaining relic of democratic power; the “bringing to perfection,” in vesting the whole powers of legislation in a Council of State, presided over by the Emperor, and composed entirely of persons paid by government, and appointed by himself. It has been already mentioned (2), that by the existing constitution three public bodies were required to concur in the formation of the laws: the Council of State, the members of which were richly endowed, and all appointed by the Emperor: the Tribunate, in which they were discussed and approved of, and the members of which, though also in the receipt of salaries from government, were, to a certain degree, dependent on popular election: and the Legislative Body, which, without enjoying the privilege of debate, listened in silence to the pleadings of the orators appointed by the Council of State, for the measures proposed by government and those of the Tribunate, either for or against their adoption. But notwithstanding the influence of the Emperor over a legislature thus in a great part appointed, and wholly paid by himself, the debates in the Tribunate occasionally assumed a freedom which displeased him; and, while he was willing to allow any latitude in argument to the discussions in the Council of State, addressed to himself or his confidential advisers, he could not tolerate public harangues in another assembly, calculated to arouse extraneous or controlling influence, or revive in any form the passions of the Revolution. For these reasons, he resolved on the entire suppression of the Tribunate, which, having been already reduced from a hundred to fifty members, and stripped by imperial influence of its most distinguished orators, had lost much of its consideration; and on the elevation of the age requisite for admission into the Legislative Body to forty from thirty years, a period of life when it might be presumed that much of the fervour in support of political innovation would be extinguished. The previous discussion on the laws proposed by government, which alone en-

(1) *Thib.* vi. 247, 248.(2) *Ante*, iii. 330.

joyed the power of bringing them forward, was appointed to take place in three commissions, chosen from the Legislative Body by the Emperor; but their debates were not to be made public. Thus was a final blow given to popular influence in France, and the authority of the executive rendered absolute in the legislature, as it had long been in the other departments of government, just eighteen years after it had been established, amidst such universal transports, by the Constituent Assembly (1).

Slavish submission with which this change was received in France. What effect did this important change, which annihilated all the objects for which the Revolution had been commenced, and re-stored government to a despotic form, more strict and powerful than that of the old monarchy, produce in France? Did it convulse that enthusiastic empire to its centre, and revive again the terrible democratic fervour of 1789? Did clubs reappear, and popular ambition arise from its ashes, and the stern virtue of the old patriots obliterate the more modern illusions of military glory? It did none of these things; it was hardly noticed amidst the blaze of the Emperor's triumphs; it did not excite a murmur, or awaken an expression of discontent from Calais to the Pyrenees. Numbers of pamphlets appeared on the subject, but they were all in warm and earnest commendation of the change; one would have supposed that two centuries, instead of eighteen years, had rolled over the head of the nation; that the days of Mirabeau and Danton had passed into the vaults of forgotten time; that the transports of Gracchus had melted away into the servility of Constantinople. The very body which was to be annihilated was the first to lick the hand which was destroying it; if liberty arose in France amidst the tears of suffering and by the light of conflagration, it expired amidst the servility of eunuchs and the adulation of the East. When the fatal decree was read in the hall of the Tribunate, thunders of applause shook the walls, and Carrion Visas, a member of that body, and cousin of Cambacérès, exclaimed, "This communication has been accompanied with so many expressions of esteem and affection, on the part of our sovereign, for his *faithful subjects in the Tribunate*; these assurances are of such inestimable importance, they have been brought forward with so much lustre, that I am sure, gentlemen, I am the organ of your sentiments when I propose that we should lay at the foot of the throne, as the last act of our honourable existence, an address which may impress the people with the idea that we have received the act of the Senate, without regret at the termination of our political existence, without inquietude for the destinies of our country, and that the sentiments of love

(1) De Staël, Dix ans d'Exil. 37, 38. Montg. vi. 77, 278. Bign. vi. 398. Pelet. 150, 153.

The project of extinguishing the Tribunate had been long entertained by Napoléon. In the Council of State, on 1st December, 1803, he said:—"Before many years have elapsed, it will probably be advisable to unite the Tribunate to the Legislative body, by transferring its powers to committees of the latter Assembly. The Senate, too feebly constituted in the outset, will require some strengthening. The other legislative bodies have no consistency: none of them could secure the nation from becoming the prey of a colonel of hussars who may have four thousand men at his disposal. The only institutions which offer any security to the public safety are the Senate and Electoral Colleges." "The Legislative Body," said he, on 29th March, 1806, "should be composed of individuals, who, after the termination of their public services, have some private fortune to fall back upon, without the necessity of giving them a pension for their subsistence. Nevertheless, there are every year sixty legislators dis-

charged from the Legislative Body, whom you know not what to make of: those who are not in office carry back nothing but ill-humour to the departments. I would wish to see there proprietors of a certain age, married, attached by the bond either of children or some fortune, to the public welfare. These men would come annually to Paris, would speak to the Emperor, and live in his circle, and return to their departments illuminated with the slender share of his lustre which had fallen on their heads. The public functionaries should also be members of the Legislative Body: you cannot render the legislature too manageable; if it becomes so strong as to be seized with the desire of ruliog, it would destroy the executive, or be destroyed by it."—See PERRET, 148, 152—an able and authentic brief record of the discussions in the Council of State, at which the Emperor presided, and his opinions on the most important subjects of government; of which an accurate and valuable translation has just been published by Mr. Cadell at Edinburgh, executed by the author's valued friend, Captain Basil Hall.

and devotion to the monarch which animated our body, will live for ever in the breasts of all its members." The address was voted by acclamation, and these sentiments found a responsive echo in the Legislative Assembly. Its president, Fontanes, said, in the name of the whole body, "The majesty of the National Assembly is about to revive under the auspices of a great man; these walls, which once resounded with so much clamour, were astonished at their silence, and that silence is about to terminate. Popular tempests shall no longer roll there: they will be succeeded by wise and temperate discussions. He who has enchained the demon of faction, no longer desires that voices respectful but free should be banished from these walls. Let us show ourselves worthy of such a gift: let the Tribune reappear without its storms; let truth shine there in its native lustre, mingled with the radiance of wisdom. A great prince must love its *éclat*; it alone can fitly illuminate his path. What has he to fear from it? the more he is regarded, the more majestic he appears; the more he is scrutinized, the more subjects of admiration are discovered." These extravagant sallies excited no general burst of indignation; they were silently read in the *Moniteur*; and the Tribunate, the last relic of freedom, sunk unheeded into the grave (1). "When the citizens," says Rousseau, "fallen into servitude, enjoy neither liberty nor the power of choice, terror and selfishness convert their suffrages into acclamations—deliberation is at an end; every one adores in public, or execrates in private. Such was the manner in which the Senate was regarded under the Roman Emperors (2)." How little did the eloquent apostle of freedom anticipate another confirmation of the same remark, from the very people whom his fervent declamations had roused to such unanimous enthusiasm in the cause of liberty.

Establish-
ment of a
censorship
of the press
27th Sept

The complete success of this great infringement on the only remaining popular part of the constitution, encouraged Napoléon to undertake still more decisive measures against the liberties of the people. Six weeks after, an Imperial decree, professing to establish the freedom of the press, in reality annihilated it, by enacting that no bookseller was to publish any work without its having previously received the sanction of the censors of the press! The same restriction had previously been imposed on journals and periodical publications; so that, from this time forward down to the fall of Napoléon, no thought could be published to the world without having previously received the sanction of the Imperial authorities. Under the active administration and vigilant police of the empire, these powers were so constantly and rigorously exercised, that not only was the whole information on political subjects or public affairs, which was permitted to reach the people, strained through the Imperial filters, but all passages were expunged from every work which had a tendency, however remote, to nourish independent sentiments, or foster a feeling of discontent with the existing government. So far was this carried, that when the Allies entered France in 1814, they found a large proportion of the inhabitants ignorant of the battle of Trafalgar. The years of the empire are an absolute blank in French literary annals in all matters relating to government, political thought, or moral sentiment. The journals were filled with nothing but the exploits of the Emperor, the treatises by which he deigned to enlighten the minds of his subjects on the affairs of state, or the adulatory

(1) "The change," says Bignon, "in the age of eligibility to the Legislative Body, and even the suppression of the Tribunate, now so important in our eyes, were hardly thought of in 1807; and so little was public opinion regarded, that the former

change was introduced by the sole authority of the Emperor, without the concurrence of any of the legislative bodies." BIGNON, vi. 398—9.

(2) MONTG. vi. 277, 280. BIGN. vi. 397, 399.

addresses presented to him from all parts of his dominions: the pamphlets and periodicals of the metropolis breathed only the incense of refined flattery, or the vanity of Eastern adulation. Talent in literature took no other direction but that pointed out by the Imperial authorities; genius sought to distinguish itself only by new and more extravagant kinds of homage. The press, so far from being the safeguard of the people against these evils, became their greatest promoter by exerting all its powers on the side of despotism. Whoever attentively considers the situation of France, the most enlightened monarchy of Europe, and so recently teeming with democratic fervour, during the ten years of the Imperial government, will at once perceive the groundless nature of the common doctrine that the press is, under all circumstances, the bulwark of liberty, and that despotism is impossible where it exists. They will rather concur in the opinion of Madame de Staël, that the effect which this mighty instrument produces, is entirely dependent on the power which gains possession of its resources; that it is only in a peculiar state of the public mind, and when a certain balance exists between political parties, that it is exerted beneficially on the side of freedom, and that at other periods, or under the influence of more corrupted feelings, it may become the instrument of the most immovable popular or Imperial despotism which ever was riveted upon mankind (1).

(1) Montg. v. 282. De Staël, *Rév. Franç.* ii. 381, 382.

Observe the picture of the identity of the effects of the press under the Imperial despotism of Napoléon, and the democratic tyranny of the majority in the American Union, as delineated by two masters, Madame de Staël and M. de Tocqueville.—“This police, for which we cannot find terms adequately contemptuous, was the instrument which Bonaparte made use of to direct public opinion in France; and in truth when there is no such thing as the freedom of the press, and the censors of the press, not confining themselves to erasing, dictate to writers of every description the opinions they are to advance on every subject of politics, religion, manners, books, and individual character, it may be conceived into what state a nation must fall which has no other nutriment for its thoughts but such as a despotic authority permits. It is not surprising, therefore, that French literature and criticism descended to the lowest point during the empire. The restrictions on the press were far less severe under Louis XIV than Napoléon. The profound saying, ‘Paper will receive any thing,’ never received a more appalling illustration. The journals were filled only with addresses to the Emperor, with his journeys, those of the Princes and Princesses of his family, the etiquettes and presentations at court. They discovered the art of being tame and lifeless at the epoch of the world’s overturn; and but for the official bulletins which from time to time let us know that half the world was conquered, one might have believed that the age was one only of roses and flowers, and sought for words in vain but those which the ruling powers let fall on their prostrate subjects. A few courageous individuals published books without the censorship of the press, and what was the consequence?—the impression was seized, and themselves prosecuted, banished, or shot like the unhappy Palm. Such terrible examples spread such an universal terror, that submission became universal. Of all the grievances which the slavery of the press produced, perhaps the most bitter was the daily spectacle of those we held most dear insulted or reviled in the journals or works published by author-

ity, without the possibility of making a reply, over half of Europe.”—DE STAËL, *Rev. Franç.*, ii. 377, 383.

So far Madame de Staël, in painting the perversion of the press to the purposes of despotism in Imperial France; mark now the picture of its operation in America, under the unrestrained sway of a numerical majority of electors. “Among the immense crowd,” says Tocqueville, “who, in the United States, take to the career of politics, I have met with few men who possess that independence of thought, that manly candour, which characterised the Americans in their war of independence. You would say, on the contrary, that *all their minds are formed on the same model*, so exactly do they adopt the same opinions. I have sometimes met with true patriotism among the people, but rarely among their rulers. This is easily explained—Supreme power ever corrupts and depraves its servants before it has irrecoverably tainted its possessors. The courtiers in America, indeed, do not say *Sire!* your Majesty! Mighty difference. But they speak without intermission of the natural intelligence of their many-headed sovereign; they attribute to him every virtue and capacity under Heaven; they do not give him their wives and daughters to make his mistresses—but by sacrificing their opinions, they prostitute themselves to his service? What revolts the mind of an European in America, is not the extreme liberty which prevails, but the slender guarantee which exists against tyranny. When a man or a party suffers from injustice in the United States from the majority, to whom is he to apply for redress? To public opinion? It is formed by the majority. To the legislative body? It is elected by the majority. To a jury? It is the judicial committee of the majority. To the executive power? It is appointed by the majority, and is the mere executor of its wishes. How cruel or unjust soever may be the stroke which injures you, redress is impossible, and submission unavoidable. I know no country in which there is so little true independence of mind and freedom of discussion, as in America. The majority raises such formidable barriers to liberty of opinion, that it is impossible to pass them; within them an author may write whatever he pleases, but he will repent it if ever he step beyond them. In democratic states,

Banishment of Madame de Staël and Madame Recamier. Under the combined influence of the entire suppression of the liberty of the press and the unwearied activity of Imperial censors and police agents, every approach even to a free discussion on public affairs, or the principles either of government or social prosperity, was stifled in France and its dependent monarchies, and one-half of Europe, in the opening of the nineteenth century, and the close of a struggle for extended privileges and universal information, was brought back to a darkness more profound than that of the middle ages. Never did Papal ambition draw so close the fetters on human thought as Imperial France; the Jesuits were not such active agents in the extension of spiritual, as the police were in the establishment of temporal power. Madame de Staël and Madame Recamier were illustrious instances that the jealousy of the Imperial government could not be relaxed even by the most brilliant or captivating qualities of the other sex. The former, long the object of Napoléon's hostility, from the vigour of her understanding and the fearlessness of her conduct, was at first banished forty leagues from Paris, then confined to her château on the lake of Geneva, where she dwelt many years, seeking in vain, in the discharge of every filial duty to her venerable father, to console herself for the loss of the brilliant intellectual society of Paris. At length the rigour of the *espionnage* became such, that she fled in disguise through the Tyrol to Vienna, and hunted out thence by the French agents, continued her route through Poland into Muscovy, where she arrived shortly before the invasion of 1812, happy to find in the dominions of the Imperial autocrat that freedom which old Europe could no longer afford. Her immortal work on Germany was seized by the orders of the police, and consigned to the flames; and France owes the preservation of one of the brightest jewels in her literary coronet to the fortuitous concealment of one copy from the myrmidons of Savary. The world has no cause to regret the severity of Napoléon to the illustrious exile, whatever his biographer may have; for to it we owe the *Dix Années d'Exil*, the most admirable of her moral sketches; the three volumes on Germany, the most eloquent of her critical dissertations; and the profound views on the British Constitution, with which she has enriched her great work on the French Revolution. Madame Recamier shared the rigours of Napoléon from her generous attention to her persecuted friend; a transient visit of a few days to Coppet, was the pretence for including her also in the sentence of banishment; the graces which had won the admiration of all Europe, and which had disdained the advances of the Emperor himself (1), were consigned, in a distant province, to the privacy of rural retirement, and the ruler of the East and West deemed himself insecure on the throne of Charlemagne, unless the finest genius then in Eu-

organized on the principles of the American Republics, the authority of the majority is so absolute, so irresistible, that a man must give up his rights as a citizen, and almost abjure his quality as a human being, if he means to stray from the track which it lays down. If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that event will arise from the unlimited tyranny of the majority; anarchy will be the result, but it will have been brought about by despotism." To the same purpose is the opinion of President Jefferson, the ablest advocate for democratic principles that ever appeared in the United States—"The executive power," says he, "is not the chief danger to be feared; the tyranny of the legislature is the danger most to be feared." What testimonies from such minds, to the identity of the effect so long observed by political writers, by unrestrained

power, whether in an absolute despot or an irresponsible numerical majority; and of the necessity of establishing the foundations of the breakwater which is to curb the force of either imperial or democratic despotism in another element than that by which its own waves are agitated! And how remarkable a confirmation of the profound remark long ago made by Aristotle, that courtiers and demagogues not only bear a strong resemblance to each other, but are in fact *the same men*, varying only in their external character according to the ruling power which they severally worship!—See TOCQUEVILLE, *De l'Amérique*, ii. 145, 146, 156, 157; JEFFERSON'S *Correspondence*, iv. 452; and ARISTOTLE, *de Pol.* c. 27.

(1) D'Abr. xiii. 124.

rope, and the most beautiful woman in France, were exiled from his dominions (4).

Judges are rendered removable at pleasure, 12th Oct. Another decree of the Senate soon after inflicted a mortal wound on the independence of the judicial establishment, by enacting that their commissions for life should not be delivered to them till after five years' previous service, and then only on the condition that their conduct had been entirely satisfactory to the Emperor. He reserved to himself the exclusive power of judging on the continuance or dismissal of every judicial functionary, from the highest to the lowest, with the aid of commissioners, appointed and exclusively directed by himself. From this time, the independence of the bench over the whole French empire was totally destroyed and practically every judge held his office during the pleasure merely of the Emperor. Several instances of arbitrary dismissal of judges, if they pronounced decrees disagreeable to government, took place; but they were less frequent than might have been expected, from the universal spirit of slavish submission which seized the magistrates of every grade, and rendered them not merely, during the whole reign of Napoléon, the servile instruments of his will, but led them formally, after his fall, to invoke the re-establishment of despotic power (2).

Severe decrees against any connivance at English commerce. Following up the same arbitrary system, it was enacted by an Imperial decree on January 14th, that not only should every seaman or passenger on board a vessel arriving in any harbour of France who should declare that it came from an English harbour, or been searched by English cruisers, receive a third of the value of the vessel or cargo, but that every public functionary who should connive in the slightest degree at the infringement of any of the decrees against English commerce, should be brought before the Criminal Court of the Department of the Seine, which was erected into a tribunal for that special purpose, and indicted for *high treason*. Bales of English goods, of great extent, were publicly burnt in all the chief cities of the countries which directly or indirectly acknowledged the French influence; and at the moment that the unhappy owners were begging from the executioners a few shreds which the flames had spared, to cover their children from the inclemency of the weather, the Emperor, by means of licenses, was daily carrying on an extensive commerce in these very articles, and amassing enormous sums at the Tuileries by the sale of the right to deal in those goods which brought death to any inferior functionary (3).

Meanwhile, the thirst for public employment in France, always great

(1) De Staël, *Dix Années d'Exil*, 74, 75, 177, 191. *Id. Rev. Franç.* ii. 309.

Napoléon's jealousy of Madame Récamier's beauty and influence carried him to still more unjustifiable lengths. Her husband, who was a great banker in Paris, became bankrupt, and he seriously proposed in the Council of State, that she should be subjected to a joint responsibility with him for the debts of the bank! "I am of opinion," said he, "that in case of bankruptcy, the wife should be deprived of all her conjugal rights; because our manners sanction the principle, that a wife must follow the fortune of her husband, and that would deprive her of all inducement to make him continue his extravagances." "The class of bankers," says Pelet, the impartial reporter of these important debates, "always excited the Emperor's jealousy, because they were an independent class who had no need of the government, while the government often stood in need of their assistance. Besides that, in wishing to render Madame Récamier responsible for her husband's

debts, he was actuated by a special spite against that celebrated lady. The little court with which she was surrounded, on account of her incomparable beauty, excited his jealousy as much as the talents of Madame de Staël. Elevated as he was above all others, he could not see, without pain, that she shared with him the public attention. He was more irritated by it than he would have been by a decided opposition to his government. Even the celebrity of M. Gall, and his well-known system of craniology, excited his jealousy; he could not endure that he should be more talked of than himself."—PELET, *Opinion de Napoléon dans le Conseil d'Etat*, 261. The well-known story in Boswell of Goldsmith, at Antwerp, taking the pct, because two handsome young ladies at the window of the inn excited more attention than himself, is nothing to this.—See BOSWELL'S *Johnson*.

(2) *Montg.* vi. 282, 283.

(3) *Montg.* vi. 299. De Staël, *Rev. Franç.* ii. 251.

among that energetic and aspiring people, rose to a perfect mania. The energy of the Revolution, the ardent passion for individual elevation which constituted its secret but main spring, was now wholly turned into that channel, and by a change of circumstances, remarkable indeed, but not unnatural, the same desire which, when revolutionary elevation was practicable, convulsed all the nation with democratic fervour, now that court favour was the only avenue to promotion, led to the extremity of Oriental obsequiousness. The prefects, who had the patronage of all the numerous government offices within their jurisdictions, held a court, and exercised an influence equal to that of petty sovereigns; the ministers of state were besieged with innumerable applications for every office which fell vacant; the Emperor himself received hundreds of petitions for every situation in his gift, from the highest to the lowest. All ranks, classes, and parties, concurred in this selfish struggle; the old noblesse, with a few honourable exceptions, vied with each other for the most trifling appointments in the Imperial ante-chambers; the patriots of 1789 burned with ardour to share in the advantage of the Imperial government; even such of the blood-stained Jacobins of 1793 as the guillotine and subsequent proscriptions had spared, sunk down into obscure pamphleteers or functionaries in the employment of the despot who had extinguished their extravagant chimeras (1). When such was the disposition of the leading parties in the Revolution, both on the royalist and republican side, it may readily be conceived with what eagerness the rising generation, the young men who had grown up to manhood under the star of Napoléon's glory, who knew of the fervour of democracy only as a hideous dream of former days, the immense mass who looked to advancement in life, and saw no hope of attaining it but in the favour of government, rushed into the same career, and how completely every feeling, down to the fall of Napoléon, was absorbed in the general desire to bask in the sunshine of Imperial favour. Such was the universality and vehemence of this passion, that it superseded every other feeling, whether private, social, or political, and with the exception of a few rigid republicans, such as Carnot and Lafayette, swept before it the whole democratic principles of France (2).

The Constituent Assembly had paved the way for this great alteration by the suppression of the privileges of the nobles, and the annihilation of all provincial and local authority, which necessarily devolved in every branch of the administration, either on the popular assemblies or the central government; the Legislative Assembly followed it up by banishing all the clergy and landholders, and issuing the iniquitous decrees for the confiscation of their property; and the Convention put the finishing stroke by inhumanly massacring their leading members, and rendering the reparation of this injustice even to their heirs impossible, by alienating their possessions to the innumerable millions of revolutionary proprietors. It is in these frightful deeds of national injustice, that we are to look for the remote but certain cause of the rapid centralization of the subsequent governments, and the unbounded extent of the Imperial authority. When Napoléon succeeded to supreme power, he found all local or subordinate sources of influence or authority closed up or annulled, and nothing remained but the central government. The people had effectually succeeded in destroying the counteracting influence of all other bodies

(1) Even Barère was employed in this capacity by Napoléon, and dragged out an obscure existence as a hired pamphleteer and eulogist of the Imperial

government, till its fall in 1814.—*Biog. des Contemporaries*, *Sup. Voce Barère*.

(2) De Staël, ii. 372, 373. *Dix An, d'Exil*, 38. *Las Cas*, vii. 100, 101.

or individuals in the state; but they had been unable to retain in their own hands the power which they had, in the first instance, erected on their ruins. Such had been the corruption, selfishness, incapacity, or wickedness of the functionaries appointed by the masses, that by common consent they had been deprived, either formally or tacitly, of their power of nomination; and every appointment, without exception, in the empire, flowed from the central government. Not only were the whole members of the Council of State, the Senate, and the Legislative Body, selected by the Emperor; but he had the appointment of the whole officers in the army and navy, and the police, whether local or general: the whole magistrates of every degree; the judges, whether supreme or inferior; all persons employed in the collection of the revenue, the customs, and excise; the whole ministers of the Church; all the teachers of youth; all the professors in the universities, academies, and schools; all persons in the post-office, or concerned in the administration of the roads, bridges, harbours, fortresses, and cities in the empire. In a country deprived of its great landed proprietors by the confiscations of the Revolution, bereaved of commerce and colonies by the events of the war, and almost destitute of capital or private fortunes from the preceding convulsions, these different employments constituted the only avenues to subsistence or eminence which remained to those who were either averse to, or above the rank of manual labour, or retail trade. This state of matters, incident to a people highly excited and inspired with the strongest feelings of individual ambition, can alone account for the universal passion for government employment which seized all ranks of the French nation during the latter years of the reign of Napoléon; and before we censure them as volatile and inconsistent, when we contrast this mania with the democratic fervour of 1789, we would do well to reflect whether any other people, under similar circumstances, would have remained more steadfast to their original professions; and whether both dispositions of the public mind were not in truth, at bottom, the result of the same thirst after individual distinction, varying in the effect it produced (1) according to the change in the means of obtaining elevation which the altered circumstances of society had occasioned (2).

Policy of the Emperor in this respect. Napoléon seized, with all his wonted ability, on the extraordinary combination of circumstances which had thus in a manner thrown absolute power into his hands. "His system of government," says Madame de Staël, "was founded on three bases—To satisfy the interests of men at the expense of their virtue; to deprave public opinion, by falsehoods or sophisms perpetually repeated from the press; and to convert the passion for freedom into that for military glory. He followed up this system with rare ability." The Emperor himself has given us some important information on his designs, and what he had effected in this respect. "I had established," said he, "a government the most compact, carying on its operations with the most rapidity, and capable of the most nervous efforts that ever existed upon earth. And, truly, nothing less was required to triumph over the immense difficulties with which we were surrounded, and produce the marvels which we accomplished. The organization of the prefectures, their action, and results,

(1) *Las Cas. vii. 101. De Staël, Rév. Franç. ii. 372, 374. Id. Dix. An. d'Exil, 38, 39.*

(2) Napoléon has left some precious observations on this important subject. "Our excuse for the boundless thirst for employments which existed under the empire," said he, "is to be found in the misfortunes and convulsions of the Revolution. Every one was displaced; every one felt himself

under the necessity of seating himself again; and it was in order to aid that feeling, and give way to that universal necessity, that I felt the propriety of endowing all the principal offices with so much riches, power, and consideration; but in time, I would have changed that by the mere force of opinion,—*Las. Cas. vii. 102.*

were alike admirable. The same impulse was given at the same instant to more than forty millions of men; and by the aid of these centres of local activity the movement was as rapid at all the extremities as at the heart of the empire. Strangers who visited us were astonished at this system; and they never failed to attribute the immense results which were obtained, to that uniformity of action pervading so great a space. Each prefect, with the authority and local patronage with which he was invested, was in himself a *little Emperor*; but, nevertheless, as he enjoyed no force but from the central authority, owed all his lustre to official employment, and had no natural or hereditary connexion with the territory over which his dominion extended, the system had all the advantages of the feudal government without any of its inconveniences. It was indispensable to clothe them with all that authority; I found myself made Dictator by the force of circumstances; it was necessary, therefore, that all the minor springs should be entirely dependent on and in complete harmony with the grand central moving power. The spring with which I covered the soil required a prodigious elasticity, an unbounded tension, if we would avert the strokes which were levelled at our authority. Education may subsequently effect a change; but our generation were inspired with such a thirst for power, and exercised it in so arrogant a manner, to give it the mildest name, and at the same time were so headlong in their passion to fawn upon greatness and wear the chains of slavery, that no other system of government was practicable (1)."

He re-establishes titles of honour. Principles on which it was founded.

But with all his admiration for the centralized government which he had established, and of the machinery of prefects, mayors, adjoints, and other functionaries, by which it was carried into effect, no man knew better than Napoléon that it was not in such a system that the foundation for a durable dynasty on the throne could be laid. The system of prefects enjoying absolute power, but deriving all their consideration from transient government appointments, was in reality nothing else but the system of Oriental pachalics, held in subjection by a vigorous Sultan; and all history told that such government rarely descended to the third generation from their original founder. "An aristocracy," says Napoléon, "is the true, the only support of a monarchy; without it, the state is a vessel without a rudder—a balloon in the air. A true aristocracy, however, must be ancient; therein consists its real force; and that was the only thing which I could not create. Reasonable democracy will never aspire to any thing more than obtaining an equal power of elevation to all. The true policy in these times was to employ the remains of the aristocracy with the forms and the spirit of democracy. Above all, it was necessary to take advantage of the ancient historic names; it was the only way to throw the halo of antiquity over our modern institutions. My designs on this point were quite formed, but I had not time to bring them to maturity. It was this, that every lineal descendant of an old marshal or minister should be entitled at any time to get himself declared a duke by the government, upon proving that he had the requisite fortune; every descendant of a general, or governor of a province, to obtain the title of count upon obtaining a similar endowment. This system would have advanced some, excited the hopes of others, awakened the emulation of all without injuring any one; pretty toys, it is true, but such as are indispensable for the government of men. Old and corrupted nations cannot be governed on the same principle as simple and virtuous ages; for one, in these times, who would sacrifice all to the public

good, there are thousands and millions who are governed only by their interests, their vanity, or their enjoyments; to attempt to regenerate such a people in a day, would be an act of madness. The true genius of the workman consists in making a right use of the materials which he has at his disposal, to extract good even from the elements which appear at first sight most adverse to his designs; and there is the real secret of the revival of titles, ribbons, and crosses. And, after all, these toys are attended with few inconveniences, and are not without some advantages. In the state of civilisation in which we are placed, they are proper to awaken the respect of the multitude, and not without influence in producing a feeling of self-respect in their owners; they satisfy the vanity of the weak, without giving any just cause of offence to the strong (1).”

Re-establishment of hereditary titles of honour, 11th March, 1808. Proceeding on these principles, a *Senatus Consultum*, in March 1808, re-established hereditary titles of honour, under the denomination of Prince, Duke, Count, Baron and Chevalier. The persons so ennobled were empowered to entail a certain income, under the name of majorats, in favour of their direct descendants. This was the first formal re-establishment of a nobility; but Napoléon had previously, on repeated occasions, exercised the power of conferring titles on the leading persons in his government or army, without any other authority than his own will; and among others had, by a patent dated 28th May, 1807, created Lefebvre Duke of Dantzic, with an hereditary succession to his son; and all the marshals of the empire, as well as grand officers of the Imperial Court, had already been created Princes or Dukes, shortly after the campaign of Austerlitz (2). But these titles were all connected with foreign estates or possessions, or named after some glorious foreign exploit, and did not infringe, except indirectly, on the equality in France itself, which it had been the great object of the Revolution to establish. Now, however, this fundamental principle was openly violated; and in the lifetime of the generation which had waded through oceans of blood to abolish these distinctions they were re-established in greater numbers, and on a more rigid style of etiquette than ever (3).

Speeches on the subject in the legislative body. Such a stretch, coming so soon after the universal passion for equality, which, bursting forth in 1789, had since convulsed France and Europe, was of itself sufficiently remarkable; but it was ushered into the Legislative Body. “Senators!” said Cambacérès, “know that you are no longer obscure plebeians or simple citizens. The statute which I hold in my hand confers on you the *majestic title of Count*. I myself, Senators, am no longer merely the citizen Cambacérès: as well as the great dignitaries of the empire, I am a prince, your most Serene Highness! and my most serene person, as well as all the other holders of the great dignities of the empire, will be endowed with one of the grand duchies reserved by the Imperial decree of 50th March, 1806 (4). As the son of a prince cannot, in the noble hierarchy, descend to a lower rank than that of a duke, *all our children* will enjoy that title. But the new order of things erects no impassable or invidious barrier between the citizens; every career remains open to the virtues and talents of all; the advantage which it awards to tried merit will prove no injury to that which has not yet been put to the test.” Thunders of applause shook the Senate at this announcement; and that body, composed almost entirely of persons of plebeian birth, whom success in the Revolution

(1) Las Cas. v. 23, 25.

(2) *Ante* v. 654.

(3) Montg. vi. 303, 305. Dum. xix.

(4) *Ante* v. 643.

had raised to eminence, and many of whom had voted in the Convention for the death of Louis, not only accepted with gratitude the Imperial gift, which was thus the price of abandoning all their former principles, and put on with alacrity the state livery which was the badge of their servitude, but *unanimously* embodied their devotion in an address to the Emperor on the occasion, which must be given entire, as one of the most memorable monuments of political tergiversation and baseness which the history of the world has to exhibit (1).

Endowment
of the new
Peers with
revenues
from foreign
states.

The institution of this new hereditary noblesse was attended with one peculiarity, which was at once indicative of the ephemeral basis on which it was founded, and the incapability of the infant order to answer any of those important purposes in the state which an ancient and independent aristocracy afford. Most of the new nobles were soldiers of fortune; almost all of them were destitute of any property, but such as their official emoluments or the opportunities they had enjoyed of foreign plunder had afforded. To obviate this inconvenience, and prevent the new nobility from degenerating into a mere set of titled menials, or pensioned functionaries, Napoléon fell upon the expedient of attaching to these titles rich endowments, drawn from the revenue of foreign countries conquered by the French arms, or held by them in subjection. All the French marshals and the chief dignitaries of the empire were in this manner quartered on the German or Italian states, and large sums, drawn from the industry or resources of their inhabitants, annually brought to the great central mart of Paris to be expended (2). The increase of opulence to the Imperial capital was thus indeed most sensible; and, in a similar proportion, did the Imperial government, the author of so many benefits to its citizens, become popular and respected; but the effects of this perpetual abstraction of wealth from other countries to the metropolis of the great nation, were, to the last degree, vexatious to their inhabitants, and proved one con-

(1) Moutg. vi. 304, 306.

Address of the Senate to the Emperor on the subject.
“Sire! The Senate presents to your august Majesty the tribute of its gratitude for the goodness which has prompted you to communicate, by his most Serene Highness the Chancellor of the Empire, the two statutes relative to the erection of Imperial titles of the 30th March, 1806, and the 19th August in the same year. By that great institution, Sire! your Majesty has affixed the seal of durability to all the others which France owes to your wisdom. In proportion, Sire, as one observes the mutual links which connect together the different parts, so multiplied and yet so firmly united, of that great fabric; in proportion as time, which alone can develop the full extent of its benefits, shall have fully unfolded them, what effects may not be anticipated from your august wisdom! A new value awarded to the recompenses which your Majesty never fails to award to real merit, in what obscurity soever fortune may have placed it, and how varied soever may be the services which it has rendered to the state; new motives to imitate such great examples; fresh bonds of fidelity, devotion, and love towards our country, its sovereign, and his dynasty; a closer bond of union between our institutions and those of confederate or friendly nations; fathers recompensed in what is most dear to them; the recollections of families rendered more touching; the memory of our ancestors enshrined; the spirit of order, of economy, and of conservation strengthened by its most obvious interest, that of its descendants; the first bodies of the empire, and the most noble of our institutions drawn closer together;

all dread of the return of the odious Feudal System for ever abolished; every recollection foreign to what you have established extinguished; the splendour of the new families deriving fresh lustre from the rays of the crown; the origin of their illustration rendered contemporary with your glory; the past, the present, and the future attached to your power, as in the sublime conceptions of the great poets of antiquity, the first link of the great chain of destiny was placed in the hands of the gods. Such, Sire, are the results of the institution to which your Majesty has given life. The combination of such important results, giving security to those to whom the present is as nothing, when there is no guarantee for the future, consolidates in its foundations, fortifies in all its parts, brings to perfection in its proportions, and embellishes in its ornaments, the immense social edifice, at the summit of which is placed the resplendent throne of the greatest of monarchs.”—*See Moniteur, 11th March, 1807, and Monit. vi. 306, 308.* The extraordinary nature of this address will not be duly appreciated unless it is recollected that a considerable proportion of these obsequious senators, now so ready to wear the Imperial livery and form a part in the great pyramid which supported the throne, were once furious Jacobins, stained with the worst atrocities of the Reign of Terror, and almost all at one period ardent supporters of the principles of liberty and equality. It is sufficient to mention the names of Cambacérès, Fouché, Sièyes, Merlin de Douai, Carnot, Beugnot, Cornudet, Pastout, Vienne-Vaublanc, Fontanes, Fabre de l’Aude, etc., besides a host of others.

(2) As a specimen of the manner in which the

siderable cause of the deep-felt and far-spread hatred which ultimately occasioned its fall. In this respect Napoléon not only evinced none of his wonted sagacity, but acted in direct opposition to what common sense dictated as the fitting course for the monarch of a great and varied empire. How different was the policy of the Romans, who not only left at the disposal of the municipalities in their extensive dominions the greater proportion of their local revenues, but annually remitted large sums from the imperial treasury for the construction of edifices of utility or embellishment in all their principal cities; so that the sway of the Emperors was felt chiefly in the increasing opulence and splendour of their provincial capitals (1).

System of fusion which Napoléon pursued of the ancient and modern noblesse. It was another part of Napoleon's system, which he laboured assiduously to promote, to effect an amalgamation, or *fusion* as he called it, of the ancient with the modern noblesse, that, burying in oblivion former discord, they should cordially unite in resisting any farther changes, and supporting the Imperial throne. With this view he not only opened his antechambers to the old nobility, who rushed in in crowds to occupy them, but promoted to the utmost of his power the distribution of the old families through the innumerable offices of his dominions, and did all that he could, by the offer of splendid establishments, to overcome the repugnance of the ancient noblesse to matrimonial alliances with the soldiers of fortune who had risen from the ranks to greatness under the banners of the empire. In one respect, this system succeeded even beyond his expectation. Fondly attached, notwithstanding all their reverses, to feudal ideas, clinging still, notwithstanding a total change of manners, to antiquated customs, the old nobility found themselves suddenly elevated to an extraordinary and unhoped-for degree of importance in the

Imperial generals or dignitaries were endowed out of the revenues of the conquered or subject states, it may be sufficient to cite those who were alleneated on the domains of the small Electorate of Hanover.

(List of the revenues bestowed from the Electorate of Hanover.)

Berthier, Prince of Neufchatel,	140,000 frs. or L. 5,600 a-year.	
Bernadotte, Prince of Pontecorvo,	100,000	4,000
Mortier, Duke of Treviso,	100,000	4,000
Duroc, Duke of Friuli,	85,000	3,400
Ney, Duke of Elchingen,	83,000	3,180
Angereau, Duke of Castiglione,	80,000	3,200
Masséna, Duke of Rivoli,	80,000	3,200
Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza,	66,000	2,700
Davoust, Duke of Auerstadt,	60,000	2,400
Soult, Duke of Dalmatia,	53,000	2,150
Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic,	50,000	2,000
Prince Lebrune,	50,000	2,000
Lannes, Duke of Montehello,	50,000	2,000
Marshal Bessières,	50,000	2,000
Gen. Sébastiani,	40,000	1,600
Juuet, Duke of Abrantès,	35,000	1,450
Gen. Friand,	30,000	1,200
Gen. Bessan,	30,000	1,200
Generals Victor, Oudinot, St.-Hilaire, Gardeneu, Gazan, Caffarelli, Dupas, Lassalle, Klein, Soulis, Dorsenne, Rapp, each 20,000, in all,	240,000	9,600
Generals Mullin, Druel, Compans, Gudin, Verdier, Bonnies, Lacoste, Daru, and others, in all 13, 25,000 each,	325,000	13,000
Marmont, Duke of Ragusa, Maret, Fouché, Decrès, Regnier, Mollini, Gaudin, Champagny, Lernaudois, Clarke, Cretel, Bertrand, Monecy, Pérignon, Servières, Marchand, Ségur, Dupont, 20,000 each, in all, 19 individuals,	380,000	15,200
Mouton, Belliard, Savary, Lauriston, each 15,000,	60,000	2,400
General Becker,	12,000	480
Regnaud St-Jean d'Angely, Dufermier, Laerier, Gen. Grouchy, Gen. Nansouty, Bigot, each 10,000, in all,	60,000	3,200
Total,	2,259,000 frs.	1,91,160 yearly.

—HARD. x. 388-400; *Pièces Just.*

(1) Hard. x. 488, 490.

court of the new Emperor; and, by the grace of their manners, the brilliancy of their conversation, and their perfect familiarity with the formalities and etiquette of the ancient régime, soon acquired a marked superiority in that field over the soldiers or civilians of humble birth whom the changes of the Revolution had elevated to greatness. By a singular, but not unnatural feeling also, they were destitute of the scruples at accepting offices in the household, which persons of less illustrious descent might have felt. A Montmorency would willingly become maid of honour to the Empress, or even descend to lace her shoe, which a lady of plebeian birth might have deemed a degradation. Thus the court was soon filled with the descendants of the old noblesse, and widely as the Emperor opened his doors for their reception, amply as he multiplied the chamberlains, equerries, lords in waiting, ladies of the bed-chamber, squires, pages of the antechambers, and other functionaries of the palace, he found it impossible to keep pace with the crowds of titled applicants who incessantly besieged its gates for admission. The new nobility soon conceived a violent jealousy at these intruders who had supplanted them in the court circles, and openly testified their animosity even in presence of the Emperor himself. The system of fusion met with very little success with the ladies of the rival classes of nobility; but the substantial advantages of great fortune and dignified station, reconciled the plebeian duchesses to the superior favour shown to their patrician rivals, while the brilliant uniforms, high stations, and military lustre of the young generals induced not a few of the descendants of the oldest families in France to ally their fortunes to the sons of those upon whom their parents would have deemed it a degradation to have bestowed a look (1).

Great discontent of the French Republicans at this step, and their views regarding it.

Notwithstanding all his efforts, however, it was impossible for Napoléon to conceal from the clear-sighted republicans of France that the restoration of hereditary titles of honour was an entire departure, in the most vital points, from all the principles of the Revolution. In fact, the only surprising thing is, that he himself did not perceive how completely its ultimate effect was subversive of all the passions which had agitated France in 1789, and during the whole fervour of its subsequent changes. It was in vain to say that titles of honour were now restored as a personal, not a hereditary distinction; that the career of merit, both in the civil and military department was open to all; and that every peasant's son might indulge the hope, by bravery in the field, of fighting his way from the humble rank of a grenadier to a marshal's baton and dukedom; or, by skill and address in diplomacy, of advancing from the counter of the tradesman to the dignity of ambassador and prince of the empire. During the reign of Napoléon, indeed, and under the pressure of those national difficulties which rendered it indispensable to look for talent in every grade, even the lowest in the state, there might be some foundation for this observation; and doubtless the aspiring temper of the *tiers état* could not but feel gratified, at beholding the number of their own, or an inferior rank, who

(1) Pelet, 107, 108. Las Cases, ii. 288, 289. De Staël, Rev. Franç. ii. 333, 335. D'Abr. ix. 287; ii. 324.

The reasons assigned by Napoléon in the Council of State for the employment of the ancient in preference to the modern noblesse was as follows:—"It is among the old families that you can alone find still some remains of great fortune; by that means they exercise a great influence on government. How could you compose a court with the men of the Revolution? You find in their ranks only honourable functionaries without fortune, or opulent contractors without character—a court

of salaried officials would be at once onerous to the state, and without dignity in the eyes of the people. If the old fortunes are divided by distributions on death, they are restored by successions: the new fortunes have nothing to look to in that way; on the contrary, they are surrounded with needy relatives. Government can now no longer enrich, as formerly, its servants by the domains of the crown or confiscations; it ought, therefore, as much as possible to take advantage of fortunes already made, and employ them in its service."—PELET, *Conseil d'État de Napoléon*, 107, 108.

now as warriors or statesmen occupied the highest stations in the empire. But to those who carried their views beyond the reign of the emperor or the existing generation, and looked to the present institutions as a guarantee for republican equality in future times, these considerations afforded little matter for consolation. They could not disguise from themselves that the new imperial dignities, though the reward of merit to the present holders, would become the birthright of descent to the next generation; they could not hope that the same stirring and anxious times would always continue which rendered it necessary for government to throw themselves for support on the middling classes of the people; and they anticipated the time with dismay, when, during the pacific periods of subsequent reigns, the imperial nobility would come to monopolize the influence, offices, and power of the state, as completely as ever had been the case by their feudal predecessors in the days of Francis I. or Louis XIV. What was the origin of all nobility but personal merit? every family, how great soever in its subsequent stages, had some obscure citizen for its original founder; the first king had been a fortunate soldier. If an aristocracy existed at all, obstructing the rise of inferior citizens, and monopolizing for a privileged class the influence and riches of the state, it would be no consolation to the friends of equality to assert that it took its origin from the revolutionary, not the feudal wars, and that its paladins were to be found not in the Round Table of Charlemagne, but the marshals of Napoléon.

In truth, the Emperor was too far-sighted not to feel the justice of these observations; and although, in his addresses to the people, he was cautious to hold out the new nobility as the reward of merit only, yet he secretly felt that it was in fact the revival of a family distinction. But he was also aware that the favour of the populace cannot be relied on for the durable support of government; that an hereditary monarchy cannot exist without an hereditary aristocracy, whose interests are entwined with its fate; and that, without such lasting support, founded on the permanent interests of a privileged class, his throne would be lost by his descendants as speedily as it had been won by himself. All history, and especially that of the Asiatic empires, proves that no family, how great soever in its original founder, could long keep possession of the throne, unless it had cast its anchor either in the interests of an hereditary nobility or religious attachment centered in the descendants of a single family. And the friends of freedom, had they possessed more penetration than at that time, or even now prevails on this subject in France, might have been consoled by the reflection that, however hostile to the equality, the passion for which formed the leading principle of the Revolution, such an aristocracy formed an essential element in the formation of lasting freedom; and that although there were many instances in which such an aristocracy had proved an insurmountable bar to the elevation of the middling classes of society, there was not one example of liberty not having entirely perished, without such a barrier to resist its encroachments, under the debasing influence of a centralized despotism.

Rapid progress of court etiquette at Paris. The rapidity with which court etiquette, and all the minutiae of regal manners now spread, exceeds belief, and notwithstanding the abundance of contemporary proof, appears almost incredible in a country so recently convulsed with revolutionary passions. The old archives of the monarchy were ransacked to discover the whole details of the ancient ceremonials; whoever could point out an additional bow to be made, a more respectful mode of presenting an address to be adopted, a more gorgeous display of pomp or splendour to be introduced, was received as a bene-

factor of the human race. The old ceremonies at the rising and retiring to rest of the kings were re-established, though abridged in some of their details; the ancient forms of presentation were revived; and it was seriously debated at court whether the fatiguing form of dining in public once a-week should not be restored. In magnificence and splendour the Imperial court far exceeded not only any thing in Europe, but all that the pride of Louis XIV. had conceived. The whole royal palaces, with the exception of Versailles, were refurnished in the most sumptuous style; the value of the plate and furniture which they contained was estimated at fifty millions of francs, or two millions sterling. At the marriage of the Empress Marie Louise, four queens held her train (1). In the antechambers of the Emperor, seven kings were sometimes to be seen. And when this first occurred, it was just seventeen years since it had been written, with universal consent, over the principal archway in the Tuileries—"Monarchy is abolished in France, and *will never be restored* (2)."

Great internal prosperity of France under the empire.

While not merely the forms of monarchical, but the essence of despotic power, were, in this manner re-established in France, amidst the general concurrence of the nation, the Emperor was careful to accompany the change with such substantial benefits and real ameliorations as amply reconciled the great mass of the citizens to the loss of the once prized democratic powers which had brought such unheard-of disasters on their possessors and the whole community. Though completely despotic, the Imperial government had one incalculable advantage; it was regular, conservative, and systematic. The taxes were heavy, but the government expenditure was immense, and enabled the people to pay them with facility: no forced loans or arbitrary confiscations swept off, as in the time of the Republic, the accumulations of years by one fell exaction; no uncertainty as to enjoying the fruits of industry paralysed in any branch of employment the hand of the labourer. Every thing was orderly and tranquil under the Imperial sway; the Emperor demanded, indeed, more than half their sons from his subjects of every degree, but a boundless career was opened to the conscripts; and visions of a marshal's baton or a general's staff danced before the eyes of many a youthful aspirant, who was destined to an early and unheeded grave in the field of battle or amidst the horrors of the military hospital. The stoppage of all external commerce, combined with the vast and constantly increasing expenditure of government, produced an extraordinary degree of vigour in domestic industry and internal communication; the roads, the canals which connected the provinces with each other, were covered with waggons or boats laden with the richest merchandise; the cultivators every where found an ample market for their produce, in the vast consumption of the armies; the manufacturing cities vied with each other in activity and enterprise; and even commercial wealth, reviving from its ashes under the firm rule of the Emperor, exerted its energies on internal traffic, and turning inwards, promoted internal circulation through the great arteries of the empire. Beet root was largely cultivated as a substitute for the sugar cane, and though the saccharine matter obtained from that useful vegetable was inferior in sweetness and richness to that which the West India islands yielded, yet it was superior in clearness and delicacy, and, as a native production, was justly admired. Lyon, Rouen, and the Flemish cities again resounded with the activity of the artisan; their ruined fabrics were restored,

(1) Las Cas, ii. 290, 291. De S'aül, R^{ev.} Franç. ii. 334, 335.

(2) De Staël, ii. 235.

the empty warehouses replenished; and the vast internal consumption of the empire, deprived of all foreign competition, rapidly raised from the dust the prosperous manufactures of the monarchy which the confiscation of the Revolution had to all appearance irrevocably destroyed (1).

Great effect of the foreign plunder and contribution on the industry of France. Much as this extraordinary flood of internal prosperity was owing to the rapid circulation of wealth, occasioned by the great expenditure, exceeding thirty millions sterling, which was drawn from the ordinary revenue of the empire (2), more still was to be ascribed to the enormous sums which were extracted from one-half of Europe in the shape of subsidies, contributions, or the maintenance of the Imperial armies, which was all expended, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of the French people. The immense sums, amounting to above twenty-four millions sterling, have been already mentioned (5) which were extracted from Prussia and the countries between the Elbe and the Vistula, in two years subsequent to the irruption of the French armies into their territories in October 1806. But exorbitant as this was, it constituted but a part of the great system of foreign plunder which formed so important an element in the general system of the Imperial government. We have the authority of the able and impartial biographer of Napoléon for the assertion, "that since their departure from the heights of Boulogne, two hundred thousand French soldiers had been constantly fed, clothed, paid, and lodged, at the expense of foreign states; above four hundred millions of contributions (L.16,000.000) had, in addition, been levied in money or goods, from the countries occupied by the Imperial troops, the treasury had received part of this sum, and the remainder, expended on the services of the army, had reduced by one-half the amount required from the French Exchequer for its support. A few years before, Louisiana had been sold by the First Consul to America, to obtain a supply for the pressing wants of the treasury; on his return from the campaign of Austerlitz, the Emperor found the treasury exhausted, and the bank on the eve of insolvency; but the campaigns of the two next years gave him a year's revenue in advance in the coffers of the state, besides a large reserved treasure in the vaults of the Tuileries (4). When such extraordinary supplies were obtained by foreign plunder for the French treasury, it is not surprising that a very great degree of prosperity should have pervaded all its departments, and in an especial manner made itself felt at the metropolis; and, in truth, all the great and splendid works thenceforward undertaken by the Emperor, and which have shed such an imperishable lustre round his name,

(1) Bign. vi. 403, 407. Jom. ii. 442, 444.

(2) Revenue of the empire, exclusive of contributions from foreign states and all extraordinary supplies :—

(Its revenues from 1808 to 1813.)

In 1808,	664,879,901 francs, or	L.26,500,000
1809,	723,513,020	29,000,000
1810,	744,392,027	29 700,000
1811, including Roman States,	907,295,657	36,200,000
1812,	876,266,180	35 300,000
1813,	824,273,749	33,000,000

—DUC DE GAETA, i. 307, 308.

It is not going too far to say, that the sums drawn during these years, directly or indirectly, by plunder, contributions, tribute in subsidies from foreign states, amounted to at least half as much more : and the sums, from the difference in the value of money, were equal to almost double their nominal amount in the currency of Great Britain. Thus, during the six last years of Napoléon, an ex-

penditure equal to nearly a hundred millions sterling in England took place in the French empire; of which more than a third was drawn from foreign countries. It is not surprising that such a government for the time should be popular, notwithstanding its despotic character and the conscription.

(3) *Ante*, vi. 98.

(4) Jom. ii. 437, 438.

were carried on by funds wrung, directly or indirectly, from the suffering inhabitants of his subject territories (1).

Striking account of the public works of France by the Minister of the Interior, Aug. 16, 1807.

And these works, undertaken under the Imperial government, were really such as to justify the enthusiastic admiration of a people even less passionately devoted than the French to public splendour. They were thus noticed in the report of the Minister of the Interior in August 1807, when Napoléon met the Chambers after his return from Tilsit; and, after making every allowance for the exaggerated style of such state papers, much remains to attract the admiration of succeeding ages, and demonstrate the great objects to which, in domestic administration, the ambition of the Emperor was directed "Thirteen thousand leagues of public roads have been kept in order or repaired; the two greatest works undertaken for centuries, the roads of Mont Cenis and of the Simplon, have, after six years of labour, been completed. The road from Spain to Italy is in progress: the Apennines are the theatre of a series of works which will unite Piedmont to the shores of the Mediterranean, and complete the union of Liguria to France: eighteen rivers have seen their navigation improved or prolonged beyond hitherto impassable barriers, by means of locks, dykes, or towing paths: four bridges have been erected during the last campaign: ten others are in full progress; ten canals, almost all commenced during the present reign, are in full activity. Nor do the maritime harbours offer fewer prodigies. Antwerp, so recently insignificant, has become the centre of our great maritime preparations: for the first time, that part of the Scheldt sees vessels of 74 and 80 guns floating on its bosom: fourteen ships of the line are on the stocks within its walls; many are finished and have descended to Flushing: that harbour has seen its docks deepened, its entrance improved, and it is already capable of containing a squadron: at Dunkirk and Calais piers have been constructed; at Cherbourg two vast breakwaters erected; at Rochefort and Marseilles equally important maritime improvements are in progress. The existence of our cotton manufactures being secured, investigations are in progress for the discovery of places suited to the culture of that important article: the improvement of the linen fabrics has been the object of constant solicitude: veterinary schools have been established, and already fill the army and the fields with skilled practitioners; a code is preparing for the regulation of commerce: the School of Arts and Mechanics at Compeigne flourishes, and has been transferred to Chalons; others on a similar plan are in the course of formation; Italy opens an extensive mart for our industry: the war, changed into a contest for commercial independence, has become the greatest stimulant to French industry; every one of our conquests, while it is a market closed to England, is a new encouragement afforded to French enterprise. Nor has the capital of this great empire been neglected; it is the Emperor's wish that that illustrious city, become the first in the universe, should befit by its splendour so glorious a destiny. At one extremity of Paris a bridge has been completed, to which victory has given the name of Austerlitz; at another, a second is commencing, to which Jena will afford a still more glorious appellation; the Louvre advances to its completion, marking, in its matured progress through centuries, the successive ages of Francis I, of Henry IV, of Louis XIV, restored to life by the voice of Napoléon: fountains without number flow night and day in all parts of the city, testifying, even to the humblest classes, the care which the Emperor bestows on their most trifling accommodation. Two

(1) De Staël, *Rev. Franç.* ii, 266.

triumphal arches are already erected, or founded, one in the centre of the palace inhabited by the Genius of Victory; the other at the extremity of the most beautiful avenue of the finest city in the world. The tomb of Desaix has been erected on the summit of the Alps, whose rugged precipices are not less startled at the monument of our perfection in the arts, than they were at the passage of the artillery drawn by the arms of valour. The fine arts in France are occupied almost entirely in tracing on marble or canvass the glorious exploits of our armies, while the mind of the Emperor, ever meditating fresh triumphs, has selected for his antagonist the demon of ignorance; and, by the establishment of twelve colleges for the study of law, and gratuitous schools for the teaching of medicine in all the principal cities of the empire, has laid the foundation of the extension of general knowledge in the most essential subjects of public instruction (1) ”.

When the French people saw this magnificent announcement of internal improvement, contemporaneous with the official promulgation of the treaty of Tilsit, the conquest of Prussia, the restoration of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and the erection of the Kingdom of Westphalia, it is not surprising that they were dazzled by the brilliancy of the spectacle, and yielded to the pleasing illusion that the Revolution, nursed in violence and baptized in blood, was to set amidst a blaze of unprecedented glory. But the querulous discontent and substantial oppression of other nations, might have even then taught them that this splendid fabric rested on a dangerous foundation, and that the system was not likely to be durable which impoverished all others to enrich one favoured state; while a sagacious observer of this long and glowing enumeration of the internal projects of the Emperor could hardly have avoided the inference that the government had now drawn to itself the patronage and direction of domestic improvement of every description; that the very magnitude and universality of public undertakings proved that private enterprise had sunk into the dust; and that, reversing the whole principles of the Revolution, the welfare of society had come to depend on the point of the pyramid.

The finances of France, in an especial manner, occupied the attention of the Emperor; and the talent of his subjects, adapted beyond any other people in Europe to organization and accuracy in matters of detail, brought that important branch of administration to an extraordinary degree of perfection. The official exposition set forth by his ministers annually, exhibited an excess of income above expenditure (2); but no

(1) Bign. vi. 402, 407.

(2) The Budget exhibited to the Chambers for 1808, was as follows :—

(Budget of 1808.)

INCOME.		EXPENDITURE.	
	Francs.		Francs.
Direct contributions.	295,241,651	Public debt,	74,000,000
Registers and crown lands, . . .	181,458,491	Pensions,	31,000,000
Customs,	75,973,797	Civil list,	28,000,000
Lottery,	12,804,486	Judges,	22,000,000
Post-office,	8,524,586	Foreign relations,	2,000,000
Excise,	82,772,692	Minister of the Interior, . . .	52,000,000
Salt and Tobacco, by the Alps, . .	5,104,198	— of Finance,	21,900,000
Salt Mines,	3,000,000	— of Treasury,	8,000,000
		— of War,	201,619,000
	664,879,901	Ordnance,	134,880,000
or L.26,500,000		Marine,	117,200,000
		Religion,	14,000,000
		Police general,	1,055,000
		Negotiations,	8,000,000
		Miscellaneous,	6,316,000
			730,000,000
			or L. 29,200,000

reliance can be placed on these statements as a true picture of the financial condition of the empire, when ten or fifteen millions sterling were annually drawn from foreign nations by contributions or subsidies, which did not appear in the yearly budgets; and all the armies quartered beyond the frontiers of the empire, whether in Germany, Italy, or the Spanish peninsula, were systematically and invariably maintained and paid at the exclusive expense of their inhabitants. It is sufficient to observe, therefore, that as long as the empire of Napoléon endured over foreign nations, no want of money was ever experienced at the Imperial headquarters, and that the sums extracted from them during its continuance amounted to at least a half of those derived from the legitimate taxation of his own subjects. The longer his experience extended, the more was he attached to the admirable system of indirect taxation, the only secure basis for the permanent income of a great nation. "The principle I should wish to see established," said he, on 20th February 1806, "is to introduce a great number of moderate indirect taxes, susceptible of augmentation, when the public necessities call for their elevation (1)".

Despotic
character
of the new
law of high
treason.

But the march of despotism is not for ever on flowers; nor is it always blessings and splendid improvements only which it confers upon its subjects. It soon appeared, that the brilliant public works and bewildering enumerations of great undertakings with which the Minister of the Interior dazzled the eyes of the people, were but the splendid covering with which Napoléon was gilding over the old and well-known chains of Roman servitude. On the 1st February, 1810, the Penal Code made its appearance; and the few real patriots who had survived the storms of the Revolution perceived with grief, that out of 480 crimes which it enumerated, no less than 220 were state offences (2). In this long and portentous enumeration were included almost all the offences embraced under the denomination of lese-majesty in the jurisprudence of the lower empire: among others the non-revelation of crimes affecting the security of the state which have come to any one's knowledge; illegal societies or assemblages of any kind; and seditious offences, committed either by writings published or unpublished, images, or engravings. The punishment of such non-revelation was declared to be the galleys, if the crime not disclosed was lese-majesty; imprisonment from two to five years, if seditious. So special and minute are the crimes against the security of the state, and so slender the evidence required to establish them, that in troubled times, and in the hands of a despotic monarch, they furnished the most ample means of totally extinguishing the liberties of the people, and rendering every person amenable to punishment who in the slightest degree obstructed the measures of government (3).

Decree establishing eight state prisons in France, March 3, 1810.

Imprisonment has ever been the great instrument of despotic power: it is not by heart-rending punishments inflicted on its victims in presence of the people, but by the silent unseen operation of confinement and seclusion, that the spirit of freedom has in general been broken. Founded, as the empire of Napoléon was, on the suppression of all the passions of the Revolution, and succeeding, as it did, to a period when great political parties had been interested in their preservation,

—See DUC DE GAETA, i. 306; and MONTGAILLARD, vi. 364, 365.

The Kingdom of Italy alone produced to Napoléon a yearly tribute of 100,000,000 francs, or L.4,000,000, and for this we have the authority of his own words; but no mention of this contribution, any more than the L.3,400,000, paid annually

by Spain and Portugal, or the L.24,000,000 levied on the north of Germany, appears in these annual budgets.—See *Seance*, 7 *Avril*, 1806; PELET.

(1) Pelet, 236.

(2) Code Penal sec. 75 to 131, and sec. 132 to 294.

(3) Code Penal, Arts. 132-294.

it was not to be expected that this great engine was to remain powerless in his hands. It is a remarkable fact, highly characteristic of the ambitious spirit which inspired, and the absence of all regard for real freedom which distinguished, the whole changes of the Revolution, that not one of the successive parties which were elevated to power during its progress ever thought of the obvious expedient, essential to any thing like freedom, of limiting by law the period to which imprisonment, at the instance of government, without bringing the accused to trial, could extend. Each was perfectly willing that arbitrary imprisonment should continue, provided only that they enjoyed the power of exercising it. During the Reign of Terror, this iniquitous system was carried to a height unparalleled in any former age; and above two hundred thousand captives at one time groaned in the state prisons of France. Even under the comparatively regular and constitutional sway of the Directory, it was still largely acted upon: the first use of their power made by each faction, as they got possession of the executive, was to consign all the dangerous persons of the opposite parties to prison; and we have the authority of Napoléon for the assertion, that at one time the state prisoners under their rule amounted to sixty, and when he took possession of power, were still nine, thousand (1). Under his more vigorous, but humane administration, the amount was much lessened, but still it was considerable; and great numbers of persons constantly remained in jail, without any means either of procuring their liberation or forcing on their trial. Their number and unhappy condition had long attracted the attention of the Emperor; and at length a

March 3. decree was passed, regulating their treatment and places of confinement, and defining the authorities by whom their detention was to be authorized. By this decree eight state prisons were established in France, viz.—Saumur, Ham, If, Landskron, Pierre Chatel, Fenestrelles, Campiano, and Vincennes. The detention of prisoners in them required to be on a warrant of the Private Council of the Emperor, on a report of the Minister of Police, or Public Justice. The former was invested with the power of putting any person that he thought proper under the surveillance of the police. The captives in the state prisons retained the power of disposing of their effects, unless it was otherwise ordered; but they could not receive any money or movables but in the presence of the governor of the prison, and by his authority. All correspondence or intercourse with the rest of the world was rigorously forbidden; and any jailer who should permit or connive at the correspondence of any prisoner with any person whatever, was to be dismissed, and punished with six months' confinement (2).

Under this rigorous system, great numbers of persons of the highest rank and noblest character were confined in these state prisons during the whole reign of Napoléon, not only from France itself, but from Piedmont, Lombardy, the Roman States, Germany, and Switzerland. An order, signed by Napoléon, the Minister of Police, or the Privy Council, was a sufficient warrant in all those countries, not only to occasion the arrest of any suspected person, but his detention in one of these gloomy fortresses, to all appearance for the whole remainder of his life—nobles of the highest rank, priests of the most exalted station, citizens of the most irreproachable lives, were seized in every part of Europe subject to the French influence, paraded through the towns of the country to which they belonged, with shackles on their hands or chains round their necks, and then

(1) Napoléon in Month. i. 176.

(2) Decree, March 3, 1810. *Moniteur* and *Montg.* vii. 11, 12.

consigned to the gloomy oblivion of the state prisons, there to languish in captivity for the remainder of their lives. The offences for which this terrible penalty, worse than death itself, was inflicted, were of the most trivial kind; their being regarded as punishable at all, savoured rather of the dark policy of Tiberius than the more lenient administration, even of despotic countries, in modern times. An unhappy *bon mot*, a cutting jest at the expense of any of the Imperial authorities, a few sarcastic lines, were sufficient to consign their unfortunate authors to close confinement for the rest of their days (1). The state prisons exhibited the most extraordinary assemblage of persons; those on the north of the empire were chiefly filled with ardent democrats, or devoted partisans of the House of Bourbon; those in the southern provinces with ecclesiastics or priests who had expressed themselves incautiously regarding the captivity and dethronement of their spiritual sovereign; but numbers were there immured against whom no definite charge or overt act could be brought, but who, from some unknown cause, had excited the jealousy of the Emperor or some of the Imperial authorities. One day there arrived at the doors of these gloomy abodes a young nobleman of elegant figure, gay manners, and dissipated habits; the next an aged priest, in the decline of life, whose grey hairs were sent to bleach amidst the snows of the Alps; next came a violent democrat, who, untaught by the disasters of twenty years, was still raving about the Rights of Man; then a faithful adherent of the fallen dynasty, or an uncompromising assertor of the wrongs of the conquered provinces. All who in any way, or from any motive, had excited either the displeasure or the fears of the Emperor, were sent into captivity; but the greater proportion were ecclesiastics, among whom was the intrepid and able Cardinal Pacca, who had, in an especial manner, roused his indignation, by his bold counsels to the Pope, soon the companion of his captivity, to resist the Imperial aggressions on the Holy See (2).

One circumstance of peculiar and unprecedented severity attended the state victims of Napoléon, which had been unknown in Europe since the fall of the Roman empire. The extent of his dominions, the wide sway of his influence, rendered it almost impossible to fly from his persecution. By passing the frontier, and escaping into other states, no asylum, as in former times, was obtained; the influence of the Imperial authorities, the terrors of the Imperial sway, pursued the fugitive through

Slight causes for which persons were immured.

(1) Cardinal Pacca, long a victim of the tyrannical government of Napoléon, on account of the courageous stand which he made against his spoliation of the Holy See; and who, for six years, was confined in the state prison of Fenestrelles among the solitudes of the Alps, has given us the following account of some of his fellow-captives:—"On my arrival in the prison, one of the first persons I met was the arch-priest of Fontainelle, in the Duchy of Parma, *vir simplex et timens Deum*, who had been sentenced to three years' confinement for having written, in 1809, to a neighbouring curate that the Archduke John was advancing with his army; the next was Tognetti de Pisa, condemned to six months' imprisonment for having imprudently repeated a satire he had heard against the Emperor; Girolamo de Forte, also, for having composed some poems in favour of the Austrians, when in 1800 they chased the French from Italy; and Leonard de Modigliano, Dean of Forlì, for having been imprudent in his language against the French Emperor, were sentenced to an unlimited period of captivity, and only received their liberation on the downfall of Napoléon. They tra-

versed the most populous cities of Lombardy in the course of their transmission to prison, the former with handcuffs, the latter with a chain about his neck, of which he still bore the marks when I saw him in the prison of Fenestrelles."—*Memoirs du CARDINAL PACCA*, i. 237, 238.

(2) Pacca's Mem. i. 237, 270, 271, 274.

These ecclesiastics were sentenced to unlimited imprisonment for the most trifling causes. Out of nineteen who were imprisoned along with Cardinal Pacca in the fortress of Fenestrelles, amidst the Savoy Alps, three Spaniards by birth were there for having declared, at Parma, against the iniquitous war which the Emperor was waging against their nation; another for being suspected of having carried on a secret correspondence with the Pope when in confinement in France; others for having refused to take the oath of fidelity to the French Emperor in the Roman States; one from Bastia in Corsica for having preached a sermon containing some passages which were thought to be a satire on the Emperor, in regard to the affairs of the church. He was seized before he had concluded his discourse, and instantly conducted to prison.—*PACCA*, i. 271, 272.

the whole of Europe ; and, as in the days of Caligula or Nero, the victim of Imperial jealousy could find no resting-place on the Continent till he had passed the utmost limits of civilisation, and amidst the nomade or semi-barbarous tribes on the frontiers of Europe, found that security which the boasted institutions of its ancient states could no longer afford. The mandates of the Emperor, the inquisition of his police, reached the trembling fugitive as effectually on the utmost verge of the Austrian or Spanish dominions, in the extremity of Calabria, or in the marshes of Poland, as in the centre of Paris ; and it was not till he had escaped into the Ukraine, or the Turkish provinces, or had found an asylum in the yet unsubdued realm of Britain, that the victim of Imperial persecution could find a secure resting-place. The knowledge of this, which universally prevailed, added fearfully to the terrors of the Imperial government ; the firmest mind, the most undaunted resolution despaired of entering the lists with an authority which the whole civilized world seemed constrained to obey ; and the immense majority of the prudent and the selfish quailed under the prospect of incurring the displeasure of a power whose lightest measure of animadversion would be banishment into the savage or uncivilized parts of the earth (1). Such was the weight of this despotism, that even the brothers of Napoléon could not endure it. Louis resigned the throne of Holland, and Lucien sought in England that freedom, for the loss of which all the grandeur and power of the brother, whom his presence of mind had seated on the Consular Throne, could afford no compensation.

With such powers to support his authority, and such terrors to overawe discontent or stifle resistance, Napoléon succeeded, without the least difficulty, in maintaining a despotism in France, during the whole remainder of the empire, unparalleled for rigour and severity in modern times. Not a whisper of resistance was any where heard to his orders throughout all his vast dominions. The Senate joyfully and servilely registered his decrees, voted his taxes, and authorized his conscriptions ; the press was occupied only with narrating his journeys, transcribing his eulogies, or enforcing his orders ; the Chamber of Deputies vied with their dignified brethren in the upper Chamber in addressing the Emperor only with the incense of Eastern adulation. The Legislature voted, and the nation furnished to their ruler, during the ten years which elapsed from his assuming the Imperial throne to his abdication, the stupendous number of TWO MILLIONS THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND CONSCRIPTS, of which above *two millions two hundred thousand* perished in his service (2). The taxes, enormously heavy, were only prevented from being screwed up to the highest possible amount by the systematic plunder of all the tributary countries of Europe. Yet his government was not only obeyed without a murmur during all that time, but

(1) De Staël. *Dix Ans d'Exil*. 219, 229. *Id.* Rev. Franç. ii. 400.

Madame de Staël has left a graphic picture of the terrors with which the jealousy of Napoléon was attended even to the softer sex ; and which prompted her to undertake a perilous journey from Geneva by the Tyrol, Vienna, and Galicia, into Russia, in the depth of winter, in order to fly the intolerable anxiety of her situation. The Austrian police, acting under his orders, continued the same odious system ; and it was not till she reached the frontiers of Old Russia, and war was declared between that power and Napoléon in 1812, that she was able to draw breath. The duchess of Abrantes has given a still more romantic and interesting account of the extraordinary adventure of Mrs. Spencer Smith, wife of the British resident at Stutgard, who incurred the real or feigned displeasure of Napoléon in

1804, at the time of the Duke d'Enghien's murder, and the alleged counterplot in which he was participant to dethrone the Emperor. [*Ante*, v. 93, 95.] She was actively pursued by the bloodhounds of the French police, solely on account of her husband's acts, from the neighbourhood of Vicenza, across the Julian and Tyrol Alps to the romantic shores of the König Sea, near Salbourg, where she for the first time got beyond their reach, by escaping into the Austrian territories, which were not at that period (1804) subjected to the disgrace of being forced to yield obedience to the mandates of the French police.—See D'Ann. xiii. 124. A few years later she could have found no security till she had traversed the whole Imperial territories, and reached the Ottoman dominions—*Dix Ans d'Exil* 239, 250.

(2) The following is a summary of the men levied and destroyed in France during the ten years of the

these terrible sacrifices, draining as they did its heart's blood from the nation, were passively yielded by all classes; and the despot, who was visibly leading them to perdition, was surrounded on all sides, and at all times, by the incense of flattery and the voice of adulation (1).

Excessive
rigour of the
conscription
laws.

So severely, however, did the conscription press upon the natural feelings of the human heart, both in parents and their offspring, that although the salaried dependents of the Emperor, in the Legislature and elsewhere, obsequiously voted all his demands for men, and the press lavished nothing but encomiums on his measures, yet it was not without extreme difficulty and excessive rigour that it could be carried into execution, especially in the rural districts of the empire. The infirmities which might be pleaded in exemption were severely scrutinized, and inveterate asthma, habitual spitting of blood, or incipient consumption, alone sustained as a sufficient excuse. Exemptions at first were allowed to be purchased for three hundred francs; but this privilege was soon repealed, and in the latter years of the empire a substitute could not be procured for less than eight hundred or a thousand pounds. No Frenchman, liable, or who once had been liable to the conscription, could hold any public office, receive any public salary, exercise any public right, receive any legacy, or inherit any property, unless he could produce a certificate that he had obeyed the law, and was either legally exempted, in actual service, discharged, or that his services had not been required. Those who failed to join the army, when drawn, within the prescribed time, were deprived of their civil rights, and denounced to all the gendarmerie in the empire as deserters. Eleven depots were appointed for the punishment of the refractory, where they wore the uniform of convicts, received their fare, and were employed to labour on fortifications or public works without any pay. The terrors of this treatment, however, being at length found to be insufficient to bring the conscripts to their colours, it was decreed that a deserter or person who failed to attend should be fined fifteen hundred francs, and sentenced to three years' hard labour in the interior, with his head shaved but his beard long; if he deserted

Emperor's reign; the most extraordinary instance of the destruction of the human species by the operation of regular government that exists in the annals of the world:—

(Enormous destruction of human life under his foreign wars and the conscription.)

Dates of the decrees of the Senate.	
24th Sept. 1805,	80,000 men.
Nov. 1806,	80,000
7th April, 1807,	80,000
21st Jan. and 10th Sept. 1808, . . .	240,000
18th April and 5th Oct. 1809, . . .	76,000
13th Dec. 1810,	160,000
20th Dec. 1811,	120,000
13th March, 1st Sept. 1812,	237,000
13th Jan., 3d April, 24th } Aug., 9th Oct., 11th } Nov., 1813. }	1,040,000
<hr/>	
In ten years,	2,113,000
Army in existence in 1804,	640,000
<hr/>	
Departmental Guards, Vo- luntary Levies, and Levy <i>en masse</i> , in 1814, }	250,000
<hr/>	
	3,003,000
Remained alive in arms, } or prisoners in 1814, }	802,600
<hr/>	
Destroyed in 10 years,	2,200,400

—See DUPIN, *Force Commerciale de France*, i. 3; and *Moniteur*, dates *ut supra*.

(1) *Montg.* vi. 276, 277.

from the army, his punishment was to be undergone in a frontier place, where he was sentenced to hard labour for ten years, on bread and water, with a bullet of eight pounds' weight chained to his leg, and with a shaved head and unshaved beard; a penalty, in comparison of which death itself would have appeared an act of mercy. Such were the punishments which awaited, without distinction, all the youth of France, if they tried to evade a conscription which was cutting them off at the rate of two hundred and twenty thousand a-year. The practical result of this excessive severity, joined to the known impossibility of earning a subsistence in a country where landed property was already subdivided into eight millions of hands, and commercial enterprise annihilated, by any other means than the favour or employment of government, was, that the whole youth of the nation, of the requisite age and capable of undergoing its fatigues, were voluntarily or involuntarily enrolled in the profession of arms (1).

System of
the imperial
education.
Ecclesiasti-
cal schools,
and lyceums
and military
academies.

The public instruction established in France under the empire was eminently calculated to favour the same tendency. The schools were of two kinds, the ecclesiastical schools and the lyceums. The ecclesiastical schools were established by the bishops and clergy, chiefly for the education of the young persons destined for their own pro-

fession, and in them the elements of grammar were taught along with a system of religious education. As they were supported, however, by voluntary contributions alone, they were few in comparison with the numbers of the people, and totally inadequate to the purposes of national instruction. Such as they were, however, they excited the jealousy of the Emperor, who was unwilling that any considerable establishment in the empire, especially in relation to so important a matter as public education, should exist independent of the patronage and authority of government. It was decreed, therefore, that there should be no more than one ecclesiastical school allowed in each department; and that that one should be in a large town where a lyceum or government academy was established; all others were to be shut up in a fortnight, under heavy penalties, and their property of every description applied to the use of the great Imperial establishment called the University (2).

Constitu-
tion of the
Imperial
University.

The Imperial University was the chief instrument which the Emperor had set on foot for obtaining the entire direction of public education in all its branches. This body was totally different from an university in our sense of the term: it was rather a vast system of instructing police diffused over the country, in connexion with and dependent on the central government. At its head was placed a Grand Master, one of the chief dignitaries of the state, with a salary of 150,000 francs (L.6000) a-year. Under him were an ample staff, all of whom were nominated by himself, and extending over the whole empire, viz.—a treasurer and chancellor, ten counsellors for life, twenty in ordinary, and thirty inspectors-general, all endowed with ample salaries; under them were the rectors of academies, as they were called, who, in no respect, corresponded to the English functionaries of the same name, but were elevated officers, analogous to and ranking with the bishop of the diocese, as numerous in the empire as there were courts of appeal, and each possessing an inferior jurisdiction and staff of officers similar to the Grand Master. Under each rector were placed the faculties or schools of theology, jurisprudence, medicine, physical sciences, the lyceums, colleges, institutions, and pensions, and even the schools of primary instruc-

(1) Code Nap. Art. Conscription. Southey's Pen. War. i. 23, 28.

(2) Thib. Hist. de Nép, vi. 539, 555. Southey's Pen War. i. 47, 48.

tion. The teachers in all these various schools were either nominated directly by the Grand Master or by the inspectors, counsellors, or rectors who owed their appointments to him; so that, directly or indirectly, they were all brought under the control of the central government. Voluntary schools, or communal colleges as they were called, established by the communities or rural divisions of the empire, were not prohibited, and about four hundred of them were set on foot in the early years of the empire; but it was required that every person who taught in them should take out a graduation at the university, and pay for his license to teach from 200 to 600 francs every ten years; and besides, that the whole sums which they drew should be thrown into a common fund, to be apportioned out by the central government, not according to the number of the scholars which each could produce, or the expenditure which it might require, but the pleasure of the minister to whom the distribution was confided. Under such restrictions it may easily be believed that the communal or voluntary schools rapidly died away, and nearly the whole education of the empire was brought directly under the direction and appointment of government (1).

Lycœums or
military
academies.
Their regu-
lations and
great im-
portance.

The government schools, which thus, under the successive graduation of schools of primary instruction, colleges, and lycœums, pervaded the whole empire, were the great instrument to which Napoléon trusted, both for the formation of the national temper into a docile and submissive character, and the direction of its whole moral energies to the purposes of military aggrandizement. All the boys who, in the primary schools, evinced talent, spirit, or aptitude for military exploit, were transferred to the colleges, and from thence to the lycœums. In the latter academies every thing bore a military character; the pupils were distributed into companies, having each its sergeant and corporal; their studies, their meals, their rising and going to bed, were all performed by beat of drum—from the age of twelve they were taught military exercises; their amusements, their games were all of a military character. Nor were other encouragements of a more substantial description wanting. To each lyceum one hundred and fifty bursaries were annexed, paid by government, and bestowed on the most deserving and clever of the young pupils, in order to defray their expenses at the higher military academies, or polytechnic school at Paris; and from the many thousand salaried scholars thus chosen, two hundred and fifty were annually transferred to the special military academies, where they were exclusively maintained at the expense of the state, and when they arrived at the proper age, provided with commissions in the army, or offices in the civil departments of government. Nor was this all—two thousand four hundred youths of the greatest promise, were annually chosen from the conquered or dependent territories, and educated at the military schools at the public expense; and in like manner apportioned out, according to their disposition and talents, into the military or civil services of the empire. At all these schools religion was hardly mentioned; political studies were altogether prohibited; moral disquisitions little regarded; but geography, mathematics, mechanics, the physical sciences, fortification, gunnery, engineering, and whatever tended directly or indirectly to the art of war, sedulously taught and encouraged. The professors in the lycœums and colleges were bound to celibacy; the primary teachers might marry, but in that case they were compelled to lodge without the precincts; a regulation which, to persons of their limited income, seldom exceeding twenty pounds a-year,

(1) Thib. Hist. de Nap. iv. 540, 558. Southey's Pen. War. i. 44, 47.

amounted to a prohibition. All the teachers, of whatever grade, were liable to instant dismissal on the report of the rectors or inspectors, that any of the rules were infringed. Their emoluments were all derived from government, and their promotion depended entirely on the same authority. The scholars were debarred from all correspondence except with their parents; and letters even from them could only be received in presence of the master. Thus, not only were the whole schools of the empire directed to the purposes of war or abject submission, and directly placed under the control of government, but a spiritual militia established in them all, to enforce every where the mandates and doctrines which it promulgated. Napoléon did not discourage education, but rendered it solely and exclusively subservient to his purposes. He did not destroy the battery, but seized its guns, and skilfully turned them on the enemy. Combining into one government all the known modes of enslaving and degrading mankind, by the conscription, he forced, like Timour or Genghis Khan, all the physical energies of his subjects into the ranks of war, and the prosecution of military aggrandisement: by the police, the state prisons, and the censorship of the press, he enforced every where, like the Byzantine Emperors, implicit obedience to his civil administration, and directed at pleasure the thoughts of his subjects; while, by means of a vast system of centralized education skilfully directed to the purposes of conquest or despotism, and maintained by an order of educational Jesuits abjectly devoted to his will, he aimed, like Loyola or Hildebrand, at throwing still more irremovable chains over the minds of the future generations of mankind (1).

Rapid transition from republican to despotic ideas.

On one occasion, when the learned and intrepid M. Suard had concluded, in Napoléon's presence, a warm eulogium on the talent with which Tacitus had portrayed the lives and vices of the Roman Emperors, he observed,—“ You say well; but he would have done still better if he had told us how it happened that the Roman people tolerated and even loved those bad emperors. It is that which it would have been of the most importance for posterity to know (2)”. If this observation is just, as it undoubtedly is, with reference to the Roman emperors, how much more is it applicable to Napoléon himself; for nothing is more certain than that, in the midst of all this despotic rule, when the Emperor was overturning all the principles of the Revolution, draining France of its heart's-blood, and training the generation, educated amidst the fumes of equality, to the degradation of slavery, he was not only tolerated, but almost worshipped by his subjects. This extraordinary change also took place, not as in the Roman empire, after the lapse of centuries, but in one generation. The age of Gracchus was in France instantly succeeded by that of Caligula; the democratic fervour of the contemporaries of Marius, plunged at once into the Eastern adulation of the successors of Constantine.

Remarkable difference between the English and French Revolutions in this respect.

In this respect, there is a most remarkable difference between the English and French Revolutions. In both, indeed, a brief period of democratic fervour was succeeded, as it ever must be in an old state, by a military despotism; but the temper with which this change of government was received in the two countries, was totally at variance, and the frame of government which has been left in each is essentially different. “ The English aristocracy,” says Madame de Staël, “ had more dignity in their misfortunes than the French; for they did not commit the two

(1) Thib. vi. 540, 547. Southey, i. 48, 55. Génie de la Rév. i. 392.

(2) De Staël, Rev. Franç. ii. 387.

immense faults from which the French will never be able to exculpate themselves—the first, that of having united themselves to strangers against their native country; the second, that of having condescended to accept employments in the antechambers of a sovereign who, according to their principles, had no right to the throne (1).” But this remarkable difference was not confined to the aristocracy; all classes in England evinced an early and decided aversion to the violent measures of the army and its chiefs: the nobles and landed proprietors kept aloof from the court of the Protector, neither assisting at his councils nor accepting his repeated offers of lucrative situations; and such was the temper of the Commons, that Cromwell soon found they were totally unmanageable, and therefore disused them as jurymen, and they returned such refractory representatives to Parliament, that none of the Houses which he summoned were allowed to sit more than a few days. England, therefore, was overwhelmed by a military usurpation, but the spirit of the nation was not subdued; and even in its gloomiest periods might be seen traces of a free spirit, and growing marks of that independent disposition which waited only for the death of the unfortunate Usurper to re-establish the national liberties. In France, on the other hand, all classes seemed to vie with each other in fawning upon the triumphant conqueror who had subverted the Revolution; the nobles rushed in crowds into his antechambers, and laid the honours of the monarchy at his feet; the burghers vied with each other in obsequious submission to his will, or graceful flattery to his actions; the *tiers-état* joyfully clothed themselves with his titles, or accepted his employment; the peasantry gave him their best blood, and cheerfully yielded up their children to his ambition. The senate was the echo of his sentiments; the council of state the organ of his wishes; the legislative body the register of his mandates; the legislature was submissive; the electors pliant; the jurymen obedient; and, in the whole monarchy, so recently convulsed with the fervour of democracy, was to be heard only the mandates of power, the incense of flattery, or the voice of adulation.

Its causes.
Superior
violence and
injustice of
the French
convulsion. Much of this extraordinary difference between the immediate effects of the Revolutions in the two countries is, without doubt, to be ascribed to the greater devastation, more sweeping changes, and deeper guilt of the French convulsion. The bloody proscriptions, and unbounded confiscations of the popular party, were the cause which at once occasioned and justified the emigrations of the noblesse. Though political wisdom, equally as true patriotism, should have forbid their uniting their arms, under any circumstances, with the stranger against their native land, yet some allowances must be made for the lacerated feelings of men first driven into exile by a blood-thirsty faction, and then deprived of their estates and reduced to beggary, because they declined to return and place their necks under the guillotine. We can sympathize with the implacable vengeance of those who had seen their parents, brothers, sisters, or children, massacred by an inhuman party, who, by rousing the cupidity of the working classes, had succeeded in establishing the most infernal despotism in their country which had ever disgraced mankind. The excessive misery, too, which democratic ascendancy had produced upon all ranks, and especially the lowest, induced, as its natural result, that universal and ardent desire for the establishment of a powerful and energetic government, which woful experience had proved to be the only practicable mode of terminating the general calamities. The reaction of order and tranquillity against republican

(1) Rev. Franc. ii. 336.

violence and misery, was more powerful and widespread in France than England, because the suffering which had preceded it had been more acute and universal. The despotism of Napoléon was more oppressive and more willingly acquiesced in than that of Cromwell, from the same causes which had rendered the atrocities of the revolutionists in France more excessive than those of the republicans in England.

But after making every allowance for the weight and importance of these circumstances, it is evident that something more is required to explain the extraordinary change in the national disposition which took place from the days of the Revolution to those of the empire. That suffering should produce an alteration of opinion in regard to the merits of the changes which had occasioned it—that the now universally felt evils of democratic government should incline all classes to range themselves under the banners of a single chief, is indeed intelligible; and in truth nothing more than the operations of experience upon the great body of mankind. But that this experience should produce individual baseness—that the fumes of Republicanism should be succeeded, not by the caution of wisdom, but the adulation of selfishness—and that the riot of European liberty should plunge at once into the servility of Eastern despotism, is the extraordinary thing. It is in vain to attempt the explanation of this phenomenon in the influence of an extraordinary man, or the mingled sway of the ambitious passions which an unprecedented career of success had brought to bear upon the nation. These circumstances will never at once alter the character of a people; they cannot convert public spirit into selfishness; they cannot do the work of centuries of progress, or change the age of Fabricius into that of Nero.

It was not the love of freedom, but the desire of elevation which convulsed France. An attentive consideration of these particulars must, with every impartial mind, lead to the conclusion that it was not the spirit of genuine freedom which convulsed France and desolated Europe, but the bastard passion for individual elevation. Both these passions are, indeed, essential to a successful struggle in the later stages of society in favour of liberty, because such a struggle requires the general concurrence of mankind; and such concurrence, except in cases of extraordinary fervour or rural simplicity, is not to be gained but by the combined influence of the selfish and the generous passions of our nature. But every thing in the final result depends on the proportion in which these noble and base ingredients are mingled in the public mind. In either case, if democracy becomes triumphant, suffering will be induced, and a reaction must ensue; but if the generous flame of liberty is the ruling passion, the period of despotic sway and military force will be one of indignant silence, convinced reason, or compulsory submission; if the selfish passion for distinction, or the ardent thirst for authority is the moving power, it will be distinguished by the baseness of servility, the lust of corruption, the rhetoric of adulation. The reason is obvious. In the excesses of power, whether regal, aristocratic, or republican, the disinterested friends of freedom, either in the conservative or liberal ranks, can discover nothing but a matter of unqualified hatred and aversion; but the aspirants after distinction, the candidates for power, the covetous of gold, find in those very excesses the precise objects of their desire, provided only that their benefits accrue to themselves. If, therefore, from the temper of the public mind, it has become evident that democratic anarchy can no longer be maintained, and that the stern sway of authority has, for a season at least, become unavoidable, the selfish and corrupt hasten to throw themselves into its arms, and lavish that flattery on the

single which they formerly bestowed on the many-headed despot, in the hope that they may thus secure to themselves the real objects of their ambition; while the virtuous and patriotic retire altogether from public life, and seek in the privacy of retirement that innocence which can no longer be found in the prominent stations of the world. Then is the period when the indignant lines of the poet are indeed applicable—

“ When vice prevails, and impious men bear sway,
The post of honour is a private station.”

The principles of freedom never were attended to in the French Revolution. That the spirit of freedom was at no period the ruling passion of the French Revolution, has been declared by all its observers, and clearly demonstrated by the events of its progress. Napoléon and Madame de Staël have concurred in stating, that the desire for equality was the moving principle, and this desire is but another name, in an advanced age, for the selfish passion for individual aggrandisement. Men profess, and for the time perhaps feel, a desire that all should start equal, in order that their own chance of being foremost in the race should be improved: but if they can turn the advantage to their own side, they are in no hurry to share it with those whom they have outstripped. The most ardent of the French Revolutionists showed, by their subsequent conduct, that they had no sort of objection to the most invidious and exclusive distinctions being re-established, provided only that they were conceived in their own favour. The remarkable and luminous facts, that not one of the successive factions which rose to power in the course of the convulsion, ever thought either of limiting the period within which an accused party may be detained in prison, without being brought to trial, or abolishing the odious and degrading fetters of the police, or securing to the minority in opposition to the ruling power, the means of influencing public opinion, by a practically free press, and the undisturbed right of assembling to discuss the measures of government in public meetings, afford insurmountable proofs that nothing was ever farther from their real intentions than the establishment of the principles of genuine freedom. All these parties, indeed, when struggling for power, were loud in their demand for these essential guarantees to liberty, without the full establishment of which its blessings must ever be an empty name: but none, when they attained it, ever thought of carrying their principles into practice, or putting that bit in their own mouths which they had been so desirous of placing in those of their antagonists. None of them evinced the slightest hesitation in taking advantage of, and straining to the utmost, those arbitrary powers which, by common consent, seemed to be left at the disposal of the executive government. The conclusion is unavoidable, that throughout the whole period it was selfish ambition which was the real principle of action; and that, if the love of freedom existed at all, it glowed in so inconsiderable a number of breasts as to be altogether incapable of producing any durable impression on the national fortunes. Nor is this surprising, when it is recollected in what an advanced age of society, and among what a corrupted, and above all, irreligious people the Revolution broke out. The degrees in which the spirit of public freedom and the desire of private aggrandisement will be mingled in every democratic convulsion, must always be almost entirely dependent on the proportion in which the generous and disinterested, or the selfish and grasping passions, previously prevail in the public mind. And, without disputing the influence of other causes, it may safely be affirmed that the main cause of the difference is to be found in the prevalence or the disregard of religious feeling; that it is in its ascendancy that the only effect-

ual safeguard can be found against the temptations to evil, which arise during the progress of social conflicts; and that of all desperate attempts, the most hopeless is, to rear the fabric of civil liberty or public virtue, on any other basis than that Faith, which alone is able to overcome the inherent principles of corruption in the human heart.

Of all the manifold and lasting evils which the thorough ascendency of democratic power, even for a short time, produces, perhaps the most lamentable and that of which France, under the empire, afforded the most memorable example, is the utter corruption of public opinion and confusion of ideas which it necessarily induces, terminating at last in the general application to public actions, of no other test but that of success. The way in which this deplorable consequence ensues is very apparent, and it points in the clearest manner to the principle on which alone a good government can be formed. Where property is the ruling, and numbers the controlling power, the opinion of the multitude is necessarily, in the general case, in favour of a virtuous administration, and adverse to the corruptions or oppression of government, because the majority have nothing to gain by such abuses; and where private interest does not intervene, it will always, as in a theatre, be on the side of virtue. However much disposed the holders of authority in such a state may be, unduly to extend its limits, or apply it to their own private purposes, as well as the public service, they are prevented from pushing such abuses to any great excess by the watchful jealousy of the popular classes in the state. But when the people are themselves, or by means of their demagogues, in possession, not merely of the power of controlling and watching the government, but of actually directing its movements and sharing in its profits, this salutary and indispensable check is at once destroyed. From being the determined enemies, the democratic party become at once the most decided supporters of every species of corruption, because they are now to profit by its effects; and although the opposite party, now excluded from office, may be loud in their condemnation of such proceedings, yet, being overthrown in the conflict, they are no longer able to direct the measures of government, and but a minority in the state, they are not, at least till after the lapse of a very long period, able to bring over the majority to their sentiments, or form that general concurrence which can properly be called public opinion. In the interim, every species of abuse is not only practised but loudly applauded by the democratic body now interested in their continuance; and hence, not only the destruction of that invaluable check which, under other circumstances, the opinion of the majority in opposition forms to the misdeeds of the few in power, but the total corruption and depravation of the feelings on public matters of that majority itself. The restraining has now become the moving power; the check upon evil the stimulant to corruption; the flywheel instead of the regulator of the machine, the headlong force which is to hurl it to destruction. Such is the extent of this evil, and such the rapidity with which, under the combined influence of temptation to themselves and impotence in their adversaries, the tyrant majority are seduced into depraved principles and a course of iniquity, that it may perhaps be pronounced the greatest, because the most lasting and irremediable, of the evils of democratic government.

General corruption of public opinion which the French Revolution produced.

Centralization in such a state of public feeling, is the great enemy which freedom has to dread, because it is the one which addresses itself to the principles which possess the most durable sway over the human heart. More than military force or anarchical

Rapid growth of centralization in this state of public feeling.

misrule, it has in every age been the grave of real liberty. If such a withering system is attempted in the healthful state of the body politic, that is, where property and education are the ruling, and numbers and popular zeal the controlling power, it will always experience from the natural jealousy of government on the part of all who do not participate in its advantages, the most decided opposition, and except in extraordinary circumstances, is not likely to meet with any considerable success. But the case is widely different when the democratic rulers are themselves in power. Centralization then goes on at the gallop; and for a very obvious reason, that both the necessities of government, the interests of its democratic supporters, and the experienced evils of the popular election of public functionaries concur in recommending it. The executive being erected on the ruins of, or against the wishes of the holders of property, has nothing to expect from their support, and, therefore, is fain to extend its influence, and provide for its numerous and needy followers, by the multiplication of offices all in the appointment of the central government; the popular leaders, hoping to profit largely by this accumulation of official patronage in the hands of their chiefs, not only in no ways oppose, but give their most cordial support to the same system; while the great mass of the people, disgusted with the weak or corrupt administration of the municipal or local functionaries who owed their elevation to popular election, rapidly and inevitably glide into the opinion, that no mode of appointment can be so bad as that under the evils of which they are now suffering, and that a practically good government can never be attained till the disposal of all offices of any importance is vested in the executive authority. Thus all classes, though for very different reasons, concur in supporting the system of centralization; a system, nevertheless, which, though doubtless often productive of improvement in the outset, in practical administration and local government, is the most formidable enemy in the end which the cause of freedom has to combat, and against which, therefore, it behoves its real friends in an especial manner to be on their guard. The anarchy which is the first effect of democratic ascendancy, necessarily and rapidly terminates in military despotism, that despotism itself, from its brutality and violence, cannot, in any well-informed state, be of very long endurance; but the irresistible sway of a centralized government, established by a democratic executive and sustained by the aid of selfish support from the popular party, may finally crush the spirit and extinguish all the blessings of freedom, by removing all the practical evils which preceding convulsions had occasioned, enlisting alike the friends of order and the partizans of democracy in its ranks, and engaging the most influential portion of the people by interested motives in its support. It was neither the vengeance of Marius, nor the proscriptions of Sylla, neither the aristocracy of Pompey, nor the genius of Cæsar, which finally prostrated the liberties of Rome; it was the centralized government of Augustus which framed the chains which could never be shaken off. There is the ultimate and deadly foe of freedom; there the enemy, ever ready to break in and reap the last spoils of the discord and infatuation of others. And wherever such a centralized system has grown up in an old established state, after a severe course of democratic suffering, it is not going too far to assert that the cause of freedom is utterly hopeless and that the seeds of death are implanted in the community (1).

Striking
opinion of
M. de Toc-
queville on
this subject.

(1) I am happy to find this opinion, which I have long entertained, supported by the great authority of M. de Tocqueville. "If absolute power," says he, "should re-establish

itself, in whatever hands, in any of the democratic states of Europe, I have no doubt it would assume a new form unknown to our fathers. When the great families and the spirit of clanship prevailed, the individual who had to contend with tyranny

Ability with which Napoléon took advantage of these circumstances to establish despotic power.

It is in these predisposing circumstances that we must look for the real causes, not merely of the despotism of Napoléon, but, of the ready reception which it met with from all classes, and the alacrity with which the fervent passions of democracy were converted at once into the debasing servility of Asiatic despotism. The Republican writers fall into the most palpable error when they accuse that great man of having overturned the principles of the Revolution, and of being the real cause of its terminating in the establishment, of arbitrary power. So far from it, he worked out these principles to their natural and unavoidable result; he did no more than reap the harvest, from the crop which had been sown by other and very different hands. The real authors of the despotism of Napoléon, were those who overturned the monarchy of Louis. It was Siéyes and Mirabeau, and the exalted spirits of the Constituent Assembly, who set in motion the chain of causes and effects which necessarily, in their final result, induced the chains of the empire. Doubtless, Napoléon availed himself with great skill of the extraordinary combination of circumstances, which had thus in a manner presented despotism to his grasp. The leading principles of his government, as Madame de Staël has well observed, were to respect studiously the *interests* which the Revolution had created, to turn its *passions* into the career of military conquest, or civil ambition, to open the career of success alike to all who deserved it, and to govern public opinion by a skilful use of the influence of the press (1). No maxims more likely to govern an active, energetic and corrupted people could possibly have been devised; but still they would have failed in producing the desired effect, and the attempt to enslave France would have proved abortive, even in his able hands, if success had not been rendered certain by the madness and guilt which preceded him. And in executing the mission on which he firmly believed he was sent, to close the wounds and put a stop to the horrors of the Revolution, we are not to imagine that he was to blame, so far at least as his domestic government was concerned. On the contrary, he took the only measures which remained practicable to restrain its excesses, or put a period to its suffering; and subsequent experience has abundantly proved that every government which was founded on any other principles, or practically gave the people any share of that power for which they had so passionately contended, involved in itself the seeds of its speedy destruction.

never felt himself alone, he was supported by his clients, his relations, his friends. But when his estates are divided, and races are confounded, where shall we find the spirit of family? What force will remain to the influence of habit among a people changing perpetually, where every act of tyranny will find a precedent in previous disorders, where every crime can be justified by an example: where nothing exists of sufficient antiquity to render its destruction an object of dread, and nothing can be figured so new that men are afraid to engage in it? What resistance would manners afford which have already received so many shocks? What could public opinion do, when twenty persons do not exist, bound together by any common tie; when they can no more meet with a man, a family, a body corporate, nor a class of society, which could represent, or act upon that opinion; when each citizen is equally poor, equally impotent, equally isolated, and can only oppose his individual weakness to the *organized strength of the central government*? To figure any thing analogous to the despotism which would then be established amongst us, we

would require to recur not to our own annals, we would be forced to recur to the frightful periods of Roman tyranny, when manners being corrupted, old recollections effaced, habits destroyed, opinions wavering, liberty deprived of its asylum under the laws, could no longer find a place of refuge; where no guarantee existing for the citizens, and they having none for themselves, men in power made a sport of the people, and princes wore out the clemency of the Heavens, rather than the patience of their subjects. They are blind indeed who look after democratic equality for the monarchy of Henry IV or Louis XIV. For my own part, when I reflect on the state to which many European nations have already arrived, and that to which others are fast tending, I am led to believe that soon there will be no place among them but for *democratic equality or the tyranny of the Cæsars*." TOCQUEVILLE, ii. 258, 259. What a picture of the effects of democratic triumph from a liberal writer, himself an eyewitness to its effects!

(1) Rev. Franç. ii 255.

But this
how great
soever an
evil, was un-
avoidable in
the state in
which
France was,
on the ter-
mination of
the Revolu-
tion.

And although nothing can be more certain than that centralization is the ultimate extinguisher of freedom, and the insidious foe which, elevated on its triumphs, is finally destructive of its principles; yet it is not, in such a state of society as France was in the time of Napoléon, to be regarded as an evil which it was the duty of a real patriot to resist. As long, indeed, as the elements of freedom exist in a state,—that is, as long as the higher and middling classes retain their public spirit and their possessions, it is impossible that public jealousy can be too strongly aroused on this subject, or that it can be too strongly impressed upon the people; that if all the interests of the state are centred in the hands of the executive, be it monarchical or democratic, the extinction, not only of the rights, but of the spirit, of freedom is at hand, and nothing remains to the state but an old age of decrepitude and decline. But if the people would shun these evils, they must pause in the threshold of their career, and avoid the destruction of those classes inferior to the throne, though superior to themselves, whose influence forms an essential ingredient in the composition of public freedom. The English did so—the rights of the middling ranks, the church, and the aristocracy, survived the triumphs of Cromwell, and in consequence, two hundred years of liberty have been enjoyed by the British nation. The French did not do so—the church, the middling ranks, and the aristocracy were utterly destroyed during the fervour of the Revolution; and in consequence, notwithstanding all their sufferings since that time, they have not enjoyed one hour of real freedom. Many struggles have ensued, and may ensue, for the possession of supreme power; many revolutions of the palace have shaken, and may hereafter shake, the fabric of their society; but no attempt has been made, or will be made, to limit the power of their executive or extend the liberty of their people. The centralized, despotic government of Napoléon, still remains untouched—the question with all parties is, not whether its powers shall be restrained, but who shall direct them? The more popular and democratic the faction is which gains the ascendancy, the more formidable does the action of the state machine become, because the weaker is the counteracting force which is to restrain its motions. If the extreme democratic party were to succeed to power, the force of the centralized government, based on the support of the people, would, in a short time, become wellnigh insupportable. In the triumphs which they achieved, and the crimes which they committed, the early revolutionists poured the poison which ever proves fatal to freedom through the veins of their country; with their own hands they dug the grave of its liberties; nothing remained to their descendants but to lie down and receive their doom. When this last deplorable effect has taken place, it becomes the duty of the patriot no longer to resist the centralizing system; but to support it as the only species of administration, under which, since freedom is unattainable, the minor advantage of a tranquil despotism can be attained.

Ultimate
effect on ge-
neral free-
dom of re-
sistance to
democracy
in England,
and its tri-
umph in
France.

It was a rule in one of the republics of antiquity, that no public monument should be voted to any person who had been engaged in the administration of affairs till ten years after his death, in order that the ultimate effect of his measures, whether for good or for evil, should be first fully developed. Judging by this principle, to how few characters in the French Revolution will the friends of freedom, in future times, rear a mausoleum; to how many will the abettors of arbitrary power, if their real opinions could be divulged, be inclined to erect statues! Looking forward for the short period of only

eighteen years, not a month in the lifetime of a nation, and seeing in the servility and sycophancy of the empire the necessary effects of the vehemence and injustice of the Constituent Assembly, what opinion are we to form of the self-styled patriots and philosophers of the day, who thus, in so short a time, blasted the prospects and withered the destiny of their country? Who were the real friends of freedom? Mr. Pitt and Mr. Burke, who, by combating the ambition of democracy and coercing its extravagance in this country, have bequeathed to their descendants the glorious and enduring fabric of British liberty; or Mirabeau and Danton, who, by achieving for its votaries a bloody triumph on the banks of the Seine, plunged their children and all succeeding ages into the inextricable fetters of a centralized despotism? It is fitting, doubtless, that youth should rejoice; but it is fitting also that manhood should be prosperous and old age contented; and the seducers, whether of individuals or nations, are little to be commended, who, taking advantage of the passions of early years or the simplicity of inexperience, precipitate their victims into a course of iniquity, and lead them, through a few months of vicious indulgence or delirious excitement, to a life of suffering and an old age of contempt!

CHAPTER XLVIII.

FOREIGN TRANSACTIONS OF EUROPE FROM THE PEACE OF TILSIT TO THE OPENING OF THE SPANISH WAR.

JULY 1807—SPRING 1808.

ARGUMENT.

General Suffering and Dismay produced in Russia by the treaty of Tilsit—Universal feeling of Despondence which it occasioned in Great Britain—Continental Changes by which it was followed—Constitution for the Grand Duchy of Warsaw—Constitution of the Kingdom of Westphalia—Oppressive Military Government of the Confederation of the Rhine and Hanse Towns—Excessive Rigour of the treatment which Prussia experienced—Fresh Requisitions imposed on its inhabitants—Limitation of its regular forces, and intersection of its territory by military roads—Wise internal measures adopted by the Prussian Government—Accession of Baron Stein to the Ministry—His firm Character and admirable Measures—Salutary Reforms which he introduced into the kingdom—Varied Causes of Distress in Prussia, which lead to the exile of Stein—History, Character, and great military Reforms of Scharnhorst—Rise and progress of the Tugendbund and Secret Societies in the north of Germany—Illustrious and patriotic Characters which that Secret Society embraced—Situation, Statistics, and Power of Austria at this period—She joins the Continental System, and thereby obtains the evacuation of Brauneau—Resources, Statistics, and Strength of the Austrian monarchy—Affairs in Sweden—its Continental forces are shut up in Stralsund—Siege and Fall of that fortress—Capture of the islands of Danholm and Rugen—Reasons which led to the Copenhagen Expedition—Resolution of the British Cabinet in regard to it—Equipment and departure of the Expedition—Ineffectual Negotiation with Denmark—Proclamation of Lord Cathcart to the inhabitants of Zealand, and reply of the Prince Regent of Denmark—Siege of Copenhagen—First action of Sir Arthur Wellesley in Europe—Surrender of the City and Fleet to the English forces—Great sensation excited in Europe by the Expedition—Justification of it soon afforded by Napoléon—General Feeling of England on the subject—Argument in Parliament against the Expedition—Argument in support of it by the Ministers—The secret Article of the Treaty of Tilsit regarding the Danish fleet is at length produced, which settles the question—Napoléon's real opinion regarding it—Ineffectual mediation of Russia between England and France—Rupture of that power with Great Britain—Concurring statement of the English and French Ambassadors on its causes—The Russians declare war against Sweden—Russian Manifesto against England—Declaration by Great Britain in reply—Denmark enters cordially into the war against Sweden and England—Affairs of Russia and Turkey—Curious secret Despatch from Savary at St. Petersburg to Napoléon on this subject—The Turks, finding themselves betrayed by the French, prepare themselves to renew the war—Changes in Constitution of the Italian States—Union of Parma and Placentia to France—Great Works undertaken at Milan—and state of Italy at this period—Farther encroachments of Napoléon on the side of Holland, Germany, and Italy—Reflections on the imminent hazard to Europe from the Treaty of Tilsit, and from the division of its kingdoms between two potentates—Importance of the blow already struck by England at Napoléon's new naval confederacy.

General suffering and dismay produced in Russia by the Treaty of Tilsit. If the treaty of Tilsit was productive of glory to the Emperor Napoléon, and transport and opulence to the citizens of his victorious capital, it was the commencement of a period of suffering, ignominy, and bondage to the other capitals of continental Europe. Russia, it was true, had extricated herself unscathed from the strife; her military renown had suffered no diminution on the field of Eylau, or in the agony of Friedland; it was apparent to all the world, that she had been outnumbered by banded Europe, not conquered by France, in the strife. But still she had failed in the object of the war; her arms, instead of being advanced to the Rhine, were thrown back to the Niemen; in indignant silence her warriors had re-entered their country, and surrendered to their irresistible rivals the mastery of Western Europe. If the Czar had been seduced

by the artifice of Napoléon, or dazzled by the halo of glory which encircled his brows; if the army was proud of having so long arrested, with inferior forces, the conqueror before whom the Austrian and Prussian monarchies had sunk to the dust, the nobles were not carried away by the general illusion; they saw clearly, amidst the flattery which was lavished on their rulers, the gilded chains which were imposed on their country. They could not disguise from themselves that France had not only acquired by this treaty an irresistible preponderance in Western and Central Europe, but subjected Russia herself to her command; that the price at which all the advantages of the treaty to the empire of the Czar had been purchased was its accession to the Continental System, and the closing of its ports to the ships of Great Britain; and that thus not only were they likely to be deprived of half their wonted revenue from their estates, by losing the principal market for their produce, but compelled to contribute to the aggrandizement of a rival empire, already too powerful for their independence, and which, it was foreseen, would, ere long, aim a mortal stroke at their national existence. So strong and universal were these feelings among the whole aristocratic and commercial circles, that when General Savary, whom Napoléon had chosen as his ambassador at the Russian capital, on account of the address he had exhibited, and the favour with which he had been received by Alexander at the time of the battle of Austerlitz (1), arrived at St.-Petersburg, he experienced, by his own avowal, the utmost difficulty in finding any furnished hotel where he would obtain admission; and during the first six weeks of his stay there, though he was overwhelmed with attention from the Emperor, he did not receive one invitation from any of the nobility; and while he saw the guests whom he met at the palace depart in crowds to the balls and concerts of that scene of festivity, he himself returned, mortified and disconsolate, from the Imperial table to his own apartments (2).

General
feeling of
despondence
which pre-
vailed in
Great Bri-
tain.

In the British dominions the disastrous intelligence produced a different, but perhaps still more mournful feeling. England was, by her maritime superiority, relieved from the apprehensions of immediate danger, and the general resolution to maintain the contest continued unabated; but a feeling of despondence pervaded the public mind, and the strife was persevered in rather from the stern principle of dogged resistance, or a sense of the impossibility of making a secure accommodation, than from any hope that the war could be brought to a successful issue. This general impression cannot be better portrayed than in the words of Sir James Mackintosh, the able champion, in its early days, of the French Revolution:—"I do not indeed despair of the human race; but the days and nights of mighty revolutions have not yet been measured

(1) *Ante*, v. 235.

(2) Savary, iii. 98. 100. Hard, x. 28, 29.

In Savary's case the general aversion to the cause of France was increased by the part which he was known to have taken in the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, which had been one of the leading causes of the irritation which led to the war. Napoléon, charmed at having extricated himself with credit from so perilous and unprofitable a contest, gave the most positive injunctions to his envoy at the Russian court at all hazards to avoid its renewal. "I have just concluded peace," said he to Savary; "they tell me I have done wrong, and that I shall repeat it; but, by my faith, we have had enough of war—we must give repose to the world. I am going to send you to St Petersburg as chargé d'affaires till an ambassador is appointed; you will have the direction of my affairs there; lay it down as the

ruling principle of your conduct that any further contest is to be avoided; nothing would displease me so much as to be involved in that quarter in fresh embarrassments. Talleyrand will tell you what to do, and what has been arranged between the Emperor of Russia and me. I am about to give repose to the army in the country we have conquered, and to enforce payment of the contribution; that is the only difficulty which I anticipate; but regulate yourself by this principle, that *I will on no account be again drawn into the contest*. Never speak of war; in conversation studiously avoid every thing which may give offence; contravene no usage; ridicule no custom. Neglect nothing which may draw closer and perpetuate the bonds of alliance now contracted with that country."—SAVARY, iii. 96, 97, and HARD, x. 29.

by human intellect. Though the whole course of human affairs may be towards a better state, experience does not justify us in supposing that many steps of the progress may not be immediately for the worse. The race of man may at last reach the promised land; but there is no assurance that the present generation will not perish in the wilderness. The prospect of the nearest part of futurity, of all that we can discover, is very dismal. The mere establishment of absolute power in France is the least part of the evil; it might be necessary for a time to moderate the vibrations of the pendulum in that agitated state; but what are the external effects of these convulsions? Europe is now covered with a multitude of dependent despots, whose existence depends on their maintaining the paramount tyranny in France. *The mischief has become too intricate to be unravelled in our day*; an evil greater than despotism, or rather the worst and most hideous form of despotism, approaches; a monarchy literally universal seems about to be established; then all the spirit, variety, and emulation of separate nations, which the worst forms of internal government have not utterly extinguished, will vanish. And in that state of things, if we may judge from past examples, the whole energy of human intellect and virtue will languish, and can scarce be revived otherwise than by an infusion of barbarism (1).” Such were the anticipations of the greatest intellects of the age, even among those who had originally been most favourable to the democratic principle, and that, too, on the eve of the Peninsular campaigns, and at no great distance from the general resurrection of Europe after the Moscow retreat; a memorable example of the fallacy of any political conclusions founded upon the supposed durability of the causes at any one time in operation; and of the oblivion of that provision for the remedy of intolerable evils, by the reaction of mankind against their sufferings, and of the general intermixture of the principles of good and evil in human affairs, which, as it is the most general lesson to be deduced from history, so is it fitted above all others to inspire moderation in prosperous, and constancy in adverse affairs.

Constitution for the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The political changes consequent in Central Europe on the treaty of Tilsit were speedily developed. On his route to Paris, Napoléon met a deputation of eight of the principal nobles, in the French interest, of Prussian Poland at Dresden; and Talleyrand, in a few days, produced a constitution for the Grand Duchy, calculated, as he thought, at once to satisfy the general wish for a restoration of their nationality, and accord with the despotic views of the Emperors of the East and West. By this deed, which was produced with more than usual rapidity, even in those days of constitution manufacture, the ducal crown was declared to be hereditary in the Saxon family; the Grand Duke was invested with the whole executive power, and he alone had the privilege of proposing laws to the Diet, with whom the prerogative remained of passing or rejecting them. This Diet was composed of a Senate of eighteen, named by the Grand Duke, embracing six bishops and twelve lay nobles, and a Chamber of Deputies of a hundred members; sixty being named by the nobility, and forty by the boroughs. The Chambers, like those at Paris, were doomed to silence; they could only decide on the arguments laid before them, on the part of the Government, by the orators of the Council of State—and of the Chambers, by commissions appointed by them. This mockery of a Parliament was to assemble only once in two years, and then to sit only fifteen days. The ardent plebeian noblesse of Poland, whose democratic passions had so long brought desolation on their

(1) Sir James Mackintosh to W. Ogilvie, Feb. 24, 1808. Mem. i. 383, 384.

country, found little in these enactments to gratify their wishes; but a substantial improvement was made in the condition of the peasantry, by a clause declaring that the whole serfs were free. No time, however, was left for reflection; the deputies were constrained to accept it; and the new constitution of Poland was not only framed, but sworn to at Dresden during the brief period of Napoléon's sojourn there on his route to Paris (1).

On 22d July, 1807, The constitution given to the new kingdom of Westphalia was, in like manner, founded entirely upon the model of that of France. It Constitution of the Kingdom of Westphalia, Dec. 15, 1807, contained a King, Council of State, Senate, silent aristocratic Legislature, and public orators, like all those cast at this period, from the Parisian mould. The throne was declared hereditary in the family of Jérôme Bonaparte, the Emperor's brother, and first sovereign; one half of the allodial territories of the former sovereigns, of which the new kingdom was composed, were placed at the disposal of Napoléon, as a fund from which to form estates for his military followers; provision was made for payment of the military contributions levied by France, before any part of the revenue was obtained by the new sovereign; the kingdom was declared to form part of the Confederation of the Rhine, and its military contingent, drawn from a population of about two millions of souls, fixed at 25,000 men; in default of heirs-male of his body, the succession to the throne was to devolve to Napoléon and his heirs by birth or adoption. Every corporate right and privilege was abolished—trial by jury and in open court introduced in criminal cases; all exclusive privileges and exemptions from taxation annulled—the nobility preserved, but deprived of their former invidious rights. The Chamber of Deputies consisted of a hundred members, of whom seventy were chosen from the landed aristocracy, fifteen from the commercial, and fifteen from the literary classes. Salutary changes! if the equality which they were calculated to induce was the enjoyment of equal rights and general security, but utterly fatal to freedom, if they were only fitted to introduce an equality of servitude, and disable any individuals or associated bodies from taking the lead in the contest for the public liberties with the executive power (2).

Oppressive military government of the Confederation of the Rhine and Hanse Towns. The states of the Rhenish confederacy had flattered themselves, that the general peace concluded on the shores of the Niemen would finally deliver them from the scourge of warlike armaments and military contributions, but they were soon cruelly undeceived.

Shortly after the general pacification, and before they had recovered from the burden of maintaining, clothing, and lodging the numerous corps of the Grand Army which traversed their territories on the road to the Rhine, they were overwhelmed by the entry of a fresh body of forty thousand men, who issued from France and took the route of the Vistula, still at the sole expense of the allied states. They were speedily followed by a body of Spaniards, drawn from Italy, and which went to augment the corps of Romana, under the orders of Bernadotte, on the shores of the Baltic; a sad omen for succeeding times, when the conclusion of peace was immediately succeeded by fresh irruptions of armed men, and burdensome preparations, at the cost of the allied states, for future hostilities. It soon appeared that the stipulations in favour of the conquered territories in the formal treaties, were to be a mere empty name; it had been provided at Tilsit that Dantzic was to be a free city, governed by its own magistrates; but Rapp, the new governor, was speedily introduced at the head of a numerous

(1) Harl. ix. 448, 449. Bigu. vi. 387, 388. Lucches ii. 14, 19.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 783. State Papers. Bigu. vi. 389, 390. Mart. Sup., iv. 493,

French garrison, who summarily expelled the Prussian inhabitants, and began the rigorous enforcement of the French military contributions and the Continental System. The same system of government was sternly acted upon in Hamburg, Bremen, Lubeck, and all the Hanse Towns; Bourrienne continued to enforce it with such severity at Hamburg, that the trade of the place was entirely ruined, and large sums remitted quarterly to the Tuileries, out of the last fruits of the commercial enterprise of the Hanse Towns (1).

Excessive
rigour of the
treatment
which Prus-
sia experi-
enced.

But most of all did the ruthless hand of conquest fall with unmitigated rigour on the inhabitants of Prussia. Hard as their lot appeared to be, as it was chalked out in the treaty of Tilsit, it was yet enviable, compared to that which, in the course of the pacification which followed, actually ensued from the oppressive exactions of the French Government, and the unbounded insolence of its soldiery. Immediately after the conclusion of the treaty which reft them of half their dominions, the

King and Queen repaired to Memel, where they were compelled to sign a fresh convention, which, under pretext of providing for the liquidation of the contributions and speedy evacuation of their territories, in effect subjected them, without any appearance of termination, to those intolerable burdens. By this treaty it was provided that the evacuation of the fortresses, with the exception of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, should take place before the 1st November; but that on the condition only, that the whole contributions were previously paid up; a condition which it was well known could not be complied with, as they amounted to above four times the revenue of the whole kingdom before its dismemberment (2), in addition to the burden of feeding, clothing, paying, and lodging above one hundred and fifty thousand men, for which no credit was given in estimating their amount by the French commissaries. By a second convention, concluded at Elbing three months afterwards, the

Oct. 13.

unhappy monarch, instead of the single military road through his territories from Dresden to Warsaw, stipulated by the treaty of Tilsit, was compelled to allow five passages, two for troops and five for commercial purposes, to Saxony, Poland, and their respective allies—a stipulation which in effect cut them through the middle, and subjected the inhabitants on these

Nov. 5.

roads to unnumbered exactions and demands, both from the French and allied troops. Rapp soon after, instead of a territory of two leagues in breadth around the walls of Dantzic, as provided in the treaty, seized upon one

Nov. 9.

two German miles, or eight English miles broad, counting from the extreme point of its outworks; while by a third convention, in the beginning of November, Prussia was not only forced to cede to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw New Silesia and the circle of Michelau, no inconsiderable addition to the losses, already enormous, imposed by the treaty of Tilsit, but to ratify the ample grants out of the hereditary revenues of the Prussian crown made by the Emperor Napoléon in favour of Berthier, Mortier, and other of his military chiefs (3).

Fresh re-
quisitions
imposed on
Prussia,
limitation of
its regular
forces, and
imposition
of fresh mi-
litary roads.

Vexatious as these fresh demands were, and cruelly as their bitterness was aggravated by the arrogant manner in which compliance was demanded by the French authorities, they were inconsiderable compared to the enormous burden of the military requisitions which, from this time till the opening of the Russian campaign, perpetually drained away all the resources of Prussia. Not content with the crushing exactions to the amount of six hundred millions

(1) Bour. vii. 231, 240. Hard. ix. 442, 443, Lucches. ii. 14, 17.

(2) They amounted to 600,000,000 francs, or L.24,000,000; and the revenue of Prussia, before

the war, was about L.4,500,000.—*Vide ante*, v. 87, and vi. 142.

(3) Hard. ix. 451, 454. Mart. Sup. iv. 452, 474.

of francs (L.24,000,000), already imposed during the war, Daru, the French receiver-general for the north of Germany, brought forward after the peace fresh claims to the amount of 154,000,000 (L.6,200,000); and although that able functionary, on the earnest representations of the King, consented to take 55,000,000 francs off this enormous requisition, the French minister Champagny, by the directions of Napoléon, raised it again to the original sum. It was at length fixed at one hundred and forty millions, (L.5,600,000), and Glogau, Stettin, and Custrin pledged for its final liquidation, on condition that, till that took place, a French corps of ten thousand men, should be put in possession of these fortresses, and maintained there entirely at the expense of Prussia. All this was exclusive of the cost of feeding, paying, and clothing the whole French troops still on or passing through the Prussian territory, who were not short of a hundred thousand men. In addition to this, the King was obliged to bind himself not to keep on foot during ten years, more than forty-two thousand men, and to permit his dominions to be traversed by five additional military roads between Warsaw, Dresden, Dantzic, and Magdeburg. Thus, while his territory was intersected in every direction by military chaussées for the benefit of his enemies, his chief fortresses still in their hands, and his subjects oppressed by the merciless exactions of a prodigious army, quartered apparently without end upon their industry, his own troops were reduced to so low an amount as to be barely equal to the collection of the revenue required by so vast a host of depredators. And to complete the picture of his misfortunes, the King was immediately compelled to adopt the Continental System, and declare war against Great Britain; a measure which, by exposing his harbours to blockade, and totally destroying his foreign commerce, seemed to render utterly hopeless the discharge of the overwhelming pecuniary burdens with which his kingdom was loaded (1)!

Wise internal measures adopted by the Prussian government. To all human appearance the power of Prussia was now completely destroyed; and the monarchy of the Great Frederick seemed to be bound in fetters more strict and galling than had ever, in modern times, been imposed on an independent state. And, doubtless, if these misfortunes had fallen on a people and a government not endowed in the highest degree with the spirit of patriotism and constancy in misfortune, this effect would have taken place. But adversity is the true test of political as well as private virtue, and those external calamities which utterly crush the feeble or degenerate, serve only to animate the exertions and draw forth the energy of the uncorrupted portion of mankind. While the diplomatists of Europe were speculating on the entire extinction of Prussia as an independent power, and the only question appeared to be, to what fortunate neighbour the remnant of her territories would be allotted, a new and improved system of administration was adopted in all the branches of her government, and the foundation was laid in present suffering and humiliation, of future elevation and glory. Instead of sinking in despair under the misfortunes by which they were oppressed, the King and his Ministers were only roused by them to additional exertions to sustain the public fortunes. During the long period of peace which Prussia had experienced since the treaty of Basle, in the midst of wars and disasters all around her, Frederick William had enjoyed ample opportunities for cultivating his natural taste for the fine arts; and already a gallery of paintings was, at the opening of the campaign, far advanced at Berlin, which promised ere long to rival the far-famed mu-

(1) Hard. ix. 453, 455. Mart. Sup., iv. 452, 474, 483.

seums of Munich, Dresden, or Paris. But all these gems in his crown were torn away by the ruthless hand of conquest; and his much loved monuments of genius now adorned the halls of the Louvre or graced the palace of the French Emperor. Driven by necessity to more important pursuits, the first care of the King, upon the termination of hostilities, was to free the public service from those whose temporizing and unworthy policy, or treacherous and pusillanimous conduct, had induced the general calamities. Haugwitz remained forgotten and neglected at his country residence; Hardenberg, whose great abilities were loudly called for in the present crisis, and who had been the leading Minister since hostilities had been resolved on, was compelled by the jealousy of Napoléon, not only to leave the government, but retire from the country; and it was only after the withdrawal of the French armies that he obtained leave to re-enter Prussia and return to his rural seat of Templeberg. The chancellor Goldbeck and all the inferior ministers, Massow, Reck, d'Auger, Thulmeyer, and their coadjutors, were dismissed, to the great satisfaction of the public; and the generals and inferior officers, who had so disgracefully yielded up the bulwarks of the monarchy after the catastrophe of Jena, were in a body removed from the army. Yet even here the humane and perhaps prudent disposition of the King, prevailed over the justly roused feeling of general indignation at such unworthy betrayers of national trusts; and instead of grounding their dismissal on their notorious dereliction of duty, it was in general rested on the destitute state of the public treasury and the necessity of rigorous economy in every branch of administration. The enquiry, however, under the direction of the Princes Royal, was carried through every department and grade in the army; and to demonstrate its entire impartiality, the heroic Blücher himself was subjected to the same test with his less intrepid brethren in arms (1)!

Accession of
Baron Stein
to the Mi-
nistry. His
firm charac-
ter, and ad-
mirable
measures.

Deprived by the unworthy jealousy of Napoléon of the assistance of Hardenberg's counsels, the King of Prussia had still the courage, in the almost desperate state of his fortunes, to have recourse to a statesman who, like him, had been distinguished in an especial manner by his candour. It is to the great abilities, enlightened patriotism, and enduring constancy of the BARON STEIN, that Prussia is indebted for the measures which laid the foundation of the resurrection of the monarchy. This eminent man, born in 1736, had entered the public service in the Administration of the State Mines, under the great Frederick, in 1780; but his admirable talents for business soon raised him to the direction of the customs and excise in 1784, which he held till the breaking out of the war in 1806, when he withdrew to his estates, and remained in retirement till again Oct. 5. called to the public service in the beginning of October, 1807. During his active employment he acquired, by the accuracy and fidelity of his administration, the esteem both of his sovereign and his fellow-citizens; and, during his subsequent retirement, he had ample opportunities for meditating on the causes which had brought such calamities on his country. So clearly were his ideas formed, and so decided his conviction as to the only means which remained of reinstating the public affairs, that he commenced at once a vigorous, but yet cautious system of amelioration; and, only four days after Oct. 9. his appointment as Minister of the Interior, a royal decree appeared, which introduced a salutary reform into the constitution (2).

By this ordinance, the peasants and burghers obtained the right, hitherto confined to the nobles of acquiring and holding landed property, while they

(1) Hard, ix. 456, 459. Lucches, ii. 8, 17.

(2) Hard, ix. 460, 461.

Admirable
reforms
which he
introduced
in Prussia.

in their turn were permitted, without losing cast, to engage in the pursuits of commerce and industry. Landholders were allowed, under reservation of the rights of their creditors, to separate their estates into distinct parcels, and alienate them to different persons. Every

Oct. 9. species of slavery, whether contracted by birth, marriage or agreement, was prohibited subsequent to the 11th November, 1810; and every servitude, *corvée*, or obligation of service or rent, other than those founded on the rights of property or express agreement, was for ever abolished. By a

Nov. 19. second ordinance, published six weeks afterwards, certain important franchises were conferred on municipalities. By this wise decree, which is in many respects the magna charta of the Prussian burghs, it was provided that the burghers should enjoy councillors of their own election, for regulating all local and municipal concerns: that a third of the number should go out by rotation, and be renewed by an election every year; that the council thus chosen should assemble twice a-year to deliberate on public affairs; that two burgomasters should be at the head of the magistracy, one of whom should be chosen by the King from a list of three presented, and the other by the councillors; and that the police of the burgh should be administered by a syndic appointed for twelve years, and who should also have a seat in the municipal council. The administration of the *haute Police*, or that connected with the state, was reserved to government. By a third or-

Nov. 24. dinance, an equally important alteration was made in favour of the numerous class of debtors, whom the public calamities had disabled from performing their engagements, by prohibiting all demand for the capital sums till the 24th June, 1810, providing at the same time for the punctual payment of the interest, under pain of losing the benefit of the ordinance. Thus, at the very moment that France, during the intoxication consequent on the triumphs of Jena and Friedland, was losing the last remnant of the free institutions which had been called into existence during the fervour and crimes of the Revolution, Prussia, amidst the humiliation of unprecedented disasters, and when groaning under the weight of foreign chains, was silently relaxing the fetters of the feudal system, and laying the foundation, in a cautious and guiltless reformation of experienced grievances, for the future erection of those really free institutions which can never be established on any other basis than those of justice, order, and religion (1).

Varied
causes of
distress in
Prussia.
Stein is
exiled.

In the prosecution, however, of these glorious, because wise and judicious, plans of public improvement, Stein had great difficulties to encounter. Government was overwhelmed by a multitude of civil servants, to the number of seven thousand, who had been deprived of their situations in the ceded provinces, and whose just prayers for relief could not be attended to by a treasury drained of the last farthing by the charges of the war, and the inordinate requisitions of the French armies. The rapid absorption of the precious metals by these rigorous taskmasters, the general practice of hoarding which their depredations occasioned, and the necessity in consequence of having recourse to a currency of a baser alloy, or paper money, to supply the deficiency, had totally deranged the monetary system, and occasioned a rapid enhancement of prices, under which the labouring classes suffered severely. The closing of the harbours against foreign commerce, in consequence of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, put the finishing stroke to the public distress, and raised such a ferment that the King was obliged to yield to the general clamour and the representations

(1) Hard. ix. 460, 463. Lucches. ii. 17, 18.

of the French authorities, who dreaded the effects of such an intrepid system of government, and sent Stein into honourable exile in Russia. So rapidly was this insisted on by the Ministers of Napoléon, that the last of these regenerating measures, dated 24th November, 1807, were signed by his successors, M. Dohna and Altenstein. But by this ebullition of jealousy the French Emperor gained nothing; the merit of Stein was too generally known by the intelligent classes to be forgotten; from his retreat in Courland he really directed the Prussian councils; and by the appointment of SCHARNHORST to the elevated office of Minister of War, the door was opened to a variety of important changes in that department, which were of the highest consequence six years afterwards in the mortal struggle for European freedom (1).

History, character, and great military reforms of Scharnhorst. Gerard David de Scharnhorst, who was now intrusted with the military direction of Prussia, and whose great scientific abilities subsequently rendered him so distinguished in the fields of European glory, had quitted the Hanoverian service for that of Prussia in 1801. Taken prisoner at Lubeck, but subsequently exchanged, he had powerfully contributed, by his decisive conduct at the critical moment with Lestocq's corps, to the brilliant result of the battle of Eylau. In him a blameless life and amiable manners were combined with the purest patriotism and the soundest judgment; exalted attainments were undisfigured by pride; vigour of thought was adorned by simplicity of character. The perfection of the French military organization, as well as the energy of their army, appeared to him in painful contrast beside the numerous defects, and dejected spirit, of that over which he now presided; but instead of sinking in despair under the difficulties of his situation, he was only inspired by the magnitude of the evil with additional ardour in the work of amelioration, and induced, like Stein, to take advantage of the general consternation to effect several salutary reforms, which, in more tranquil times, might have been seriously obstructed by the prejudices of aristocratic birth, or the suggestions of interested ambition. Boldly applying to the military department the admirable principles by which Stein had secured the affections of the burgher classes, he threw open to the whole citizens the higher grades of the army, from which they had hitherto been excluded, abolished the degrading corporal punishments by which the spirit of the soldier had been withered, and removed those invidious distinctions, which, by exempting some classes from the burden of personal service in the army, made its weight fall with additional severity on those who were not relieved. Every department of the service underwent his searching eye; in all he introduced salutary reforms, rectified experienced abuses, and electrified the general spirit, by opening to merit the career of promotion; while the general strength of the army was silently augmented to an extent which afterwards became in the highest degree important, by the introduction of an equally simple and efficacious regulation. By the subsisting engagements with Napoléon, it was provided that Prussia should not keep on foot more than forty-two thousand men, a stipulation which at once cast her down to the rank of a fourth-rate power, and totally disabled her from assuming the attitude of resistance to the numerous and hourly increasing demands of the French armies. To elude its operation, and at the same time avoid any direct or obvious infringement of the treaty, he took care never to have more than the agreed on number of men at once in arms, but no sooner were the young soldiers sufficiently drilled than they were sent home to their hearths, and other recruits called

(1) Hard, ix. 464, 466.

to the national standards, who, in like manner, after a brief period of service, made way for others in succession. By this simple but admirable system, which is the true secret of the political strength and military renown of Prussia, so much beyond the physical resources of the monarchy, a military spirit was diffused through the whole population; service in the army came to be considered, instead of a degradation, as an agreeable recreation after the severe labours of pacific life; the manner, carriage, and intelligence of those who returned from their standards were so much superior to those of the rustics who had remained at home, that no Prussian damsel would look at a youth who had not served his country; the passion for arms became universal; and while forty thousand only were enrolled in the regular army, two hundred thousand brave men were trained to arms and ready at a moment's warning to join the standards of their country (1).

From these salutary changes, joined to the oppressive exactions of the French armies, and the enormous contributions levied by the government through the whole of the north of Germany, arose another effect, not less important in its ultimate consequences upon the future fate of Europe. Grievously oppressed by foreign depredation, deprived by national disaster of domestic protection, surrounded within and without by rapacious enemies or impotent friends; deprived of their commerce, their manufactures, the vent for their industry, with their farm produce, liable to perpetual seizure by bands of rapacious men armed with Imperial authority, the inhabitants both of the towns and the country had no resource but in mutual and voluntary associations. The universality of the suffering produced a corresponding unanimity of opinion; the divisions which existed before the war disappeared under the calamities to which it had given birth; the jealousies of rank or class yielded to the pressure of common distress. Genius and learning, amidst the general despondency, stood forth as the leaders, privately and cautiously indeed, but still the leaders, of public thought. Societies were every where formed, in profound secrecy, for the future deliverance of Germany; the professors at the Universities were at their head; the ardent youth who attended their seminaries joyfully enrolled themselves in their ranks; the nobles and statesmen at the helm of affairs lent them what, with such materials, was much required, the aid of their wisdom and the benefits of their experience. Stein was at their head; from his retreat in Russia he exercised a secret but unlimited sway over the minds of all the energetic and generous portion of the north of Germany. Arndt, who was soon after compelled to seek an asylum from French persecution under the same empire, lent the cause all the aid of his nervous eloquence; Professor Jahn supported it with powerful zeal; Hardenberg was active in its behalf; Scharnhorst, and almost all the councillors of the King, though compelled publicly to discountenance its proceedings, were in reality, either in secret members of the TUGENDBUND (2), or warmly disposed to second its efforts (3).

There, too, were to be seen those exalted spirits, who subsequently, through evil report and good report, in prosperity and adversity, stood foremost in the bands of European freedom: Schill, whose ardent patriotism, in advance of his countrymen, precipitated, in 1809, to his own ruin, that premature resistance which four years longer of ignominy and bondage were required to render universal; Wittgenstein, the future antagonist of Napo-

(1) Hard. ix. 467, 468.

(2) Society or Bond of Virtue.

(3) Hard. ix. 467, 469.

l  on, whose clear judgment, notwithstanding the prudent reserve of his character, saw in these associations the only means of future salvation; Blucher, whose generous and inconsiderate ardour threw him early into their arms, as it afterwards warmed him in the headlong charge against the enemy; Gneisenau, whose scientific abilities supplying what was wanting in his gallant associate, proved so fatal to the arms of France. The nobles, straitened in their fortunes by the French requisitions, and insulted in their persons by the French officers; the peasants, ground to the dust by merciless exactions supported by military force; the merchants, ruined by the Continental System, and reduced to despair by the entire stoppage of foreign commerce; the burghers, become the bitterest enemies of Napol  on, from his entire overthrow of those liberal principles on which the early fortunes of the Revolution had been founded—all combined to join the secret societies, from which alone they could one day hope for the deliverance of their country. The machinery put in motion for the attainment of these objects, was indeed highly dangerous and capable of being applied to the worst purposes; but the necessities of their situation gave the lovers of the Fatherland no alternative. Alike in town and country, equally among the rich and the poor, the Tugendbund spread its ramifications; a central body of directors at Berlin guided their movements; provincial committees carried their orders into effect; and, as is usual in such cases, a dark, unseen authority, was obeyed with an implicit alacrity unknown to the orders of the successor of Charlemagne. Thus, while France, rioting in the triumph of Tilsit, and deeming her power established on an immovable basis, was fawning on her rulers with Eastern adulation, and bartering her freedom for the enjoyments of gold, Prussia, taking counsel from adversity, was preparing in silence, in the amelioration of her institutions and the energy of her inhabitants, that real regeneration which, independent of individuals, unstained by crime, was destined hereafter to raise her from the lowest state of depression to an unexample height of prosperity and glory (1).

Situation,
statistics,
and power
of Austria.

Bent to the earth by the disasters of Austerlitz, but still possessing the physical and material resources of power, Austria, during the desperate strife from the Saale to the Niemen, was silently but uninterruptedly repairing her losses, and preparing to resume her place in the rank of independent nations. If she had lost the opportunity, during the preceding winter, of interposing with decisive effect on the banks of the Elbe, she had the magnitude of previous losses, the mortal hazard of an unsuccessful demonstration, to offer in her excuse. Sufficient reliance, it was thought, could not yet be placed on the constancy of Russia; suffering had not adequately tamed the hereditary jealousy of the Prussian government. But the observers of the Imperial cabinet augured, not less from the measures which they were in the course of adopting, than the known perseverance and constancy of their policy, that they had by no means relinquished the contest, and that if a favourable opportunity should occur, they would yet appear foremost in the struggle for European freedom. During the interval of hostilities, the Aulic Council had been indefatigable in their efforts to restore the equipment and revive the spirit of the army. The artillery, abstracted from the arsenal of Vienna, had been regained in great part, by purchase from the French government; vast exertions had been made to supply the horses wanting in the cavalry regiments; the infantry had been, to a considerable extent, recruited by the prisoners who returned from France, or the

(1) Hard. ix. 467, 469, x. 74, 75.

new soldiers who had been unostentatiously invited to the Imperial standards (4).

She joins the Continental System, and obtains the evacuation of Braunau. In open violation of the treaty of Presburg, however, France had hitherto retained the fortress of Braunau, on their western frontier, on the absurd pretext, that Russia, an independent power, over whom the Imperial cabinet had no control, had not, agreeably to that treaty, evacuated the mouths of the Cattaro. Other measures, equally significant, told them that they were regarded by the great conqueror only in the highest rank of vassals. Andreossi, the French ambassador at Vienna, openly used the most menacing language, both before and after the treaty of Tilsit; new states were, without either notice or negotiation, added by a simple decree of the French Emperor to the Confederation of the Rhine (2); and Aug. 24, 1807. by a summary decree the Cabinet of Vienna was ordered, forthwith, to adhere to the Continental System. By yielding on this vital point, however, and at the same time making a skilful use of the termination of the dispute with Russia about the mouths of the Cattaro, by the treaty of Tilsit, and the growing anxiety of the French Emperor to increase his forces on the Pyrenean frontier, with a view to his ambitious projects in the Spanish peninsula, Metternich, to the great joy of the inhabitants of Vienna, who regarded its prolonged occupation as a continued badge of subjection, at length succeeded in obtaining the removal of the French troops from the ramparts of Braunau; and the Imperial dominions, still flourishing and powerful, notwithstanding all their losses, ceased to be polluted by the presence of a stranger (5).

- (1) Hard. ix. 445, 446. Report of Archduke Charles, Aug. 10, 1807.
- (2) The principalities of Anhalt, Reuss, Ladepe, Schwartzburg, and Waldeck.
- (3) Hard. ix. 445, 447.

The resources of Austria in 1807, notwithstanding the loss of Tyrol and other provinces by the peace of Presburg, were still very great; and they are an object of interest, considering the prominent share which that power soon after took in the war. They are thus stated by Baron Lichtenstein: —

(Resources and statistics of the Austrian empire.)		
Population,		24,900,000
Inhabited towns,		796
Burghs,		2,012
Villages,		65,572
Composed of		
Germans,	6,400,000	
Slavonians,	13,000,000	
Hungarians,	3,400,000	
Poles, Jews, Bohemians,	2,100,000	
		24,900,000
Divided by religion as follows: —		
Catholics,		19,292,000
Greek Church,		2,100,000
Zuinglians,		2,000,000
Protestants,		1,000,000
Jews,		508,000
Florins.		
Revenue,	100,000,000, or	L.8,000,000
Public debt,	900,000,000, or	72,000,000
Civil list and court annual charges,	11,000,000, or	900,000
Army,	40,000,000, or	3,200,000
Interest and charges of debt,		3,900,000
Army—Infantry,	271,800	
Cavalry,	50,000	
Artillery,	14,300	
Guards,	3,000	
		339,100 men.
Florins.		
Besides the Hungarian Insurrection, or levy en masse.		
Annual produce of Agriculture,	760,000,000, or	L.61,000,000
Minerals,	47,000,000, or	3,600,000
Number of oxen,	3,000,000	
horses,	1,500,000	

—LICHTENSTEIN'S Stat. de la Monarchie Autrichienne, and HARD, ix. Pièces Just, K.

Affairs of
Sweden.
The Swedes
are shut up
in Stral-
sund.

In the general wreck of the hopes of Europe on the shores of the Niemen, the King of Sweden, who possessed a spirit worthy of a more powerful monarchy and a greater part on the political theatre, was not discouraged. His semi-insular situation enabled him to bid defiance to the threats of the French Emperor; the passage round the Gulf of Bothnia was scarcely practicable; and with the assistance of England, he did not despair of being able to make head against his enemies, even if Russia should be added to their already formidable league. No sooner, therefore, did the English squadron, with the advanced guard of the land forces, which had been destined for the support of Russia and Prussia, appear in the

July 3. Baltic, than he denounced the armistice, just nineteen days after the battle of Friedland. Napoléon, noways displeased at this unexpected resumption of hostilities, immediately made preparations for bringing them to a rapid conclusion. Thirty thousand men were speedily assembled under Marshal Brune, who, as soon as hostilities recommenced on the 13th July,

July 13. began to press on all sides the fifteen thousand Swedes who occupied Pomerania. Unable to bear up against so great a preponderance of force,

July 15. the Swedish generals, after some inconsiderable combats, took shelter under the cannon of Stralsund; and Brune completed the investment of the place in the middle of July (1).

Siege and
fall of that
fortress.

The King of Sweden was soon made to perceive, from bitter experience, that after the pacification of Tilsit, the possession of his transmarine dominions was held by the most precarious tenure. At first, the English troops under Lord Cathcart, above ten thousand strong and in the finest condition, formed part of the garrison; and the presence of this imposing force appeared to promise to Gustavus, who commanded in person, the means of making a defence which might rival that by which Charles XII. had immortalized its walls. At this period the Swedish monarch appeared to be passionately desirous of military renown, and so ambitious was he of the perils and glories of actual warfare, that he went so far as to send a flag of truce to the French marshal, offering a purse of gold to the gunner in the French lines who had levelled the piece of ordnance whose shot had struck the wall a few feet from the place where he was standing, a proceeding which the English general justly considered as savouring rather of a romantic or highly excited temperament, than the sober judgment befitting the ruler of a nation (2). But stern necessity soon put a period to these chivalrous illusions.

July 30. The English troops were withdrawn in the end of July, to co-operate in the great armament intended for the reduction of Copenhagen and seizure of the Danish fleet, of which mention will immediately be made; and the Swedish garrison, without any external aid, was left to make head alone against the hourly increasing forces of the French marshal, which already were more than double their own. The evident hopelessness of the attempt to preserve the place after the treaty of Tilsit was known, and it had become apparent that the French Emperor could increase the besieging force at pleasure to quadruple its present amount, damped the military ardour of the Swedes, and induced them to prolong the defence rather from a sense of duty

Aug. 15. than any hope that it could ultimately prove successful. Trenches were opened on the night of the fête of the Emperor, by seven thousand workmen, and advanced, under the scientific direction of General Chasseloup,

(1) Dum. xix. 138, 145. Jom. ii. 456, 457.

(2) I received this anecdote from my venerable and much esteemed friend the Earl of Cathcart; whose recollections of all the events of that memo-

orable period, in which he bore so prominent a part, is still as vivid and correct, though at a very advanced age, as when they occurred thirty years ago.

with extraordinary vigour. Contrary to all previous example, the approaches were made on three fronts at the same time, and pushed with such rapidity, that in four days they were within three hundred yards of the external palisades, the batteries already armed, and every thing prepared for a bombardment. Seeing their city about to be ruined, for no political or na-

Aug. 20. tional purpose but a mere point of military honour, the magistrates threw themselves at the feet of the King, and besought him to spare the inhabitants the horrors of an unavailing defence. He could not resist the appeal, and withdrew with almost the whole garrison into the adjacent island of Rugen, while Stralsund itself, with four hundred pieces of cannon and immense military magazines, fell into the hands of the enemy (1).

Capture of the islands of Danholm and Rugen. Still the enemy kept their ground in the isles of Rugen and Danholm, which not only completely blockaded the harbour, but neutralized all the advantages otherwise consequent on the possession of this extensive fortress. Marshal Brune showed great activity in the measures adopted to root the Swedes out of this their last stronghold on the German shore. Three days after the capitulation two hundred boats and small craft were assembled; chiefly by means of land carriage, in the harbour

Aug. 25. of Stralsund, with which, on the night of the 25th, a descent was effected on the isle of Danholm, which fell into the hands of the French, with twenty pieces of cannon and its little garrison of a hundred and eighty men. Still the isle of Rugen, with the bulk of the Swedish forces, remained in the possession of the king; but the troops, wearied of a fruitless contest which they deemed foreign to the real interests of the monarchy, and strongly impressed with the idea that the military excitement of their sovereign bordered on insanity, murmured so loudly on the further continuance of the contest, that he was obliged to yield; and a convention was concluded on

Sept. 7. the 7th September, by which the island was to be given up to the French troops, and the King, with the whole garrison and fleet, were to withdraw to the Swedish shore. This convention relieved Napoléon from all anxiety in the north of Germany, and put the finishing stroke to the continental war in that part of the world; but it was far from answering the expectations of the French Emperor, who had calculated on the capture of the Swedish King, or at least the whole of his garrison (2); and it was the occasion of Marshal Brune falling into a disgrace from which he never afterwards was able to recover.

While the last flames of the continental war were thus expiring around the walls of Stralsund, a blow of the highest importance on the future prospects of the maritime contest was struck by the vigour and decision of the British Cabinet.

Reasons which led to the Copenhagen expedition. Notwithstanding all the precautions taken by the two Emperors, in their negotiations at Tilsit, to bury their designs in profound secrecy, the English Government were possessed of a golden key which laid open their most confidential communications. They were made aware of the determination of the Imperial despots to seize the fleets of Denmark and Portugal, not only before it was reduced to a regular treaty, but almost as soon as it itself was formed; and the vast forces at the disposal of the French Emperor left no room for doubt that they possessed ample means to carry their intentions into effect. Not a moment was to be lost; for in the final treaty, as already noticed (3), the first of September was fixed as the

(1) Dum. xix. 145, 161. Jour. ii. 456, 457.

(2) Jour. ii. 456, 457. Dum. xix. 161, 165.

(3) *Ante*, vi. 143.

period when the Courts of Copenhagen and Lisbon were to be summoned to place their fleets at the disposal of the combined powers, and enter into the general confederacy against Great Britain. Hardly was the ink of the treaty dry, when the French forces, under Bernadotte and Davoust, began to defile in such numbers towards Holstein, and assumed so menacing a position, that it was evident that Denmark would speedily lose her whole continental possessions, if she resisted the demands of the combined Emperors. Nor did there appear any reason to believe, that the Cabinet of Copenhagen would incur any such hazard to maintain their neutrality. On the contrary, there were the strongest grounds for concluding, that they would readily embrace so favourable an opportunity of contending, with the aid of such powerful allies, for those maritime changes which had long constituted the ruling objects of their ambition. In 1780, they had been the first to join the Northern Confederacy against England, and proclaim the principles of the armed neutrality; in 1804, they had exposed themselves for the same object, in the front rank, to the cannon of Nelson and all the terrors of the English navy. More lately, their conduct had savoured still more strongly of aversion to the English and partiality for the French alliance. The Berlin Decree of 21st November, which inflicted so unexampled and fatal a wound on neutral commerce, had drawn forth no complaints from the Danish Government; but no sooner did the British Order in Council of 7th January issue, which provided only a mild, and as it proved ineffectual measure of retaliation, by putting a stop to the coasting trade of neutrals from one French harbour to another, than the Danish minister made loud complaints, which drew forth the able and unanswerable reply from Lord Howick, which has already been quoted (1). No remonstrances had been made by the Danish Government against the threatening accumulation of forces on the frontier of Holstein; no advances to secure aid, in the peril which was evidently approaching, from the British or Swedish Cabinets. On the contrary, although Napoléon had, previous to the battle of Friedland, made proposals to Gustavus, with a view to detach him from the Russian alliance, and actually offered, as an inducement, to wrest the kingdom of Norway from the Danish Crown, and annex it to that of Sweden; yet even the generous refusal of this offer by that upright monarch, accompanied by its instant communication to the Cabinet of Copenhagen (2), had made no alteration in their line of policy, and they declined all offers of assistance against a power which had manifested so little scruple at the prospect of partitioning their dominions.

Resolution
of the British
cabinet.

In these circumstances the cabinet of Great Britain had a most serious duty to perform. They were menaced with an attack from the combined navies of Europe, amounting to one hundred and eighty sail of the line; and of that immense force they were well aware that the Baltic fleet would form the right wing (3). No time was to be lost: every hour was pre-

(1) March 17, 1807. *Ante*, vi. 166. and Parl. Deb. x. 402.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 249, 255. Parl. Deb. x. 402, 407. Jom. ii. 450, 451.

(3) General Jomini has given the following summary of the design of Napoléon and Alexander after the treaty of Tilsit to unite all the navies of Europe against England, and of the probable forces at their disposal. Speaking in the person of the French Emperor, he says "After Russia had joined my alliance, Prussia, as a matter of course, followed her example; Portugal, Sweden, and the Pope, alone required to be gained over, for we were well aware that Denmark would hasten to throw herself into our

arms. If England refused the proffered mediation of Russia, the whole maritime forces of the Continent were to be employed against her, and they could muster 180 sail of the line. In a few years, this force could be raised to 250. With the aid of such a fleet, and my immense flotilla, it was by no means impossible to lead an European army to London. One hundred ships of the line employed against her colonies in the two hemispheres, would have sufficed to draw off a large portion of the British navy; while eighty more, assembled in the Channel, would have sufficed to assure the passage of the flotilla and avenge the outraged rights of nations. Such was at bottom my plan, which only failed of success from

cious : in a few days an overwhelming French force would, to all appearance, be assembled on the shores of the Great Belt ; and, if ferried over to Zealand, might enable the Danish government securely to comply with the requisition of the combined Emperors, and bid defiance to all the efforts of Great Britain. In these circumstances they took a resolution similar to that adopted by Frederick the Great in regard to Saxony, when he received authentic intelligence of the accession, or probable accession of Saxony to the league of Russia and Austria against his existence ; and resolved, by a vigorous stroke, not only to deprive the enemy of the prize he was so soon to seize, but convert its resources to their own defence (1).

Equipment
and depar-
ture of the
expedition.

Accidental circumstances gave the British government, contrary to the usual case with an insular power, the means both with respect to land and sea forces of instantly acting on this vigorous

resolution. The first division of the expedition which had been so long in preparation to aid the Allies on the shores of the Baltic was already in the Isle of Rugen, and the remainder were in such a state of forwardness as to be ready to embark at a few days' notice. A large naval force was also assembled to act as occasion might require, and this was speedily added to with extraordinary

July. 27. expedition. Such was the activity displayed that in the end of July twenty-seven ships of the line, having on board twenty thousand land troops, set sail from the British harbours, besides other smaller vessels, amounting in all to ninety pendants, and stretched across the German Ocean for the shores

Aug. 3. of Denmark. They arrived off the Danish coast on the 5d August, and immediately stationed such a force under Commodore Keats, in the Great Belt, as effectually cut off all communication between the Island of Zealand

Aug. 4. and the adjacent isles, or shores of Jutland (2). At the same time, the troops from Stralsund, under Lord Cathcart, arrived, who immediately took the command of the whole expedition ; and the formidable armament, spreading their sails before a favourable wind, passed the Sound, and east anchor in appalling strength before the harbour of Copenhagen.

Ineffectual
negotiation
with Den-
mark.

It was no part, however, of the design of the British government to precipitate the country into hostilities; on the contrary, they were on many accounts most desirous to avoid, if possible, pro-

ceeding to that extremity, and rather to gain the object in view by diplomatic arrangements than actual force. With this view they had sent Mr. Jackson with the armament, who had resided as envoy of Great Britain for many years at the court of Berlin, and was supposed to enjoy, in a very high degree, the confidence of the northern powers. As soon as he arrived off the Danish coast, Mr. Jackson landed at Kiel, and proceeded to announce the purport of his instructions to Count Bernstorff, and request an audience of the Prince Royal. By the former he was received with the indignant vehemence natural to a patriotic minister, who saw, from what he conceived to be foreign injustice, a grievous misfortune impending over his country ; by the latter, with the mild but courageous dignity which added lustre to a

the faults committed in the Spanish war."—JOMINT,
Vie de Napoléon, ii. 449.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 255, 257. Jom. ii. 450, 451.

(2) Ann Reg, 1807, 257. Lord Cathcart's Despatch, 14th Aug. 1807. Ibid. 681, 682.

<i>Vessels.</i> —French ships of the line,	60
Spanish do	40
Russian do	25
Swedish do	15
Danish do	15
Dutch do	15
Portuguese do	10

Total. . . . 180

throne under the storms of adversity. The instructions of the English envoy, however, were peremptory, and as the Prince Royal positively refused to accede to the terms proposed, which were that the fleet should be deposited with the British government in pledge, and under an obligation of restitution, till the conclusion of a general peace, he had no alternative but to declare that force would be employed. Upon this, the Prince Royal, with praiseworthy resolution, declared his determination to share the dangers of his capital, and immediately set out for Copenhagen. He was allowed by the British cruisers to pass the Great Belt with all the officers of his staff, and was soon after followed to the capital by the British envoy; but having no powers to accede to an accommodation on the basis proposed, the negotiation broke off,

Aug. 16.

and both sides prepared to decide the matter in dispute by the sword. At the same time a proclamation was issued by the English commanders, declaring in precise terms the object of their hostility, disclaiming all idea of conquest or capture, but demanding the fleet in deposit till the conclusion of a general peace (1).

Siege and
capture of
Copenha-
gen.

The British troops commenced their disembarkation without resistance on the 16th; and in three days the whole force was landed, and the investment of the town completed. It then appeared that, however much the Danish government might have been inclined to accede to the summons of the combined Emperors, and unite their navy to the general maritime confederacy, they at least had no expectation of being so soon involved in hostilities on their own shores, and were totally unprepared for the formidable forces now arrayed by sea and land against them. Such had been the vigilance of the cruisers in the Great Belt, that no troops whatever had been ferried over from the adjacent shores; and no preparations had on their arrival been made in Zealand itself. The ramparts were unarmed; the fleet unequipped; and though great fermentation, and the most honourable patriotic zeal prevailed in the capital, few regular troops

(1) *Parl. Deb.* x. 222, 223. *Ann. Reg.* 258, 261. *Dum.* xix. 167, 173.

Proclama-
tion of Lord
Cathcart on
lauding in
Zealand.
“Whereas the present treaties of peace, and the changes of government and of territory acceded to and by so many powers, have so far increased the influence of France on the Continent of Europe, as to render it impossible for Denmark, even though it desires to be neutral, to preserve its neutrality, and absolutely necessary for those who continue to resist the French aggression, to take measures to prevent the arms of a neutral power from being turned against them; in this view, his Majesty cannot regard the present position of Denmark with indifference, and he has therefore sent negotiators with ample powers to his Danish Majesty, to request, in the most amicable manner, such explanations as the circumstances require, and a concurrence in such measures as can alone give security against the further mischief which the French meditate through the acquisition of the Danish navy. The King, therefore, has judged it expedient to demand the temporary deposit of the Danish ships of the line, in one of his Majesty's ports. The deposit seems to be just, and so indisputably necessary, under the relative situation of the neutral and belligerent powers, that his Majesty has further deemed it a duty to himself and to his people to support his demand by a powerful fleet, and by an army amply supplied with every necessary for the most active and determined enterprise. We come, therefore, to your shores, inhabitants of Zealand, not as enemies, but in self-defence, to prevent those who have so long disturbed the peace of

Europe from compelling the force of your navy to be employed against us. *We ask deposit—we have not looked to capture:* So far from it, the most solemn pledge has been offered to your government, and it is hereby renewed, in the name and by the express commands of the King our master, that if our demand is acceded to, *every ship belonging to the Danish navy, shall, at the conclusion of a general peace, be restored to her, in the same condition and state of equipment as when received under the protection of the British flag.* It is in the power of your government, by a word, to sheath our swords, most reluctantly drawn against you; you will be treated on the footing of the most friendly power; property of all sorts will be respected and preserved; the most severe discipline enforced; every article required paid for at a fair price; but if these offers are rejected, and the machinations of France render you deaf to the voice of reason and the call of friendship, the innocent blood that will be shed, and the horrors of a besieged and bombarded capital, must fall on your own heads, and those of your cruel advisers.”—See *Parl. Deb.* x. 222. The Prince Royal replied: “No example is to be found in history of so odious an aggression as that with which Denmark is menaced; more honour may now be expected from Denmark, than the pirates of Barbary, than the English government. You offer us your alliance! Do we not know what is its worth? Your allies, vainly expecting your succours for an entire year, have taught us what is the worth of English friendship.”

—See *Dumas*, xix. 171.

were assembled within its walls, and little progress could in so short a time be made in the organization of a voluntary force. The sudden calm, however, which ensued, and prevented the ships from approaching the coast to land the heavy ordnance and siege equipage, retarded for several days the approaches, and afforded the Danes a breathing-time, of which they actively availed themselves, both to prepare for their defence and retard the operations of the besiegers. But this respite was of short duration, and, by inspiring the inhabitants with fallacious hopes, in the end only led to additional

Aug. 19 and 21. and lamentable calamities. The heavy artillery was at length landed, and brought up to the trenches: the assistance of the sailors enabled the works to be prosecuted with great rapidity; and on the 1st September they were so far advanced as to have every thing in readiness for the bombardment to commence. The place was then summoned, and the same

First action of Sir Arthur Wellesley. terms generously offered which had before been rejected (1). Meanwhile, SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, who then began in high command that career in Europe which has rendered his name and country immortal, moved with ten thousand men against a body of twelve thousand militia, supported by a few regular troops which had assembled in the interior of the island at Kioje, and by a sudden attack, in which the 92d and 52d regiments distinguished themselves, dispersed them with the loss of several hundred killed, and twelve hundred prisoners (2).

Sept. 2. The offer of accommodation being rejected, the bombardment began, and was continued with uncommon vigour, and with only a short interruption, for three days and nights. The inhabitants sustained with heroic resolution the flaming tempest, and all classes were indefatigable in their endeavours to carry water to the quarters where the city had taken fire; but in spite of all their efforts the conflagration spread with frightful rapidity, and at length a great magazine of wood and the lofty steeple of the church of Our Lady took fire, and the flames, curling to a prodigious height up its wooden pinnacles, illuminated the whole heavens, and threw a lurid light over all the fleet and army of the besiegers. With speechless anxiety the trembling citizens watched the path of the burning projectiles through the air, while the British soldiers and sailors from afar beheld with admiration the heavens tracked by innumerable stars, which seemed to realize more than the fabled splendours of Oriental fireworks. At length the obvious danger of the total destruction of the city by the progress of the flames, overcame the firmness of General Peymann, to whom the Prince Royal had delegated his command; and on the forenoon of the 5th, a flag of truce appeared at the British outposts to treat for a capitulation (3). But the period of equal negotiation was past; the Danes had perilled all on the issue of the sword; and no other terms would be agreed to but the unconditional surrender of the whole fleet, with all the artillery and naval

(1) The summons set forth:—"To convince the Danish government and the whole world of the reluctance with which his Majesty has recourse to arms, we, the undersigned, at the moment when our troops are before your gates, and our batteries ready to open, renew to you the offer of the same advantageous terms which we formerly proposed: viz. if you will consent to deliver up the Danish fleet, and to our carrying it away, it shall be held in deposit merely, and restored in as good a state as received, with all its equipments, as soon as the provisions of a general peace shall have removed the necessity which occasioned this demand. But if this offer is now rejected, it cannot be repeated."—CATHCART, GAMBLER, *Sept. 1, 1807.*

(2) Sir A. Wellesley's Despatch. Ann. Reg. 1807, 703. Dum. xix. 171, 176.

(3) "From the top of a tower," says a respectable eyewitness, "I beheld, in October 1807, the extent of the devastation—whole streets were level with the ground; 1800 houses were destroyed; the principal church was in ruins; almost every house in the town bore some marks of violence; 1500 of the inhabitants had lost their lives, and a vast number were wounded. The Danes certainly defended themselves like men, and left to the English the poignant regret that the insatiable ambition of Bonaparte had converted this gallant people into our enemies."—BRENTON'S *Naval History*, ii. 177.

stores which the place contained. Hard as these terms appeared, necessity left the Danes no alternative; and a capitulation was signed on such conditions two days afterwards, in virtue of which the British troops were immediately put in possession of the citadel, gates, and arsenal; and, by the united efforts of friends and foes, a stop was at length put to the progress of the conflagration, but not before it had consumed an eighth part of the city (1).

By the terms of the capitulation, it had been stipulated that the English should evacuate the citadel of Copenhagen within six weeks, or a shorter time, if the fleet could be got ready before the expiry of that period. But such was the expedition with which the operations were conducted, and the activity displayed by both the naval and military departments, that long before the expiry of that period the fleet was equipped, the stores on board, and the evacuation completed. Early in October, the British fleet and army returned to England, bringing with them their magnificent prize, consisting of eighteen ships of the line in excellent condition; fifteen frigates, six brigs, and twenty-five gun-boats, beside two sail of the line and three frigates which had been destroyed as not worth the removal (2).

The Copenhagen expedition excited a prodigious sensation throughout Europe; and as it was a mortal stroke levelled at a neutral power, without any previous declaration of war then ascertained, or ground for hostility, it was generally condemned as an uncalled-for violation of the law of nations. "Blood and fire," said Napoléon, "have made the English masters of Copenhagen;" and these expressions were not only re-echoed over all the Continent by all that great portion of the public press which was directly subjected to his control, but met with a responsive voice in those nations, who, chagrined with reason at the refusal of its government to lend assistance in men or money at the decisive moment on the banks of the Vistula, were not sorry of this opportunity of giving vent, apparently on very sufficient grounds, to their displeasure. The Russians were loud in their condemnation of the English administration; the Emperor, with that profound dissimulation which formed so remarkable a feature in his character, affected to be deeply afflicted by the catastrophe, though none knew so well the reality of the secret articles in the treaty of Tilsit which had rendered it necessary; even their long-established national rivalry with the Danes, could scarcely induce the Swedes to receive with satisfaction the intelligence of so serious an invasion of neutral rights. Thus, on all sides and in all countries, a general cry of indignation burst forth against this successful enterprise; and the old jealousy at the maritime power of England revived with such vehemence, as for a time to extinguish all sense of the more pressing dangers arising from the military power of France (3).

Great sensation excited in Europe by this expedition.

Count Romanoff's Note to Lord G. L. Gower. But whatever might be the general impression of Europe as to the Copenhagen expedition immediately after it occurred, Napoléon was not long of affording it a complete vindication. It has been already mentioned that it was stipulated in the treaty of Tilsit that, in the event of England declining the proffered mediation of Russia, the courts of Copenhagen and Lisbon should be summoned to join the Continental League, and unite their naval forces to those of France and Russia. On the

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 263. Lord Cathcart's Despatch. Ibid. 706, 707. Dum. xix. 175, 181. Jom. ii. 454, 455.

(2) Lord Gambier's Despatch. Ann. Reg. 1807, 698, 699. Dum. xix. 179, 180.

Including the cannon placed on the praams and floating batteries which were brought away, the ar-

tillery taken amounted to 3500 pieces. The prize money due to the troops engaged, was estimated by Admiral Lord Gambier at £960,000.—See HARDENBERG, x. 42.

(3) Hard, x. 42, 45. Bign. vi. 422, 423. Parl. Deb. x. 211.

12th August, a note was transmitted to the French minister at Lisbon, peremptorily requiring that the Portuguese fleet should co-operate with the French and Danish in the maritime war, and that the persons and property of all Englishmen in Portugal should be forthwith seized. And it soon after appeared, that on the same day similar orders had been transmitted to the cabinet of Copenhagen. In a public assembly of all the ambassadors of Eu-

Aug. 16. rope, at the Tuileries, the Emperor Napoléon demanded of the Portuguese ambassador whether he had transmitted to the court of Lisbon his orders to join their fleet to the general maritime confederacy against England, and confiscate all English property within their dominions? And having said this, he immediately turned round to the Danish ambassador, and asked him whether he had done the same? The note addressed to the Portuguese government was immediately communicated by its ministers to the British cabinet: that to the Danish was concealed, and its existence even denied. Thus, at the very time that the English expedition was, unknown to France, approaching the Danish shores, the diplomatic papers and public words of Napoléon were affording decisive evidence of his preconceived designs against the Danish fleet, while the conduct of their government was equally characteristic of an inclination to slide, without opposition, into the required hostility against this country (1).

General feeling of England on the subject. But these diplomatic communications, little understood or attended to at the time by the bulk of the people, produced no general impression in England; and a very painful division of opinion existed for a considerable time, both as to the lawfulness of the expedition and the justice of the retaining the prizes which had been made. Whatever violence might have been meditated by the French Emperor, it was very generally said it would have been better to have suffered him to perpetrate it, and then made open war on his vassals, than to forestall his iniquity in this manner by its imitation. This feeling was as creditable to the public mind and the severe principles of morality which religious faith and long-established habits of freedom had produced in Great Britain, as the conception of the measure itself was honourable to the government. It was a memorable thing to see the people of England repudiate a triumph won, as it was thought, by injustice; disregard security purchased by the blood of the innocent, and look with shame on the proudest trophy of maritime conquest ever yet brought to an European harbour (2), as long as a doubt existed as to the justice of the means by which it had been acquired. Contrasting this honourable feeling with the utter confusion of all moral principle which in France resulted from the Revolution, and the universal application to public measures of no other test than success, it is impossible to deny that the religious feelings and the tempered balance of power which in England both saved the country from a disastrous convulsion, and, by restraining the excesses of freedom, preserved its existence, were equally favourable to the maintenance of that high standard of morality, which, in nations as well as individuals, constitutes the only secure basis of durable prosperity.

The Copenhagen expedition, as might have been expected, led to vehement debates in both Houses of Parliament, which, though now of comparatively little importance, as the publication of the secret article in the treaty of Tilsit

(1) Lord Wellesley's Statement. Parl. Deb. x. 345. and Lord Hawkesbury's. Ibid. x. 371.

(2) There is no example in modern times of such an armament being at once made prize and brought home by any power. At Trafalgar, only four ships of the twenty taken were brought to the British

harbours; at La Hogue, none of the prizes were saved, out of eighteen taken; and at Toulon, in 1793, no more than three sail of the line and three frigates were brought away out of the vast fleet there committed to the flames. See SMOLLETT'S *History*, ii. 151; and *ante*, ii. 173.

has completely justified the expedition, are of historical value, as indicating the opinions entertained, and the arguments advanced at the time in the country, on a subject of such vital importance to the honour and security of the empire (4).

Argument
in Parlia-
ment
against the
Copenha-
gen expedi-
tion.

(1) On the part of the Opposition, it was strongly urged by Mr. Granville Sharpe, Mr. Ponsonby, and Lord Erskine—"The ground stated in the King's speech for the Copenhagen expedition was, that the government were in possession of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in which it was stipulated that the Danish fleet should be employed against this country. If so, why is it not produced? It is said that Denmark has always been hostile to this country, and would gladly have yielded up her fleet for such a purpose on the first summons. If this is really the case, on what grounds is the charge supported? True, the ships at Copenhagen were in a certain degree of preparation, but not more so than they have been for the last half century. Was it probable that Denmark would have risked her East and West India possessions, the Island of Zealand itself, and Norway, from an apprehension that Holstein and Jutland would be overrun by French troops? If history be consulted, it will be found that no considerable armament has crossed the Great Belt on the ice for 150 years. In the face of an allied British and Swedish naval force, such an attempt would never have been thought of; so that the Danes had no reason to tremble for their capital. When the Copenhagen expedition set sail, there were 350 Danish ships in British harbours, with cargoes worth two million; and when the British Consul applied to the Chamber of Commerce, at the Danish capital, he received for answer, that there was not the slightest room for apprehension, as no such circumstances existed as were calculated to disturb the neutrality of Denmark. The plea, therefore, of impending danger, to justify so flagrant a breach of neutral rights, has not even for its basis the essential ground of correctness in point of fact.

"The vindication of this step, supposing that some danger had been shown to have existed, must rest upon its necessity; for the first principles of justice demonstrate, and the concurring testimony of all writers on the law of nations has established, that one belligerent could not be justified in taking its property from a neutral state, unless it is clearly established that its enemy meant and was able to take possession of it, and apply it to the purposes of its hostility. How, then, is it to be justified, when every appearance is against the opinion that the enemy had either the inclination or the power to convert the Danish navy into an instrument of our destruction? But this is not all.—Supposing it proved beyond the possibility of doubt, that Bonaparte intended to have seized the Copenhagen fleet, and had a force at his command adequate to that purpose, as he afterwards did with the fleet at Lishou, are we to justify our robbery upon the plea that our enemy was meditating a similar spoliation, and that it was best to be beforehand with him? It is a principle of morality applicable alike to nations and individuals, that one wrong will not authorize another; and that, unless in extreme cases, even self-defence will not justify a deviation from the laws and usages of war; how much more, therefore, is an illegal act indefensible, committed not in retaliation for, but in anticipation of, a similar unjustifiable stretch on the enemy's part! Better, far better that Bonaparte should have carried his alleged designs into full effect, and united the Danish navy to his own, than that we should have stained our national character by an act, indefensible by those who were to profit, execrable in the estimation of those who were to suffer by it.

"A comparison of dates is alone sufficient to demonstrate the untenable grounds on which this expedition was sent out. The treaty of Tilsit was signed on the 8th July; the orders for the sailing of the expedition was issued on the 19th of the same month, and for several days previously the newspapers had announced its destination. How was it possible that in so short a time preparations could have been made for so vast an armament? Admitting that a military armament, to co-operate with Russia or Sweden, and act as occasion might require, in the Baltic, had previously been resolved on, and was in a great state of forwardness, still the peculiar force employed in that expedition, the great quantity of battering cannon and besieging stores, as well as the vast amount of the naval force, proves that, long before the treaty of Tilsit was either signed or thought of the resolution to spoliolate Denmark had been formed.

"We have got possession, indeed, of the Danish fleet; but is that the real or the principal object which we have to dread, in the great maritime confederacy which an inveterate enemy is forming against us? Do we esteem as nothing the now ardent and envenomed resentment of the Danish sailors; the dubious neutrality of Russia, converted by our rapacity into real and formidable hostility; the indignation of all neutral and maritime powers at our unparalleled injustice; the loss of the character which formerly rendered us the last asylum of freedom and independence throughout the world? Better, far better would it have been, to have had to combat the Danish fleet manned by disaffected seamen, and fitted out by a reluctant government, than to have, as now, the fleets of France and Russia to fight, manned with the indignant and exasperated sailors of the north. With what countenance can we now reproach the French Emperor with his attack on Egypt, his subjugation of Switzerland, his overthrow of Portugal? We have ourselves furnished his justification; we have for ever closed our lips from the most powerful argument which we could ever have used to effect the future liberation of mankind. Will no recollection of our violence in Denmark, lie heavy on our spirits when called upon to resist the violence of the enemy retaliating upon us? Will not the hostile myriads on the opposite shore be animated with fresh ardour and confidence, that they are no longer following the banners of a desolating conqueror, but revisiting upon us the aggressions of our own fleets and armies? When we reflect on the little we have gained, and the much we have lost by this aggression, it clearly appears to have been not less impolitic and inexpedient, than iniquitous and unjust." [Parl. Deb. x. 254, 267, 355, 358, 1185, 1205.]

Powerful as these arguments were, and warily as they spoke to the best and noblest feelings of our nature, they were met by others not less cogent, and perhaps, when the period for impartial decision arrived, still more convincing. It was answered by Lord Wellesley, Lord Castlereagh, and Mr. Secretary Canning: "It is needless to ask for additional documents to justify that great and saving measure, the expedition to Copenhagen. It was evident that, after the battle of Trafalgar had annihilated his present hopes of maritime ascendancy, and the victory of Friedland had laid all the Continental States prostrate at his feet, all the efforts of Bonaparte would be turned against the power and resources of the British empire. Was any proof requisite of his desire to annihilate our independence, nay, destroy our very existence as a nation; or was any neces-

The great circumstance which long suggested a painful doubt as to the justice of the Copenhagen expedition, was the non-production of the alleged clauses in the secret treaty of Tilsit, of which Ministers asserted they were

sary as to the mode in which, being actuated by such motives, he would proceed? How has he uniformly acted in his acquisitions at land? By compelling the powers whom he had conquered or intimidated, into an alliance to co-operate with him in his future hostility against such as still remained to be subdued. Was it to be supposed that profound statesman and consummate general would not proceed in the same manner in the great object of his life, the destruction of the maritime strength and resources of this country? Actuated by such motives and principles, is it conceivable that, after his great land victory, and when he had for the first time the maritime resources of the whole Continent at his command, he would hesitate to accomplish the inviting object of adding the Danish navy, lying in a manner within his grasp, to his resources?

"But the matter does not rest on probabilities and inferences. The French Emperor announced his intention, almost in direct terms, immediately after the battle of Friedland, of uniting all the navies of Europe in one great confederacy against this country, and all his subsequent conduct has been regulated by this same principle. His plan was not confined to Denmark; it extended also to Portugal; these two powers were placed in exactly the same situation, and in both of these countries all British property was to be seized, and their respective courts compelled to unite their naval forces to those of France and Russia. It was well known that, before the 1st September, the Emperor Napoleon publicly demanded of the Portuguese ambassador, in presence of all the envoys of foreign courts, whether he had transmitted his order to the court of Portugal, to join their fleets to the maritime confederacy against England, to shut their ports against the British flag, and confiscate the property of its subjects within the Portuguese territory; and having said this, he immediately turned round to the Danish minister and asked if he had transmitted the same order to his own court. The cabinet of Lisbon have transmitted official intelligence to the government of Great Britain, that a formal demand had been made on them for the surrender of their fleet and the closing of their ports against English commerce, and the confiscation of all English property within their territories; and upon their failure to comply with the last only as the most unjust of these demands, they received a notification in the *Moniteur*, that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign, a clear demonstration of what fate awaited the Danish court, if they hesitated a moment to obey the same haughty summons.

"Difficulties, it has been said, existed in the way of the French troops effecting the passage of the Great Belt, and compelling the Danes to join in the maritime confederacy against this country. These difficulties have been much exaggerated; for it is well known that Copenhagen depends almost entirely for its supply of provisions on Jutland and Holstein, and the occupation of these provinces by the French troops would soon starve the government into submission. It was idle to suppose that the Danish troops, which did not at the utmost exceed twenty thousand men, could cope with the united armies of France and Russia. Even supposing that, with the aid of British valour, they could for a time have made a successful stand, was it likely that they would not be paralysed by the dread of engaging in a conflict with these two colossal empires, whose strife had so recently resounded through the world? And even if the Danish cabinet, in a cause in which they were heartily engaged, possessed the firmness of the Roman Senate, is it not

notorious that their wishes, in this instance, would have led them to join their forces, at the first summons, to those of France? It is in vain to refer to the dangers which their transmarine possessions would run from the hostility of Great Britain. They braved these dangers in 1780, in prosecution of the object of the armed neutrality; they braved them in 1801, when the cannons of Nelson were pointed at their arsenals, though on neither of these occasions were they supported by such a gigantic continental confederacy as now summoned them to take their place at its side. Their inclinations and secret bias have been clearly evinced by their public acts; and he has studied the history of the last fifty years, indeed, to little purpose, who does not perceive that they would enter the alliance, not as reluctant neutrals, but ardent belligerents, contending for objects which they have long had at heart.

"The power of France, already sufficiently formidable by land, and daily receiving important additions by sea, would have been increased in the most alarming manner by the fleet and the arsenals of Denmark. Twenty ships of the line, ready for sea, backed by a great supply of naval and military stores, constitute a force, in addition to that already possessed by the enemy, on which England, with all her maritime strength, cannot look without alarm. But this is not all. These twenty line-of-battle ships would speedily be joined by those of Russia and Sweden, amounting to at least as many more; the Russian fleet in the Buxine had already proceeded to Lisbon, to join the Portuguese squadron, which together amounted to twenty ships of the line. Spain could furnish the like number, and thus Napoleon would soon have been enabled to direct against this country a centre of fifty ships of the line, drawn from Antwerp, Cherbourg, and Brest, with two wings each of forty, supplied by his northern and southern confederates. He is a bold man who can look unmoved on such a prospect. Had ministers not acted as they have done they would have neglected their first and greatest duty, that of preserving the independence of their country, and with it the liberties of the world. Self-preservation is the law of nature, and that law loudly called for the adoption of this vigorous step which has at least completely paralysed the designs of their confederates in the north seas. Here was an instrument of war within the grasp of our inveterate enemy; we interposed and seized it, as he was stretching out his hand for the same purpose, and that act of energy and wisdom has the hard epithets of rapine and impiety ascribed to it! The bloodshed and devastation which occurred in the execution of this necessary act, are indeed deeply to be deplored: but the Danes had themselves to blame for these calamities, by refusing to deliver up their fleet in deposit, till the conclusion of the war, as originally and rightly proposed by the English government. The expedition had been originally destined for co-operation with the Russians and Prussians; but upon the peace of Tilsit, with a promptitude and energy worthy of the highest commendation, ministers at once gave it a different destination; and though this hold step may now be unanimously blamed on the Continent by writers who take their opinions on every subject from the beck of one or other of the Imperial despots who rule its empires, it will one day be applauded by an impartial posterity as the salvation of the British empire." [Parl. Deb. x. 267, 287, 342, 350.]

Upon a division both Houses supported ministers; the Commons by a majority of 253 to 108; the Peers by one of 105 to 48. [Ibid. x. 310, 383.]

The secret article of the treaty of Tilsit regarding the Danish fleet, is at length produced.

in possession, which provided for the seizure of the fleet by France and Russia. Notwithstanding all the taunts with which they were assailed on this subject, they for long withheld its production from the public, and it came in consequence to be seriously doubted whether such an agreement article really existed, until at length, in 1817, when the reasons for withholding it had ceased by the death of the persons by whom the discovery had been made, the decisive article was publicly revealed in Parliament (1). Thus had the British cabinet the merit of having at once early discovered, and instantly acted upon, the hidden designs of the enemy; paralysed by the vigour of their measures, the formidable naval force which was preparing against them in the north; and afterwards, for a long course of years, generously borne the whole load of opprobrium with which they were assailed, rather than by a premature publication of the secret information they had received, endangered the persons by whom it had been transmitted (2).

Ineffectual mediation of Russia, and rupture of that power with England. Aug. 5. Aug. 29.

The negotiations contemplated by the treaty of Tilsit were not long of being set on foot. Early in August, the cabinet of St.-Petersburg tendered their good offices to that of London for the conclusion of a general peace. To which Mr. Canning answered, that Great Britain was perfectly willing to treat, on equitable terms, for so desirable an object; and required in return a frank communication of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, as the best pledge of the friendly and pacific intentions of his Imperial Majesty. Baron Budberg, on the part of Alexander, eluded this demand; and instead, entered into a statement of many grievances of Russia against this country, some of which, especially the want of co-operation when the contest was quivering in the balance on the Vistula, were too well founded. Matters were in this dubious state, when intelligence arrived of the landing of the British forces in Zealand, and the demand made for the delivery, in deposit, of the Danish fleet. From the outset, the cabinet of St.-Petersburg manifested the utmost disquietude at this intelligence, and loudly protested against it as an uncalled-for violation of the law of nations. In reply, the British ambassador explicitly stated that his cabinet had received information of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, and the destined co-operation of the Danish fleet in a descent on the British shores, and called upon the Russian minister to disprove the assertion, by an unreserved communication of these hidden stipulations, and of the grounds on which France was willing to treat, and which appeared to the cabinet of St.-Petersburg so reasonable, that they gave them the additional weight of their interposition. The Russian cabinet, however, both when Baron Budberg had the direction of its foreign affairs, and after he was succeeded, early in September, by Count Romanzoff, con-

(1) Parl. Deb.

(2) The writers on the law of nations are clear that in such circumstances as the Danish fleet was here placed, its seizure was perfectly justifiable. "I may," says Grotius, "without considering whether it is merited or not, take possession of that which belongs to another, if I have reason to fear any evil from his holding it; but I cannot make myself master or proprietor of it, the property having nothing to do with the end which I propose. I can only keep possession of the thing seized till my safety is sufficiently provided for."—Grotius, b. iii. e. i. § 2.—This was precisely what the English government proposed to Denmark.

Napoléon's secret opinion regarding it.

Napoléon felt the Copenhagen blow most keenly, the more so that it was achieved by a vigour and decision in the English councils, to which they had long been strangers, and which, in that instance, even surpassed his own promptitude. "The success of the attack on Copenhagen," says Fouché, "was the first derangement of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, in virtue of which the navy of Denmark was to have been put at the disposal of France. Since the catastrophe of Paul, I had never seen Napoléon in such a transport of rage. That which struck him most in this vigorous *coup-de-main* was the promptitude and resolution of the English minister."—*Mémoires de Fouché*, ii. 137.

stantly eluded this demand; and the intelligence of the capture of the Danish fleet gave them a plausible pretext for breaking off the negotiation, without complying with so inconvenient a requisition (1). Upon that event being known in the Russian capital, the Emperor demanded of the English ambassador, whether the fleet would be restored at the conclusion of a general

Oct. 29.

peace. To which Lord Leveson Gower replied, that, "the object for which the expedition had been undertaken, viz., the removing of the Danish fleet, during the continuance of hostilities, beyond the reach of France, having been accomplished, the English government was perfectly willing to renounce any advantage which could be derived from the continuance of the war with Denmark, and earnestly pressed the Emperor to recommend neutrality, on these conditions, to the Prince Royal." These moderate views so far prevailed with the Russian cabinet, that a note

Nov. 2.

was presented by them to Savary, to signify the wish of the Emperor that the neutrality of Denmark should be re-established, and there was every prospect

Nov. 4.

of the peace of the north being undisturbed by any farther hostility, when the arrival of a messenger from Paris with decisive instructions from Napoléon, at once put an end to the negotiation. He brought a peremptory demand for the immediate execution of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, and the instant closing of the Russian harbours against the ships of Great Britain. The Emperor Alexander was startled with the imperative tone of the mandate, as, since his return to St.-Petersburg, he had been endeavouring to withdraw from his promises in that particular; but it was too late; Savary appealed to his personal honour pledged at Tilsit, and the Emperor, at whatever hazard to himself or his dominions, felt himself bound to comply (2). Next day a note was presented to the British ambassador, breaking off all relations between the two countries, requiring his immediate departure from St.-Petersburg, and re-announcing the principles of the

Secret satisfaction with which the expedition was viewed by Alexander.

(1) It appears, however, from the following passage in Sir Walter Scott, evidently founded on official information, that the cabinet of St.-Petersburg, though obliged to yield to circumstances, were secretly gratified at the vigorous and decisive stroke struck at the Danish fleet. "An English officer of literary celebrity" (probably Sir R. Wilson) "was employed by Alexander, or those who were supposed to share his most secret councils, to convey to the British ministry the Emperor's expressions of the secret satisfaction which his Imperial Majesty felt at the skill and dexterity which Britain had displayed in anticipating and preventing the purposes of France by her attack upon Copenhagen. Her ministers were invited to communicate freely with the Czar, as with a prince who, though obliged to yield to circumstances, was nevertheless as much as ever attached to the cause of European independence."—SCOTT, vi. 24. Certainly, of all the remarkable qualities of Alexander's mind, his profound power of dissimulation was the most extraordinary; and this was the opinion formed by Lord Cathcart and all who had an opportunity of seeing him even in the most unreserved and confidential manner.

(2) See the whole Papers in Parl. Deb. x. 195, 218. Sav. iii. 126, 128.

The statements of the French and English ambassadors on this point are very material, as not only are they perfectly in unison with each other, but distinctly prove that the rupture with Russia had no connexion with the Copenhagen expedition, but was the result of the secret articles of the treaty at Tilsit. Savary says—

"In the first days of November I received a courier from the Emperor, which brought instructions from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to insist upon the execution of one of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. On the day following I said to the Emperor, at a special audience, 'Sire, I am charged with the desire of my master that you should unite your force to his to compel England to listen to his propositions.' 'Very well,' replied the Emperor, 'I have given him my word that I would do so, and I will keep my promise; see Romanzoff, and return to speak with me on the subject.' On the day following I returned; and the Emperor then said that it had been agreed that France and Russia should unite to summon England, but that the mediation of Russia was first to be proposed, which should still be done. I represented that this had already taken place, and that England had refused his mediation. He mused a moment, and then said, 'I understand you, and since your master desires it, I am quite disposed to fulfil my engagements. I will to-day give orders to Romanzoff.' Two days afterwards the hostile note against England was issued, and the British ambassador demanded his passports. Having gained this much, though well aware that the principal object of Napoléon was to strike at the English commerce, I deemed it expedient to shut my eyes to the time given to the British vessels to clear out from the Russian harbours."—SAVARY, iii. 126, 128. Lord L. Gower says, in his despatch to Mr. Canning, November 4, 1807,—"Some members of the Council who were consulted on the matter, advised the Emperor not to reject so fair an opportunity of re-establishing the tranquillity of the north of Europe; and their opinion was so far taken that a note was written to General Savary

armed neutrality; and on the day following Lord Leveson Gower set out for the British shores (1).

Oct. 6.

1807.

The Russians declare war against Sweden.
Feb. 10,
1808.

This declaration of war against Great Britain was attended by a summons to Sweden, to join in the league against the latter place; and it soon appeared, from the vigorous preparations for the prosecution of the war in that quarter, that the cession of Finland to Russia had been arranged at Tilsit, and that the Czar was resolved immediately to add that important province, lying so near his capital, to his

with the view of engaging the French government to consent to the restoration of the neutrality of Denmark. The French general has remonstrated violently against this measure; and the Russian cabinet, alarmed at the violence of his language, is undecided what answer to return to the overtures received from England." And on 8th November he wrote to the same minister, "The inclosed note, the contents of which are so extremely important" (they contained a declaration of war), "has been produced by a peremptory demand, brought by the last messenger from Paris, of the immediate execution of the secret articles of the Treaty of Tilsit; and the French mission boasts that, after some difficulty, they have gained a complete victory, and have carried not only this act of hostility against England, but also every other point essential to the success of Bonaparte's views. I shall ask my passports tomorrow."—**LORD L. GOWER to MR. CANNING, Petersburg, 4th and 8th Nov. 1807.**—*Parl. Deb. x. 215, 216.*

Russian manifesto. (1) The Russian manifesto bore:— "The great value which the Emperor attached to the friendship of his Britannic Majesty enhanced the regret at perceiving that that monarch altogether separated himself from him. Twice has the Emperor taken up arms in a cause which was directly that of England, and he solicited in vain from England such a co-operation as her own interest demanded. He did not demand that her troops should be united to his, he desired only they should effect a diversion. He was astonished that in her cause she did not act in union with him, but coolly contemplating a bloody spectacle in a war which had been kindled at her will, she, instead of co-operating, sent troops to attack Buenos-Ayres and Alexandria. And what sensibly touched the heart of the Emperor, was to perceive that England, contrary to her good faith and the express terms of treaties, troubled at sea the commerce of his subjects at the very time that the blood of the Russians was shedding in the most glorious of warfare, which drawn down and fixed against the armies of his Imperial Majesty all the military force of the French Emperor, with whom the English then were and still are at war. Nevertheless when the two Emperors made peace, the Emperor of Russia, faithful to his old friendship, proffered his mediation to effect a general pacification; but the King of England rejected the mediation. The treaty between Russia and France was intended to procure a general peace; but at that very moment England suddenly quitted that apparent lethargy to which she had abandoned herself; but it was to cast upon the north of Europe new fire-brands, which were to light anew the flames of war. Her fleets and her armies appeared upon the coasts of Denmark, to execute there an act of violence of which history, so fertile in wickedness, does not afford a single example. A tranquil and moderate power sees itself assaulted as if it had been forging plots and meditating the ruin of England; and all to justify its prompt and total spoliation. The Emperor, wounded in his dignity, in the interests of his people, in his engagements with the courts of the North, by this act of violence committed in the Baltic, did not dissemble his resentment against England; new

proposals were made by England for the neutrality of Denmark, but to these the Emperor would not accede. His Imperial Majesty, therefore, breaks off all communication with England, proclaims anew the principles of the Armed Neutrality, and annuls all conventions inconsistent with its spirit."—*Parl. Deb. x. 218, 221.*

Declaration by Great Britain, 18th Dec. 1807. To this manifesto it was replied, in a long and able declaration by Great Britain, drawn by Mr. Canning—"His Majesty was apprised of the secret conditions which had been imposed upon Russia in the conference at Tilsit, but he indulged a hope that a review of the transactions of that unfortunate negotiation, and its effects upon the glory of the Russian name, and the interests of the Russian empire, would have led him to extricate himself from these trammels, contracted in a moment of despondency and alarm. His Majesty deemed it necessary to demand a specific explanation from Russia with respect to these arrangements with France, the concealment of which could not but confirm the impression already received as to their character and tendency. The demand was made in the most amicable manner, and with every degree of delicacy and forbearance; but the declaration of war by the Emperor of Russia proves but too distinctly that this forbearance was misplaced. It proves, unhappily, that the influence acquired over Russia by the inveterate enemy of England, is such as to excite a causeless animosity between the two nations, whose long connexion and mutual interests prescribed the most intimate union and co-operation. The King of England does full justice to the motives which induced the Emperor of Russia twice to take up arms in the common cause. But surely the Emperor of Russia, on the last occasion, had a more pressing call to join his arms to those of his ally, the King of Prussia, than Great Britain, then actually at war with that power. The reference to the war with the Porte is peculiarly unfortunate, when it was undertaken at the instigation of Russia, and solely for the purpose of maintaining the Russian interests against those of France. If, however, the peace of Tilsit was really a punishment for the inactivity of Great Britain, it was singularly unfortunate that it took place at a time when England was making the most strenuous exertions in the common cause, and had actually got that great armament prepared which she has since been obliged to employ to disconcert a combination directed against her own immediate interests and security. The complaint of vexations to Russian commerce, is a mere imaginary grievance, never heard of before, and now put forth only to countenance the exaggerated declamations by which France strives to inflame the animosity of the other continental powers. The vindication of the Copenhagen expedition is already before the world, and Russia has it in her power at once to disprove the basis on which it is erected, by producing the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. These secret articles were not communicated to his Majesty—they are not yet communicated—not even that which prescribed a time for the acceptance, by Great Britain, of the proffered mediation of Russia. Even after this unworthy concealment, however, so un-

extensive dominions. As fast as the troops arrived from the Niemen of St.-Petersburg, they were passed through to the frontiers of Finland, and such a force was soon accumulated there as rendered hopeless the preservation of that bright jewel to the Swedish crown. A formal declaration of war was, however, delayed till the spring following, when the preparations of the cabinet of St.-Petersburg were completed, and the season of the year enabled them to resume military operations. In the interval, the Swedish government had so carefully abstained from giving any cause of complaint to the Northern Autocrat, that when he came to assign his reasons for a rupture to the world, he could find no ground whatever on which to justify his hostilities, but that the Swedish monarch had not acceded to his proposal to break with England and join his forces to those of Russia, and was desirous of preserving throughout the contest a strict neutrality; a pretext for a war which came with a singularly bad grace from a power which affected to feel such indignation at the English government for having, for a similar reason, and when well informed of the secret designs of France against the Danish fleet, commenced hostilities against the court of Copenhagen.

Feb. 6, 1808. This declaration was immediately followed by a proclamation to the Fins by the Russian commander, in which he declared that he entered their territory with no hostile intentions, and solely to preserve them from the horrors of war, and invited them to abstain from hostilities or revolt to Russia: a promise instantly belied by the formal occupation of the whole provinces by the Muscovite forces, and the establishment of Russian authorities in every part of them excepting those fortresses still held by Swedish garrisons. Meanwhile the King of Sweden, faithful to his engagements, relying on the support of Great Britain, and encouraged by the great blow struck at the Danish power by the English armament, bid defiance to the united hostility of France and Russia, and replied to the Russian manifesto in a dignified proclamation, a model for greater powers and more prosperous fortunes, in which he bitterly complained of the invasion of his dominions and the incitement held out to his subjects to revolt by the Russian forces, without any declaration of war or ground of hostility; contrasted the present subservience of Russia to France, with the repeated declarations she had made, that its ambition was inconsistent with the liberties of Europe, and her solemn engagements to conclude no peace with that power which should be "inconsistent with the glory of the Russian name, the security of the empire, the sanctity of alliances, and the general security of Europe (1)," and justly observed, that the present war, based on the avowed design of Russia to dictate all their foreign connexions to the Northern Powers, was undertaken for no other object but to add Finland to the Russian dominions, and

suitable to the dignity of an independent sovereign, the mediation was not refused: it was conditionally accepted, and the conditions were a communication of the basis on which the proposed treaty was to be founded, and of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit: conditions to which the Emperor of Russia could not object, as the first was the same which the Emperor had himself annexed to the mediation of Austria between himself and France, not four months before; and the second was clearly called for by the previous, and long-established relations between Russia and Great Britain. Instead of granting either of these demands, Russia declares war." —*English Declaration, December 18. 1807; Parl. Deb.* x. 118-122. It will be observed how studiously, in these diplomatic papers, Russia eludes all al-

lusion to the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit. "The capture of the Danish fleet," says Hardenberg, "was not the *cause*, but the *pretext*, of Russia's rupture with England. The cabinet of St.-Petersburg, if the truth were known, was not sorry of so fair an opportunity for getting quit of all restraints upon its meditated hostilities in the North, as it already was in the South of Europe; and, notwithstanding all the loud declamations against the Copenhagen expedition, beheld, with more satisfaction, the success of England in that quarter, than it would have done the junction of the Danish fleet to the naval resources of the French Emperor." —*HARDENBERG*, x. 49.

(1) See Russian manifesto, 30th Aug. 1806.

compel Sweden to sacrifice her fleet and commerce as a security for Constadt and Revel (1).

Denmark
enters cor-
dially into
the war.

It was not to be supposed that Denmark, after the grievous though unavoidable losses she had sustained, should not resent to the utmost of her power the hostility of Great Britain. She threw herself, therefore, without reserve into the arms of France, and made every preparation for the most active hostility; though the loss of her fleet and dismantling of her arsenal, deprived her of the means of carrying on any efficient warfare, and which, on the other hand, exposed her commerce and colonies to total destruction. The Prince Royal, carried away by an excusable resentment, overlooked all these considerations, and not only constantly refused to ratify the capitulation of Copenhagen, but concluded, soon after, a treaty offensive and defensive with the Emperor Napoléon, which, by a singular coincidence, was signed on the very day on which Junot, at the head of a powerful army, commenced his march from Bayonne to enforce a similar obedience to the secret resolutions adopted at Tilsit from the court of Lisbon (2).

Affairs of
Russia and
Turkey.

While a new war was thus kindling from the ashes of the old one in the north of Europe, Russia was steadily prosecuting those ambitious designs on her southern frontier, the unmolested advancement of which had constituted the principal lure held out by Napoléon to gain her alliance on the shores of the Niemen. In this attempt, however, she did not experience all the facilities which she expected. As the main object of Napoléon, in the negotiations at Tilsit, was to accelerate the rupture of Russia with Great Britain, and procure her accession to the Continental System (3), so the ruling principle of Russia was to obtain facilities for the prosecution of her designs against the Ottoman empire, and in the mean time to postpone the evacuation of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, till she was better prepared to carry her projects of conquest into effect. Napoléon, as already stated, had agreed at Tilsit, that the evacuation should be indefinitely postponed (4); but hardly had he returned to Paris, when, being engrossed with his ambitious projects in the Spanish peninsula, and unable to appropriate to himself in consequence his anticipated share of the Ottoman spoils, he repented of the ready consent which he had given to the advances of Russia in that direction, and became desirous to throw every obstacle in the way of their further prosecution. In terms of the stipulation to that effect in the

formal treaty, the mediation of France had been offered to the Divan, which having been accepted, and an armistice concluded, nothing remained to justify the prolonged occupation of the principalities. It appeared the more necessary to bring it to a termination, as the Turks, though they gladly availed themselves of the French mediation at first, did so in the belief that they were to obtain thereby the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia; but no sooner did they discover that this was not really intended, and that the Muscovite standards were still to remain on the Danube, than they loudly expressed their resolution to continue, in preference, the conflict. They said, with justice, "In what worse situation could we be, if the French, instead of being victorious, had been beaten in Poland? Is this the Emperor's care of his allies, whom he has drawn into the conflict, to leave their richest provinces in the

The Turks,
finding
themselves
betrayed by
the French,
prepare to
renew the
war.

(1) Ann. Reg. 1808, 237, 303 and 307. Sav. iii. 112.

(2) Hard. x. 48, 49.

(3) Bign. vi. 429.

(4) Ante, vi.

"Vous pouvez la traîner en longueur."

hands of their enemies (1)?" Savary, therefore, received orders to insist in the mildest possible manner, but still to insist, for the evacuation of the Principalities; and to consent to the prolonged occupation of them by the Russian forces, only on condition that Alexander sanctioned the continued possession of Silesia by the French troops. This was at once agreed to; the two Autocrats readily consented to wink at their mutual infraction of the rights of other states; and as the Turks found that they had been betrayed by Napoléon, and some account of the secret article of the treaty of Tilsit which provided for their partition had reached them, they declined the further intervention of the French, and prepared to renew the war (2).

(1) Ann. Reg. 1807, 742. State Papers. Sav. iii. 110, 111. Bign. vi. 429, 430. Hard. x. 51, 53. Corresp. Conf. de Nap. vii. 364, 385.

(2) The negotiation between Savary and Romanzoff, and his conversations with Alexander himself on this important subject, which are given in the secret and confidential correspondence of Napoléon, are highly curious, as indicating the ulterior ambitious views of the great empires which they severally represented, and the seeds of that jealousy which, in the midst of unbounded protestations of present regard, was laying the foundation of future and mortal hostility. By despatches from Napoléon, dated Fontainebleau, 14th Oct. 1807, Savary was required to enquire what was the cause which had retarded the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russian troops, and to observe that peace could not be re-established between Russia and the Porte till that evacuation had taken place; as it was the condition which must precede the armistice which was to be the foundation of the definitive treaty; that the delay to evacuate could not fail to annul the armistice which had been concluded, and rekindle the flames of war between Russia and the Ottoman Porte. In reply, the Emperor Alexander, after alleging various insignificant reasons for not commencing the evacuation, observed, "circumstances now appear to require a deviation in this particular from the strict letter of the treaty of Tilsit. The latest advices from Vienna and Odessa concur in stating that the influence of France has declined at Constantinople; it is even said that Lord A. Paget, the English ambassador, has embarked on board Lord Collingwood's fleet in the Dardanelles. There is every probability that a treaty will be concluded between England and the Porte hostile to you, and consequently to me; and that if I should evacuate these provinces I should soon have to re-enter them in order to avert the war from my own frontiers. I must revert to what the Emperor Napoléon said to me, not once but ten times, at Tilsit, in respect to these provinces, and I have more confidence in these assurances than in all the reasons of expedience or policy which may subsequently appear to thwart them. Why, then, renounce my present advantages, when past experience tells me so clearly what will ensue if I evacuate these provinces? Even supposing that you have the upper hand at Constantinople, you can never prevent hands of insurgents from crossing the Danube, and renewing the pillage of these provinces; the orders of the Porte are null a mile from Constantinople. In our conversations at Tilsit, your Emperor often said that he was no ways set on that evacuation: that it might be indefinitely postponed; that it was not possible any longer to tolerate the Turks in Europe; that he left me at liberty to drive them into Asia. It was only on a subsequent occasion that he went back of his word so far, as to speak of leaving the Turks Constantinople and some of the adjacent provinces."

Savary replied, "Russia can always renew the

war if you find it advisable. It is needless to refer to the engagements between the two monarchs; the Emperor Napoléon has too much confidence in the honour of the Emperor Alexander to doubt the validity of the reasons which have hitherto prevented him from executing these secret engagements: but still he is desirous of seeing them carried into effect, as a peace between Russia and the Porte is all that remains to conclude the execution of the stipulations of the public treaty of Tilsit. *All that the Emperor Napoléon has said at Tilsit shall be religiously executed*; nor is there any thing in the secret treaty which is calculated to thwart the desires of Russia. Nay, the surest and most expeditious mode to arrive at it is to carry into execution the public treaty; for we must conclude an armistice with the Turks before a treaty is concluded; *or do you propose at once to write their epitaph?*"

"I yesterday had a long interview," replied Alexander, "with the Swedish ambassador, and strongly urged him to enter into all the views of France, and the risk he would run in not making common cause with her and Russia. Meanwhile the march of the troops continues; in seven or eight days the last division will have arrived, and fifty thousand men will be ready to commence the war on the frontiers of Finland. When you demanded from me a declaration of war against England, I was well aware it was no trifling change of policy which was required; no slight change of system which could be altered as soon as adopted. *Had I conceived it to be such I would never have put my name to it*; but I viewed it in a more extended light. What am I required to do, said I to myself? To prepare great events which will cause the memory of mournful ones to be forgotten, and put the two states in such political relations as can never be disturbed. Impressed with these ideas, and *within twenty-four hours after your requisition, I did what you desired*, though that war was not only no ways conducive to our interests, but, on the contrary, exposed us to very serious losses. *Now you insist that I should make war on Sweden*; I am ready to do so; my armies are on her frontier; but what return are we to obtain for so many sacrifices? Wallachia and Moldavia are the recompense which the nation expects, and you wish to bereave us of them. What reply can we make to our people if, after their evacuation, they ask us what benefits are to compensate to them for the manifold losses consequent on the war with England?"—See the whole diplomatic papers and conversations in SAVARY'S *Secret Despatch to Napoléon, St Petersburg, 18th November, 1807; Corresp. Conf. de Napoléon, vii. 564, 585*—That confidential despatch reveals more of the real nature of the secret engagements at Tilsit than any other documents in existence; and demonstrates that both the Swedish and English war were the result of those engagements, and no ways connected with the Copenhagen expedition, which is never once mentioned as a ground of complaint against Great Britain, by either Savary, Alexander, or his minister Romanzoff.

Changes in
the consti-
tution of the
Italian
States.

Meanwhile Napoléon had set out for Italy, where great political changes were in progress. Destined, like all the subordinate thrones which surrounded the great nation, to share in the rapid mutations which its government underwent, the kingdom of Italy was soon called upon to accept a change in its constitution. Napoléon, in consequence, suppressed the legislative body, and substituted in its room a senate, which was exclusively intrusted with the power of submitting observations to government on the public wants, and of superintending the budget and public expenditure. As this senate was named and paid by government, this last shadow of representative institutions became a perfect mockery. Nevertheless Nov. 20, 1807. Napoléon was received with unbounded adulation by all the towns of Italy; their deputies, who waited upon him at Milan, vied with each other in elegant flattery. He was the Redeemer of France, but the Creator of Italy; they had supplicated Heaven for his safety, for his victories; they offered him the tribute of their eternal love and fidelity. Napoléon received their adulation in the most gracious manner; but he was careful not to lose sight of the main object of his policy, the consolidation of his dominions, the dependence of them all on his Imperial crown, and the fostering of a military spirit among his subjects. "You will always find," said he, "the source of your prosperity, the best guarantee alike of your institutions and of your independence, in the constant union of the Iron crown with the Imperial crown of France. But to obtain this felicity, you must show yourselves worthy of it. It is time that the Italian youth should seek some more ennobling employment than idling away their lives at the feet of women; and that they should spurn every lover who cannot lay claim to their favour by the exhibition of honourable scars (1)."

Union of
Parma and
Placentia to
France.
Great works
at Milan.
State of
Italy.
Dec. 10,
1807.

From Milan the Emperor travelled by Verona and Padua to Venice; he there admired the marble palaces, and varied scenery, and gorgeous architecture of the Queen of the Adriatic, which appeared to extraordinary advantage amidst illuminations, fireworks, and rejoicings; and returning to Milan, arranged, with an authoritative hand, all the affairs of the peninsula. The discontent of Melzi, who still retained a lingering partiality for the democratic institutions which he had vainly hoped to see established in his country, was stifled by the title of Duke of Lodi; Tuscany was taken from the King of Etruria, on whom Napoléon had settled it, and united to France by the title of the department of the Taro; while magnificent public works were set on foot at Milan to dazzle the ardent imagination of the Italians, and console them for the entire loss of their national independence and civil liberty. The cathedral was daily adorned with fresh works of sculpture; its exterior decorated and restored to its original purity, while thousands of pinnacles and statues rose on all sides, glittering in spotless brilliancy in the blue vault of heaven; the forum of Bonaparte was rapidly advancing; the beautiful basso-relievos of the arch of the Simplon already attracted the admiring gaze of thousands; the roads of the Simplon and Mont Cenis were kept in the finest order, and daily attracted fresh crowds of strangers to the Italian plains. But in the midst of all this external splendour, the remains of which still throw a halo round the recollection of the French domination in Italy, the finances of all the states were involved in hopeless embarrassments, and suffering of the most grinding kind pervaded all classes of the people; the public expenditure of the kingdom of Italy had risen to 120,000,000 francs (L3,000,000); the annual tri-

(1) Bot. iv. 224, 230. Hard. x. 26. Montg. vi. 293.

bute of a million sterling to France was severely felt; ten thousand men had recently been raised by conscription to fill up the chasm in the army; and the misery of Piedmont, Tuscany, and the Venetian states, from the enormous contributions levied by the French troops, and the total stoppage of foreign commerce, was such as to draw forth the most piteous lamentations from its native historians (1).

Encroachments
of France on
Holland, Ger-
many, and Ita-
ly. Occupation
of Rome and
dismember-
ment of its
provinces.
Nov. 11.

The encroachments thus made on the Italian peninsula, were not the only ones which he effected in consequence of the liberty to dispose of Western Europe acquired by Napoléon at the treaty of Tilsit. The territory of the Great Nation was rounded also on the side of Germany and Holland. On the 11th of November, the important town and territory of Flushing was ceded by the King

of Holland to France, who obtained, in return, merely an elusory equivalent in East Friesland. On the 21st of January following, a décret of the senate united to the French empire, besides these places, the important towns of Kehl, Cassel, and Wesel, on the right bank of the Rhine. Shortly after, the French troops, who had already taken possession of the whole of

Feb. 2. Tuscany, in virtue of the resignation forced upon the Queen of Etruria, invaded the Roman territories, and took possession of the ancient capital of the world. They immediately occupied the Castle of St. Angelo, and gates of the city, and entirely dispossessed the Papal troops. Two months afterwards, an Imperial decree of Napoléon's severed the provinces of Ancona, Urbino, Macerata, and Camerino, which had formed part of the Eccle-

April 2. siastical estates under the gift of Charlemagne for nearly a thousand years, and annexed them to the Kingdom of Italy. The reason assigned for this spoliation was, "That the actual Sovereign of Rome has constantly declined to declare war against the English, and to coalesce with the Kings of Italy and Naples for the defence of the Italian peninsula. The interests of these two kingdoms, as well as of the armies of Naples and Italy, require that their communication should not be interrupted by a hostile power." The importance of these acquisitions, great as they undoubtedly were, especially in Italy, was not so momentous as the principles on which they were founded, and the ulterior acquisitions to which they evidently pointed. France now, without disguise, assumed the right of annexing neutral and independent states to its already extensive dominion, by no other authority than the decree of its own legislature. The natural boundaries, so long held forth as the limits of the Great Nation, were overstepped; by extending its territory beyond the Rhine, it was plain that Holland and the North of Germany were soon to be incorporated with its dominions; by stretching across the Alps, it was evident that, ere long, Rome and the whole of Italy *would* form an integral part of the dominions of Napoléon (2).

But all the other consequences of the peace at Tilsit were trifling, in comparison of those which took place in the Spanish peninsula. As the war to which they led in that quarter, however, was by far the most important and eventful which arose out of the French Revolution, brought, for the first time, the English and French armies as principals into the contest, and was the chief cause of the overthrow of Napoléon, as well as the best index to the leading features of his policy, it requires for its elucidation a separate chapter.

Reflections
on the
imminent
hazard to
Europe from
the treaty of
Tilsit.

In the consequences, however, which have already been described as flowing from the treaty at Tilsit, is to be discerned the clearest indication of the great peril which instantly threatens the cause of European independence, from the undue preponderance ac-

(1) Bot. iv. 230, 234. Hard. x. 26.

(2) Montg. vi. 288, 299, 315.

quired by any of its potentates, and of the absolute necessity which exists for the maintenance of that balance of power, in which superficial observers have so often seen only the prolific source of unnecessary warfare. The principle on which that policy is founded is that of *principiis obsta*; resist the encroachments which may give any one state an undue preponderance; and regard such contests at the extremity of the outworks, as the only effectual means of defending the ramparts of the place. Such a system requires a sacrifice of the present to the future; it involves an immediate expenditure to avert a remote, and possibly contingent, evil. It will, therefore, always be supported only by the wise, and be generally unpopular with the bulk of mankind. It is of great importance, therefore, to attend to the consequences which immediately resulted from the treaty at Tilsit, and the effects which necessarily ensued from the overthrow of this system. The inferior powers of Europe were then overawed or subdued. England had withdrawn almost entirely from the strife; and, secluded in her inaccessible isle, had remained, according to the favourite system of a numerous class of her politicians, a neutral spectator of the wars of the Continent. What was the consequence? Was it that her independence was better secured, her interests more thoroughly established, or her ultimate safety better provided for than under the more active and costly system of former times? On the contrary, while the rights and liberties of the continental states were utterly destroyed during her secession, England herself was brought to the very edge of perdition. The European strife immediately ran into a contest between its two great powers; the whole moral as well as physical strength of the Continent was arrayed under the banners of France or Russia, and when these rival powers came to an accommodation, it was by the mutual agreement to divide between them the spoils of all subordinate or neutral states. To Russia, already enriched by a portion of Prussia, was assigned Finland, the greater part of Turkey, and an irresistible preponderance in the Euxine and Baltic Seas; to France, already master of the half of Germany, was allotted Italy, Poland, and the Spanish Peninsula. These great powers at once laid aside all moderation and semblance even of justice in their proceedings; and, strong in each other's forbearance, instantly proceeded to appropriate, without scruple, the possessions of all other states, even unoffending neutrals or faithful allies, which lay on their own side of the line of demarcation. It was easy to see that the present concord which subsisted between them could not last. The world was not wide enough for two such great and ambitious powers, any more than it had been for Alexander and Darius, Rome and Carthage. Universal empire to one or other, would, it was plain, be the result of a desperate strife between them, and in that case it would be hard to say whether the independence of Great Britain had most to fear from the Scythian or the Gallic hosts. Already this danger had become apparent; all the fleets of Europe were combined under the command of the French Emperor; and in a few years he would have two hundred sail of the line, to beat down in the Channel the naval forces of England, and carry slavery and ruin into the British dominions. Such were, then, the consequences of the subversion of the balance of power; such the dangers, which induce the far-seeing sagacity of political wisdom to commence the conflict for national independence, as soon as the rights of inferior powers are menaced.

Although, however, both the liberties of England and independence of Europe, were at this time placed in such imminent peril, yet a great step had already been made towards diminishing the danger; and the Copenhagen expedition had completely paralysed the right wing of the naval force by

Great im-
portance of
the stroke
already
struck at
Napoléon's
naval con-
federacy.

which Napoléon expected to effect our subjugation. The capture of twenty ships of the line, and fifteen frigates, with all their stores complete, equivalent, in Napoléon's estimation (1), to the destruction of eighty thousand land troops, was perhaps the greatest maritime blow ever yet struck by any nation, and weakened the naval resources of the French Emperor to a degree greater in extent than any single calamity yet experienced during the war. The hostility of Russia, predetermined at Tilsit, was by this stroke kept almost within the bounds of neutrality. Sweden was encouraged to continue in the English alliance: the maritime force of the Baltic was in a manner withdrawn from the contest; a few sail of the line were all that were required to be maintained by England in that quarter. It is remarkable that this great achievement, fraught with such momentous consequences at that eventful crisis, was regarded by the nation at the time with divided and uneasy sentiments; and that the Opposition never had so largely the support of the public, as when they assailed the government for a measure, calculated, in its ultimate results, to prove the salvation of the country. But it is not to be supposed that this dissatisfaction was owing to factious motives; on the contrary, it was brought about by the ascendancy in the public mind of the best and noblest principles of our nature. And it is a memorable circumstance, highly characteristic of the salutary influence of public opinion under a really free government, in bringing the actions of public men to the test of general morality, that—while in France, where revolutionary ascendancy had extinguished every feeling in regard to public matters, except the admiration of success, and in Russia, where a despotie sway had hitherto prevented the growth of any public opinion, universal satisfaction ensued at the ill-gotten gains of the respective Emperors—the English people mourned at the greatest maritime conquest yet achieved by their arms, and disdained to purchase even national independence at the expense, as it was then ignorantly thought, of the national faith.

(1) Napoléon in Month.

CHAPTER XLIX.

PROXIMATE CAUSES OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.

ARGUMENT.

Ambitious Views of Napoléon on the Spanish Peninsula—His early Designs against Portugal and the Spanish Monarchy in July 1806—The Discovery of these Designs rouses Spain to break with France—Premature Proclamation by the Prince of Peace, announcing his Designs in October 1806—Napoléon resolves on the Dethronement of the Spanish and Portuguese Monarchs—Measures arranged at Tilsit for this Purpose—Proofs of the Secret Conferences there regarding it—Steps taken by the Portuguese Government in consequence—Origin of the Spanish Intrigues—Character of the Leading Persons there—The Prince of Peace, Charles IV.—The Queen—Sketch of the Life of the Prince of Peace—The Prince of Escóiquiz and his Confidential Advisers—Escóiquiz opens a Negotiation with the Spanish Ambassador, and the Prince of Asturias writes to Napoléon—Treaty of Fontainebleau between Charles IV and the French Emperor—Convention at the same place by which it was followed—Napoléon's Perfidious Designs both towards Spain and Portugal in acceding to it—His Secret Instructions to Junot in the Invasion of Portugal—Extreme Difficulties of that General's march across the Peninsula—Conduct of the Portuguese Government, and Situation of Lisbon at this Crisis—After great hesitation, the Court of Lisbon determine to set sail for Brazil—Proclamation of the Prince Regent on the Subject—Embarkation of the Royal Family for the Brazils—Arrival of the French at Lisbon—The Country is occupied by them in name of the Emperor, and Enormous Contributions levied by their Troops—The Portuguese Regency is at length dissolved by Junot, and the whole Kingdom seized by the French—Complete Occupation of the Provinces by their Forces, and Despair of the Inhabitants—Arrest of Ferdinand, Prince of Asturias at the Escurial, and Seizure of his Papers—Proclamation of the King of Spain on the Subject, and Correspondence with Napoléon regarding it—Letter of Charles IV to Napoléon—Cautious Conduct of the latter on receiving it, which leads to the Pardonning of the Prince of Asturias—Entrance of the French Troops into Spain—The Prince of Peace does not venture to remonstrate against this Invasion—New Levy in France, and Treacherous Seizure of Pampeluna by the French—And of Barcelona—Figueras and St Sébastians—The Emperor speedily improves upon his success, and covers the north of Spain with his Troops—The Prince of Peace at length sees through the real designs of Napoléon—His Secret Despatch to Isquierdo at this period—Napoléon demands the Cession of the Provinces to the north of the Ebro—Godoy, at length made aware of the designs of Napoléon, prepares the Flight of the Court to Seville—Tumult at Aranjuez, and Overthrow of that Minister—His Fall, and consequent Abdication of Charles IV.—His Proclamation and Secret Opinions on the Subject—Universal Joy of the Spanish People at these events—Continued Advance of the French Troops, and Entry of Murat into Madrid—He declines to recognise Ferdinand, and takes Military Possession of the Capital—Napoléon offers the Crown of Spain to Louis Bonaparte, who declines it—His Letter to that Monarch to this effect—Savary is sent to Madrid—His Secret Instructions and Object of his Journey—He arrives at Madrid, and persuades Ferdinand to go to Bayonne—Journey of Ferdinand to Burgos at that Officer's earnest desire—Secret Motives of his Councillors in agreeing to that Step—But it is strongly resisted, and his Council become divided—At length he Prolongs his Advance to Bayonne, in consequence of a letter from Napoléon—Guarded, but deceitful expressions in that Letter—Energetic Efforts of the Spanish Authorities at Biscay to stop the King—Godoy, Charles IV, and the Queen, are sent by Murat to Bayonne—Great Embarrassment experienced at this time by Napoléon in regard to the Peninsular Affairs—His admirable Letter to Murat, portraying his Views on the Subject—Extreme agitation in Madrid at the approaching Departure of the rest of the Royal Family—Commotion and Tumult at that Capital on 2d May—Barbarous Massacre subsequently committed by Murat—Prodigious Effect which it produced throughout the Peninsula—Ferdinand arrives at Bayonne, and is told he must surrender the Crown of Spain—Subsequent Negotiation between his Councillors and Napoléon—He sends for Charles IV, and has a Private Conference with Escóiquiz—Its most striking Passages—The Arrival of Charles IV solves the Difficulty—His Reception by Napoléon—Ferdinand is forced to resign the Crown in a qualified manner—But still refuses to make an Unconditional Surrender—Charles IV's Letter to his Son—Napoléon obtains an Unconditional Surrender from Charles IV—Secret Instructions of Ferdinand at this time to the

Regency at Madrid—The Intelligence of the Events there on 2d May extorts an unconditional Surrender from Ferdinand—Napoléon creates Joseph Bonaparte King of Spain, and convokes an assembly of Notables at Bayonne—His Proclamation to the Spaniards—Reflections on the unparalleled chain of fraud and perfidy by which this was accomplished—His perfidious conduct towards the Spanish Princes—Ultimate consequences of this treacherous conduct to Napoléon and his house—Its apparent wisdom, so far as mere human wisdom is concerned—The passions of the Revolution were the real cause of the disasters both to Europe and France.

Ambitious views of Napoléon in the Spanish Peninsula. His design on Portugal. No sooner had Napoléon returned to Paris, than he began to turn his eyes towards the Spanish Peninsula, and the means of bringing the resources of both its monarchies more immediately under the control of France than they had hitherto been brought, even by the abject submission of both courts to his commands. His designs against Portugal had been of very long standing; Lord Yarmouth gained a clue to them while conducting the negotiations at Paris in July 1806, for the conclusion of a general peace; and so pressing did the danger at that time appear, that July, 1806. government dispatched Earl St.-Vincent with a powerful squadron to the Tagus, to watch over British interests in that quarter, and afford to the Portuguese government every assistance in his power in warding off the danger with which they were threatened; Lord Rosslyn accompanied the expedition in a political character, and was authorized to offer the Portuguese government assistance in men and money to aid them in repelling the threatened invasion. Nor were these measures of precaution uncalled for; a corps of thirty thousand men, under the name of the "army of the Gironde," was assembling at Bayonne, under the command of Junot, and it was ascertained, by undoubted information that their destination was Lisbon (1). The presence of the British fleet under Earl St.-Vincent, in the Tagus, for a period of several months revived the drooping spirits of the Portuguese government; but after the battle of Jena, their terror of France so far prevailed as to induce them to solicit their dismissal. The march, however, of the French armies to Prussia, postponed, for a considerable period at least, the threatened invasion (2).

And against Spain. At the same period that these preparations, avowedly directed against Portugal, were going forward on the Pyrenean frontier, the cabinet of Madrid discovered, through their ambassador at Paris, that Napoléon was offering to bestow on others, without their knowledge or consent, considerable portions of the Spanish dominions. It has been already noticed that, in his anxiety for peace with England, he offered to cede the Spanish settlement of Puerto Rico; and, to obtain Sicily from the British government for his brother Joseph, he proposed to give up the Balearic Isles

(1) "Switzerland," said Talleyrand to Lord Yarmouth at Paris, on 27th July 1806, "is on the eve of undergoing a great change. This cannot be averted but by a peace with England; but still less can we alter for any other consideration our intention of invading Portugal. The army destined for that purpose is already assembled at Bayonne. This is for the consideration of Great Britain."—LORD YARMOUTH'S Despatch, July 30 1806; Parl. Deb. viii. 134.

(2) *Hard. x. 79 Parl. Deb. viii. 134.*

V: 350. Even so early as this period, the project of partitioning Portugal, and conferring a portion of it on the Prince of Peace, afterwards carried into effect by the treaty of Fontainebleau, was formed. "Lord Rosslyn," says General Foy, "was no sooner admitted to the council of Lisbon than he announced that it was all over with Portugal; that a French army, assembled at the foot of the Pyrenees, was ready to invade it, and that its conquest was al-

ready arranged between the King of Spain and the Prince of Peace. That great project," added he, "has been confided by Talleyrand to Lord Lauderdale during the negotiations at Paris. The Ministers of the King of England could not see without uneasiness the peril of their ancient allies; they have flown to their succour. A corps of 12,000 men at this moment is embarking at Portsmouth, and will shortly arrive at Lisbon; meanwhile, the court of Lisbon may draw at pleasure on the treasury of England for the charges consequent on the war."—*Foy, ii. 123.* The English expedition sailed, but afterwards went on to Sicily, as the Portuguese government, relieved of their present danger by the Prussian war, and desirous not to embroil themselves further with France, not only declined their aid, but prevailed on the English government to withdraw their squadron from the Tagus.

as a compensation to the dispossessed family of Naples (1)! Nor was this all—to make up the measure of indemnity, it was seriously proposed that a large annuity, imposed as a burden for ever on the Spanish Crown, should be settled on the dislodged family, and stipulations to this effect were inserted in the secret articles of the peace, which M. d'Oubril signed with France on July 19, 1806. July, 19, 1806 (2). Nor were these diplomatic arrangements unsupported by warlike demonstrations; on the contrary, the most active measures were taken to put the army on the Pyrenean frontier on the most efficient footing; and on the 19th July, Earl Yarmouth wrote to Mr. Secretary Fox: "There is a considerable army already forming at Bayonne; thirty thousand men are there already; this army is ostensibly directed against Portugal *but it will take Spain also* (3)."

The alarming discovery of the manner in which the French Emperor was thus disposing of portions of the Spanish monarchy, with which he was in a state of close alliance at the time without ever going through the form of asking their consent to the cessions they were required to make, added to the irritation which the court of Madrid already felt at the dethronement of the Neapolitan branch of the house of Bourbon. It produced the same impression on the cabinet of Madrid, which a similar discovery, made at the same time, on the offer of Napoléon to cede Hanover, recently bestowed on Prussia by himself, to Great Britain, as an inducement to that power to enter into a maritime peace, did on that of Berlin. Both these powers had for ten years cordially supported France; Spain, in particular, had placed her fleets and treasure at her disposal; and not only annually paid an enormous tribute (£2,800,000) to the expenses of the war, but submitted for its prosecution to the destruction of her marine, and the entire stoppage of her foreign and colonial trade. When, therefore, in return for so many sacrifices, made in a cause foreign to the real interests of Spain, her Ministers found not only that the interests of the Peninsula were noways regarded by Napoléon in his negotiation with England and Russia, but that he had actually offered the dismemberment of the Spanish monarchy, his tried and faithful ally, to appease the jealousy or satisfy the demands of these his old and inveterate enemies, their indignation knew no bounds. The veil which had so long hung before their eyes was at once violently rent asunder: they saw clearly that fidelity in alliance and long-continued national service afforded no guarantee whatever for the continued support of the French monarch, and that, when it suited his purpose, he had no scruples in purchasing a temporary respite from the hostility of an enemy by the permanent spoliation of a friend. The Prince of Peace, also, was personally mortified at the exclusion of the Spanish minister at Paris from all share in the conferences going on with d'Oubril and Lord Yarmouth for the conclusion of a general peace. Under the influence of such pressing public and private causes of irritation, the Spanish minister lent a willing ear to the advances of the Russian ambassador at Madrid, Baron Strogonoff, who strongly represented the impolicy of continuing any longer the alliance with a conqueror who sacrificed his allies to

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(1) *Ante*, v. 339.

(2) "M. d'Oubril and Talleyrand have fixed upon Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica for his Sicilian Majesty, if they cannot prevail on us to evacuate Sicily."—LORD YARMOUTH to MR. SECRETARY FOX, July 19 and 20, 1806; *Parl. Deb.* viii. 122.—And again, on 26th September, Champagne proposed to Lord Lauderdale "that his Sicilian Majesty should

have the Balearic Isles, and an annuity from the court of Spain to enable him to maintain his dignity."—LORD LAUDERDALE'S Despatch to EARL SPENCER, Paris, 26th September, 1806; *Parl. Deb.* viii. 193, 194.

(3) Torenio, i. 6. Bign. v. 345, 352. Lord Yarmouth's Despatch, Paris, July 19, 1806. *Parl. Deb.* viii. 122.

Aug. 28, 1806. propitiate his enemies; and a convention was secretly concluded at Madrid between the Spanish government and the Russian ambassador, to which the court of Lisbon was also a party, by which it was agreed that, as soon as the favourable opportunity arrived, by the French armies being far advanced on their road to Berlin, the Spanish government should commence hostilities on the Pyrenees, and invite the English to co-operate in averting the dangers with which it was menaced from the Spanish peninsula (4).

Premature proclamation by the Prince of Peace. The whole of this secret negotiation was made known to Napoléon by the activity of his ambassador at Madrid, and by the intercepting of some of the correspondence in cipher in which it was carried on. But he dissembled his resentment, and resolved to strike a decisive blow in the North of Germany before he carried into effect the views which he now began to entertain for the total conquest and appropriation of both kingdoms in the Peninsula. The imprudence of the Prince of Peace, however, publicly revealed the designs which were in agitation before the proper season had arrived; for, in a proclamation published in the beginning of October at Madrid, he invited "all Spaniards to unite themselves under the national standards: the rich to make sacrifices for the charges of a war which will soon be called for by the common good; the magistrates to do all in their power to rouse the public enthusiasm, in order to enable the nation to enter with glory the lists which were preparing." This proclamation reached Napoléon on the field of Jena the evening after the battle. He was not prepared for so vigorous a step on the part of one who had so long been the obsequious minister of his will; and it may be conceived what his feelings were, on receiving accounts of so decided a demonstration in such a moment of unexampled triumph. Too skilled in dissembling, however, to give any premature vent to his feelings, he contented himself with instructing his ambassador at Madrid to demand an explanation of so extraordinary a measure, and feigned entire satisfaction with the flimsy pretence, that it was directed against an anticipated descent of the Moors. Nay, he had the address to render this perilous step the means of forwarding his ultimate designs against the Peninsula; for, by threatening the Prince of Peace with the utmost consequences of his resentment, if the most unequivocal proof of devotion to the cause of France were not speedily given, he succeeded in obtaining the consent of the cabinet of Madrid to the march of the Marquis Romana, with the flower of the Spanish army, from the banks of the Ebro to the shores of the Baltic; thereby denuding the Peninsula of its best defenders, and leaving it, as he supposed, an easy prey to his ambitious designs (2). At the same time the court of Lisbon, justly alarmed at the perilous situation in which they were placed by this ill-timed revelation of their secret designs, lost no time in disavowing all participation in a project, which all concerned pretended now equally to condemn,

(1) Lord Londonderry, i. 19. Hard. x. 80, 81. Toreno, i. 6, 7.

(2) Hard. x. 79, 81. Southey's Pen. War, i. 83. De Pradt, Sur la Rev. d'Espagne, 15. Londonderry, i. 21, 22.

The details now given on the spoliation of Spain, which had been contemplated by Napoléon in the diplomatic conferences with the English government at Paris in July 1806, and the actual conclusion of a treaty for that spoliation with Russia in that month, are of the highest importance in the development of the remote causes of the Peninsular war, as they demonstrate that the celebrated pro-

clamation of the Prince of Peace on 5th October was not, as the French panegyrists of Napoléon represent, an uncalled-for act of original hostility on the part of the Spanish government; but a *defensive measure* merely, rendered necessary by the discovery of Napoléon's *previous*, declared intention of bestowing on strangers, without their consent, considerable portions of the Spanish dominions. This important fact, demonstrated beyond dispute by the State Papers above quoted, appears to be entirely unknown to Southey (*Penins. War*, i. 83); Napier (*Penins. War*, i. 4); and even Lord Londonderry (*Londond. i. 21, 22*).

and to propitiate the conqueror by an act which they were well aware would be well received, compelled Earl St.-Vincent to withdraw with his squadron from the Tagus.

Napoléon resolves on the dethronement of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs.

This meditated though abortive resistance of Spain, however, to the projects of spoliation which he had in contemplation, produced a very great impression on Napoléon. He perceived, in the clearest manner, the risk to which he was exposed, if, while actively engaged in a German or Russian war in front, he were to be suddenly assailed by the monarchies of the Peninsula in rear; a quarter where the French frontier was in a great measure defenceless, and from which the armies of England might find an easy entrance into the heart of his dominions. He felt with Louis XIV that it was necessary there should be no longer any Pyrenees; and as the Revolution had changed the reigning family on the throne of France, it appeared indispensable that a similar change should take place in the Peninsular monarchies. By effecting that object he thought, apparently with reason, that not only would the resources of the kingdoms it contained be more completely placed at his disposal, but his rear would be secured by the co-operation of Princes whose existence depended on the maintenance of his authority; and a new family compact, founded on the same reasons of blood connexion and state policy which had rendered it so important to the Bourbon, would, in like manner, secure the perpetuity of the Napoléon dynasty. From the people, either of Spain or Portugal, he anticipated little or no opposition, deeming them, like the Italians, indifferent to political changes, provided that no diminution were made in their private enjoyments. Although, therefore, he dissembled his intentions as long as the war continued in the North of Europe, he had already taken his resolution, and the determination was irrevocable, that the Houses of Bourbon and Braganza should cease to reign (1).

Measures arranged at Tilsit against Spain and Portugal.

The peace of Tilsit, however, placed Napoléon in a very different situation, and gave him at once the means of providing in the most effectual manner for the concurrence of Alexander, in the dethronement of the Peninsular monarchs, by merely conniving at his advances against the Turkish empire. It has already been stated, accordingly, that the invasion of Spain was settled at this period, and that the consideration given for that act of injustice, was permission to the Czar to drive the Turks out of Europe (2). In regard to Portugal, the course to be adopted was sufficiently plain. All that was required was to summon the court of Lisbon to shut their ports against England, confiscate all English property within their dominions, and declare war against the British empire. In the course of enforcing such a requisition, it was hoped that an opportunity could hardly fail to present itself, of effecting the total dethronement of the House of Bra-

(1) Las Cas. iv. 200, 201. Londond. i. 22. Hard. x. 81, 82. Thib vi. 276.

(2) *Ante*, vi. 143.

Proofs of the secret conference regarding it. "I have strong reasons to believe," says Savary, "that the affair of Spain was arranged at Tilsit. Subsequently, at St Petersburg, when the troubles in the Peninsula commenced, the Emperor seemed no way surprised at them, and not only expressed no jealousy at the entrance of the French troops into Spain, but never once mentioned the subject. And though Napoléon wrote to me every week from Paris, he never alluded to the subject; a silence which he certainly would not have preserved had every thing not been previously arranged, especially considering how much he had at heart at that period to draw closer

the bonds of the Russian alliance."—SAVARY, iii. 99; see also THIBAUDEAU, *Hist. de l'Empire*, vi. 276; ABBÉ DE PRADT, *Révolution d'Espagne*, i. 7; and ESCOÛQUIS has preserved a precious conversation which he had with Napoléon himself on that subject—"There is but one power," said he, "which can disturb my views, and I have no fears in that quarter. The Emperor of Russia, to whom I communicated my projects on Spain, which were formed at that period, approved of them, and gave me his word of honour that he would throw no obstacles in their way. The other powers will remain tranquil, and the resistance of the Spaniards will not be formidable. Believe me, the countries where monks have influence are not difficult to conquer."—ESCOÛQUIS, 131; *Pièces Just.*

Aug. 12. ganza. This was accordingly done; and on the 12th August, the Portuguese government, as already noticed, were formally summoned, in terms of the secret articles of the treaty of Tilsit, to declare war against England, adopt the Continental System, and confiscate all the English property within their bounds (1). At the same time, the army of the Gironde, which had been in a great measure broken up during the Prussian war, re-assembled at Bayonne, and before the end of August, Junot found himself at the head of Aug. 29. twenty-five thousand foot and three thousand horse; while Napoléon, in anticipation of an unfavourable reply to his demands, without waiting for an answer, at once seized the Portuguese ships in his harbours.

Measures of the Portuguese Government. The British government, who were speedily informed of the demand thus made upon their ancient ally, and were no strangers either to the powerful means at the disposal of the French Emperor for enforcing obedience to his wishes, or the inconsiderable force which the Portuguese government could oppose to his hostility, immediately sent the generous intimation to the court of Lisbon that they would consent to any Aug. 18. thing which might appear conducive to the safety of Portugal, and only hoped that the threatened confiscation of British property would not be complied with. The Prince Regent in consequence consented to shut his harbours against English vessels, and to declare war against Great Britain; but he declared that his sense of religion, and the regard which he entertained for existing treaties, would not permit him to confiscate at once the Sept. 15. property of the English merchants. Intimation was at the same time sent to the British residents, that they had better wind up their affairs and embark their property as speedily as possible. This modified compliance with his demands, however, was far from satisfying the French Emperor, to whom the confiscation of English property was as convenient as a means of gratifying his followers by plunder, as essential to the general adoption of the Oct. 10. Continental System, which he had so much at heart. Orders, therefore, were immediately dispatched to Junot to commence his march; they Oct. 17. reached the French General on the 17th October; two days after- Oct. 19. wards his leading divisions crossed the Bidasoa, while the Court of Lisbon, menaced with instant destruction, soon after issued a decree, excluding English vessels of every description from their harbours, but declaring, that if the French troops entered Portugal they would retire with their fleet to the Brazils (2).

Origin of the Spanish intrigues. Events, however, succeeded one another with extraordinary rapidity; and, without any regard to the obedience yielded by the Court of Lisbon to his demands by the proclamation of the 20th October, Napoléon had not only already resolved on the total destruction of the House of Braganza, but actually concluded a treaty for the entire partition of its dominions. The motives which led to this act of spoliation are intimately connected with the complicated intrigues which at this period were preparing

(1) Thib. vi. 277. Ann. Reg. 1807, 279, 280. Lond. i. 24, 25. South. i. 90. Hard. x. 99, 100. Parl. Deb. x. 345. Lord Wellesley's Statements. . . The note presented by the French ambassador at Lisbon to the Portuguese government was in these terms: — "The undersigned has received orders to declare, that if, on the 1st of next September, the Prince Regent of Portugal has not manifested his resolution to emancipate himself from English influence, by declaring, without delay, war against Great Britain, dismissing the English ambassador, recalling his own from London, confiscating all the English merchandise, closing his harbours against

the English vessels, and uniting his squadrons to the navies of the Continental powers, the Prince Regent of Portugal will be considered as having renounced the cause of the Continent, and the undersigned will be under the necessity of demanding his passports, and declaring war." 12th August 1807.—*For's Pen. War*, ii. 405, 406; *Pièces Just.* —By a curious coincidence, this note, which so completely justified the Copenhagen expedition, was presented at Lisbon on the very day on which the British fleet approached the shores of Zealand.

(2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 280. Lond. i. 27, 28. Hard. x. 103, 104. Thib. Hist. de l'Empire, vi. 260, 261.

the way for the dethronement of the Spanish House of Bourbon, and the lighting up the flames of the PENINSULAR WAR.

Character of the leading persons there, the Prince of Peace, Charles IV., the Queen.

The views of Napoléon on the Spanish Peninsula, first formed in the summer of 1806, and matured by the consent of Alexander at Tilsit, required even more the aid of skilful and unscrupulous diplomatists than of powerful armies towards their developement. He found such aid in Talleyrand and Duroc, the only ones of his confidential counsellors who at this period were initiated in his hidden designs; and from the former of whom he received every encouragement for their prosecution (1), while his acute ambassador at Madrid, Beauharnais, transmitted all the information requisite to enable him to appreciate the disposition of the leading political characters with whom he was likely, in carrying them into execution, to come into collision. The Spanish royal family at this period was divided and distracted by intrigue to a degree almost unprecedented even in the dark annals of Italian or Byzantine faction. The King, Charles IV., though a prince by no means destitute of good qualities, fond of literature and the fine arts, endowed with no inconsiderable share of political penetration, and obstinately resolute, when fairly roused, upon the maintenance of his own opinions, was nevertheless so extremely indolent, and so desirous of enjoying on a throne the tranquillity of private life, that he surrendered himself on ordinary occasions without scruple to the direction of the Queen and the Prince of Peace. She was a woman of spirit and capacity, but sensual, intriguing, and almost entirely governed by Don Manuel Godoy, a minister whom her criminal favour had raised from the humblest station to be the supreme director of affairs in the Peninsula. He was not by nature a bad man; and being endowed with considerable talents, might, under a free constitution, and in a country where greatness was to be attained by integrity of conduct and capacity for the direction of affairs, have preserved an unblemished reputation. Even as it was, his administration, among many grievous evils, conferred some important benefits on his country. But, elevated to power by the partiality of a woman, ambitious, vain, and ostentatious, surrounded by a jealous nobility, who regarded his extraordinary influence with undisguised aversion, he had no resource for the preservation of his power but in the same arts to which he had owed his rise: and an inordinate ambition, unsatiated even by the long tenure which he had held of absolute power in the Peninsula, now aspired to a throne, and aimed at the formation of a dynasty which might take its place among the crowned heads of Europe (2).

(1) Talleyrand and his partisans have taken advantage of his dismissal from the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs shortly after this period, to represent him as hostile to the war with Spain. There can be no doubt, however, from his communications to Savary at Tilsit, that he was privy then to that design, and approved of it; [*Ante*, vi.] and Napoléon constantly asserted that it was he who originally suggested the subjugation of the Peninsula to him. "Napoléon declared," says O'Meara, "that Talleyrand was the first to suggest to him the invasion of Spain."—O'MEARA, ii. 330. See also THIBAUDEAU, vi. 296.

(2) Hard. x. 85, 87. Thib. vi. 277, 278. Toreno, i. 9, 12. Nell. i. 3, 4.

Sketch of the life of Don Manuel Godoy, born at Badajoz in 1767, of a noble but obscure family, affords as singular an example of sudden elevation as the history of Europe or the East has recorded. A mere private in the body-guard, he owed the first favour of the

Queen to the skill with which he sung and touched the lute, so favourite an instrument in that land of love and romance. Rapidly advanced by the Royal favour in that dissolute court, he had the singular art, ever since 1793, not merely to lead captive his royal mistress, but to acquire an unlimited sway over the mind of the King, and at the same time live publicly with another mistress (Dona Pepa Tudo), by whom he had several children. His education had been neglected, but he had considerable natural talents, which appeared in an especial manner in the numerous and successful intrigues which he carried on with the ladies of the Court, whose rivalry for his favours increased with every additional title he acquired. He was not, however, naturally bad, and never disgraced his administration by acts of cruelty. In five years he rose from being a private in the guards to absolute power, and was already loaded with honours and titles before the treaty of Basle, in 1785, which procured for him the title of Prince of the Peace. From that time, down

The Prince of Asturias, and Escoiquiz, his confidential adviser.

The Prince of Asturias, afterwards so well known in Europe under the title of Ferdinand VII, was born on the 14th October, 1784; and was consequently twenty-four years of age when the troubles of Spain commenced. Facile and indolent in general, though at the same time irascible and impetuous on particular occasions, he had fallen entirely under the guidance of those by whom he was surrounded. They were all creatures of the Prince of Peace, with the exception of the virtuous Count Alvarez, whose principles were too unbending to allow him to remain long in the corrupted atmosphere of a despotic Court; and the Canon Escoiquiz, an ecclesiastic of remarkable talents, extensive knowledge, and profound dissimulation, who, by his capacity and zeal in his service, had at length acquired the absolute direction of his affairs. The Prince of Asturias had been formerly married to a princess of the Neapolitan House of Bourbon, whose talents, high spirit, and jealousy of the exorbitant influence of the Prince of Peace, had fomented the divisions almost inseparable from the relative situation of heir-apparent and ruling monarch in an absolute government. Two parties, as usual on such occasions, formed themselves at the Spanish court; the one paying their court to the ruling power, the other worshipping the rising sun. The Prince of Peace was the object of universal idolatry to the first. Escoiquiz was the soul of the last. The Princess of Asturias, after four years of a brilliant existence, died, universally regretted, in May 1806, leaving the Spanish monarchy, at the approaching crisis of its fate, exposed, in addition to the divisions of a distracted court, to the intrigues consequent on the competition for the hand of the heir-apparent to the throne (1).

Escoiquiz opens a negotiation with the French ambassador, and the Prince of Asturias writes to Napoléon.

Godoy saw the advantage which his future rival was likely to derive from his ascendant over the mind of Ferdinand, and therefore he had long before taken the decisive step of exiling him from Madrid to the place of his ecclesiastical preferment at Toledo. He afterwards adopted the design of extending the influence he held over the reigning monarch to the heir-apparent, by marrying him to Dona Maria Louisa de Bourbon, sister of his own wife; and even went so far as to propose that alliance to the Prince. This project, however, miscarried, and Godoy again returned to his ambitious designs, independent of the heir-apparent, who resumed his relations with Escoiquiz and the malcontent party among the nobility. No sooner, therefore, did Napoléon turn his eyes towards Spain in spring 1807, than he opened secret negotiations with him; while, at the same time, Escoiquiz, who, though banished to Toledo, was still the soul of the Prince's party, commenced underhand intrigues in the same quarter, and came privately to Madrid to arrange with the Duke del Infantado, the Duke de San Carlos, and the other leaders of the

to the period of the French invasion, his ascendant at Court was unbroken, and his influence both over the King and Queen unbounded. At the special desire of the King, he at length espoused the daughter of Don Louis, brother to that monarch; and his daughter was destined in marriage to the young King of Etruria. He had all the passion for show and splendour which usually belongs to those who are elevated to a rank which they have not held from their infancy; this prodigality occasioned a perpetual want of money, which was supplied by the sale of offices and the receipt of bribes of every description, and under his administration a frightful system of corruption overspread every branch of the public service. Many public improvements, however, also signalized it. The impulse given by the Bourbons to the sciences and arts was continued and increased;

greater benefits were conferred on public industry during the fifteen years of his government than during the three preceding reigns. Schools were established for the encouragement of agriculture, the spread of medical information, and the diffusion of knowledge in the mechanical arts. He braved the Inquisition, and snatched more than one victim from its jaws. He arrested the progress of estates held in mortmain, which threatened to swallow up half the land of the kingdom. But he was unfit for the guidance of the state in the trying periods of the revolutionary wars; and drew on Spain the contempt of foreign powers by the subservience and degradation of his foreign administration.—See *Godoy's Mem.* i. 1, 217; and *For.* ii. 250, 262.

(1) *Ibid.* x. 88, 89. *Thib.* vi. 277, 278. Cevallos, 12, 13.

Prince's party, the means of permanently emancipating him from the thralldom of the ruling favourite. It was in order to foment and take advantage of these divisions that Napoléon sent Beauharnais as his ambassador to Madrid in July 1807; and that skilful diplomatist was not long in opening secret conferences with the Duke del Infantado, in which it was mutually agreed that, both for the security of the Spanish monarchy, and to form a counterpoise to the enormous power and ambitious projects of the Prince of Peace, it was indispensable that the Prince of Asturias should espouse a Princess of the imperial family of Bonaparte. Beauharnais afterwards wrote to Escoiquiz, Sept. 30. calling on him to "give a specific guarantee, and something more than vague promises on the subject." Thus encouraged, the Prince of Asturias wrote directly to Napoléon a letter, in which, after the most exaggerated flattery, and a declaration that his father was surrounded by evil counsellors who misled his better judgment, he implored him to permit him the honour of an alliance with his imperial family (4).

Beauharnais had warily entered into these views of the Prince of Asturias, in the hope, that if the proposed alliance took place, the choice of the Prince would be directed to a niece of the Emperor, and relation of his own, who was afterwards bestowed on the Duke d'Arenberg. But when the letter reached Napoléon, he had other views for the disposal of the Spanish throne. By means of Isquierdo, a Spanish agent at Paris, who was a mere creature of the Prince of Peace, he had for some time been negotiating a treaty with Charles IV, the object of which was at once to secure the partition of Portugal, and bestow such a share of its spoils on the Prince of Peace as might secure him to the French interest, and prevent him from opposing any serious obstacle to the total dethronement of the Spanish royal family. This negotiation took place, and the treaty in which it terminated was signed by Isquierdo, in virtue of full powers from Charles IV, without the knowledge of the Prince of Masserano, the Spanish ambassador at Paris: a sufficient proof of the secret and sinister designs it was intended to serve, and of the dark crooked policy which the Emperor Napoléon had already adopted in regard to Spanish affairs.

By this treaty it was stipulated, that in exchange for Tuscany, which was ceded to France, the province of Entre Douro e Minho, the northern part of Portugal, comprehending the city of Oporto, should be given to the King of Etruria, with the title of King of Northern Lusitania, to revert, in default of heirs, to His Most Catholic Majesty, who, however, was not to unite it to the Crown of Spain: that the province of Alentejo and Algarves, forming the southern part of the kingdom, should be conferred on the Prince of Peace, with the title of Prince of Algarves; and in default of heirs-male, in like manner, and on the like conditions, revert to the Crown of Spain: that the sovereigns of these two new principalities should not make war or peace without the consent of the King of Spain; that the central parts

(1) Thib. vi. 280, 282. Tor. i. 12, 13. Harl. x. 89, 90. Ceval. 13. *Moniteur*, Feb. 5, 1810.

"The world daily," said he, "more and more admired the goodness of the Emperor; and he might rest assured he would ever find in the Prince of Asturias the most faithful and devoted son. He implored, then, with the utmost confidence, the paternal protection of the Emperor, not only to permit him the honour of an alliance with his family, but that he would smooth away all difficulties, and cause all obstacles to disappear before the accomplishment of so long cherished a wish. That effort

on the part of the Emperor was the more necessary, that the Prince was incapable of making the smallest exertion on his own part, as it would infallibly be represented as an insult to the royal authority of his father; and all that he could do was to refuse, as he engaged to do with invincible constancy, any proposals for an alliance which had not the consent of the Emperor, to whom the Prince looked exclusively for the choice of his future Queen."—FERDINAND to NAPOLEON, 11th October, 1807; *Thib.* vi. 281, 282; *Moniteur*, 5th Feb. 1810.

of Portugal, comprehending the provinces of Beira, Traz-oz-Montes, and Portuguese Estremadura, should remain in sequestration in the hands of the French till a general peace, to be then exchanged for Gibraltar, La Trinité, and the other Spanish colonies conquered by the English; that the sovereign of these central provinces should hold them on the same tenure and conditions as the King of Northern Lusitania; and that the Emperor Napoléon “should guarantee to His Most Catholic Majesty the possession of all his states on the continent of Europe, to the south of the Pyrenees (1).”

Convention
of Fontain-
bleau, 27th
Oct.

To this secret treaty of spoliation was annexed a convention, prescribing the mode in which the designs of the contracting powers should be carried into effect. By this it was agreed, that a corps of twenty-five thousand French infantry and three thousand cavalry should forthwith enter Spain and march across that country, at the charge of the King of Spain, to Lisbon; while one Spanish corps of ten thousand men should enter the province of Entre Douro e Minho, and march upon Oporto, and another of the like force take possession of the Alentejo and the Algarves. The contributions in the central provinces, which were to be placed in sequestration, were all to be levied for the behoof of France; those in Northern Lusitania and the principality of Algarves for that of Spain. Finally, another French corps of forty thousand men was to assemble at Bayonne by the 20th November at latest, in order to be ready to enter Portugal and support the first corps, in case the English should send troops to the assistance of Portugal, or menace it with an attack; but this last corps *was on no account to enter Spain* without the consent of both the contracting parties. As the principal object of this treaty was to give France possession of Lisbon and the maritime forces of Portugal, it was communicated in substance to the Emperor of Russia; and a Russian squadron of eight ships of the line, under Admiral Sinavin, passed the Dardanelles and steered for Lisbon, to support the French army, and prevent the escape of the Portuguese fleet, a short time before Junot broke up from Bayonne for the Portuguese frontier, and long before any rupture had taken place between England and the Cabinet of St.-Petersburg (2).

Napoléon's
perfidious
designs both
towards
Spain and
the Prince
of Peace in
this treaty.

These treaties were not merely a flagrant act of iniquity on the part of both the contracting powers, by providing for the partition of a neutral and unoffending power, which had even gone so far as to yield implicit obedience, by the proclamation of the 20th October, eight days before they were signed, to all the demands of the partitioning cabinets; but they were yet more detestable, from involving a double perfidy towards the very parties who were in this manner made the instruments of the ambitious designs of the French Emperor. While Godoy was amused and for the time secured in the French interest by the pretended gift of a principality, his downfall had in reality been resolved on by Napoléon, who had never forgiven the proclamation of 5th October, 1806; and this specious lure was held out, without any design of really conferring it upon that powerful favourite, merely in order to remove him from the Spanish court, and make way for the great designs of the French Emperor in both

(1) See the treaty in Foy, ii. 406. Tor. i. 384.

(2) See the Convention in Foy, ii. 411, 412. Sav. iii. 145.

“On reaching Lisbon,” says Thiebault, “we found there eight sail of the line and a frigate, under Admiral Sinavin’s orders. This fleet, which, in consequence of the alliance between France and Russia, and the war of the latter with England, was to afford us an additional guarantee for the protec-

tion of the harbour, gave us in the sequel far more apprehension than security.”—THIEBAULT, *Exp. de l’Armée Franc. en Portugal*, 86, 87. The presence of the Russian fleet, however, is stated by Lord Londonderry, whose means of information were far superior to those of the French military historian, to have been purely accidental.—LONDONDERRY, i. 37.

parts of the Peninsula; while the French force, which was provided for at Bayonne in the end of November, was not intended to act against either the English or Portugal, but to secure the frontier fortresses of Spain for Napoléon himself; and the Spanish forces, which were to be marched into the northern and southern provinces of Portugal, were not designed to secure any benefit for his most Catholic Majesty, but to strip his dominions of the few regular troops which, after the departure of Romano, still remained for

Dec. 23. the defence of the monarchy. So little care was taken to disguise this intention, that, by a decree soon after from Milan, Junot, the commander of the French invading force, was appointed governor of Portugal, and he was ordered to carry on the administration of the whole in the Emperor's name, which was accordingly done (1). History contains many examples of powerful monarchs combining iniquitously together to rob their weaker neighbours; but this is perhaps the first instance on record in which the greater of the partitioning powers, in addition to the spoliation of a neutral and unoffending state, bought the consent of its inferior coadjutors in the scheme of iniquity by the perfidious promise of some of those spoils which it exclusively destined for its own aggrandisement (2).

His secret instructions to Junot in his invasion of Portugal. It may easily be believed, that, when such were the views entertained at this period by the French Emperor, the letter of the Prince of Asturias, written at the suggestion of Beauharnais, offering his hand to a Princess of the imperial family, was not likely to receive a very cordial reception. It was permitted, accordingly, to remain without an answer; and meanwhile the march of Junot across the Peninsula was pressed by

Nov. 3. the most urgent orders from the imperial headquarters. Early in November, General Clarke, the Minister of War, wrote by Napoléon's command, a letter to that marshal, in which he was ordered to advance as far as Ciudad Rodrigo from the 1st to the 13th November, and at latest to reach Lisbon by the 30th. His orders were to proclaim peace to Portugal, and alliance and friendship to its Prince Regent; but meanwhile to press on with ceaseless activity, and at all hazards get possession of the fleet and fortresses at Lisbon, before they could be reached by the English forces (5). Junot was not backward in acting upon the perfidious policy thus prescribed to him;

(1) By Junot's proclamation, dated 1st February, 1808, proceeding on the Milan decree of 23d December, 1807, it was declared, "The house of Braganza has ceased to reign in Portugal; and the Emperor Napoléon having taken under his protection the beautiful kingdom of Portugal, wills that it should be administered and governed *over its whole extent* in the name of his Majesty, and by the general-in-chief of his army."—See TORENO, i. 49; and For, iii, 343.

(2) Godoy's Mem. i. 55. Introduction, Sav. iii. 246, 247. Hard. x. 91, 92. Tor. i. 19.

(3) D'Abr. xi. 27. Hard x. 97, 98.

He was specially ordered, "on no account to stop, whether the Prince Regent did or did not declare war against England; to move on rapidly towards the capital, receiving the propositions of the Portuguese government, without returning any written answer, and to use every possible effort to arrive there as quickly as possible, *as a friend, in order to effect the seizure of the Portuguese fleet*. Should the Portuguese government have already declared war against England, you are to answer,—My instructions are to march straight on Lisbon, without halting a single day; my mission is to close that great harbour against England. I would be entitled to attack you by main force, but it is repugnant to the great seal of Napoléon, and to the French character,

to occasion the effusion of blood. If you make no assemblages of troops; if you dispose them so as to cause me no disquietude; if you admit no auxiliary till the negotiations set on foot at Paris are terminated, I have orders to consent to it.' This is the footing on which you *must represent matters*; you must hold out that you are arriving merely as an auxiliary; meanwhile, a courier, dispatched twenty-four hours after the arrival of the main body of the army at Lisbon, will transmit the *real intentions* of the Emperor, which will be, that the propositions made are not accepted, and that the country must be treated as a conquered territory. It is on this principle that we have acted in Italy, where the property of all Portuguese subjects has already been put under sequestration. By proceeding in this manner you will, without firing a shot, make yourself master of ten sail of the line and valuable arsenals; that is the *grand object*, and to arrive at it you must never cease to hold out that you come, *not to make war, but to conciliate*." [Hard. x. 97, 98.] The secret instructions of Junot, written by the Emperor with his own hand, were of the same tenor:—"They enjoined Junot," says the Duchess of Abrantes, "to do every thing in order to gain possession, not of the person of the Prince of Brazil, but of certain other persons therein named, and above all, of the city, forts, and fleet of Lisbon."—D'ABRANTES, xi. 27.

but in the execution of it he encountered the most serious difficulties; and such was the rapidity of his march, and the state of disorganization to which his corps was reduced by the severity of the weather and the frightful state of the roads, that if any resistance whatever had been attempted by the Portuguese Government, he must infallibly have been destroyed. At first he proceeded, by easy marches, and in good order, through the north of Spain; but when he reached Ciudad Rodrigo, the orders he received to hasten his march and seize upon the fleet were so urgent (1), that he deemed it necessary to press his march with the most extraordinary expedition, and disregard every thing but the one grand object in view. He accordingly issued a proclamation to the inhabitants (2), in which he disclaimed any hostile intentions, and declared he came only as an ally, and to save them from the hostility of the English (3). Two days afterwards, the army entered Portugal, where they soon gave convincing proofs how little their declared resolution of protecting property and abstaining from every species of outrage was to be relied on. Pillage of every sort was systematically practised by all grades, from the commander-in-chief to the common soldier. Junot faithfully acted up to his instructions to employ the language of conciliation, but act upon the principle of the most decided hostility. Such conduct naturally made the inhabitants fly their approach; and this circumstance, joined to the forced marches the soldiers were compelled to make, the excessive severity of the rains, which fall in that country at that period of the year with all the violence of the tropics; and the rugged, impracticable nature of the roads, or rather mountain paths, which they were obliged to traverse, destitute of bridges and almost impassable for carriages, produced such an effect upon the French army, that in a few days it was as much disorganized as it would have been by the most disastrous defeat. No words can do justice to the hardships which were undergone, and the disorder which ensued, during the march from the frontier to Abrantes: the firmness of the oldest officers, even in the leading column, was shaken by it, and those which followed hurried along without any order, like a confused horde of robbers (4). Many battalions subsisted for days together on nothing but chestnuts, and the quantity even of that humble fare was so scanty, that they lost several hundred men a-day—whole companies and squadrons were washed away in the ravines by the swollen mountain torrents. At length, after undergoing incredible privations, the leading bands of the French army, two thousand strong, approached Lisbon in the end of November: but straggling in such small numbers, and in such deplorable condition, that they resembled rather the fugi-

(1) "On no account halt on your march even for a day. The want of provisions could be no reason for doing so; still less the state of the roads. Twenty thousand men can march and live any where, even in a desert."—*NAPOLEON to JUNOT, Nov. 2, 1807: TORENO, i. 35.*

(2) "The Emperor Napoleon sends me into your country at the head of an army, to make common cause with your well-beloved Sovereign against the tyrant of the seas, and save your beautiful capital from the fate of Copenhagen. Discipline will be rigidly preserved, I give you my word of honour for it; but the smallest resistance will draw down the utmost severity of military execution. The Portuguese, I am persuaded, will discover their true interests, and, seconding the pacific views of your Prince, receive us as friends; and that the city of Lisbon, in an especial manner, will behold us with pleasure within its walls, at the head of such an army as can

alone preserve it from the eternal enemies of the Continent."

(3) *Ibid.* x. 106, 110. *Foy*, ii. 335. *South*, i. 100. *Lond.* i. 31, 32. *Nevis*, 190, 200.

(4) "It is impossible," says Thiebault, an eyewitness, "to give an idea of the sufferings of the army before reaching Sobreira. In truth, if the leading columns were a prey to these horrors, which nothing could alleviate, it may easily be imagined what must have been the situation of those which succeeded them. The army, in truth, was on the verge of dissolution; it was on the point of disbanding altogether,—the general-in-chief was within a hair's breadth of being left without an army. Nevertheless, it was indispensable not to halt for a moment; every thing required to be risked: we were obliged to succeed, or bury ourselves in the mountains with the whole army."—*THIEBAULT, Campaigne en Portugal, 45.*

tives who had escaped from a disastrous retreat than the proud array which was to overturn a dynasty and subdue a kingdom (1).

Conduct of the Portuguese Government, and situation of Lisbon at this crisis. The elements of glorious resistance were not wanting in the Portuguese capital. Its inhabitants were three hundred thousand: its forts strong, covered with a numerous artillery, and garrisoned by fourteen thousand men: an English squadron lay in the Tagus, with Sir Sidney Smith at its head, whose versatile genius was peculiarly fitted for such an undertaking, and who had shown at Acre what vigour he could infuse into a besieged population. The English sailors longed to see the work of defence begin: Sir Sidney offered to bring his ships abreast of the quay, and there, seconded by the indignant populace, dispute every inch of ground with the invader. But the destitute condition of the French army was unknown; and even if it had been fully understood, both the Portuguese government and the English ambassador, Lord Strangford, were aware that Junot's was but the advanced guard of a greater army, which would speedily follow if the first were discomfited; and that any resistance would only serve to give the French Emperor an excuse for measures of extraordinary rigour to the Portuguese nation, without affording any reasonable prospect of ultimate success. The great object was to withdraw the royal family and the fleet from the grasp of the invaders, and secure for them a refuge in Brazil till the present calamitous season were overpast. As soon as they saw the danger approaching, therefore, the Portuguese government took every imaginable precaution to disarm the conqueror by anticipating all his requisitions: proclamation, as already mentioned, was issued, closing the harbours against English vessels, and adopting the Continental System; and, as the march of the invaders still continued, this was followed, a few days afterwards, by another in which the more rigorous step of sequestering the property, and arresting the persons of such of the English as still remained in Portugal, was adopted; though with the secret design of indemnifying the sufferers as soon as the means of doing so were at the disposal of the government. Though this last measure was known to be exceedingly painful to the Portuguese government, and was evidently adopted under the mere pressure of necessity, yet it was a step of such decided hostility, that it compelled Lord Strangford to take down the arms of Great Britain from his house and demand his passports; and soon after, amidst the tears of the inhabitants, he followed the English factory to Sir Sydney Smith's fleet (2).

After great hesitation, the court of Lisbon resolve to depart for Brazil. Although, however, the relations between the two countries were thus formally broken, yet, as it was well known that the cabinet of Lisbon had yielded only to unavoidable necessity, and as their tardiness in acceding to the demand of Napoléon for the instant seizure of British property had sufficiently demonstrated the reluctance with which measures of severity had been adopted by them, the British ambassador still remained on board the English fleet, ready to take advantage of the first opening which should occur for the resumption of more amicable correspondence. Meanwhile every thing at Lisbon was vacillation and chaos; and the Prince and his council, distracted between terror at the unceasing advance of Junot, and anxiety about the loss of their colonies and commerce by a rupture with England, hesitated between the bold counsels of Don Rodrigo de Lousa and the Count Linares, who strenuously recommended determined resistance to the invaders, and the natural timidity of a court sur-

(1) Thib. 32, 69. Foy, ii. 335, 367. Tor. i. 35. (2) Ann. Reg. 1807, 280. South. i. 96, 97. Foy, 36. Napier, i. 141. Lond. i. 33. Abr. xi. 25, 26. ii. 377, 379. Nevis, 190, 200.

rounded with dangers and debilitated by the pacific habits of successive reigns. At length, however, such information was received as determined the irresolution of the cabinet. An ominous line appeared in the *Moniteur*,—

OF Nov. 13.

“the House of Braganza has ceased to reign;” and with the paper containing that announcement of the fate which awaited them, Lord Strangford transmitted to the Prince Regent copies of the secret treaty and convention of Fontainebleau, by which the portions assigned to each of the partition-

Proclamation
of the
Prince Regent
on
the subject.

ing powers were arranged. Intelligence received shortly after of the entrance of the Spanish troops into the Alentejo and the northern provinces of the kingdom, left no room for doubt that the copies were correct, and that the treaty was immediately to be acted upon.

Nov. 24.

At the same time Lord Strangford landed, and promised his Royal Highness, on the honour of the King of England, that the measures hitherto adopted by the Portuguese court were regarded as mere acts of compulsion, and had noways abated the friendship of her old ally, if he would still avail himself of it. These representations, seconded by the efforts of Sir Sidney Smith, who brought his squadron to the mouth of the harbour, ready alike for hostile operations or pacific assistance, gave such support to Don Rodrigo

and the patriotic party, that the court resolved, if the messenger dispatched to obtain a stoppage of Junot's advance were not successful, to

embark for the Brazils. He entirely failed in arresting the march of the French general, and orders were therefore given that the fleet should, as speedily as possible, be got ready for sea; and the Prince Regent published a dignified proclamation on the following day, in which he announced a resolution worthy of the heroic house of Braganza, and prepared to seek in Transatlantic climes “that freedom of which Europe had become unworthy (4).”

Embarkation
of the
Royal
Family for
Brazil, 27th
Nov.

The fleet, at first, was in a state but little prepared for crossing the Atlantic, and still less for conveying the motley and helpless crowd of old men, women, and children, who were preparing to follow the court in their migration to South America. By great

exertions, however, and the active aid of the British sailors, who, overjoyed at this extraordinary energy on the part of the Prince Regent, exerted themselves with unheard-of vigour in their assistance, eight sail of the line, three frigates, five sloops, and a number of merchant vessels, in all six-and-thirty sail, were got ready on the following day, when the Royal family prepared to carry their mournful but magnanimous resolution into execution. Preceded by the archives, treasure, plate, and most valuable effects, the royal exiles proceeded in a long train of carriages to the water's edge. Never had been seen a more melancholy procession, nor one more calculated to impress on the minds even of the most inconsiderate the magnitude of the calamities

(4) Hard. x. 108, 111. South. i. 103, 110. Foy, ii. 380, 383. Tor. i. 37, 39. Nev. i. 165, 180. Lord Strangford's Pamphlet, 52, 75.

“Having tried, by all possible means, to preserve the neutrality hitherto enjoyed by my faithful and beloved subjects; having exhausted my royal treasury, and made innumerable other sacrifices, even going to the extremity of shutting the ports of my dominions to the subjects of my ancient and royal ally, the King of Great Britain, thus exposing the commerce of my people to total ruin, and consequently suffering the greatest losses in the collection of the royal revenue, I find that troops of the Emperor of France, to whom I had united myself on the Continent, in the hope of being no more disturbed, are actually marching into the interior of

my dominions, and are far on their way to this capital. Desirous to avoid the fatal consequences of a defence, which would be far more dangerous than profitable, serving only to create a boundless effusion of blood, dreadful to humanity, and to inflame the animosity of the troops which have entered this kingdom, with the declaration and promise of not committing any, the smallest hostility; and knowing also, that they are more particularly directed against my royal person, and that my faithful subjects would be less exposed to danger if I were absent from the kingdom, I have resolved to retire, with the Queen and Royal Family, to my dominions in America, and establish myself in the city of Rio Janeiro till a general peace.”—*Ann. Reg.* 1807, 776, *State Papers*.

which the unbounded ambition of France had brought on the other nations of Europe. The insane Queen came in the first carriage: for sixteen years she had lived in seclusion, but a ray of light had penetrated her reason in this extremity, and she understood and approved the courageous act; the widowed Princess and the Infanta Maria were in the next, with the Princess of Brazil, bathed in tears; after them came the Prince Regent, pale and weeping at thus leaving, apparently for ever, the land of his fathers. In the magnitude of the royal distress, the multitude forgot their own dangers; their commiseration was all for the august fugitives, thus driven by ruthless violence to a distant shore—with the descendants of a long line of kings, forced to seek, in mournful exile, an asylum from the hand of the spoiler. Such was the crowd which assembled round the place of embarkation, that the Prince was compelled to force his way through with his own hand. There was not a dry eye among all the countless multitude when they stepped on board; uncovered and weeping, the people beheld, in speechless sorrow, the departure of their ancient rulers. In the general confusion of the embarkation, parents were separated from children, husbands from wives, and both remained ignorant of each other's safety till they landed in the Brazils; while the shore resounded with the lamentations of those who were thus severed, probably for ever, from those whom they most loved. It was some consolation to the crowd, who watched with aching eyes the receding sails, to see the royal fleet, as it passed through the British squadron, received with a royal salute from all the vessels; emblematic of the protection which Great Britain now extended to her ancient ally, and an earnest of that heroic support which, through all the desperate conflict which followed, England was destined to afford to her courageous inhabitants. Numbers, however, observed, with superstitious dread, at the moment of the salute the sun became eclipsed, and mournfully repeated the words, "the House of Braganza has ceased to reign." Never had a city been penetrated with a more unanimous feeling of grief; the royal family, kindly and warm-hearted, had long enjoyed the affections of the people; the bitterness of conquest was felt without its excitement. In mournful silence the people lingered on the quay from whence the royal party had taken their departure; every one, in returning to his home, felt as if he had lost a parent or a child. The embarkation took place from the Quay of Belem, on the same spot from whence, three centuries before, Vasco de Gama had sailed upon that immortal voyage which first opened to European enterprise the regions of Oriental commerce, and whence Cabral set forth upon that expedition which gave Portugal an empire in the West, and had provided for her an asylum, in the future wreck of her fortune in the Old World (4).

Arrival of
the French
at Lisbon,
Nov. 30.

Hardly had the royal squadron, amidst tempestuous gales, cleared the bar, and disappeared from the shores of Europe, when the advanced guard of Junot's army, reduced to sixteen hundred men and a few horsemen, arrived on the towers of Belem. He came just in time to see the fleet receding in the distance, and, in the ebullition of his passion, himself discharged a piece of ordnance at a merchant vessel which, long retarded by the multitude who were thronging on board, was hastening, under the walls of that fortress, to join the fleet which had preceded it. Although, however, the French troops were so few, and in such deplorable condition as to excite pity rather than apprehension, yet no resistance was attempted; the

(4) Nevis. 175, 180. South. i. 107, 113. Hard. x. 108, 111, 112. Foy, vi. 383, 390. Tor. i. 39, 40. Ann. Reg. 1807, 281.

Regency, to whom the Prince Royal had on his departure intrusted the administration of affairs, wisely deeming a contest hopeless from which the government itself shrunk, and regarding as their first duty the negotiating favourable terms for the inhabitants with the invaders. Resistance, therefore, was not attempted, and Europe beheld with astonishment a capital, containing three hundred thousand inhabitants and fourteen thousand regular soldiers, open its gates to a wretched file of soldiers without a single piece of cannon, the vanguard of which, worn out and extenuated, not fifteen hundred strong, could hardly bear their muskets on their shoulders, while the succeeding columns were scattered in deplorable confusion over mountain paths two hundred miles in length. Such was their state of starvation, that on entering the city many of the soldiers dropped down in the streets or sunk exhausted in the porches of the houses, being unable to ascend the stairs, until the Portuguese humanely brought them sustenance. It received its new masters on the anniversary of the very day (50th November) on which, a hundred and sixty-seven years before, the Portuguese had overturned the tyranny of the Spaniards, and re-established, amidst universal transport, the national independence (1).

The country is occupied by Junot in name of the French, and enormous contributions levied by their troops.

Junot immediately took military possession of the country; the French troops were cantoned chiefly in the capital and the strongholds in its vicinity, while Elvas surrendered to the Spanish General Solano, and Taranco, with the northern corps of the troops of that nation, took peaceable possession of the important and opulent city of Oporto. The strict discipline maintained by these Peninsular

corps, afforded a striking contrast to the license indulged to the French soldiers, whose march, albeit through a friendly state which had as yet committed no act of hostility, was marked by plunder, devastation, and ruin; and hopes began to be entertained by those in the French interest, that the independence of their country might still be preserved. But these hopes were of short duration, and Portugal soon experienced, in all its bitterness, the fate of every country which, from the commencement of the war, had received, whether as friends or enemies, the tricolor flag. Heavy contributions, both in money, subsistence, and clothing, had from the first been levied by the French troops; and Junot, with almost regal state, was lodged in the now deserted palace: but the first was ascribed by their deluded friends to the necessitous and destitute condition of the French troops; and the last was forgiven in an officer, whose head, never equal to his valour, appeared to have been altogether carried away by the novelty and importance of the situation in which he was now placed. All uncertainty, however, was

Dec. 13. soon at an end. A fortnight after their arrival, a review of six thousand troops in the capital took place; the soldiers were assembled in the principal streets and squares—the infantry in battalions, the cavalry in squadrons, the artillery limbered up and in order for service, and the whole population of the neighbourhood crowded together to witness the spectacle. Suddenly, the thunder of cannon from the Moorish fort attracted their attention; all eyes were instantly turned in that direction, and they beheld the ancient flag of Portugal torn from the staff, upon which the tricolor standard was mounted. The magnitude of the calamity now became apparent: Portugal, seized by a perfidious foe, was to be reduced to a province of France. At first a solemn silence prevailed; but soon a hoarse murmur, like the distant roar of the ocean, arose, and the cries, “Portugal for ever, death to

(1) Thib. vi. 271. Thieb, 68, 69, 72. Nevis, i. 185, 213. South, i. 116, 117. Foy, ii. 400, 403.

the French!" were heard on all sides. But the principal persons of the city were secured, the populace were disarmed, and the forts and batteries were all in the hands of the invaders. The evening was spent in feverish agitation; but the people, destitute of leaders, were unable to turn the general indignation to any account, and the day closed without any convulsion having occurred (1).

The Regency is at length dissolved by Junot, and the whole country seized by the French.

This measure, however significant as to the ultimate designs of the conqueror, was yet only a demonstration; and as the police of Lisbon was rigidly enforced by the French, and no other change made in the government but the introduction of two or three creatures of his into the Regency, which still administered the laws in the name of the Prince Regent, hopes began to be again entertained that it would prove only a temporary occupation. But events which rapidly succeeded, demonstrated that Portugal was destined to drain to the dregs the cup of humiliation before the day of its political resurrection arose. A forced loan of 2,000,000 cruzados (L.200,000) was exacted from the merchants,

Dec. 5. though their fortunes were seriously affected by the blockade of the harbour, and the entire stoppage of foreign commerce and public credit. The entire confiscation of English goods was next proclaimed, and ordered to be enforced by tenfold penalties and corporal punishment; while the carrying of arms of any sort was strictly prohibited, under the pain

Dec. 6. of death, over the whole kingdom. Meanwhile, fresh troops daily poured into the capital; and, to accommodate them, the monks were all turned out of the convents, which were forthwith converted into military barracks. Still, no indication of a permanent partition of the kingdom had appeared at Lisbon, and Junot seemed chiefly intent on a small squadron which he was fitting

Jan. 1808 out with great expedition in the harbour, apparently against the English, although the Spanish officers at Oporto and in the Alentejo made no secret of the treaty of Fontainebleau, and had already begun to levy the revenue collected there in the name of the King of Spain. But on

Feb. 1. the 1st February the mask was at once thrown aside, and it appeared that Napoléon was resolved to appropriate the whole monarchy to himself, without allotting any portion to his confederate in iniquity. On that day Junot went in state to the palace of the inquisition, where the Regency was assembled, and, after a studied harangue, read a proclamation of Napoléon, dated from Milan in the December preceding, followed by a proclamation of

Dec. 23. his own, which at once dissolved the Regency,—appointed Junot governor of the whole kingdom, with instructions to govern it all in name of

Feb. 1, 1808. the Emperor Napoléon,—ordained a large body of Portuguese troops to be forthwith marched out of the Peninsula, and, for the support of the Army of Occupation, now termed the Army of Portugal, imposed a contribution of a hundred million of francs (L.4,000,000), above double the annual revenue of the monarchy, upon its inhabitants, besides confiscating the whole property of the Royal family, and of all who had attended them in their flight (2).

(1) Nevis. i. 250, 273. Lond. i. 45, 46. Thib. vi. 273, 274. South. i. 123, 125. Foy, iii. 11, 14.

(2) Foy, iii. 15, 23. Lond. i. 47, 49. Tor. i. 41, 42, 49, 50. Neva, i. 263, 288.

"Inhabitants of Portugal," said Junot's proclamation, "your interests have engaged the attention of the Emperor; it is time that all uncertainty as to your fate should cease; the fate of Portugal is fixed, and its future prosperity secured, by being taken under the all-powerful protection of Napoleon the

Great. The prince of Brazil, by abandoning Portugal, has renounced all his rights to the sovereignty of that kingdom; the House of Braganza has ceased to reign in Portugal; the Emperor Napoléon has determined that that beautiful country, governed over its whole extent in his name, should be administered by the General-in-chief of his army." Thus did Napoléon first sign a treaty at Fontainebleau for the entire spoliation of the Portuguese dominions; next, by his perfidious invasion, drive the ruling so-

Complete
occupation
of the king-
dom by the
French and
despair of
the inhabi-
tants.

These orders were instantly carried into effect. The Portuguese arms were every where taken down from the public offices and buildings, and those of Imperial France substituted in their room. Justice was administered in the name of the French Emperor, and by the Code Napoléon; the whole revenue was collected by the French authorities, and the regiments assigned for the foreign army moved towards the frontiers: a universal despair seized all classes at this clear manifestation of the subjugation of their country. The peasants, heart-broken and desperate, refused to sow their fields with grain; the soldiers, wherever they were not overawed by a superior force of the French army, disbanded and returned home, or betook themselves to the mountains as robbers; the higher classes almost all fled from Lisbon, as from a city visited by the plague; and notwithstanding the presence and influence of the invaders, only three houses were lighted on occasion of the general illumination ordered by the French in honour of the change of government. In the provinces the general indignation was manifested in still more unequivocal colours; the growing insolence and rapacity of the French soldiers led them into frequent conflicts with the now aroused population; tumults, massacres, and military executions, occurred in almost every city, village, and hamlet of Portugal; and Junot, alarmed at the increasing ferment, formally disbanded the whole of the army which had not been ordered to proceed to France (1). Meanwhile, plunder was universal from the highest rank to the lowest; and the

March 13.

General-in-chief set the example of general spoliation, by appropriating to himself plate and valuable articles of every description, collected from the churches and royal palaces (2).

While the fate of Portugal was thus to all appearance sealed by the usurpation of Napoléon, events of still greater importance were in progress, in relation to the Spanish monarchy, which, in their immediate effects, precipitated the explosion of the Peninsular war.

Arrest of
Ferdinand,
and seizure
of his papers.

What care soever the advisers of Ferdinand may have taken to conceal from the reigning monarch his letter of 14th October, proposing, without his father's knowledge, an alliance with the Imperial family, so important a step did not long remain unknown to the Prince of Peace. The numerous spies in his employment who surrounded the heir-apparent, both in the French capital and his palace of the Escorial, got scent of the secret; and Isquierdo transmitted from Paris intelligence that some negotiation of importance was in progress, in consequence of which the Prince was more narrowly watched; and, as the evident anxiety and pre-occupation of his mind seemed to justify the suspicions which were entertained, he was at length arrested by orders of his father, and a seal put on all his papers.

Oct. 29.

He was privately examined before the Privy Council, and afterwards reconducted as a prisoner by the King himself, in great state, at the head of his guards, to the palace of the Escorial, whose walls, still melan-

vereign into exile; and then assign that very compulsory departure as a reason for the previously concerted appropriation of the whole of his territories to himself.—See both the *Milan Decree* and *Juxor's Proclamation* in Fox, iii. 343, 345; *Pièces Just.*

(1) The Portuguese legion thus drafted off for France, were at first nine thousand strong, but five thousand deserted or died on the march through Spain, and not four thousand reached Bayonne. Napoléon, however, who there reviewed them, said to Prince Wolkowski, "These are the men of the South; they are of an impassioned temperament; I

will make them excellent soldiers." They served with distinction both in Austria and Russia, and were particularly noticed for their good conduct at Wagram in 1809, and Smolensko in 1812. They were faithful to their colours and oaths, though still in their hearts attached to their country, and bore on their standards this striking device,

"Vadimus immixti Danais; haud numine nostro."

—Fox, iii. 40, 41, note.

(2) Lond. i. 50, 54. South, i. 152, 162. Nevis, i. 240, 249. Foy, ii. 5, 38.

choly from the tragic catastrophe of the unfortunate Don Carlos in a preceding reign, were fraught with the most sinister presages. Among his private papers were found—one written entirely by the hand of the Prince, blank in date, and with a black seal, bestowing on the Duke del Infantado the office of Governor-general of New Castile, and all the forces within its bounds, in the event of the King's death; a key to the correspondence in cipher formerly carried on by the late Princess of Asturias and the Queen of Naples her mother; and a memorial of twelve pages to the King, filled with bitter complaints of the long-continued persecution of which the Prince had been the object, denouncing the Prince of Peace as guilty of the most wicked designs, even that of mounting the throne by the death of his Royal Master, and which proposed a variety of steps to secure the arrest of that powerful favourite. A writing of five pages was also discovered, written like the preceding by Escoiquiz, detailing the measures adopted by the Prince of Peace to bring about a marriage between the heir-apparent and his wife's sister, the best mode of avoiding it, and hinting at the prospect of an alliance between the Prince of Asturias and a member of the Imperial family. In these papers, thus laid open without reserve to the royal scrutiny, there was nothing, with the exception of the first, which had the appearance even of implicating the Prince in any design against his father's life or authority; though much descriptive of that envenomed rancour between his confidants and those of the reigning monarch, which the long ascendant of the Prince of Peace, and the animosity which had prevailed between him and the heir-apparent, were so well calculated to produce. Even the first, though it indicated an obvious preparation for the contemplated event of the King's decease, and fairly inferred an anxiety for that event, could not, when taken by itself, without any other evidence, be considered as a legitimate ground for concluding that so atrocious an act as the murder or deposition of the King was in contemplation; since it was equally referable to the anxiety of the heir-apparent, who had given no indications of so depraved a disposition, to secure the succession, menaced, as he conceived it to be, upon his natural demise (1).

Proclamation of the King on the subject, and correspondence with Napoléon. Revealed, however, to a corrupted court, and falling into the hands of persons actuated by the worst suspicions, because themselves capable of the most nefarious designs, these papers afforded too fair an opportunity to Godoy and his party of ruining the Prince, and at the same time gave too clear indication of the hazard which they would themselves run upon his accession to the throne, to be laid aside

Oct. 30. without being made the foundation of decisive measures. On the very next day, accordingly, a proclamation was issued from the Escorial by the King, in which the Prince of Asturias was openly charged with having engaged in a conspiracy for the dethronement and death of his father, and the immediate prosecution and trial of all his advisers was announced to the bewildered public (2). At the same time despatches were forwarded to Napoléon, reiterating the same charges, and earnestly imploring his counsel and assist-

(1) Tor. i. 22, 23. Thib. vi. 283, 284. Foy, ii. 99. South. i. 187, 188.

(2) Tor. i. 23, 24. Neill. i. 4, 5. Thib. vi. 284, 285.

It was stated in this proclamation, "I was living persuaded that I was surrounded with the love due to a parent by his offspring, when an unknown hand suddenly revealed to me the monstrous and unheard-of conspiracy which had been formed against my life. That life, so often endangered, had become a burden to my successor, who, pre-occupied, blinded, and forgetful of all the Christian

principles which my care and paternal love have taught him, had engaged in a conspiracy for my dethronement. I was anxious myself to ascertain the fact, and surprising him in his own apartment, I discovered the cipher which enabled him to correspond with his companions in iniquity. Every thing necessary has been done, and the proper orders given for the trial of these guilty associates, whom I have ordered to be put under arrest, as well as the confinement of my son to his own apartments."—*Proclamation, 30th October, 1807; TORRENO, i. 24.*

ance in extricating his unfortunate ally from the difficulties with which he was surrounded (1).

When Napoléon, however, received this letter, he was noways disposed to lend any assistance to Charles IV, on whose dethronement he was fully resolved, though he was as yet uncertain as to the particular means or course to be followed in order to effect that object. He determined immediately to keep himself entirely clear from these domestic dissensions, took the utmost care that his name should not in any way be mixed up with them, and resolved only to take advantage of them, if possible, to get quit of both father and son. He said, therefore, on receipt of the letter,—“These are domestic concerns of the King of Spain; I will have nothing to do with them:” at the same time Champagny, minister of foreign affairs, wrote to the Prince of Peace, that on no account was his name to be implicated in this affair (2); and Talleyrand gave the same assurances in the strongest terms to Isquierdo; protesting at the same time the Emperor’s fixed resolution to carry into execution the whole provisions of the treaty of Fontainebleau (5). Meantime, the storm which threatened such serious consequences blew over in Spain, from a discovery of the party who was at the bottom of the intrigue. The Prince of Asturias, justly alarmed for his life,

Oct. 30. revealed, in a private intercourse with his father and mother, the letter he had written to Napoléon, proposing his hand to one of his relations, and at the same time disclosed all the parties, not excluding the French am-

Which leads to the pardon of the Prince of Asturias. bassador, who were privy to that proceeding. This disclosure operated like a charm in stilling the fury of the faction opposed to the Prince; ignorant of the extent or intimacy of his relations with the French Emperor, they recoiled at the idea of driving to extremities the heir of the throne, who might possibly have engaged so powerful a protector to espouse

Nov. 5. his cause. The matter was therefore hushed up; the Prince wrote penitential letters to his father and mother, avowing “that he had failed in his duty, inasmuch as he should have taken no step without their concurrence:”

Nov. 5. and throwing himself on their mercy. Upon this a decree of the King was issued, declaring, “The voice of nature has disarmed the arm of vengeance; when a guilty party solicits pardon, the heart of a father cannot refuse it to a son. My son has disclosed the authors of the horrible plan which some wretches have put into his head; I pardon him, and shall receive him to favour when he has given proofs of sincere amendment.” The trial of the

Jan. 20, 1808. Prince’s confidants went on, but terminated three months after in

Letter of Charles IV to Napoléon. (1) “Sir my brother—At the moment when I was exclusively occupied with the means of destroying our common enemy, and fondly hoped that all the plots of the late Queen of Naples were buried with her daughter, I discovered with horror that the spirit of intrigue had penetrated the interior of my palace, and that my eldest son, the heir-presumptive to the throne, had not only formed the design to dethrone, but even to attempt the life of myself and his mother. Such an atrocious attempt merits the most exemplary punishment; the law which calls him to the succession should be repealed; one of my brothers will be more worthy to replace him in my heart, and on the throne. I pray your Majesty to aid me by your lights and counsel.”—CHARLES IV to NAPOLEON, *S. Lorenzo*, 30th October, 1807; SAVARY, iii. 143.

(2) The Emperor insists that on no account should any thing be said or published in relation to this affair, which involves him or his ambassador. He has done nothing which could justify a suspicion

that either he himself or his minister have known or encouraged any domestic intrigue of Spain. He declares positively, that he never has, and never will intermeddle with it. He never intended that the Prince of Asturias should marry a Princess of France, or Mademoiselle Tascher, long since affianced to another; he will oppose no marriage of the Prince of Asturias with any person he pleases; his ambassador Beauharnais has instructions to take no part in the affairs of Spain.”—CHAMPAGNY to the Prince of Peace, 15th November, 1807; THIBAUDEAU, vi. 291, 292.

(3) “What chiefly shocked the Emperor,” said Talleyrand to Isquierdo on 15th November, “was, after the treaty of 27th October, to see himself apparently implicated, in the face of Europe, in intrigues and treasons. He has expressed a natural indignation at it, because it affects his honour and probity. The Emperor desires only the strict execution of the treaty of Fontainebleau.”—THIBAUDEAU, vi. 291.

their entire acquittal, to the great joy of the nation, who had never attached any credit to this alleged conspiracy, but considered it as a got-up device of the Prince of Peace to ruin his rival Escoiquiz. Nevertheless, that acute counsellor, as well as the Dukes of Infantado and St. Carlos, with several others, were kept in confinement, or sent into exile; and Napoléon, who in truth had not instigated this intrigue, but saw the advantage it would give him in his designs against the Peninsula, was secretly rejoiced to see the father and son thus envenomed against each other, and resolved to dispossess them both (1).

Entrance of
the French
troops into
Spain.
Nov. 22.

It was not long before this resolution to appropriate to himself a part, at least, of the Spanish dominions, without the slightest regard to his recent and solemn guarantee of their integrity in the treaty of Fontainebleau, was acted upon by the French Emperor. The force of forty thousand men, which had been provided for at Bayonne by that treaty, but which was not to enter Spain except with the consent of the King of Spain, was now increased to sixty thousand; and without any authority from the Spanish government, and though the situation of Portugal noways called for their advance, began to cross the frontier, and take the road, not towards Lisbon, but Madrid. Twenty-four thousand infantry and four thousand horse, with forty guns, under Dupont, first passed the Bidassoa, and moved towards Valladolid, where headquarters were established in the beginning

Jan. 9. of January. A second army, under Moncey, consisting of twenty-five thousand foot, three thousand horse, and forty pieces of artillery, soon followed; and such was the haste with which they were forwarded to their destination, that they were conveyed across France by post, and rapidly defiled towards the Ebro; while, on the other extremity of the Pyrenees, Duhesme, with twelve thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and twenty cannon, entered Catalonia, and took the road to Barcelona (2).

The Prince
of Peace does
not venture
to remon-
strate
against this
invasion.

Although the operations in Portugal afforded no sort of reason for this formidable invasion, yet so much were the inhabitants of the country in the habit of yielding implicit obedience to the French authorities, in consequence of the submissive attitude of their government for so long a period, that it excited very little attention either in Spain or over the rest of Europe,—to the greater part of which it was almost unknown. Public attention followed the progress of the Emperor in Italy; and, dazzled by the splendid pageants and important changes which were there going forward, paid little regard to the progress of obscure corps on the Pyrenean frontier. Notwithstanding all their infatuation, however, the Cabinet of Madrid were not without anxiety at this uncalled-for and suspicious invasion of their frontiers; but they were deceived by the repeated assurances which they received, both verbally and in writing, from the French Ministers, of the determination of the Emperor to execute all the provisions of the treaty of Fontainebleau (3); and the Prince of Peace was fearful, lest, by starting ill-timed suspicions, he might put in hazard the brilliant prospects which he conceived were opening both to the Spanish monarchy and himself from the spoils of Portugal. They were involved in the meshes of guilty ambition, and could not extricate themselves from its toils till they had themselves become its prey (4).

The time, however, was now rapidly approaching when Napoléon deemed it safe to throw off the mask. No sooner had he returned from Italy to

(1) O'Meara, ii. 160. Tor. i. 26, 33. Nell. i. 5, 6, Thib. vi. 285, 297. South. i. 187, 191.

"I never," said Napoléon, "excited the King of Spain against his son. I saw them envenomed against each other, and thence conceived the design

of deriving advantage to myself, and dispossessing both."—O'Meara, ii. 160.

(2) Foy, iii. 72, 74. Tor. i. 46, 47. Lond. i. 55, 56.

(3) See ante, vi. 259.

(4) Tor. i. 47, 48. Nell. i. 9, 10. South. i. 195.

New levy in France. Treacherous seizure of Pampeluna. Paris than the Minister of War transmitted a message to the Senate, requiring the levy of 80,000 conscripts out of those who should become liable to serve in 1809,—a requisition which that obsequious body forthwith voted by acclamation, though the peace of Tilsit had,

Jan. 6. to all appearance, closed the Temple of Janus for a very long period, at least in regard to Continental wars. This warlike demonstration, though levelled ostensibly at England, yet contained ambiguous expressions

Jan. 14, 1808. which pointed not unequivocally to projects of aggrandisement on the side of the Spanish Peninsula (1). Shortly after, the French forces began, by fraud and false pretences, to make themselves masters of the frontier fortresses of Spain; and the success with which their dishonourable stratagems were crowned was such as almost to exceed belief, and which could not have occurred but in a monarchy debilitated by a long period of despotic misrule. Pampeluna was the first to be surprised. Early in February, General d'Armagnac directed his steps on this perfidious mission through Roncesvalles, the fabled scene of heroic achievement. He first requested leave from the governor of that fortress, to lodge two battalions with

Feb. 9. the Spanish troops in the citadel; and when this was refused, remained for some days in the town on the most friendly terms with the Spanish garrison, until they were so completely thrown off their guard, that he succeeded in surprising the principal gate of the citadel by means of three hundred men, admitted, one by one, with arms under their cloaks, during the night, into his house, which was within the walls, while the attention of the Spanish sentinels was taken off by his soldiers playing in sport at snow-balls with each other close to the drawbridge of the citadel. Next morning a proclamation appeared, beseeching the inhabitants to "consider this as only a trifling change, incapable of disturbing the harmony which ought to subsist between two faithful allies (2)."

Treacherous seizure of Barcelona, Figueras, and St. Sebastian by the French, Feb. 13. Duhesme's instructions were, in like manner, to make himself master of Barcelona; and he was not long of effecting that object. Boldly advancing towards that fortress, under the pretence of pursuing his march to Valencia, he totally disregarded the summons of the Conde de Espeleta, captain-general of the province, who required him to suspend his march till advices were received from Madrid; and so intimidated the governor, by threatening to throw upon him the whole responsibility of any differences which might arise between the two nations from the refusal to admit the French soldiers within the walls, that he succeeded in getting possession of the town. Still, however, Fort Montjuic and the citadel were in the hands of the Spaniards; but the same system of audacious treachery shortly after made the invaders masters of the strongholds. Count Theodore Lecche, the commander of the Italian division, assembled

Feb. 28. his troops as for a parade on the glacis of the citadel. After the inspection was over, the Italian general came with his staff, on horseback, to converse with the Spanish officers, and insensibly moved forward to the draw-

(1) "There is a necessity," said Clarke and Champagny, "of having considerable forces on all points exposed to attack, in order to be in a situation to take advantage of any favourable circumstances which may occur to carry the war into the bosom of England, to Ireland, or the Indies. Vulgar politicians conceive the Emperor should disarm: such a proceeding would be a real scourge to France. It is not enough to have an army in Portugal; Spain is in alarm for Cadiz; Ceuta is menaced; the English have disembarked many troops in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar; they have directed to that quarter

those which have been recalled from the Levant, or withdrawn from Sicily. The vigilance of their cruisers on the Spanish coast is hourly increasing; they seem disposed to avenge themselves on that kingdom, for the reverses they have experienced in the colonies. The whole Peninsula, therefore, in an especial manner calls for the attention of his Majesty." —CLARKE and CHAMPAGNY'S Reports, *Moniteur*, 24th Jan., 1808; and *Foy*, iii. 76, 77.

(2) *Tor.* i. 51, 52. *South.* i. 197, 198. *Lond. l.* 56. *Foy*, iii. 81, 84.

bridge; and while still there, so as to prevent its being drawn up, a company of grenadiers stole unperceived round the palisades, and rushing in, disarmed the Spanish guard at the gate, and introduced four battalions, who got Feb. 29. possession of the place. Montjuic fell still more easily; the governor, though a man of courage and honour, was unable to withstand the peremptory summons of the French general, who audaciously demanded the surrender of that impregnable fortress, with the menace to render him responsible for the whole consequences of war with France, which would inevitably result from a refusal (1). San Fernando de Figueras next fell into the March 18. hands of the French. The governor, on his guard against surprise, was cajoled into permitting two hundred conscripts to be lodged in the citadel, the finest fortification in Spain, under pretence that there was not accommodation for them in the town. Instead of conscripts, chosen soldiers were introduced, who, in the night overpowered the sentinels, and admitted four regiments, who lay in the neighbourhood. Finally, St.-Sebastians, the key to the great road from Bayonne to Madrid, and the destined theatre of such desperate struggles between the French and English, was obtained on still more easy terms. By permission of the Spaniards, it had become the depot for the hospital of the French regiments who had passed through; but the governor, conceiving disquietude at the visible increase in the number of these pre-March 3. tended patients, and having learned some indiscreet expressions of Murat as to St.-Sebastians being indispensable to the security of the French army, communicated his fears to the captain-general of the province, and also to the Prince of Peace, with an earnest request for instructions (2). The Prince, too far gone to recede, counselled submission, though his eyes were now opened to the treachery of which he had been the victim; and, to his disgrace be it said, the last bulwark of his country was yielded up in consequence of express instructions from him written with his own hand (3).

The Emperor speedily improves upon his success, and covers the north of Spain with troops.

Thus were taken, by the treachery and artifice of the French Emperor, the four frontier fortresses of Spain; those which command the three great roads by Perpignan, Navarre, and Biscay, across the Pyrenees, and the possession of which gives an invader the entire command of the only passes practicable for an army from France into the Peninsula. And they were taken not only during a period of profound peace, but close alliance between the two countries, and by a power which, only a few months before, had so solemnly guaranteed the integrity of the Spanish dominions! History has few blacker or more disgraceful deeds to commemorate; and, doubtless, the perpetration of them must have been a subject of shame to many of the brave men engaged in the undertaking, how much soever the better feelings of the majority may have been obliterated by

(1) "My soldiers," said he, "are in possession of the citadel: instantly open the gates of Montjuic, for I have the special commands of the Emperor Napoleon to place garrisons in your fortresses. If you hesitate, I will, on the spot, declare war against Spain, and you will be exclusively responsible for all the torrents of blood which your resistance will cause to be shed." The name of Napoleon produced all these marvellous effects; it operated like a charm in paralysing the resistance even of the most intrepid spirits; many could encounter death; few had the moral courage to undergo the political risk consequent on resistance to his mandates. The Spanish governors at this period also had another excuse,—the perfidy with which they were assailed by his orders, was so unprecedented as to be inconceivable to men of honour.—See Foy, iii, 80.

(2) Tor. i. 53, 58. Foy, ii. 78, 85. Nell. i. 10. South. i. 199, 204. Thib. vi. 312.

(3) "On the margin of the letter of the Duke de Mahon, captain-general of Guipuscoa, requesting instructions, and fully detailing the danger, was written in the Prince of Peace's own hand,—'Let the governor give up the place, since he has not the means of resisting, but let him do so in an amicable manner, as has been done in other places where there were even fewer reasons or grounds for excuse than in the case of Saint-Sebastians.'—March, 3, 1808. TORRESO, i. 58. The general answer returned by the Prince of Peace to the repeated demands which he received from the North, for instructions how to act, had previously been—"Receive the French well; they are our allies; they come to us as friends."—HARDENBERG, x. 122.

that fatal revolutionary principle, which measures the morality of all public actions by no other test but success. Napoléon, however, who never enquired into the means, provided the end was favourable, was overjoyed at this easy acquisition of the keys of Spain, and was led from it to discard all fears of a serious rupture in the course of his projected changes of dynasty in the Peninsula. With his accustomed vigour, he instantly prepared to make the most of his extraordinary good fortune in these important conquests; fresh troops were instantly poured into the newly acquired fortresses; their ramparts were armed, their ditches scoured, their arsenals filled; the monks in them were all turned adrift, and the monasteries converted into barracks. Several millions of biscuits were baked in the frontier towns of France, and speedily stored in their precious magazines. The whole country from the Bidassoa to the Douro was covered with armed men; the Spanish authorities in all the towns were supplanted by French ones; and before as yet a single shot had been fired, or one angry note interchanged between the Cabinets, the whole of Spain, north of the Ebro, was already wrested from the Crown of Castile (4).

The Prince of Peace at length sees through the real designs of France.

How deeply soever Godoy may have been implicated, by long established intimacy and recent lures, in the meshes of French diplomacy, he could not any longer remain blind to the evident tendency of the designs of Napoléon. The seizure of Pampeluna first

drew the veil in part from his eyes; the successive captures of Barcelona, St.-Sebastians, and Figueras, next tore it asunder; finally, the proclamation of Junot, on the first February, at once dashed to the earth all his hopes of national or individual aggrandisement. The portentous announcement that Junot was to administer the affairs of Portugal in its *whole extent*, in the name of the Emperor, evinced clearly that all the provisions in the treaty of Fontainebleau in favour either of the Spanish family, who had ceded the throne of Tuscany, or the Prince of Peace individually, were blown to the winds. The private correspondence of that ambitious statesman, accordingly, at this period, evinces the utmost uneasiness at the designs of France (2). But the uncertainty of which he so bitterly complained, was of short duration.

Feb. 6. A requisition, by Napoléon, for the removal of the Spanish fleet to Toulon, which the Cabinet of Madrid were weak enough to comply with, though

Feb. 27. the rapid succession of events prevented its execution, was soon followed by a formal demand of all Spain to the north of the Ebro, to be incorporated with the French monarchy. In return, he offered to cede to the Spanish monarchy his newly acquired realm of Portugal (3); but it was readily foreseen that the proposal would prove entirely elusory, as Junot had taken possession of the whole country in the name of Napoléon, and it was

(1) Foy, iii. 85, 87, 89. Tor. i. 59, 60. South. i. 195, 205. Lond. i. 57, 60.

General Foy, though a liberal writer, and of the Napoléon school, gives a full detail, much to his credit, of these disgraceful transactions, and draws a veil over none of the dishonourable deeds by which they were accomplished.—See Foy, iii. 75, 85. This is the true and honourable spirit of history, and withal the most politic, for it gives double weight to the defence of his country on other points when undertaken by such a champion.

His secret (2) On February 9th, Godoy wrote despatch to his agent Isquierdo at Paris the Isquierdo at following secret despatch :—"I receive no news; I live in uncertainty; the treaty is already a dead letter; this kingdom is covered with troops; the harbours of Portugal are

about to be occupied by them; Junot governs the whole of that country. We have just received a demand for the remainder of our fleets to co-operate with the French, which must be complied with. Every thing is uncertainty, intrigue, and distrust; public opinion is divided; the heir-apparent to the throne was lately involved in a treasonable conspiracy; the French troops live at free quarters on the country; the people are exhausted by their requisitions. You yourself have been to little purpose at Paris; the ambassador there is useless. What the devil is to come of all this? what will be the end of this uncertainty? If you know any thing, for God's sake let me know it; any thing is better than this uncertainty."—GODOY to ISQUIERDO, 9th February, 1808; THIERIAUDEAU, vi. 311, 313.

(3) Thib. vi. 312, 313. Hard. x. 122, 123. Tor. i. 58, 59. Foy, iii. 109.

not to be supposed he would ever relinquish his grasp of a monarchy so important in his maritime designs against Great Britain (1).

Godoy, at length made aware of the designs of Napoléon, prepares the flight of the court to Seville. Possessed of Spain to the north of the Ebro, including, of course, Catalonia, Navarre, the whole frontier fortresses, and passes through the Pyrenees, was, in a military point of view, possession of Spain itself; not a fort existed to arrest the French between that river and the capital. The intelligence communicated by Isquierdo revealed the alarming fact, that the title of Emperor of the *Indies*, was to be given to Ferdinand; and that Napoléon continually reverted to the dependence of the tranquillity of France on the succession to the Crown of *Spain*. In the course of the conferences, the Spanish diplomatist had penetrated the real secret, and distinctly warned the Prince of Peace that the total dethronement of the House of Bourbon was resolved on. The arrival of

March 11. the Queen of Etruria at Madrid at this juncture, who had been forced to renounce one throne by the French Emperor, and since insidiously deprived of the compensation promised her instead of Portugal, enhanced

March 13. the general embarrassments; and at length the arrival of Murat at Burgos, with the title of "Lieutenant of the Emperor," and an immense staff, both civil and military, left no room for doubt that Napoléon was determined to appropriate to himself the whole Peninsula. In this extremity the Prince of Peace, roused to more manly feelings by the near approach of danger, both to the monarchy and his own person, recalled a letter which

March 15. he had dispatched to Paris, consenting to the cession of the provinces north of the Ebro, and counselled the King to imitate the example of the Prince Regent of Portugal and depart for Seville, with a view to embark

March 16. for America. Preparations were immediately made for the journey; the guards were assembled at Aranjuez, then the royal residence; thirty pieces of cannon were brought from Segovia, and messengers dispatched to Gibraltar to bespeak an asylum for the fugitive monarch within its impregnable walls. Meanwhile Napoléon, keeping up to the last his detestable

March 17. system of hypocrisy, sent the King a present of twelve beautiful horses, with a letter announcing "his approaching visit to his friend and ally the King of Spain, in order to cement their friendship by personal intercourse, and arrange the affairs of the Peninsula without the restraint of diplomatic forms;" while the passage of the Bidassoa by six thousand of the Imperial Guard, the formation of a new French army, nineteen thousand strong, in Biscay; under Marshal Bessières, and the increase of the forces in Catalonia to fifteen thousand men (2), told but too clearly that if he did arrive, it would be with the pomp and authority of a conqueror.

The Prince of Asturias was offered by the King either to share the flight of the Royal family, or remain at home with the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom. He at first preferred the former alternative, though his confidants, not yet convinced of the total

Tumult at Aranjuez, and overthrow of the Prince of Peace.

Napoléon demands the cession of the provinces to the north of the Ebro. (1) The proposition for the cession of the provinces north of the Ebro was brought to Madrid by Isquierdo, in the form of a proces-verbale of the import of long conferences held at Paris between himself, Duroc, and Talleyrand; they bore:—The Emperor is desirous of exchanging Portugal with the Spanish provinces to the north of the Ebro, to avoid the inconvenience of a military road across Castile. A new treaty, offensive and defensive, appears necessary to bind Spain more closely to the Continental System. The repose of his empire requires, that the *succession to the Crown of Castile* should be fixed in an irrevocable

manner. His Majesty is willing to grant permission to the King to bear the title of *Emperor of the Indies*, and to grant his niece in marriage to the Prince of Asturias.—Such was the proces-verbale; but Isquierdo, says Foy, was too acute a diplomatist not to see that Napoléon was deceiving all the world; and that he was bent upon getting the entire command of the whole Peninsula, and disposing of it at his pleasure.—Foy, iii. 109, 110; and ISQUIERDO'S *Despatch to the Prince of Peace*, 24th March, 1808; SAVARY, iii. 142.

(2) Tor. i. 60, 64. Thib. vi. 313, 318. Foy, iii. 103, 113. Lond. i. 60, 64.

overthrow of the dynasty contemplated by Napoléon, dissuaded him from the step, and strongly recommended him to throw himself into the arms of Napoléon. Meanwhile, the preparations for a journey by the Court, and certain vague rumours of their approaching departure from the kingdom, which had transpired, collected an unusual crowd to Aranjuez, and increased to the very highest pitch the anxiety of the people at Madrid; who, notwithstanding the ignorance in which they were kept, had still learned with dismay the seizure of the frontier fortresses, and the occupation of the northern provinces by the French troops. The French ambassador openly and loudly condemned the projected departure to the south, as uncalled-for, imprudent, and calculated only to disturb the existing state of amity between the two nations,—while Murat at Burgos issued a proclamation, which arrived at this period at the capital, in which he enjoined his soldiers, “to treat the Spaniards, a nation estimable in so many respects, as they would treat their French compatriots, as the Emperor wished nothing but happiness and felicity to Spain.” Still the general effervescence continued, and the King, to

March 16. calm it, issued a proclamation, in which he earnestly counselled peace and submission: an advice which had a precisely opposite effect. As the period of departure approached, the reluctance of Ferdinand to accompany the fugitive monarch became hourly stronger, and his friends gave out that he was resolved to remain at home and stand by his country: a resolution which was loudly applauded by the people, who regarded him as the only hope of the nation, and were worked up to a pitch of perfect fury against the Prince of Peace, whom they regarded as, more than he really was, the author of all the public calamities. A casual expression which dropped from the Prince on the morning of the 17th, “This night the Court sets out, but I will not accompany them,” increased the general ferment, by spreading the belief he might possibly be reluctantly torn away from the kingdom of his fathers. At length, when the royal carriages drew up to the door of the royal palace, and preparations for an immediate departure were made, matters came to a crisis: the people rose in tumultuous masses; a large body took

March 17. post at the palace, cut the traces of the carriages, and put an entire stop to the intended journey, while a furious mob, composed in great part of disbanded soldiers, surrounded the hotel of the Prince of Peace, from whose guards they experienced no resistance, forced open the doors, ransacked the most private apartments in searching for the object of their indignation, who, however, for the time escaped; but still observing some moderation in their excesses, brought the Princess, with all the respect due to her rank, to the royal palace (1).

Fall of the Prince of Peace, and abdication of Charles IV. March 18. In the first moment of alarm, the Prince of Peace had escaped by a back passage, with a single roll, which was lying on the table, in his hand, and flying up to the garrets, hid himself under a quantity of mats, until the first violence of the tumult had subsided. To appease the people, the King issued a decree the following morning, by which he was deprived of his functions as Generalissimo and High Admiral, and ‘banished’ from Court, with liberty only to choose his

(1) Tor. i. 69, 75. Foy, iii. 113, 117. Thib. vi. 321, 322. Lond. i. 64, 65.

The tumult at the Prince of Peace's palace first commenced from the mob recognising in the person of a veiled lady, who left the palace at dusk on the evening of the 17th, surrounded by the guards, Donna Josefa Tudo, who had so long been the mistress of the favourite. His marriage with the niece of the King no more disturbed their relations, than

either the one or the other excited any jealousy in the breast of the Queen, whose criminal partiality had been the sole cause of his original elevation;—and the tumult at Aranjuez found them both residing quietly under the same roof —Toreno, i. 74; Foy, iii. 116. This is a clear proof that, in some cases at least, the ardour of the sun in a warm climate does not inflame the passion of the green-eyed monster.

place of retreat. This measure, however, was far from restoring general tranquillity; the violence of the public feeling was manifested by the seizure of Don Diego Godoy, a relation of the Prince, who was conducted with every mark of ignominy by his own troop of dragoons to his barracks: and secret information was received, that a new and more serious tumult was preparing for the succeeding night, having for its object a more important change than the overthrow of the ruling favourite. At the same time intelligence arrived that the guards when sounded as to whether they would repel an attack upon the palace, answered, "that the Prince of Asturias could alone ensure the public safety;" and at the same time that Prince waited on the King, and offered, by sending the officers of his household through the crowd, to disperse the assemblage; a proposal which was gladly accepted, but necessarily led to the suspicion, that he who could so easily appease, had not been a stranger to the origin, of the tumult. The night passed quietly over, but next morning, at ten o'clock, a frightful disturbance arose, in consequence of the discovery of Godoy in his own palace.

March 19. The unhappy victim of popular fury had remained for thirty-six hours undiscovered in his place of concealment; but at length the pangs of thirst became so intolerable as to overcome the fear of death, and he ventured down stairs to get a glass of water. He was recognised by a Walloon sentinel at the foot of the steps, who immediately gave the alarm. A crowd instantly collected; he was seized by a furious multitude, and with difficulty rescued from instant death by some guards who collected around him, and, at the imminent risk of their own lives, dragged him suspended from their saddles almost in the air, covered with contusions, and half dead with terror, at a rapid pace across the Place San Antonio to the nearest prison, amidst the most dreadful cries and imprecations. Prevented from wreaking their vengeance on the chief object of their hatred, the mob divided into separate parties, and traversing the streets in different directions, sacked and levelled with the ground the houses of the principal friends and dependants of Godoy. At length Ferdinand, to whom all eyes were now turned as the only person capable of arresting the public disorders, at the earnest entreaty of the King and Queen, whose anxiety, amidst all the perils with which they were themselves surrounded, was chiefly for the life of their fallen favourite, flew to the prison at the head of his guards, and prevailed on the menacing mob by which it was surrounded to retire. "Are you as yet King?" enquired the Prince of Peace, when Ferdinand first presented himself before him. "Not as yet, but I shall soon be so." In effect, Charles IV deserted by the whole Court, overwhelmed by the opprobrium heaped on his obnoxious minister, unable to trust his own guards, and in hourly apprehension for the life, not only of Godoy, but of himself and the Queen, deemed a resignation of the crown the only mode of securing the personal safety of any of the three; and in the evening a proclamation appeared in which he relinquished the throne to the Prince of Asturias (1).

(1) Lond. i. 65, 66. Tor. i. 73, 79. Foy, iii. 118, 122. Nell. i. 15, 20. Thib. vi. 321, 323.

His proclamation, and secret feelings on the subject. "As my habitual infirmities no longer permit me to bear the weight of the government of my kingdom, and standing in need, for the reestablishment of my health, of a milder climate and a private life, I have determined after the most mature deliberation, to abdicate the Crown in favour of my heir and well-beloved son, the Prince of Asturias, and desire that this, my free and spontaneous abdication, should be fully carried into

execution in all points."—*Decree 19th March, 1808*; Foy, iii. 371.—On the day following, the King informed Murat of his resignation, with full details of his reasons for so doing, but without alleging any others than those set forth in the public instrument; but on the 21st he wrote a secret despatch to Napoléon, in which he asserted,—“I have not resigned in favour of my son, but from the force of circumstances, and when the din of arms and the clamours of my insurgent guards left me no alternative but resignation or death, which would speedily have been followed by that of the

Universal
joy of the
people at
these events.

The Prince was proclaimed King under the title of Ferdinand VII on the day of his father's abdication; and this auspicious event, coupled with the fall of Godoy, diffused universal transport. All

ranks and classes of the people shared in it: the surrender of the frontier fortresses; the hundred thousand men in the northern provinces, the approach of Napoléon with his guards, were forgotten, now that the traitors who had betrayed the nation were fallen: the houses in Madrid were decorated during the day with flowers and green boughs; at night a vast illumination burst forth spontaneously in every part of the city. Ferdinand VII was hailed with enthusiastic applause as the saviour of his country, whenever he appeared in public; while the public fury against the Prince of Peace rose to such a height, that the people in many parts of the kingdom destroyed the institutions which he had established for the promotion even of agriculture, manufactures and the arts, from which nothing but unmixed good could have been anticipated (1).

Continued
advance of
the French
troops, and
entry of
Murat into
Madrid.
March 15.

While the Spanish people were thus abandoning themselves to transports of joy at the accession of a new monarch to the throne, Murat at the head of the French troops was rapidly approaching Madrid. On the 15th March, he set out at the head of the corps of Moncey, the imperial guard and the artillery from Burgos,

taking the road of the Somo-Sierra. On the same day, Dupont, with two divisions of his corps and the cavalry, broke up for the Guadarama pass; the third division of Dupont's corps remained at Valladolid to observe the Spanish troops which occupied Galicia. No sooner had these forces advanced on the road towards Madrid, than their place at Burgos was supplied by the army of reserve under Bessières. The whole body moved on by brigades, taking with them provisions for fifteen days, and fifty rounds of ball cartridge each man; they bivouacked at night with patrols set, and all the other precautions usual in an enemy's territory. They every where gave out that they were bound for the camp of St.-Roque, to act against the English, at the same time belying these pacific declarations by arresting all the Spanish soldiers and posts whom they met on the road, so as to prevent any intelligence of their approach being received. In this way they passed without opposition, and almost without their advance being known, the important range of mountains which separates Old from New Castile; and

March 23. Murat, having learned at Beytrajo, on their southern side, of the events at Aranjuez, redoubled his speed, and entered Madrid at the head of the cavalry and imperial guard and a brilliant staff, on the day following and took up his quarters in the Hotel of the Prince of Peace. This formidable apparition excited much less attention than it would otherwise have done, in consequence of all minds being intent on the preparation for Ferdinand VII on the following day making his public entry into the capital. He

Queen. I have been forced to abdicate, and have no longer any hope but in the aid and support of March 21. my magnanimous ally, the Emperor Napoléon." On the same day he drew up a secret protest, which sets forth,—“I declare that my decree of 19th March, by which I abdicated the Crown in favour of my son, is an act to which I was forced, in prevent the effusion of blood in my beloved subjects. It should, therefore, be regarded as null.”—See both documents in *For*, iii. 392, 393; *Pièces Just.*—On the other hand, the day after his abdication, Charles IV said to the diplomatic body assembled at the Escorial,—“I never performed an action in my life with more pleasure.” The truth appears to be, that the abdication, in the

first instance, was prompted chiefly by terror for the life of the Prince of Peace, for whose safety throughout the Royal pair manifested more solicitude than for their own concerns; and it was an afterthought to protest against it as null, or attempt to recede from the act. Thibaudau seems to incline to the opinion that the protest on 21st March was drawn out subsequent to its date, and after the arrival of Murat, though, doubtless, the resignation of the Crown, even if suggested only by terrors for Godoy's life, cannot be considered as a voluntary deed.—See TORENO, i. 85, 86, and THIBAUDEAU, vi. 328.

(1) *Tor.* i. 84, 85. *Lond.* i. 66. *South.* i. 209, 218. *Nell.* i. 21, 22.

came in accordingly, accompanied by two hundred thousand citizens of all ranks, in carriages, on foot, and horseback, who had gone out to welcome their Sovereign; and Murat, who was an eye-witness to the universal transports which his presence occasioned, failed not instantly to write off to Napoléon intelligence of what he had seen, with many observations on the probable effect of so popular a Prince permanently retaining the supreme direction of affairs (1).

Murat declines to recognise Ferdinand, and takes military possession of Madrid.

The first care of Ferdinand, after he ascended the throne, was to transmit to Napoléon a full account of the transactions at Aranjuez, according to his version of the affair; and he anxiously awaited the answer which was to be received from the supreme arbiter of his fate. In the interim, however, he experienced from the French authorities the utmost reserve; and when he made a visit to Murat, and was announced as King of Spain, he had the mortification of being obliged to return, not only without any of the honours due to his rank, but without having had a single word addressed to him by that officer or his attendants (2). As, however, it was of the utmost importance to the new sovereign that he should be recognised by the French Emperor,—and his situation without such countenance was not only precarious but full of danger,—no pains were spared to conciliate his favour, and win the good-will of the French generals in Madrid. Flattery, caresses, obsequious obedience to every demand, were all tried, but in vain; Murat, aware of the secret designs of his brother-in-law on the throne of Spain, was careful to avoid every thing which could have the semblance even of recognising his title to the throne. Meanwhile, Charles IV and the Queen more and more alarmed for the safety of their fallen favourite, did not let a day pass without reiterating their entreaties to Murat to take him under his protection, and now openly represented the resignation as an involuntary act; while that general, careful above all to advance the interests of his master, took military possession of the capital, occupied and fortified the Retiro, reviewed all his forces on the edge of the town, and nominated General Grouchy, governor of Madrid. Every thing asked by the French authorities was instantly granted; all their requisitions for the support, clothing, or pay of the troops, were carefully complied with; and even the ungracious demand for the sword of Francis I, which had hung in the royal armoury ever since it had been taken in the battle of Pavia, was also yielded to the desire of Ferdinand to conciliate his much dreaded ally (3). A hint was next given that the journey of DON CARLOS, the King's brother, destined to celebrity in future times, to receive the emperor on the frontiers of the kingdom, would be very acceptable: this, too, was instantly acquiesced in, and preparations were made for his departure. Encouraged by such marks of compliance, Beauharnais then insinuated that it would have the best effect upon the future relations of the two potentates, if Ferdinand himself were to go at least as far as Burgos to receive his august guest; but the advisers of the Spanish monarch

(1) Lond. i. 67, 68. South. i. 219, 225. Foy, iii. 128, 130. Tor. i. 93, 97. Thib. vi. 325.

(2) "The Queen of Etruria had, unknown to Murat, arranged matters for an interview between him and Ferdinand VII., and accordingly he made his appearance and was announced as *King of Spain*, when the French General was paying a visit to the Ex-Queen of Tuscany. Murat stood up when he entered the room, but did not advance a step to meet him: Ferdinand paused at his unexpected reserve; and the Queen, to put an end to so awkward a scene, sat down to the piano and began to play. Neither

said a word; at length Ferdinand mechanically drew near to his sister, and stood beside the instrument; Murat never stirred, and soon after, bowing to the Queen, retired, without having taken any further notice of the embarrassed monarch."—Foy, iii. 140, note.

(3) "It was brought in state from the Armoria Real to the palace of Murat by the Count Altemion. 'It could not,' said he, 'be given up to more worthy hands than those of the illustrious general formed in the school of the hero of the ages.'"—Foy, iii. 142.

were startled at this demand, especially so soon after the perfidious seizure of the fortresses: and the inhabitants of Madrid, grievously offended at the coldness of the French authorities to their beloved Prince, and the unauthorized intrusion of their troops into the capital, were daily becoming more and more exasperated at their imperious allies (1).

Napoléon received the account of the events at Aranjuez, on the night of the 26th March, at Paris. He instantly took his final resolution, and next morning offered the crown of Spain to his brother Louis. His letter to that Prince still exists, and affords decisive evidence of his views on that monarchy, even at that early period, and of the profound dissimulation, as well as thorough perfidy by which his subsequent conduct, both to Ferdinand and Charles IV, was characterised (2). Louis, however, was not deceived by the specious offer thus held out to him: he had felt on the throne of Holland the chains of servitude, and the responsibility of command, and he was thinking rather of resigning his onerous charge than accepting another still more burdensome: he therefore refused. At the same time Napoléon had a long conversation with Isquierdo at St.-Cloud, as to the state of public opinion in the Peninsula, and the feelings with which they would regard a prince of his family, or even himself, for their sovereign. Isquierdo replied—"The Spaniards would accept your Majesty for their sovereign with pleasure, and even enthusiasm, but only in the event of your having previously renounced the crown of France." Struck with this answer, he meditated much on the affairs of Spain; and without revealing to him his real designs on the Spanish crown, sent Savary to Madrid, to carry into execution his intrigues in the Spanish capital; and foreseeing that the crisis of the Peninsula was approaching, and that it was indispensable that he should get both Charles and Ferdinand into his power, set out himself for Bayonne in the beginning of April (3).

(1) Lond. i. 69, 70. Foy, i. 140, 142. Thib. vi. 332. Tor. i. 109.

Napoléon's letter to his brother Louis was in these terms:—"27th March, 1808—The King of Spain has just abdicated; the Prince of Peace

has been imprisoned; insurrectionary movements have shown themselves at Madrid. At that instant our troops were still forty leagues distant; but on the 23d, Murat must have entered that capital at the head of forty thousand men. The people demand me, with loud cries, to fix their destinies. Being convinced that I shall never be able to conclude a solid peace with England till I have given a great movement on the Continent, I have resolved to put a French Prince on the throne of Spain. In this state of affairs I have turned my eyes to you for the throne of Spain. Say at once what is your opinion on that subject. You must be aware that this plan is yet in embryo; and that although I have 100,000 men in Spain, yet, according to circumstances, I may either advance directly to my object, in which case every thing will be concluded in a fortnight, or be more circumspect in my advances, and the final result appear only after several months' operations. Answer categorically—if I declare you King of Spain, can I rely on you?"—NAPOLÉON TO LOUIS, 27th March, 1808.—Toreno, i. 100; and Thibaudeau, vi. 334.

(3) Savary iii. 162. Tor. i. 100, 101. Thib. vi. 334, 335. Foy, iii. 142, 143.

His secret instructions, structions for Madrid. Napoléon said and object of to him:—"Charles IV has abdicated; his journey, his son has succeeded him, and this change has been the result of a revolution in which the Prince of Peace has fallen, which looks as if

these changes were not altogether voluntary. I was fully prepared for some changes in Spain; but I think they are now taking a turn altogether different from what I intended. See our ambassador on the subject; enquire especially why he could not prevent a revolution in which I shall be forced to intervene, and in which I shall be considered as implicated. Before recognising the son, I must be made aware of the sentiments of the father; nothing will induce me to do so till I see the resignation duly legalized, otherwise a troop of traitors may be introduced into my palace during the night, who may force me to abdicate, and overturn the state. When I made peace on the Niemen, I stipulated, that if England did not accept the mediation of Alexander, he should unite his arms to mine to constrain that power to submission. I would be weak, indeed, if, having obtained that single advantage from those whom I have vanquished, I should permit the Spaniards to embroil me afresh on my weak side, and give that power much greater advantages than they had lost by the rupture with Russia. *What I fear above every thing is a revolution, of which I neither know the direction nor hold the threads*; doubtless, it would be a great object to avoid a war with Spain; such a contest would be a species of sacrilege, but I would willingly incur all its hazards, if the prince who governs that state is disposed to embrace such a policy. I should thus be in the same situation with Louis XIV. when he engaged, in support of his grandson, in the war of the succession; the same political necessity governs both cases. Had Charles IV. reigned, and the Prince of Peace not been overturned, we might have remained at peace, because I could rely on them; but now all is changed. But if Spain is inclined to throw itself into the opposite policy, I

He arrives
at Madrid;
persuades
Ferdinand
to go to
Bayonne.

No person could be better qualified than Savary to execute the ambiguous but important mission with which he was now charged. Devoted in his attachment to the Emperor, intimately acquainted with his most secret projects, active, insinuating, skilful, a perfect master of finesse and dissimulation, and wholly unscrupulous in the means employed for the execution of his purposes, he was admirably adapted for conducting that dark intrigue, which was intended, without a rupture, to terminate in the dethronement of the entire race of the Spanish House of Bourbon. In the most flagitious as well as important deeds of Napoléon's life, the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, the Russian negotiations succeeding the Treaty of Tilsit, and in those which followed the battle of Austerlitz, he had borne a conspicuous part, and his present situation at the head of the Gendarmerie d'Elite, gave him the direction of the most important part of the state police. Fully possessed of the secret views of the Emperor, and entirely regardless of any breach of faith in carrying them into effect, he spared neither menaces, nor flattery, nor assurances of safety to accomplish the grand object of getting Ferdinand into the hands of Napoléon (1). No sooner had he arrived at Madrid than he demanded a special audience of the King, which was immediately granted. He there declared,—“I have come at the particular desire of the Emperor, solely to offer his compliments to your Majesty, and to know if your sentiments in regard to France are in conformity to those of your father. If they are, the Emperor will shut his eyes to all that is past, he will *not intermeddle in the smallest particular in the internal affairs of the kingdom*, and he will instantly recognise you as King of Spain and the Indies (2).” This gratifying assurance was accompanied with April 10. so many flattering expressions and apparent cordiality that it entirely imposed not only on Ferdinand, but his most experienced counsellors; and Savary's entreaties that he would go at least as far as Burgos to meet the Emperor, who was already near Bayonne, on the road to Madrid, were so pressing, that their reluctance to his departure from the capital was at length overcome, and he set out from Madrid, in company with the French envoy, to meet his august protector (3).

Journey of
Ferdinand
to Burgos
at Savary's
earnest de-
sire.

The King was every where received on his route to the northern provinces with the same enthusiastic joy as at Aranjuez and Madrid; though the simple inhabitants of Castile, not involved in the trammels of intrigue, and uninfluenced by the delusions which

should not hesitate to enter the monarchy with all my forces; for that country, if ruled by a warlike prince, inclined to direct against us all the resources of his nation, might perhaps succeed in *displacing by his own dynasty my family on the throne of France*. You see what might happen in France if I do not prevent it; it is my duty to foresee the danger, and take measures to deprive the enemy of the resources they otherwise might derive from it. If I cannot arrange with either the father or son, *I will make a clean sweep of them both*; I will reassemble the Cortes, and resume the designs of Louis XIV. I am fully prepared for all that; I am about to set out for Bayonne; I will go on to Madrid, but only if it is absolutely unavoidable.”—SAVARY, iii. 162, 166.

(1) He admitted to the Abbé de Pradt, that his mission was to get Ferdinand from Madrid.—DE PRADT, 73.

(2) Cevallos. 28, 29.

(3) Cevallos. 28, 29. Tor. i. 112, 113. Escoiq. 54. Savary, iii. 181, 182. Foy, iii. 145.

“I asked permission,” says Savary, “to accompany the King on his journey to the north, *solely for this reason*:—I had come from Bayonne to Madrid as a common courier, as was the custom of travel-

ling at that time in Spain. I had scarcely arrived when I was under the necessity of retracing my steps in the same fashion in order to meet the Emperor, at the same time that Ferdinand was pursuing the same route. I found it much more convenient to request leave for my carriage to join that of his Majesty; I did so, and my carriage accordingly made part of the royal cortège.”—SAVARY, iii. 185, 186.—It is incredible that this was the real reason which induced Savary to accompany the King back to Burgos. Don Pedro Cevallos says, “General Savary made use of the most pressing instance to induce the King to go to meet the Emperor, alleging that such a step would appear infinitely flattering to his Imperial Majesty; and this he repeated so often, and in such insinuating terms, asserting, at the same time, that the Emperor might be hourly expected, that it was impossible to withhold credit from the assertion. When the day of departure was fixed, the French general, in like manner, solicited the honour of accompanying his Majesty in his journey, which could in no event be prolonged beyond Burgos, according to the positive intelligence he had just received of the approach of his Majesty.”—CEVALLOS, 31.

were practised on their superiors, beheld with undisguised anxiety the progress of their sovereign towards the French frontier. At Burgos, however, the uneasiness of the King's counsellors greatly increased, for not only were they now surrounded by the French troops, but the Emperor had not arrived, and no advices of his having even crossed the frontier were received. The matter was warmly and anxiously debated in his council, and opinions were much divided as to the course which should be adopted; Don Pedro Cevallos earnestly insisting, that the King should go no further, and portraying in vivid colours the evident peril with which such an inconsiderate surrender of his person into the hands of so ambitious a potentate would be attended. The other counsellors of the King were more undecided; alleging for their public justification that it was utterly inconceivable that Napoléon should entertain any sinister designs against the person of the monarch on the throne of Spain, and thus run the risk not only of lighting up the flames of a frightful war in the Peninsula, but placing the whole resources of its Transatlantic possessions at the disposal of the English government (1). Cevallos still maintained his opinion, and the ultimate determination appeared

But it is strongly resisted, and his council becomes divided.

still uncertain, when Savary joined the deliberations. He protested loudly against any change in the King's plans as uncalled-for and unnecessary, prejudicial alike to the honour of the French Emperor and of himself as his envoy, and likely more than any other

step which could be taken to embroil the two kingdoms, and destroy that good understanding which was just beginning to arise between their respective monarchs. "I will let you cut off my head," says he, "if,

in a quarter of an hour after the arrival of your Majesty at Bayonne, he does not recognize you as the King of Spain and of the Indies. To preserve consistency, he will, perhaps, in the first instance, address you with the title of your Highness; but in a few minutes he will give you that of your Majesty. The moment that is done, every thing is at an end: then your Majesty may instantly return into Spain (2)."

These words were decisive: the King was surrounded by eight thousand of the French troops, without a single guard to his person. The earnest manner and apparent sincerity of Savary disarmed suspicion: if it had still existed, resistance was hardly possible without a battalion to support it; and the fatal resolution to continue the journey to Bayonne was taken almost from necessity, although the people were so alive to the danger that they every where manifested the utmost repugnance to the journey being continued, and rose at Vittoria in menacing crowds to prevent it. At that place a faithful counsellor of the King, Don Mariano de Urquijo, arrived from Bilboa, and not only laid before him a memoir, distinctly foretelling the danger which awaited him from the French Emperor, but suggested a plan by which escape in disguise was still possible, and mentioned that both the captain-general of Biscay and a faithful battalion

At length he prolongs it to Bayonne in consequence of a letter from Napoléon.

(1) These, however, were not their only, nor their real reasons; in truth they had gone too far to recede; it had already transpired that Charles IV had denounced the resignation of Aranjuez as a forced act, and was doing his utmost to engage the French government in his interest. They were all, with the exception of Cevallos, involved in that transaction, and they thus saw the penalties of treason menacing them in rear; the country was overrun by French troops; a national struggle in defence of Ferdinand appeared hopeless, or at least there were no preparations for it; and

there seemed no safety even to their lives but in advancing rapidly, and by early submission and adroit flattery winning the powerful protection of the French Emperor before the partisans of the late monarch had had time to make any impression. This is the true secret of the majority of Ferdinand's counsellors advising him to go on to Bayonne, after the dangers of it had become so evident as to excite tumults even in the humblest ranks of the people.— See Fox, iii: 146, 147.

(2) Cevallos. 31, 32. Foy, iii, 147, 149. Escoiq. 41, 54. Sav. iii, 186, 187.

would be at hand at Mondragon to conduct him to Durango, and from thence to the fortified town of Bilboa. Hervaz repeated the same advice: the chief of the customhouse made offer of two thousand of his officers to protect his Majesty: the Duke of Mahon, Governor of Guipuscoa, offered to pledge his head that he should escape safely into Arragon, and to accompany him in his flight, observing that it should never be said that a great-grandson of the brave Crillon was wanting in the hour of need to a descendant of Henry IV. So many and such concurring efforts would probably have diverted the King from his design, were it not that at that very moment Savary, who had gone on to Bayonne, and seen the Emperor, returned, bringing a letter from Napoléon himself to Ferdinand, dated from that town only two days before. This letter was couched in such encouraging terms, and held out such flattering though equivocal assurances of an immediate recognition, which were strongly repeated by Savary on his word of honour, that it relieved Ferdinand's counsellors of all their perplexities; and it was finally resolved to continue the journey without delay to Bayonne (1). When the Duke de Mahon wished still to remonstrate, Escoiquiz, who entirely directed the King, interrupted him by the words,—“The affair is settled; to-morrow we set out for Bayonne; we have received all the assurances which we could desire.” Still the public anxiety continued; and when the horses came to the door on the following morning, a vast crowd assembled, and cut the traces. A proclamation was immediately issued to calm the general effervescence, in which the King declared “that he was assured of the constant and sincere friendship of the Emperor of France, and that, in a few days, the people would return thanks to God for the prudence which dictated the temporary absence which gave them so much disquietude; and the carriage, surrounded by a mournful and submissive, but still unconvinced crowd, took its departure, guarded by the French division of Verdier. Two days afterwards Ferdinand crossed the Bidassoa, and proceeding to Bayonne, finally committed himself to the honour of the French Emperor (2).

Guarded but deceitful expressions in that letter. (1) Napoléon said in this letter,—“The affair of Aranjuez took place when I was occupied with the affairs of the north. I am not in a situation to form an opinion concerning it, nor of the conduct of the Prince of Peace; but what I am clear about is, that it is dangerous for kings to accustom their subjects to the shedding of blood, and to taking justice into their own hands. The King has no longer any friends. Your Highness will have none, if ever you prove unfortunate. The people willingly take vengeance for the homage which they in general pay us. As to the abdication of Charles IV, it took place at a moment when our armies covered Spain; and, in the eyes of Europe and posterity, I shall appear to have sent my troops for no other purpose but to precipitate from the throne my friend and ally. As a neighbouring sovereign, I am called on to enquire into, before I recognise, that abdication. I declare to your Royal Highness, and to the whole world, if the abdication of King Charles was really voluntary, if he was not constrained to it by the revolt and insurrection of Aranjuez, *I will, without hesitation, and at once, recognise you as King of Spain.* I desire much to converse with you on this subject. The circumspection which, for some months, I have employed in these affairs, should induce you to rely with the more confidence on me if, in your turn, factions of any sort should disturb you on the throne. Your Royal Highness has now my whole thoughts. You see that I float between different

ideas, and have need to be fixed. You may, however, rest assured, that, in any event, I shall conduct myself towards you as I have done towards your father. Rely on my desire to conciliate every thing, and on my wish to find occasion to give you proofs of my affection and perfect esteem.” — Napoléon to Ferdinand, Bayonne, April 16, 1808. — When he put this insidious epistle into Savary's hands, Napoléon said to him,—“If the Prince of Asturias had followed wise counsels, I should have found him here; but from what you tell me, I suppose he conceived apprehensions from the preparations of the Grand Duke of Berg (Murat). Return and give him this letter from me; allow him to make his reflections on it. You have no need of finesse; he is more interested in it than I am. Let him do as he pleases. According to your answer or your silence, I shall take my line, and also adopt such measures as may prevent him from returning elsewhere but to his father. There is the fruit of bad counsels. Here is a prince who perhaps will cease to reign in a few days, or induce a war between France and Spain.” At the same time he wrote to Murat to save the life of the Prince of Peace, but send him immediately to Bayonne.—SAVARY, iii. 200, 212, 213.

(2) Tor. i. 115, 119. Cevallos. 31, 33. Escoiq. 52, 56. Foy, iii. 148, 151. Thib. vi. 345, 351. De Pradt, 74. Sav. iii. 210, 214.

Godoy,
Charles IV,
and the
Queen, are
sent by
Murat to
Bayonne.

Upon his departure from Madrid, Ferdinand had intrusted the government to a Regency, of which the Infant Don Antonio was the head. Murat, however, was the real centre of authority; the presence of thirty thousand French troops gave him an influence which was irresistible. No sooner had the King left the capital than he insisted that the Prince of Peace should immediately be given up to him. Don Antonio refused to do so until he received authority from Ferdinand, to whom he instantly dispatched a courier for instructions. Meanwhile the French general continued to insist for the delivery of the important prisoner, threatening, at the same time, to put to the sword, in case of refusal, the six hundred provincial guards intrusted with his custody. At length authority arrived from the King for his surrender, which the Infant communicated to the officer in command of the guards, with the simple observation, "that on

April 20. the surrender of Godoy depended the preservation of the Crown of Spain to his nephew." On the same day he set out from Madrid under a strong French escort, and six days afterwards arrived at Bayonne. Mean-

April 26. while Murat harassed the Regency with repeated and vexatious demands, apparently prompted by no other motive than to disgust them with the cares of an unsubstantial command, and accustom the people to regard the French headquarters as the centre from which all real authority emanated. Soon after he repaired in person to the Escorial, and had long and repeated conferences with Charles IV and the old Queen. The result of their deliberations soon appeared in the transmission to Don Antonio of the antedated and secret state paper, already noticed (1), in which the King protested against his abdication as brought about by constraint and intimidation; and by the earnest advice of Murat he set out immediately after, in company with the Queen, surrounded by French guards, for Bayonne, to lay his grie-

April 30. vances at the feet of Napoléon, where he arrived four days after his fallen favourite. Thus did the French Emperor, by the influence of his name, the terrors of his armies, and the astuteness of his diplomatists, succeed in inducing the leaders of all the parties which now distracted Spain, including the late and present sovereign, to place their persons at his disposal; while, at the same time, the communications on his part which brought about this extraordinary result were managed with such address, and enveloped in such mystery, that not only could none of them boast of possessing a distinct pledge of what he intended to do, but all had reason to hope that the result would prove entirely conformable to their interests (2).

Great em-
barrassment
experienced
by Napoléon
in regard to
the Penin-
sular affairs. Meanwhile Napoléon, though possessed of such extraordinary influence, and invested with almost absolute power over the affairs of Spain and Portugal, and the interests of the crowned heads which they contained, was extremely embarrassed how to act: not that he swerved in the slightest degree from his intention of making, as he himself said, a "clean sweep of them" (*maisonnette*), but that he perceived, in the brightest colours, the abyss on the edge of which he was placed, and anticipated, with just and sagacious foresight, the incalculable consequences which might result from the lighting of the flames of a national war in the Peninsula. Through all the weakness and submission of the last century, he still discerned the traces of energy and resolution in the Spanish character. The timidity of its foreign conduct, the abuses of its internal administration, he justly ascribed to the corruption of the nobles, or the imbecility of the

(1) *Ante*, vi. 267.

(2) *Tor.* i. 124, 127. *Fcy*, iii. 152, 155. *Thib.* vi. 353, 354. *Hard.* x. 142, 145.

court. His generals had transmitted daily accounts of the alarming fermentation which seemed to prevail, especially in the lower classes of the community; and he rightly concluded that he would be involved in inextricable embarrassment if, on a side where he had so long been entirely secure, there should arise a contest animated by the indignant feelings of a nation hitherto virgin to revolutionary passions. His instructions to Murat, accordingly, at this period were to conduct himself with the utmost circumspection; to avoid every thing which might excite an angry feeling, or provoke a hostile collision; to strengthen his military hold of the country; but do nothing which might disturb the pacific negotiations by which he hoped, without drawing a sword, to obtain in a few days the whole objects of his ambition (1).

Murat, however, was not a character to execute with skill the delicate mission with which he was intrusted, and he was too much accustomed to

(1) Napoléon to Murat, 29th March, 1808. Sav. iii. 168.

His admirable letter to Duke of Berg, that you are deceiving Murat, portraying his views regarding it. The events of the 19th March have singularly complicated our affairs; I am in the greatest perplexity; never suppose that you are engaged with a disarmed nation, and that you have only to show yourself, to insure the submission of Spain. The revolution of 20th March proves that they still have energy. You have to deal with a virgin people, they already have all the courage, and they will soon have all the enthusiasm, which you meet with among men who are not worn out by political passions.

March 29, 1808. "The aristocracy and the clergy are the masters of Spain; if they become seriously alarmed for their privileges and their existence, they will rouse the people and induce an eternal war. At present I have many partisans among them; if I show myself as a conqueror I will soon cease to have any. The Prince of Peace is detested, because they accuse him of having given up Spain to France, that is the cry which led to the usurpation of Ferdinand; but first, the popular party would have been the least powerful. The Prince of Asturias has none of the qualities essential for the chief of a nation; that want, however, will not prevent them, in order to oppose us, from making him a hero. I have no wish to use violence towards that family; it is never expedient to render one's self odious, and inflame hatred. Spain has above one hundred thousand men in arms; less would suffice to sustain an interior war; scattered over several points, they might succeed in effecting the total overthrow of the monarchy. I have now exhibited to you the difficulties which are insurmountable; there are others which you will not fail soon to discover.

"England will not let slip this opportunity of multiplying our embarrassments; she sends out forces daily, while she keeps on the coasts of Portugal and the Mediterranean; she is making enrolments of Sicilians and Portuguese. The Royal family having quitted Portugal to establish itself in the Indies, nothing but a Revolution can change the state of that country and that is the event for which, perhaps, Europe is the least prepared. The persons who see the monstrous state of the government in its true light, are a small minority; the great majority profit by its abuses. Consistently with the interests of my empire, I can do infinite good to Spain. What are the best means of attaining that object? Should I advance to Madrid and assume the rights of a protector, by declaring for the father against

the son? It is difficult to re-establish Charles IV. His rule and his favourite have become so unpopular they could not stand three months. Ferdinand, again, is the enemy of France; it is because he is so, that they have put him on the throne. To keep him there would be to promote the factions, who, for twenty-five years, have wished the subjugation of France. A family alliance would be a feeble bond; the Queen Elizabeth and other princesses perished miserably when they wished to sacrifice them to atrocious vengeance. I think we should precipitate nothing, and take counsels from future events.

"I do not approve of your taking possession so precipitately as you have done of Madrid; you should have kept the army ten leagues from the capital. Your entry into Madrid, by exciting the alarm of the Spaniards, has powerfully supported Ferdinand. I will write to you what part to adopt in regard to the old King; take care you do not commit me to meet with Ferdinand in Spain, unless you deem it expedient for me to recognise him as King of Spain. Above all, take care that the Spaniards do not suspect what part I am about to adopt: you can have no difficulty in doing so, for I have not fixed on one myself.

"Impress upon the nobles and clergy, that if France is obliged to interfere in the affairs of Spain, their privileges will be respected. Say to the magistrates and citizens of towns, and to the enlightened persons, that Spain requires to re-create the machine of government: that it has need of institutions which will preserve it from the weight of feudalism, and protect and encourage industry. Paint to them the present condition of France, despite the wars it has undergone: the splendour of its religion; the importance of a political regeneration; the internal security and external respect which it brings in its train. I will attend to your private interests: have no thought of them: *Portugal remains at my disposal*. Let the French army avoid every encounter, either with the Spanish army or detached bodies: not a cartridge should be burned on either side. Keep the army always some days' march distant from the Spanish corps. *If war break out, all is lost.*"—NAPOLEON TO MURAT, 29th March, 1808; SAVARY, iii. 168, 171. History does not afford a more luminous example of sagacious foresight than this letter presents; and yet the Emperor, soon after, fell headlong into the very dangers which he here so clearly depicted, and was so desirous to avoid! It is remarkable as a proof of his profound habits of dissimulation, even with his most confidential servants, that, in his letter to his lieutenant at Madrid, he makes no mention of the design to place a relation of his own on the throne of Spain, though only three days before, he had offered it to Louis King of Holland.—*Vide ante*, vi. 269.

Symptoms
of resistance
in Spain to
the invaders.
Arrogant
conduct of
Murat.

make every thing bend to military force, to be qualified to assume at once, in circumstances singularly difficult, the foresight and circumspection of an experienced diplomatist. His precipitance and arrogance, accordingly, accelerated the catastrophe the Emperor was so solicitous to avoid. Already an alarming explosion had taken place at Toledo: cries of "Long live Ferdinand VII" had been heard in the streets

from countless multitudes; and when General Dupont was dispatched, five days afterwards, to restore order, it was only by a well-timed and earnest mediation of the archbishop that a serious conflict was avoided. The

fermentation in the capital was hourly increasing, especially since it was known that Ferdinand had crossed the frontier to throw himself into the arms of Napoléon, and that his father and the Prince of Peace had since set out in the same direction. Though the French had hitherto observed tolerable discipline, yet the disorders inseparable from the continued passage of such large bodies of men, accustomed to the license of campaigns, had produced repeated conflicts between them and the inhabitants; blood had flowed in several places, and at Burgos the assemblage had been so alarming, that it required to be dispersed by regular platoons of the French infantry. Irritated at these symptoms of resistance, and trusting to nothing but force for its suppression, Murat wrote in the most menacing terms to Don Antonio, stating, that he could permit no concourse of men in the streets; that the

anarchy which prevailed was intolerable; that his resolution to suppress it was irrevocably taken, and that if the government was not sufficiently strong to enforce obedience to its orders, he would take upon himself to maintain the public tranquillity. The Regency issued severe proclamations

against seditious assemblages or meetings, and replied in the most submissive manner to the thundering menaces of Murat; but, though no public demonstration had yet taken place, the most alarming reports were in circulation: the French officers publicly gave out that Napoléon would reinstate Charles IV on the throne; the departure of that sovereign with the Prince of Peace, for the Pyrenees, seemed to countenance that idea (1), and reports were circulated, and greedily credited, that thirty thousand armed Biscayans had fallen on Bayonne, and rescued their beloved Prince from his oppressors, while Arragon, Catalonia, and Navarre had risen in a body to cut off the retreat of the French army.

Extreme
agitation at
Madrid on
the ap-
proaching
departure of
the rest of
the royal
family.

At length, in the beginning of May, matters came to extremities. The government were a prey to the most cruel disquietude, being left in the approaching crisis of the monarchy with the responsibility of command, and without its powers: ignorant which sovereign they were ultimately to obey: fearful of betraying their country, and equally so of precipitating it into a hopeless struggle: actuated at times by a generous desire to maintain the national independence and throw themselves on public sympathy for their support, and apprehensive at others that in so doing they might mar an accommodation when on the point of being concluded, and incur the pains of treason from a government which they had involved in irretrievable embarrassments—unable to determine on any decided course, in the midst of such unparalleled difficulties, they adopted meanwhile the prudent step of confining the troops to their barracks, and exercising the most rigid vigilance, by means of the police, to prevent the quarrels, often attended with bloodshed, which were perpetually occurring between the French soldiers and the Spanish citizens. The Imperial guard, with

(1) Thib. vi. 369, 371. Tor. i. 124, 127. Foy, iii. 159, 160. Lond. i. 71, 72.

a division of infantry and brigade of cavalry, alone were quartered in Madrid : the artillery was all in the Retiro, but large bodies of troops, amounting in all to above thirty thousand men, were in the immediate neighbourhood, ready to pour in on the first signal. The whole population of the capital was in the streets : business was every where at a stand, and in the menacing looks and smothered agitation of the groups might be seen decisive proofs that a great explosion was at hand. “*Agibatur huc illuc urbs vario turbæ fluctuantis impulsu; completis undique basilicis et templis, lugubri prospectu, neque populi neque plebis ulla vox: sed attoniti vultus, et conversæ ad omnia aures: non tumultus non quies: quæc magni metus et magnæ iræ, silentium* April 29. *erat* (1).” Matters were in this combustible state when Murat demanded that the Queen of Etruria, and the Infants Don Francisco and Don Antonio should forthwith set out for Bayonne. The government hesitated on this demand, which was in effect delivering up the whole remainder of the Royal family into the hands of the French Emperor : Murat insisted, throwing upon them the whole responsibility of a war in case of refusal : and the Minister of War, upon being referred to, drew so gloomy a picture of the military resources of the monarchy, that resistance was deemed impossible, and this last requisition was agreed to, and the hour of their departure fixed for the following morning (2).

At ten o'clock on that day the Royal carriages came to the door of the palace, and preparations for the departure of the Princes took place. The Queen of Etruria, who, from her long residence in Italy, had ceased to be an object of interest to the people, set off first, and was allowed to depart without disturbance, though an immense crowd was collected, and the whole city was in violent agitation. Two other carriages remained, and it was known among the bystanders that they were to convey the Infants Don Antonio and Don Francisco : a report soon spread, that Don Francisco, who was a boy of thirteen, was weeping in the apartments above, and refused to go away : presently an aide-de-camp of Murat arrived on horseback, and, making his way through the throng, ascended the stairs of the palace ; the report instantly flew through the crowd that he was come to force the Royal youth from the palace of his fathers. Nothing more was requisite to throw the already excited multitude into a combustion : the French officer was violently assailed, and would have been dispatched on the spot, if Don Miguel Flores, an officer of the Walloon Guards, had not protected him at the hazard of his own life. Both would, however, in all probability, have fallen a sacrifice to the fury of the populace, had not a French piqueur at that moment come up, which withdrew the officer in safety to his comrades. Murat instantly resolved to punish severely this insult to his authority—a detachment of foot-soldiers appeared with two pieces of cannon, and by several discharges with grape-shot, within point-blank range, easily dispersed the crowd which was collected round the palace. But the sound of that cannon resounded from one end of the Peninsula to the other ; in its ultimate effects it shook the empire of Napoléon to its foundation ; it was literally the beginning of the end. Instantly, as if by enchantment, the city was in a tumult—the Spanish vehemence was roused at once into action ; all considerations of prudence, consequences, and probabilities of success, were forgotten in the intense indignation of the moment. Every where the people flew to arms : knives, daggers, bayonets, were seized wherever they could be found ; the

Commotion
and massacre
at Madrid on
2d May.

(1) Tac. Hist. i. 40. April 29.

(2) Tor. i. 127, 135. Foy, iii. 159, 163. Nell. i. 49, 55. Lond. i. 72, 73. Libb. vi. 370, 372.

gunsmiths' shops ransacked for fire-arms, and all French detachments passing through the streets surrounded, and in many cases cut to pieces. Such a tumultuary effort, however, could not long prevail against the discipline and skill of regular soldiers: the Spanish troops were locked up, by orders of their government, in their barracks, and could render no assistance; and though the rapid concentration of the French, when the firing commenced, induced the people for a time to imagine that they had driven them from the capital, yet they were soon, and cruelly, undeceived. Reinforced by the numerous battalions which now poured from all quarters into the city, and supported by the artillery, which on the first alarm had been brought from the Retiro, the French returned to the charge: repeated discharges of grape cleared the streets of Aleala and San Geronymo, while the Polish lancers and Mamelukes of the Imperial Guard followed up the advantage, charged repeatedly through the flying masses, and took a bloody revenge for the death of their comrades. Meanwhile the Spanish troops, agitated by the sound of the tumult and discharges of artillery, but without any orders how to act, were uncertain what to do, when they were decided by an attack of the French on one of their barracks. Determined by this hostile act, the artillerymen drew out their guns, and placing themselves in front of the people, who had retreated to them for support, fired several rounds with fatal effect into the French columns, which were approaching. By a sudden rush, however, the guns were carried, and a great part of the artillerymen bayoneted, among whom were the brave Daoiz and Velarde: illustrious as the first distinguished men who fell in the Peninsular war (1). At two o'clock in the afternoon the insurrection was suppressed at all points, and the troops on both sides had returned to their barracks:—on the side of the French three hundred had fallen: on that of the Spaniards not quite so many.

Barbarous
massacres
subse-
quently
committed
by Murat. Hitherto neither party could be said to have been to blame: the tumult, however deplorable in its consequences, was evidently the result of a collision unpremeditated on both sides; the measures of Napoléon had rendered unavoidable an ebullition of indignation on the part of the outraged Spanish nation; they had burst forth, and could not complain if they met with the usual fate or hazards of war. In repelling the violence with which they were assailed, the French had not exceeded the bounds of military duty: the Spanish Ministers, especially O'Farrell and Azanga, had thrown themselves into the thickest of the tumult, and earnestly imploring a cessation of the strife, and at the hazard of their own lives, saved great numbers of both nations from destruction. Many deeds of generosity had occurred on both sides, and shed a lustre alike on the French and Spanish character. But at this juncture, after the fighting had ceased and the danger was entirely over, Murat commenced a massacre as unprovoked as it was impolitic, as unjustifiable as it was inhuman. Trusting to the amnesty which had been proclaimed by the chiefs on both sides, the Spaniards had resumed in part their ordinary occupations, or were walking about the streets discussing the events of the day, when great numbers of them were seized by the French soldiers, on the charge of having been engaged in the tumult, hurried before a military commission, and forthwith condemned to be shot. Preparations were immediately made to carry the sentence into execution: the mournful intelligence spread like wildfire through Madrid; and all who missed a relation or friend were seized with the agonizing fear that he was

(1) *Tor.* i. 135, 139. *Nell.* i. 53, 55. *Nap.* i. 23, 24. *South.* i. 310, 315. *Lond.* i. 74. *Thib.* vi. 373, 374. *Foy.* iii. 163, 170.

among the victims of military barbarity. While the people were in this state of anxiety, and when the approach of night was beginning to increase the general consternation, the firing began, and the regular discharge of heavy platoons at the Retiro, in the Prado, the Puerto del Sol, and the church of Senora de la Soledad, told but too plainly that the work of death had begun. The dismal sounds froze every heart with horror : all that had been suffering during the heat of the conflict was as nothing compared to the agonizing feeling of that cold-blooded execution. Nor did the general grief abate when the particulars of the massacre became known : numbers had been put to death, who were merely found in the streets with a knife on their persons and had never been in the conflict at all : all were denied the consolations of religion in their last moments. Tied two by two, they were massacred by repeated discharges of musketry : the murders were continued on the following morning ; and nearly a hundred had perished before, on the earnest intercession of the Spanish ministers, Murat consented to put a stop to the barbarity (1).

Extreme
indignation
which this
massacre
excited in
Spain.

This atrocious massacre was as impolitic as it was unjustifiable. The Spaniards, who took up arms with such desperate, though hopeless courage, to prevent the last remnant of their royal family from being torn away from their capital, were not the subjects of the French crown, nor could they be regarded, either legally or morally, as rebels to its authority. Deprived as they were by the frauds and artifices of the French Emperor of their lawful sovereign, with their capital in the possession of his troops, and their fortresses perfidiously seized by his directions, they had no resource but in national resistance. To treat a nation so situated, when attempting to assert its rights, like rebels against their own government, and put them to death in great numbers after the conflict was over, in cold blood, was so glaring an act of cruelty and injustice as could not fail to excite the unanimous indignation of mankind. Of all people in the world the French had the least right to object to such a popular effort in defence of the national independence, as it was founded on the principle on which their whole resistance to the coalition of the European powers against their Revolution had been founded, and which they had, on numberless occasions, held up to the admiration and imitation of mankind. The indignation, accordingly, which this massacre excited throughout Spain was indescribable. With a rapidity that never could have been anticipated, in a country where so little internal communication existed, the intelligence flew from city to city, from province to province, and awakened that universal and energetic feeling of national resentment, which, if properly directed, is a certain forerunner of great achievements. With a spirit, hitherto unknown

(1) Foy, iii. 171, 172. Thib. vi. 374, 375. Tor. i. 141, 142. Lond. i. 74. South. i. 316, 317. Nap. i. 24, 25.

"Among those who were shot were many who had never been engaged in the conflict, and whose only crime consisted in being found on the streets with large knives or cutting instruments upon their persons. They were put to death without the assistance of a priest to console their last moments—a circumstance which in that religious country added to the horror which the executions excited."—Foy, iii. 172. The honesty and candour of General Foy are as admirable as his talent and eloquence.

"At the distance of twenty years," says an eyewitness, the Spanish historian, "our hair still stands on end at the recollection of that mournful and silent night ; the calm of which was only interrupted by the cries of the unhappy victims, or the

sound of the cannon and musketry discharged at intervals for their destruction. The inhabitants all retired to their homes, deplored the cruel fate which was then befalling a parent, a brother, a child. We, in our family, were bewailing the loss of the unhappy Oviedo, whose release we had been unable to obtain, when he entered pale and trembling into the house. He had been saved by the generosity of a French officer, after his hands were bound, and he was drawn up for execution in the court of the Retiro, who was melted by the energy of his address in that awful moment to break his bands, and set him at liberty. He was hardly out of the limits of the palace when he heard the discharges which terminated the agony of his companion in misfortune. Among the victims were many priests, old men, and persons of the most respectable character."—Toreno, i. 142, 143.

in Europe since the commencement of the first triumph of the French revolutionary armies, the people in all the provinces, without any concert amongst each other, or any direction from the existing authorities, began to assemble and concert measures for the national defence. Far from being intimidated by the possession of their capital and principal fortresses by the enemy, they were only the more roused by the sight of such advantages in the hands of a perfidious foe, to the more vigorous exertions to dispossess him. The movement was not that of faction or party, it animated alike men of all ranks, classes, and professions. The flame spread equally in the lonely mountains as in the crowded cities; among the hardy labourers of the Basque Provinces as the light hearted peasantry of the Andalusian slopes; amidst the pastoral valleys of Asturias or the rich fields of Valencia, as in the crowded emporiums of Barcelona and Cadiz. The movement was universal, unpremeditated, simultaneous; and within a week after the untoward tidings reached Bayonne, Napoléon was already engaged in a struggle which promised to be of the most sanguinary character with the Spanish people (1).

Ferdinand arrives at Bayonne, and is told he must surrender the crown of Spain.

While the perfidious invasion of Napoléon, and the cruel massacres of Murat, were thus exciting the flames of a national war in the Peninsula, matters were fast approaching to a crisis at Bayonne. Intimidated by the violence of Murat, and no longer able to withstand the commands which he conveyed to them from his Imperial master, the Infants Don Francisco and Don Antonio set out, the day after the tumult at Madrid was quelled, for Bayonne, leaving the capital without any native government, entirely at the mercy of the French generals. Before they could arrive at the place of their destination, however, matters had arrived at a crisis between Napoléon and the royal family of Spain. No sooner

April 20.

had Ferdinand taken the fatal step of crossing the Bidassoa, and throwing himself upon the generosity of the French Emperor, than he perceived, in the manner in which he was received, such symptoms as inspired the most serious disquietude as to his future fate. The customary marks of respect to a crowned head were wanting; the French authorities addressed him only by the title of "Your Royal Highness," instead of "Your Majesty." His first reception at Bayonne, however, was calculated to dispel these sinister presentiments. Shortly after his arrival there, the Emperor came in person on horseback, attended by a brilliant staff, to pay him a visit; Ferdinand went to the end of the street to meet him; the Emperor embraced him round the neck, and, though he never used the word Majesty, yet treated him with such distinction as inspired the most flattering hopes. On the same day he went to dine at the chateau of Marae, where the Imperial headquarters were established; Napoléon sent his own carriages to bring him and his suite to his palace, where he was received by the Emperor himself, at the foot of the staircase, a piece of attention never paid by sovereigns except to crowned heads. During the entertainment the attention of the Emperor to his guest was unbounded; and although he still eluded the decisive word "Majesty," yet his manner was such as to inspire both Ferdinand and his attendants with the belief that he was their decided friend, and that every difficulty would speedily be adjusted. But this pleasing illusion was of short duration. After sitting a short time at table, Ferdinand returned to his hotel, while Escoiquiz remained, by special desire, to have a private conference with Napoléon. A few minutes after he arrived there, the Spanish King was followed by Savary, who announced, on the part of the Emperor, that his resolution was irre-

(1) South, i. 334, 336. Lud. i. 74, 76. Tor. iii. 173, 175. Foy, i. 189, 192. Thib. vi. 411, 414.

vocably taken, that Ferdinand must instantly resign the throne both of Spain and of the Indies, in both of which the family of the Bourbons was to be succeeded by a prince of the Napoléon dynasty. Should he agree amicably to these conditions, hopes were held out that he might obtain the Grand Duchy of Tuscany as an indemnity. It is remarkable that Napoléon should have chosen for the time of this stunning announcement the very moment when Ferdinand had returned from his gracious reception at the Imperial residence; and for the person to convey it the very officer who had been dispatched by himself to Madrid to induce him to advance to Bayonne to meet him, and who had offered to pledge his head, not five days before, that the moment he arrived there the Prince of Asturias would be recognised as King of Spain (1).

Subsequent
negotiation
between his
counsellors
and Napoléon.

This terrible announcement fell with the more force upon Ferdinand and his counsellors, that they were entirely unprepared for it; the assurances held out by Savary and the letters of Napoléon having inspired them with the belief, that all that was wanting to a satisfactory adjustment of affairs was, that Ferdinand should show so much deference to Napoléon as to proceed to Bayonne to meet him. Neither the prince nor his council, however, were overwhelmed by the extraordinary disclosure. Without absolutely committing themselves at first to any decided proposition, they continued the negotiation for nearly a week afterwards, both by means of Cevallos and Escoiquiz, who had frequent interviews with Napoléon in person, and Champagny, who had now succeeded Talleyrand as his minister for Foreign Affairs. These conferences, however, came to nothing. On the part of Napoléon and his Ministers it was strongly urged that the interest, not merely of France, but of Spain, imperatively required that the two monarchies should be placed under dynasties belonging to the same family; that Napoléon could not submit any more than Louis XIV to have a dubious ally or hidden enemy in his rear while engaged with the forces of Europe in front; that the secret hostility of Spain had been clearly evinced by the ill-timed proclamation of the Prince of Peace immediately before the battle of Jena; that the numberless corruptions and abuses of the Spanish internal administration loudly called for an immediate remedy, and that could never be applied with safety by any other authority but that great conqueror who, educated amidst the storms and enlightened by the experience of the Revolution, was now the master of such irresistible power as to be able to give to other states the benefits of liberal institutions suited to the spirit of the age, without the risk of those convulsions which had obliterated so many of their beneficial effects in his own country. It was replied to these specious arguments, which came with additional weight from the mouth of the Emperor, by Cevallos and Escoiquiz, that it was as impolitic as unjust to compel a sovereign who had left his own dominions to throw himself upon the honour of another, and that too at the special request of that other, to renounce the throne which had descended to him from his ancestors; that if any thing was deemed illegal in the resignation of Charles IV at Aranjuez, that might be a good reason for restoring the throne to the deposed monarch, but could be none for transferring it to the French Emperor; that the effort, however, now made to obtain a renunciation of the crown from Ferdinand evidently showed that the transaction was regarded as legal, and that the title to dispose of the crown was vested in its present holder; that the expedience of a close alliance

(1) Cev. 33, 37. Escoiq. 56, 60. Tor. i. 146, 147. Thib. vi. 356, 357. Foy, iii. 151, 152. South. i. 260, 262.

between France and Spain was indeed indisputable for both monarchies, but that France had already enjoyed it ever since the peace of Basle, and the way to secure it in future was instantly to recognise the Prince of Asturias, whereby both the monarch and his subjects would be bound by such important obligations as would render the future union between the two monarchies indissoluble; whereas, by wresting from him his sceptre, the most imminent risk would be run of exciting a national war in the Peninsula, and giving the English an advantageous base from which to direct their military efforts against Napoléon, besides the certainty of separating the Transatlantic colonies from the mother country, and throwing those vast and rising states, with their important treasures and commerce, into the arms of the inveterate enemy of the French empire. To this last argument, the justice of which could not be denied, Napoléon replied, that he was well aware of that danger, but that he had provided against it by having sent out frigates to the South American states, who were prepared to receive with thankfulness their transfer to a Prince of the Napoléon dynasty. These conferences, as might have been expected, led to no result; at a secret meeting of the counsellors of Ferdinand,

April 24. held at midnight, it was resolved to decline the propositions of the French Emperor, and demand passports for their immediate return to Spain, which was accordingly done next day. Napoléon was highly indignant at this resistance to his wishes, and refused the passports, under the pretence that till the Aranjuez affair was cleared up he could neither issue passports to Ferdinand as King of Spain, nor permit him to depart from a situation where he was liable to answer for his conduct to his justly offended parent. At the

April 26. same time a decisive report was presented by Champagny to the Emperor, which was, of course, the echo merely of his private instructions. This state paper set out with his favourite maxim, that "*what state policy required, justice authorized*;" that the interests of France and Spain indispensably called for identity both in the dynasty who governed, and the institutions which prevailed among them; that to recognise the Prince of Asturias was to surrender Spain to the enemies of France, and deliver it over to English usurpation; to restore Charles IV was to renew the reign of imbecility and corruption, and occasion a boundless effusion both of French and Spanish blood; no alternative remained, therefore, but for Napoléon to dispossess them both, and establish in Spain a Prince of his own family, with institutions analogous to those of the French empire (1).

Napoléon was greatly perplexed at the steady refusal of Ferdinand to surrender the throne. He had not calculated upon such firmness in any Prince of the House of Bourbon. Not that he had the slightest hesitation of persisting in his original plan of entirely dethroning that family, but that he attached the greatest weight to the acquisition of a legal title to their possessions. No man knew better that, although force may subjugate the physical strength, a sense of legal right is generally necessary to win the moral consent of nations; and although Spain seemed prostrated with its fortresses and capital in his possession, yet he deemed his acquisitions insecure till he had obtained, in form at least, the consent of the legal inheritors of its throne. Hoping, therefore, to succeed better with the father than he had done with the son, he reiterated his directions to Murat to send on Charles IV and the Queen to Bayonne as quickly as possible; and in the mean while, in private conferences with Escoiquiz, unfolded, with

Napoléon
sends for
Charles IV
and has a
private con-
ference with
Escoiquiz.

(1) Moniteur, 7th Sept. 1808. Thib. vi. 356, 359, Cev. 35, 48. Escoiq. 26, 62. Sav. iii. 168, 172. Tor. i. 148, 150 Foy, iii. 152.

unreserved confidence, from the very commencement, his views upon the Spanish Peninsula. They took their rise, he stated, from the proclamation of the Prince of Peace on the eve of the battle of Jena. Ever since that important revelation, he had been able to see nothing in the Spanish government but secret enemies veiled under the mask of friendship; the proposed marriage of the Prince of Asturias to a relation of his own appeared but a feeble bond to hold together nations now actuated by hostile sentiments; he proposed to give to the Prince of Asturias an indemnity in Portugal or Tuscany, and to place one of his brothers on the Spanish throne. He had now divulged to him, and him alone, the whole of his designs in regard to the Peninsula. The conversation in which the determinations were expressed by the Emperor is given at full length by Escoiquiz, and is one of the most precious historical documents of his reign (1). Though doubtless extended and amplified by the Spanish counsellor, it bears all the marks of his original thought; and Thibeaudeau, whom long acquaintance with the Emperor in the Council of State had rendered the best possible judge both of his ideas and expressions, has declared that it "bears the signet mark of truth (2)."

(1) Thib. vi. 357, 358. Tor. i. 148, 149 Escoiq. 57, 59.

Its most striking passages. (2) "I have long desired, Monsieur Escoiquiz," said the Emperor, "to speak to you on the affairs of the Peninsula, with the frankness which your talents and your office with the Prince of Asturias deserve. I cannot, in any situation, refuse to interest myself in the fate of the unhappy King who has thrown himself on my protection. The abdication of Charles IV at Aranjuez, in the midst of seditious guards and a revolted people, was clearly a compulsory act. My troops were then in Spain; some of them were stationed near the court; appearances authorized the belief that I had some share in that act of violence, and my honour requires that I should take immediate steps to dissipate such a suspicion. I cannot recognise, therefore, the abdication of Charles IV till that monarch, who has transmitted to me a secret protest against it, shall have voluntarily confirmed it by a voluntary deed when freed from restraint.

"I would say farther, that the interests of my empire require that the House of Bourbon, the implacable enemy of mine, should lose the throne of Spain, and the interests of your nation equally call for the same change. The new dynasty which I shall introduce will give it a good constitution, and by its strict alliance with France preserve Spain from any danger on the side of that power, which is alone in a situation seriously to menace its independence. Charles IV is willing to cede to me his rights, and those of his family, persuaded that his sons, the Infants, are incapable of governing the kingdom in the difficult times which are evidently approaching.

"These then are the reasons which have decided me to prevent the dynasty of the Bourbons from reigning any longer in Spain. But I esteem Ferdinand, who has come with so much loyalty to throw himself into my power, and I am anxious to give him some indemnity for the sacrifices which he will be required to make. Propose to him, therefore, to renounce the crown of Spain for himself and his descendants, and I will give him in exchange Etruria, with the title of king, as well as my niece in marriage. If he refuses these conditions, I will come to an understanding with his father, and neither he nor his brother shall receive any indemnity. If, on the other hand, he does what I desire, Spain shall preserve its independence, its laws, usages, and religion. I do not desire a village of Spain for myself."

Escoiquiz then endeavoured in vain to combat the Emperor's reasons for holding the matter at Aranjuez as constrained. He then added, "but suppose it were not so, can you deny that the interests of my house require that the Bourbons should cease to reign in Spain? Even if you are right in all that you say, I should answer—bad policy." Having said these words, he took Escoiquiz by the ear, which he pulled in good humour. "Come, Canon, you are amusing me with real *châteaux en Espagne*. Do you really think that while the Bourbons remain on the throne at Madrid, I could ever have the security which I would have, if they were replaced by a branch of my family? The latter, it is true, might have some disputes with me or my descendants; but so far from wishing, like a Bourbon, the ruin of my house, they would cling to it in moments of danger, as the only support of their own throne.

"It is in vain to speak to me of the difficulties of the enterprise. I have nothing to apprehend from the only power who could disquiet me in it. The Emperor of Russia, to whom I communicated my designs at Tilsit, which were formed at that period, approved of them, and gave me his word of honour he would offer no resistance. The other powers of Europe will remain quiet, and the resistance of the Spaniards themselves cannot be formidable. The rich will endeavour to appease the people, instead of exciting them, for fear of losing their own possessions. I will render the monks responsible for any disorder, and that will lead them to employ their influence, which you know is considerable, in suppressing any popular movements. Believe me, Canon, I have much experience in these matters; the countries where the monks are numerous, are easily subjugated; and that will take place in Spain, especially when the Spaniards shall see that I am providing for the national independence and benefit of the country, giving them a liberal constitution, and at the same time maintaining their religion and usages. Even if the people were to rise in a mass, I would succeed in conquering them, by sacrificing 200,000 men. I am not blind to the risk of a separation of the colonies; but do not suppose I have been slumbering even on that point. I have long kept up secret communications with Spanish America, and I have lately sent frigates there to obtain certain advices as to what I may expect; and I have every reason to believe that the intelligence which I will receive, will prove of the most favourable description."—Escoiquiz, 107, 135; *Pièces just.*

The arrival of Charles IV solves the difficulty. His reception by Napoléon. April 25.

From this embarrassment, however, Napoléon was soon relieved by the arrival of Charles IV and the Queen at Bayonne. Such was the impatience of the Royal travellers to arrive at the place of their destination, that they wrote from Aranda to Napoléon to inform him of their approach, and testify their anxiety to throw themselves entirely upon his protection. So sensible were the counsellors of Ferdinand of the advantage which the French Emperor would derive from the presence of the late monarch, that they were no sooner informed of his approach than they again earnestly solicited passports for Ferdinand to return to Spain, which was refused; and it was soon apparent, from the movements

of the police, that he was detained a prisoner in his own hotel. On the 29th there appeared in the Bayonne Gazette the protest of Charles IV against his abdication, and his letter of 25d March to Napoléon: publications which sufficiently evinced the tenor of the reception which he was to experience.

On the following day the late King and Queen entered Bayonne; ever since passing Burgos they had been received with royal honours; at the Bidassoa they were received by Berthier with great pomp; and at the gates of Bayonne by the whole garrison under arms. Soon after their arrival at the hotel, Napoléon came to visit them in person. The old King met him at the foot of the stair, and threw himself into his arms; Napoléon whispered in his ear, "you will find me always as you have done, *your best and firmest friend*." Napoléon supported him under the arm as he returned to the apartments. "See, Louisa," said the old King, "he is carrying me." Never had the Emperor's manner appeared more gracious; never did he more completely impose, by the apparent sincerity of his kindness, upon the future victims of his perfidy (1).

Ferdinand is forced to resign the crown.

Immediately after the arrival of Charles IV Napoléon had a private conference with him, the Queen, and the Prince of Peace, in which it was resolved, by the united authority of the Emperor and old King, to compel Ferdinand to resign the throne. He rightly judged that, having once overcome that difficulty, it would be a comparatively easy matter to extract the resignation of the crown from the old King when reinstated

in his rights. Ferdinand accordingly was sent for next day, and the moment he came into the room, Charles IV commanded him to deliver to him, before six o'clock on the following morning, a simple and unqualified resignation of the crown, signed by himself and all his brothers. In case of refusal, it was distinctly intimated that he and all his counsellors would be proceeded against as traitors. Napoléon strongly supported the old King, and concluded with ominous menaces in the event of refusal. Ferdinand endeavoured to speak in his own defence, but he was interrupted by the King, who commanded him to be silent, and the Queen soon after broke into the apartment, with such violent and passionate expressions, that Ferdinand found it impossible to make a word be heard. He retired from the conference overwhelmed with consternation and despair. Similar threats of instant death were conveyed on the same evening by Duroc to the Infants Don Carlos and Don Antonio; and such was the impression produced by these menaces, that it was determined by the counsellors of Ferdinand that no alternative remained but immediate submission. A conditional resignation was accordingly written out and signed by them all on the following day, in which Ferdinand renounced the crown, on condition that he and his father should both return to Madrid, where the Cortes should be assem-

May 1.

bled; and that if Charles declined to return to Spain to govern himself, he should govern the kingdom in his father's name and as his lieutenant (1).

Ferdinand still refuses to agree to an unconditional resignation.

This qualified resignation, however, in which the Prince of Asturias still announced his intention of returning to Madrid as his father's lieutenant, and resuming there, in his name, the royal functions, was far from meeting the views of Napoléon, who was irrevocably set upon obtaining from the young King such an unconditional surrender of his rights as might leave the throne vacant for a Prince of his own family. He wrote, therefore, a letter, which was signed by Charles IV and passed for his own production, though the depth of its thought and the energy of its expression clearly indicated the Imperial hand (2). Ferdinand, however, was still unmoved, and replied, two days afterwards, in a letter, in which he vindicated his own conduct, and expressed his astonishment at the colour now put upon the Aranjuez resignation, which had not only been uniformly represented by Charles IV as a voluntary act, but avowedly contemplated for a long time before it took place (3). This continued refusal on Ferdinand's part added extremely to the embarrassments of Napoléon, and he was at a loss to perceive any mode by which he could attain his favourite object of gaining possession of the throne of Spain, with the semblance of a conveyance from the legal owner (4).

Napoléon obtains an unconditional surrender of the throne from Charles IV.
May 5.

More successful with the father than the son, Napoléon had already obtained from Charles IV an unqualified resignation of all his rights to the throne of Spain. A treaty to this effect, agreed to on the 4th and signed on the 5th of May, by Duroc on the part of Napoléon, and the Prince of Peace, in virtue of special powers from their respective masters, contained an unqualified resignation of the crown of Spain, not only for himself and Ferdinand, but all his successors, and a transference of it in absolute sovereignty to the Emperor Napoléon. The only provisions in favour of Spain were, that the integrity of the kingdom should be

(1) *Cev.* 50, 51. *Escoiq.* 64, 65. *Tor.* i. 151, 152. *Thib.* vi. 365, 367.

His letter to (2) "What has been your conduct?" his son. the old King was made to say; "you have spread sedition through my whole palace; you have excited my very body-guards against me; your own father became your prisoner; my first Minister, whom I had raised and adopted into my own family, was dragged, covered with blood, into a dungeon; you have withered my grey hairs and despoiled them of a crown borne with glory by my fathers, and which I have preserved without stain; you have seated yourself on my throne; you have made yourself the instrument of the mob of Madrid, whom your partisans had excited, and of the foreign troops, who at the same moment were making their entry. Old, and broken down with infirmities, I was unable to bear this new disgrace; I had recourse to the Emperor, not as a King at the head of his troops and surrounded by the pomp of a throne, but as a fugitive abandoned monarch, broken down by misfortune. I have found protection and refuge in the midst of his camp; I owe him my own life, that of the Queen, and that of my prime Minister; he is acquainted with all the outrages I have experienced, all the violence I have undergone; he has declared to me that he will never recognise you as King. In tearing from me the crown, it is your own which you have broken; your conduct towards me, your letters, which evince your hatred towards France, have put a wall of brass between you and the throne of Spain. I am King by right of descent, my abdication was the result of force and violence. I can admit the validity of no acts resulting from the as-

sembly of armed mobs; every thing should be done for the people, nothing by them. Hitherto I have reigned for the people's good, hereafter I shall still act with the same object; when I am once assured that the religion of Spain, its independence, integrity, and institutions are secured, I shall descend to the grave, imploring pardon for you for 'the bitterness of my last days.' I can agree to no assembly of the Cortes; that is a new idea of the inexperienced persons who surround you."—*Letter, CHARLES IV to FERDINAND, 2d May, 1808.*

Unquestionably it was neither Charles IV nor the Prince of Peace who penned these vigorous lines. It is curious to observe the sentiment, "every thing for the people, nothing by them," in the mouth of the military champion of the Revolution.

(3) Ferdinand in this letter made the just observation, "that the perpetual exclusion of his dynasty from the throne of Spain could not be effected without the consent of all those who either had or might acquire rights to its succession, nor without the formal consent of the Spanish nation assembled in Cortes, in a situation freed from all restraint, and that any resignation now made would be null, from the obvious restraint under which it was executed."—*FERDINAND to CHARLES IV, 4th May, 1808; TORRENO, vol. i. App. No. 9.* Already the opposing parties had changed sides; Napoléon, the hero of the Revolution, would consent to no assembling of the Cortes; Ferdinand, the heir of the despotic house of Bourbon, appealed for support to that national assembly.

(4) *Tor.* i. 152, 153. *Thib.* vi. 368, 369. *Cev.* 50, 51. *Escoiq.* 64, 65.

preserved; that its limits should be unchanged by the Prince whom Napoléon might place on the throne; that the Catholic religion should be maintained, and no reformed religion tolerated—the palace of Compeigne was to be assigned to the King, the Queen, and the Prince of Peace, during the lifetime of the former, with a pension of thirty millions of reals. At the same time an annuity of 400,000 francs was provided for each of the royal infants of Spain. The only point in this treaty upon which there was any serious discussion was the matter of the pensions; the surrender of the monarchy was agreed to without hesitation by the imbecile old King and his pusillanimous Minister. Thus had Charles IV the disgrace of terminating his domestic dissensions by the surrender of his throne and the liberties of his people into the hands of a stranger; and the Prince of Peace the infamy of affixing his name, as the last act of his ministerial existence, to a deed which deprived his sovereign and benefactor of his crown, and for ever disinherited his descendants (1).

Secret instructions of Ferdinand to the regency at Madrid. On the same day on which this treaty was signed, a secret deputation reached Ferdinand from the provisional government at Madrid, consisting of Layas, aide-de-camp to the Minister of War, and Castro, Under Secretary of State. They came to demand instructions chiefly on the points—whether they were at liberty to shift their place of deliberation, as they were subjected to the control of the French army in the capital; whether they should declare war against France, and endeavour to prevent the further entrance of troops into the Peninsula; and whether, in the event of his return being prevented, they should assemble the Cortes. Ferdinand replied, that he was deprived of his liberty, and in consequence unable to take any steps in order to save either himself or the monarchy; that he therefore authorized the junta of government to add new members to their number, to remove whoever they thought proper, and to exercise all the functions of sovereignty; that they should stop the entrance of fresh troops, and commence hostilities the moment that he was removed into the interior of France, a step to which he never would consent till forced to it by violence; that the Cortes should be convoked, in the first instance, to take measures for the defence of the kingdom, and then for such ulterior objects as might require consideration. The decrees necessary to carry these instructions into effect were soon after brought to Madrid by an officer destined for distinguished celebrity in future times, DON JOSEPH PALAFOX (2).

The intelligence of the events at Madrid on 2d May compels a resignation of the throne from Ferdinand. From the embarrassment arising from the continued resistance of Ferdinand to make the resignation required of him, Napoléon was at length relieved by the receipt of intelligence of the bloody commotion at Madrid, which at once brought to a crisis the affairs of the Peninsula. He received the news of that calamitous event as he was riding out to Bayonne, at five o'clock in the afternoon of

(1) Tor. i. 404. App. No. 11. Cev. 134, 136.

Charles IV was not destitute of good qualities, but he was a weak incapable Prince, totally unfit to hold the reins of power during the difficult times which followed the French Revolution. He himself gave the following account to Napoléon of his mode of life at their first dinner together at Bayonne. "Every day," said he, "winter as well as summer, I went out to shoot from the morning till noon; I then dined, and returned to the chase, which I continued till sunset. Manuel Godoy then gave me a brief account of what was going on, and I went to bed to recommence the same life on the morrow, if not prevented by some important solemnity." Such had been his habits for twenty years, and those, too, the most critical for the Spanish monarchy. Notwithstanding all this, however, he would have

passed for a respectable prince in ordinary times, and but for the pernicious influence of his wife; for he was gifted with an admirable memory, and quick parts, and considerable powers of occasional application, and had throughout that humanity and love of justice which are the most valuable qualities in a sovereign. But his indolence and negligence of public affairs ruined every thing in the monarchy, by throwing the whole direction of affairs into the hands of the Queen and the Prince of Peace, whose infamous connexion, dissolute habits, and unbounded corruption, both degraded the character and paralysed the resources of the nation.—TODD, i. 155, 156.

(2) Tibb. vi. 377, 378. South. i. 322, 323. Cev. 56, 58. Tor. i. 152, 153.

the 5th of May, and immediately returned to his chateau, where he sent for Charles IV, the Queen, Ferdinand, and the Prince of Peace. The Prince of Asturias was assailed by Charles IV and the Queen with such a torrent of abuse, that Cevallos, who was present on the occasion, has declared that he cannot prevail on himself to transcribe it. Napoléon joined in the general vituperation, and the sternness of his manner, and vehemence of his expressions, at once showed that the period had now arrived when submission had become a matter of necessity. He spoke of the outraged honour of the French armies; of the blood of his soldiers, which called aloud for vengeance; of a war of extermination, which he would wage to vindicate his authority (1). He concluded with the ominous words,—“Prince, you must choose betwixt cession and death.” Similar menaces were conveyed by Duroc to the Infants Carlos and Don Antonio, and other members of the royal family. Sensible now that any farther resistance might not only, without any benefit, endanger his own life, but possibly draw after it the destruction of the Royal family,

May 6. Ferdinand resolved upon submission. On the following morning, he addressed a letter to his father, in which he announced his intention of

May 10. unqualified obedience; and four days afterwards a treaty was signed, by which he adhered to the resignation by his father of the Spanish crown, and acquired in return the title of Most Serene Highness, with the palace, park, and farms of Navarre, with fifty thousand arpents of woods connected therewith, and an annuity of 600,000 francs a-year, from the French Treasury. The same rank, with an annuity of 400,000 francs, was allotted to

May 12. the Infants Don Carlos and Antonio. As soon as this treaty was signed, Ferdinand and his brothers were removed to Bourdeaux, where these two princes signed a renunciation of their rights to the throne, and Ferdinand was made to affix his name to a proclamation, in which he counselled submission and peace to the Spanish people. The three royal captives were shortly after, removed to Valençay, the seat of Talleyrand, in the heart of France, where they continued during the remainder of the war. No indemnity whatever was provided for the Queen of Etruria or her son, who, compelled by Napoléon in the outset of these transactions to renounce the crown of Tuscany, had been subsequently amused by the elusory promise of a throne in Lusitania, and was now sent a destitute captive into the interior of France (2).

Napoléon makes Joseph King of Spain, and convokes an Assembly of Notables.

Having now succeeded in his main object of dispossessing the Bourbon family, and obtaining a semblance of legal title from the ejected owners to the Spanish throne, Napoléon was not long of bringing his other arrangements regarding the Peninsula to an issue. The refusal of his brother Louis to accept the throne had

(1) Napoléon on this occasion made it a special subject of reproach to Ferdinand, “that by flattering the opinion of the multitude, and forgetting the sacred respect due to authority, he had lighted the conflagration now ready to devour the Peninsula.”—*Foy*, iii. 177.

(2) *Cev.* 51, 52, 133, 140. *Eseniq.* 64, 65. *Thib.* vi. 380, 384. *Tor.* i. 156, 157, 159. *Foy*, iii. 177.

Napoléon's own account of the Bayonne affair is in all substantial points the same as that above given. “Ferdinand offered, on his own account, to govern entirely at my devotion, as much so as the Prince of Peace had done in the name of Charles IV; and I must admit that if I had fallen into their views, I would have acted much more prudently than I have actually done. When I had them all assembled at Bayonne, I found myself in command of

much more than I could have ventured to hope for, the same occurred there, as in many other events of my life, which have been ascribed to my policy; but in fact were owing to my good fortune. Here I found the Gordian knot before me; I cut it. I proposed to Charles IV and the Queen that they should cede to me their rights to the throne. They at once agreed to it, I had almost said voluntarily; so deeply were their hearts ulcerated towards their son, and so desirous had they and their favourite now become of security and repose. The Prince of Asturias did not make any extraordinary resistance: neither violence nor menaces were employed against him; and if fear decided him, which I well believe was the case, it concerns him alone.”—*LAS CASAS*, iv. 210, 211.

induced him to cast his eyes to Joseph, King of Naples, an arrangement which, besides providing a sovereign, who, it was hoped, would prove entirely submissive to the views of the Emperor in that important situation, was attended with the additional advantage of opening a throne for Murat, who, after holding the almost regal state of Lieutenant of the Emperor at Madrid, could hardly be expected to descend to any inferior station. To preserve appearances, however, it was deemed advisable that the semblance of popular election

May 8. tion should be kept up; and with that view, the moment that the Emperor had obtained the consent of Ferdinand to his resignation, he dispatched instructions to Murat, to obtain a petition from the junta of government and the principal public bodies of Madrid for the conferring of the throne upon the King of Naples. At the same time, to supply any

May 4. interim defects of title which might be thought to exist in the Emperor's Lieutenant to act in Spain in civil concerns, a decree was signed by Charles IV on the very day of his renunciation, and transmitted to Madrid, where it arrived

May 7. three days afterwards, which conferred on Murat the title of Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom with the presidency of the junta of government, which in effect put that important body, now reduced merely to the official ministers, entirely at his disposal. This nomination was accompanied by a proclamation of the old King, drawn by Godoy, in which he counselled his former subjects, "that they had no chance of safety or prosperity for the Spaniards, but in the friendship of the Emperor his ally." This was followed by another, the work of Escoiquiz, from the Prince of Asturias,

May 12. from Bourdeaux on the 12th; in which he also advised his countrymen "to remain tranquil, and to look for their happiness only in the wise disposition and power of Napoléon." It may easily be believed how readily Murat exerted himself, to pave the way for that elevation of Joseph which promised so immediately to promote his own advantage. The most energetic measures were immediately adopted to obtain at Madrid declarations in favour of the new dynasty: and the leading authorities, perplexed and bewildered at the unparalleled situation in which they were placed, and the earnest exhortation to submission which they received from their lawful sovereign, were without difficulty won over to the interest of the rising

May 12. dynasty. The Junta of government, indeed, at first protested against the abdication at Bayonne, and refused to connect themselves in any way with these proceedings: but they were soon given to understand that their lives would be endangered if they continued to uphold the rebel authority of the Prince of Asturias, and at the same time the most flattering prospects were held out to them if they took the lead in recognising the new and inevitable order of things. These artifices proved successful, and the Junta, satisfied with protesting that they in no way recognised the acts of Charles IV

May 13. and Ferdinand, and that the designation of a new monarch should in no ways prejudice their rights or those of their successors, concluded with the resolution that the Emperor's choice should fall on his elder brother the King of Naples. The municipality of Madrid also presented a petition to

May 25. the same effect; and Napoléon, satisfied with having thus obtained the colour of public consent to his usurpation, issued a proclamation con-
voking an assembly of one hundred and fifty Notables to meet at Bayonne on

June 6. the 15th June following. Joseph, who had no choice but submission, quitted with regret the peaceful and smiling shores of Campania (1), set

(1) Thib. vi. 388, 392. Tor. i. 161, 168. Foy, iii. 181, 185. Nell. 84, 92. South. i. 325, 332.

out for his new kingdom, and arrived at Bayonne on the 6th June, where he was magnificently received by Napoléon, and on the same day proclaimed King of Spain and the Indies (1).

Reflections
on the un-
paralleled
chain of
fraud and
perfidy by
which this
was accom-
plished.

Such is a detailed account of the artifices by which Napoléon succeeded in wresting the crowns of Spain and Portugal from their lawful possessors, and placing the first on the head of one of his own brothers, while the second remained at his disposal for the gratification of one of his military lieutenants. Not a shot was fired, not a sword was drawn to effect the vast transfer; the object for which Louis XIV unsuccessfully struggled during fourteen years was gained in six months; present fraud, the terrors of past victory, had done the work of years of conquest. But these extraordinary successes were stained by as great vices; and perhaps in the whole annals of the world, blackened as they are by deeds of wickedness, there is not to be found a more atrocious system of perfidy, fraud, and dissimulation than that by which Napoléon won the kingdoms of the Spanish Peninsula. He first marched off the flower of its troops into the north of Germany, and by professions of amity and friendship lulled asleep any hostile suspicions which the cabinet of Madrid might have conceived; and then entered into an agreement with Alexander for the dethronement of its sovereigns, and bought the consent of Russia to that spoliation of the faithful allies of ten years' duration, by surrendering to its ambition the more recent confederates which he had roused into hostility on the banks of the Danube, during the desperate struggle of the last six months. He then concluded a treaty with Spain at Fontainebleau, in which he purchased the consent of that power to the partition of his ally Portugal, by promising to the court of Madrid a share of its spoils, and to its minister a princely sovereignty carved out of its dominions; and in return for this forbearance solemnly guaranteed all its possessions. Hardly was the ink of this treaty dry, when he directed his armies across the Pyrenees in such force as to evince an intention not merely of appropriating to himself the whole dominions of his old tributary dependent Portugal, but of seizing upon at least the northern provinces of Spain, while the remaining forces of that monarchy were dissipated in the south and north of Portugal in search of elusory acquisitions at the expense of the cabinet of Lisbon. The sentence, at the same time, goes forth at the Tuileries, "the house of Braganza has ceased to reign," and the Royal family at Lisbon are driven into exile to Brazil; while the Queen of Etruria is obliged to resign the throne of Tuscany, on a promise of an indemnity on the northern provinces of Portugal. Scarcely, however, is the resignation elicited under this promise obtained, when that promise, too, is broken; the dispossessed Queen,

Napoléon's proclamation to the Spaniards 25th May. (1) On this occasion the Emperor addressed the following proclamation to the Spanish people:—"Spaniards! After a long agony, your nation was on the point of perishing: I saw your miseries, and hastened to apply a remedy. Your grandeur, your power, form an integral part of my own. Your princes have ceded to me their rights to the crown of Spain. I have no wish to reign over your provinces, but I am desirous of acquiring eternal titles to the love and gratitude of your posterity. Your monarchy is old; my mission is to pour into its veins the blood of youth. I will ameliorate all your institutions, and make you enjoy, if you second my efforts, the blessings of reform, without its collisions, its disorders, its convulsions. I have convoked a general assembly of deputations of

your provinces and cities; I am desirous of ascertaining your wants by personal intercourse; I will then lay aside all the titles I have acquired, and place your glorious crown on the head of my second self, after having secured for you a constitution which may establish the sacred and salutary authority of the sovereign, with the liberties and privileges of the people. Spaniards! Reflect on what your fathers were; on what you now are! The fault does not lie in you, but in the constitution by which you have been governed. Conceive the most ardent hopes and confidence in the results of your present situation, for I wish that your latest posterity should preserve the recollection of me and say—he was the regenerator of our country."—THIBAUDEAU, vi 390, 391.

albeit a creation of Napoléon's own, is deprived of her indemnity; the stipulated principality in favour of the Prince of Peace is cast to the winds; and orders were issued to Junot to administer the government of the whole of Portugal in name of the Emperor Napoléon.

His perfidious conduct towards the Spanish Princes.

Meanwhile, the French armies rapidly inundate the northern provinces of the Peninsula; the frontier fortresses are seized, in the midst of profound peace, by a power in alliance with Spain, and which, only four months before, had formally guaranteed the integrity of its dominions; a hundred thousand men overspread the provinces to the north of the Ebro, and approach the capital. These disastrous events excite the public indignation against the ruling monarch and his unworthy favourite; they are overthrown by an urban insurrection, and the Prince of Asturias, by universal consent, is called to the throne. No sooner is he apprised of this event, than Napoléon dispatches Savary to induce the new King to come to Bayonne, under a solemn assurance, both verbally and in writing, that he would at once recognise him, if the affair at Aranjuez was explained; and that in a few minutes every thing would be satisfactorily adjusted. Agitated between terror and hope, Ferdinand, in an evil hour, and when his capital is occupied by French troops, consents to a step which he had scarcely the means of avoiding, and throws himself on the honour of the French monarch. Napoléon, in the interim, sends for Charles IV and the Prince of Peace, and between the terror of his authority and the seductions of his promises, contrives to assemble all the royal family of Spain with their confidential counsellors at Bayonne. No sooner are they arrived than he receives and entertains them in the most hospitable manner, and when they are beginning to indulge the hopes which such flattering conduct was fitted to inspire, suddenly salutes them with the announcement that the House of Bourbon has ceased to reign, and closes this matchless scene of duplicity, fraud, and violence, by extorting, by means of persuasion, menaces, and intimidation, a resignation of the throne from both the father and son, whom he had so recently solemnly bound himself to maintain in their possession! To crown the whole, while alluring, like the serpent, his victims into his power, he is secretly offering their dominions to one of his brothers after another; he is, underhand, holding out promises of support both to the old and the new King of Spain, and he has all the while irrevocably resolved upon the dethronement of both, and the supplanting of the House of Bourbon by that of Bonaparte in both the thrones of the Peninsula. He concludes by sending Charles IV and Ferdinand with all their family into state captivity in the interior of France; discarding Godoy without his stipulated principality; cheating the Queen of Etruria out of her promised indemnity; disinheriting at once the regal families of Spain, Portugal, and Etruria, and placing his own brother on the throne of the Peninsula, in virtue of a determination formed, by his own admission, ever since the treaty of Tilsit!

Ultimate consequences of this perfidious conduct to Napoléon and his house.

Was, then, such atrocious conduct as successful in the end as it was in the commencement? and did the dynasty of Napoléon reap in its final results benefits or injury from acquisitions obtained by so black a course of perfidy? Let the answer be given in his own words—"It was that unhappy war in Spain which ruined me.

The results have irrevocably proved that I was in the wrong. There were serious faults in the execution. One of the greatest was that of having attached so much importance to the dethronement of the Bourbons. Charles IV was worn out; I might have given a liberal constitution to the Spanish nation, and charged Ferdinand with its execution. If he put it in force in good faith,

Spain would have prospered, and put itself in harmony with our new institutions; if he failed in the performance of his engagements, he would have met with his dismissal from the Spaniards themselves. You are about to undertake, said Escoiquiz to me, one of the labours of Hercules, where, if you please, nothing but child's play is to be encountered. The unfortunate war in Spain proved a real wound, *the first cause of the misfortunes of France*. If I could have foreseen that that affair would have caused me so much vexation and chagrin, I would never have engaged in it. *But after the first steps taken in the affair, it was impossible for me to recede*. When I saw those *imbécilles* quarreling and trying to dethrone each other, I thought I might as well take advantage of it to dispossess an inimical family; but I was not the contriver of their disputes. Had I known at the first that the transaction would have given me so much trouble, I would never have attempted it (1)."

Its apparent wisdom, so far as human policy is concerned. The fact thus admitted by Napoléon, and clearly proved by his history, that the Spanish war was the principal cause of his ruin, is one of the most luminous examples which the annals of the world exhibit, of the subjection of human affairs to the direction of an overruling power, which makes the passions and vices of men the instruments of their own punishment. So far as mere wordly policy was concerned, and on the supposition that there were no moral feelings in mankind—feelings which cannot for a length of time be outraged with impunity—there can be no doubt that he judged wisely in attempting, by any means, the extension of his dynasty over the Peninsula. The reasons of state policy which rendered it essential for Louis XIV to face the strength of banded Europe to maintain the family compact in the Peninsula, were still more forcibly applicable to Napoléon, as his dynasty was a revolutionary one, and could not hope to obtain lasting support but from sovereigns who rested on a similar foundation. How then did it happen that a step recommended by so clear a principle of expedience, and attended by the most unhopèd-for success in the first instance, should ultimately have been attended with such disaster?—Simply because it was throughout based on injustice; because it violated the moral feelings of

(1) Las Cas. iv. 204, 205. O'Meara, ii. 167.

The assertion here made, and which was frequently repeated by Napoléon, that he was not the author of the family disputes between Charles IV and Ferdinand, but merely stepped in to dispossess them both, was perfectly well founded, and is quite consistent with all the facts stated in the preceding deduction. It is evident also, that such was the fascination produced by his power and talents, that no difficulty was experienced in getting the Royal family of Spain to throw themselves into his hands; nay, that there was rather a race between the father and son which should first arrive at his headquarters to state their case favourably to that supreme arbiter of their fate. That Savary was sent to Madrid and again back to Vittoria to induce Ferdinand to come to Bayonne, was admitted by himself, [De Pradt, 73.] but he evidently had little difficulty in accomplishing his task. But the real reproach against Napoléon, and from which he has never attempted to exculpate himself, is having first agreed with Alexander at Tilsit to dispossess the House of Braganza and Bourbon; then, to lull asleep the latter power, signed the treaty of Fontainebleau, which guaranteed its dominions; then perfidiously seized its fortresses without a shadow of pretext; and finally taken advantage of the family dissensions to attract both the old King and his son to Bayonne, where they were compelled to abdicate.

Long as the preceding narrative of the causes which led to the Peninsular war has proved, it will not by the intelligent reader be deemed misplaced, when the vital importance of the facts it contains, both to the issue of the contest and the character of Napoléon is taken into view, the more especially as it has hitherto not met with the attention it deserves from English historians. Colonel Napier, in particular, dismisses the whole subject in a few pages; and blames Napoléon, not for attacking Spain, but chiefly, if not entirely, for not attacking it in the interests of democracy. "There are many reasons," says this energetic and eloquent writer, "why Napoléon should have meddled with the interior affairs of Spain; there seems to be no good one for his manner of doing it. His great error was, that he looked only to the Court, and treated the people with contempt. Had he taken care to bring the people and their government into hostile contact first, instead of appearing as the treacherous arbitrator of a domestic quarrel, he would have been hailed as the deliverer of a great people."—NAPIER, i. 22, 23. In energy and fire of military description and ability of scientific disquisition, the gallant colonel is above all praise; but he is far from being equally safe as a guide to political events, or as a judge of the measures of government.

mankind, outraged their national attachments, and roused all classes by the overbearing excitement of the generous emotions into an unreflecting, it may almost be said an instinctive, resistance. In the final success of that resistance, in the memorable retribution which it at last brought on the principal actors in the drama which began with such apparently undeserved success, is to be discerned the clearest proof of the manner in which Providence works out the moral government of the world, and renders the guilt and long-continued success of the wicked, the instruments of their own ultimate and well-deserved punishment. When the Spaniards beheld Napoléon sending their princes into captivity and wresting from them their crown, from themselves their independence; when they saw Murat in triumph drowning the Madrid insurrection in blood, and securely massacring her gallant citizens after the fight was over, they sank and wept in silence, and possibly doubted the reality of the Divine superintendence of human affairs, when such crimes were permitted to bring nothing but increase of power and authority to their perpetrators. But mark the end of these things, and the consequences of these atrocities upon their authors by a series of causes and effects, every one of which now stands forth shining in imperishable light! Napoléon, who then sent an unoffending race of monarchs into captivity, was himself, by its results, driven into a lasting and melancholy exile. France, which then lent its aid to a perfidious and unjust invasion, was itself, from its effects, subjected to a severe and galling subjugation: Murat, who then with impunity massacred the innocent by the mockery of military trial, signed, in the order for their condemnation, the warrant for his own dethronement and execution not seven years afterwards!

The passions of this Revolution the real causes of the disasters both of Europe and France. In authorizing or committing these enormous state crimes, Napoléon and France were in truth acting in conformity to that moral law of the universe, which dooms outrageous vice, whether in nations or individuals, to prepare, in the efforts which it makes for its present gratification or advancement, the means of its ultimate punishment. Napoléon constantly said, and said truly, that he was not to be blamed for the wars which he undertook; that he was driven on by necessity; that he was always placed in the alternative of farther triumphs or immediate ruin; that he was in truth the head of a military republic, which would admit no pause to its dictator in the career of victory (1). There is no one who attentively considers his career, but must admit the justice of these observations, and absolve him individually, in consequence, from much of that obloquy which the spectacle of the dreadful and desolating wars in which he was so powerful an agent, has naturally produced among mankind. But that just indignation at the profuse and unprofitable effusion of blood, which has been erroneously directed by a large and influential class in France to the single head of Napoléon, should not on that account be supposed to be ill-founded;

(1) "Throughout my whole reign," said Napoléon, "I was the keystone of an edifice entirely new, and resting on the most slender foundations. Its duration depended on the issue of each of my battles. If I had been conquered at Marengo, the disastrous times of 1814 and 1815 would immediately have come on. It was the same at Austerlitz, Jena, and other fields. The vulgar accuse my ambition of all these wars; but they, in truth, arose from the nature of things, and that constant struggle of the past and the present, which placed me continually in the alternative of conquering, under pain of being beaten down. *I was never, in truth, master of my own*

movements; I was never at my own disposal. At the commencement of my elevation, during the Consulate, my partisans frequently asked me, with the best intentions, whither I was tending, and I constantly answered with perfect sincerity, I did not know. They were astonished, but I said no more than the simple truth. My ambition, I admit, was great, but it was of a frigid nature, and caused by the opinion of the masses. During all my reign, the supreme direction of affairs really lay with the people; in fact, the Imperial Government was a kind of Republic."—LAS CASAS, vi. 41; vii. 125; O'MEARA, i. 405.

the feeling is just, the object only of it is mistaken ; its true object is that selfish spirit of revolutionary aggrandizement, which merely changed its direction, not its character, under the military dictatorship of the French Emperor : which hesitates at no crimes, pauses at no consequences ; which, unsatiated by the blood and suffering which it had produced in its own country, sought abroad, under his triumphant banners, the means of still greater gratification ; and never ceased to urge on its remorseless career, till the world was filled with its devastation, and the unanimous indignation of mankind was aroused for its punishment.

CHAPTER L.

CAMPAIGN OF 1808 IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

ARGUMENT.

Memorable Events, of which the Spanish Peninsula has been the theatre—Singular and uniform Character of their Guerilla Warfare—Physical Conformation of the Country which has led to these results—Great Mountain Ranges of Spain and Portugal—Extraordinary Resolution with which, in every age, the Spaniards have defended their cities—Peculiarities in the Civil History of the Peninsula, which have so long rendered its people a divided community—Effect of those circumstances in promoting the means of internal and separate defence—Corruption of the Nobility, and extent to which Entails were carried—State of the Peasantry, statistical Details on that subject—The Church—its Usefulness, Character, and Sway over the People—and great influence on the Spanish contest—Spain was still unexhausted by revolutionary passion—Composition and Character of the French Army at this period—its Discipline, Equipment, and Efficiency—and Numbers—Force and Character of the British army—the amount of its various branches—admirable Spirit with which it was animated and regarded by the People—Character and Qualities of the British Soldiers—important Effect of their Officers being exclusively taken from the higher ranks—severe Discipline and Corporal Punishments which still subsisted—General Foy's graphic contrast of the English and French Soldiers—and of the Officers of their respective armies—Difficulty of keeping any considerable force together in the interior of the Peninsula—Military Force of Spain at the commencement of the contest—Military Force and Physical Character of Portugal—Amount, Quality, and Disposition of the French Army at this period in Spain—Progress and early Forces of the Spanish Insurrection—frightful Disorders which signalized its commencement in some cities—cruel Massacre with which the Revolution in Valencia began—prudent Measures adopted by the Nobles at Seville—Proceedings of its Junta—Proclamation which it issued against Napoléon—wise Instructions to their Troops—Capture of the French fleet at Cadiz—Insurrections in Asturias, Galicia, Catalonia, and Arragon—Measures of Napoléon in regard to the Insurrection—Proceedings of the Notables assembled at Bayonne—Proclamation of the Gracdes of Spain to their countrymen—Degrading Letter of Escóiquiz and the counsellors of Ferdinand to King Joseph—Constitution of Bayonne given by Napoléon to the Spaniards—Proceedings of Napoléon, Joseph, and the Junta of Notables at Bayonne—Ministry of Joseph—his Journey to, and Arrival and Reception at Madrid—honourable instances of resistance to the general torrent of adulation among the Gracdes in his favour—memorable Answer of the Bishop of Orense to his summons to Bayonne—universal Joy with which the news of the Insurrection is received in England—Noble Speech of Mr. Sheridan on the Spanish War in Parliament—Answer of Mr. Canning—Reflections on this debate—English Budget of 1808—Immense Succours sent out to the patriots of the Peninsula by the British Government—Napoléon's first Orders for the suppression of the Insurrection—Success of Bessiéres over Cuesta in Leon and in Biscay—Operations of Lefebvre in Arragon—First Siege of Saragossa—Its failure—Expedition of Moncey against Valencia—Its failure—Progress of the Insurrection, and partial Successes of the Patriots in that quarter—Operations of Bessiéres against Cuesta and Blake—Battle of Rio-Secco and defeat of the Spaniards—March of Dupont into Andalusia, and his early Successes there—Accumulation of Forces around the invaders under Castanos—Battle of Baylen and Surrender of Dupont—its prodigious Results both in Spain and over Europe—Shameful Violation of the capitulation by the Spaniards—Departure of Joseph from Madrid, and concentration of the French troops behind the Ebro—Campaign in Catalonia and siege of Gerona—entry of the Spanish troops into the Capital—Universal Transports in the Peninsula—Affairs of Portugal—Commencement of the Insurrection, and disarming of the Spanish troops there—The English Cabinet resolves on sending succours to that Kingdom—Sir Arthur Wellesley takes the command of the Expedition, and arrives off Mondego Bay—Landing of the British troops, and combat of Roliça—Relative forces on both sides—Battle of Vimiero—Sir A. Wellesley's intentions for following up his success are frustrated by the arrival of Sir H. Burrard and Sir H. Dalrymple, who supersede him in the command—Convention of Cintra—its Expedience at that juncture—views with which it was regarded in France by Napoléon—Senseless Clamour in England on the subject leads to a Court of Enquiry—Its result—Disgraceful revelations which are made at Lisbon of the plunder by all ranks in the French army—British troops advance into Spain under Sir John Moore—Deep Impression which these events make

on Napoléon—his Preparations to meet the danger—Interview at Erfurth with Alexander—its secret Objects, and Tenor of the Conferences held there—Conduct of Austria, and negotiations with that power and the Princes of the Rhenish Confederacy—Napoléon's return to Paris—Great Levy of Men ordered by the French Government—and Preparations for the contest—Forces on both sides on the Ebro—Positions and Strength of the English army—Napoléon joins the French army—Attack on Blake, and his Defeat, at Reynosa and Espinosa—Battle of Burgos, and Defeat of the Spanish centre—Battle of Tudela, and Rout of their left—disorderly and eccentric Retreat of their troops from the Ebro—Rapid and concentrated Advance of the French—Forcing of the Somo-Sierra Pass—Capture of the Retiro, and prodigious agitation in Madrid—Fall of that Capital—Bold advance of Sir John Moore to Sabagun on the French line of communication—it instantly paralyses their further advance towards the South—Rapid march of Napoléon with an overwhelming force towards the English troops—they retreat on the line of Galicia—Napoléon returns to Paris—gallant Actions of Light Cavalry, and capture of Lefebvre Desnouettes—Sir John Moore retires to Lugo—offers battle there, which is declined—continues the retreat to Corunna—Extreme severity of the weather, and hardships the troops underwent in the retreat—Arrival at Corunna of the troops and the transports from Vigo Bay—Battle of Corunna, and Death of Sir John Moore—Embarkation of the troops, and their Return to England—Extreme gloom and Despondency which these events produce in the British Isles—Reflections on the Campaign—Its chequered Result—but, on the whole, eminently unfavourable to France—Reflections on the Effect of Sir John Moore's Movement, and its consequences on the issue of the Campaign—and on the Character of the British Soldiers, as now evinced in their first serious Continental Campaign.

Memorable events, of which the Spanish peninsula has been the theatre.

THE Spanish peninsula, in which a frightful war was now commencing, and where the armies of France and England at last found a permanent theatre of combat, has been distinguished from the earliest times by memorable achievements, and is illustrated by the exploits of the greatest captains who have ever left the impress of their actions on the course of human events. The mighty genius of Hannibal there began its career, and under the walls of Saguntum gave the earliest token of that vast capacity which was soon to shake to its foundation the enduring fabric of Roman power; Scipio Africanus here first revived the almost desperate fortunes of the republic, and matured those talents which were destined on a distant shore to overthrow the fortunes of the inveterate enemy of his country; the talents of Pompey, the genius of Cæsar, were exerted on its plains—a severer struggle than that of Pharsalia awaited the founder of the empire on the shores of the Ebro; the desperate contest between Christianity and Mahomedanism raged for centuries amidst its mountains, and from their rocks the wave of Mussulman conquest was first permanently repelled. Nor has the Peninsula been the theatre in modern times of less memorable exploits: the standards of Charlemagne have waved in its passes; the bugles of Roncesvalles have resounded through the world; the chivalry of the Black Prince, the skill of Gonzalvo of Cordova, have been displayed in its defence; the genius of Napoléon, the firmness of Wellington, have been exerted on its plains; and, like their great predecessors in the wars of Rome and Carthage, these two illustrious chiefs rolled the chariot of victory over its surface, and missing each other, severally conquered every other opponent till their mutual renown filled the world, and Europe, in breathless suspense, awaited their conflict on the shore of a distant land.

Uniform and singular character of their Guerilla warfare. From the earliest times, the inhabitants of the Peninsula have been distinguished by a peculiarity of military character and mode of conducting war which is very remarkable. Inferior to many other nations in the firmness and discipline with which they withstand the shock of battle, they are superior to them all in the readiness with which they rally after defeat, and the invincible tenacity with which they maintain a contest under circumstances of disaster, when any other people would succumb in despair. In vain are their armies defeated and dispersed, are

their fortresses taken, their plains overrun, their capital subdued; singly or in small bodies they renew the conflict; they rally and reunite as rapidly as they disperse; the numerous mountain chains which intersect their country, afford a refuge for their broken bands; their cities make a desperate though insulated defence; and from the wreck of all regular or organized opposition, emerges the redoubtable GUERRILLA warfare. "*Prælio victi Carthaginienses,*" says Livy, "*in ultimam Hispaniæ oram, ad oceanum, compulsi erant; disparem autem, quod Hispania, non quam Italia modo, sed quam ulla pars terrarum bello reparando aptior erat, locorum, hominumque ingeniis. Gens nata instaurandis, reparandisque bellis, brevi replevit exercitum animosque ad tentandum de integro certamen fecit* (1)." It is a singular fact, strikingly illustrative of the durable influence of common descent and physical circumstances on national character through all the varieties of time, religion, and political condition, that the system of warfare, thus deemed peculiar to Spain, of all nations in the world, in the days of Scipio and Sertorius, has continued to distinguish its inhabitants, without any interruption, to the present time; that it was pursued without intermission for eight hundred years in their wars with the Moors, formed the leading characteristic of the struggle with Napoléon, and continues at this hour to be the leading feature of the savage contest between the aristocratic and democratic parties which has for so many years bathed the Peninsula in blood.

Physical conformation of the country which has led to these effects. Durable characteristics of this kind attaching for ages to a nation, though its inhabitants have in the course of them become the mixed progeny of many different races of mankind, will invariably be found to arise from some peculiarity in its physical circumstances, which has imprinted a lasting impress on all its successive inhabitants. This is in an especial manner the case with Spain and Portugal. Their territory differs in many important particulars from any in Europe. Physically considered, it belongs as much to Africa as Europe: the same burning sun parches the mountains and dries up the valleys of both; no forests clothe their sides; naked they present their arid fronts to the shivering blasts of the north, and the scorching rays of a tropical sun. Vegetation in general spreads in proportion only as irrigation can be obtained; aided by that powerful auxiliary, the steepest mountain sides of Catalonia and Arragon are cut into terraces and clothed with the most luxuriant vegetation: without it, vast plains in Léon and the Castiles are almost entirely destitute both of cultivation and inhabitants. So extensive in consequence are the desert tracts of Spain, that the country, viewed from the summit of any of the numerous mountain ridges with which its inland provinces are intersected, in general exhibits only a confused group of barren elevated plains and lofty naked peaks, intersected here and there by a few glittering streams flowing in deep valleys, on the margins of which alone are to be seen crops and flocks and the traces of human habitation. The whole country may be considered as a vast mountainous promontory, which stretches from the Pyrenees to the southward, between the Atlantic and Mediterranean sea. On the shores of the ridge to the east and west are plains of admirable fertility, which, at no distant period, have been submerged by the waves of the sea; but in the interior an elevated assemblage of mountain ridges and lofty desert plains is to be found, in the centre of which Madrid is placed, in an upland basin, at a height of eighteen hundred feet above the level of the sea. The great rivers in consequence flow for the most part to the east and west in long courses, and are fed by tribu-

(1) Liv. xxviii. c. 43. xxiv. c. 42.

tary streams which meander at the bottom of ravines of surprising depth, shut in often by precipitous banks or very steep declivities. Three great chaussees only, viz. those leading from Madrid to Bayonne by the Somo-Sierra pass, that to Valencia, and to Barcelona, intersect this great desert central region; in every other quarter the roads are little better than mountain paths, uniting together towns built for the most part on the summit of hills, surrounded by walls environed by superb olive woods, but having little intercourse either with each other or the rest of Europe (1).

Great
mountain
ranges of
Spain and
Portugal.

It may readily be imagined what extraordinary advantages a country of such natural strength and character must afford to insulated and defensive warfare. In almost every quarter it is intersected by long, rocky, and almost inaccessible mountain chains, which form a barrier between province and province, almost as complete, not merely to hostile armies, but even the inhabitants of the country, as that interposed by the Alps or the Pyrenees. Branching out from the great chain which separates France from Spain, one vast mountain ridge runs to the westward, forming in its course the Alpine nests and inaccessible retreats of Asturias and Galicia; while another, stretching to the eastward, covers with its various ramifications nearly the whole of Catalonia, and encloses in its bosom the admirable industry and persevering efforts of its hardy cultivators. In the interior of the ridges which descend from the crest of the Pyrenees to the long vale of the Ebro, are formed the beautiful and umbrageous valleys of Navarre and Biscay, where, in mountain fastnesses and amidst chestnut forests, liberty has for six hundred years diffused its blessings, and the prodigy has been exhibited of independent privileges and democratic equality having been preserved untouched, with all their attendant security and general comfort, amidst an otherwise despotic monarchy. Beyond the Ebro, one great mountain range, stretching across from the frontiers of Catalonia to the neighbourhood of Lisbon, forms the almost impassable barrier between the valleys of the Tagus and the Douro, and the provinces of old and new Castile, Leon, and Estremadura: its western extremity has been immortalized in history; it contains the ridge of Busaco, and terminates in the rocks of Torres-Vedras. Another, taking its rise from the high grounds which form the western limit of the plain of Valencia, extends in a south-westerly direction to Cape St.-Vincent in the south of Portugal, and separates in its course the outlines of the Tagus and the Guadiana; a third, also reaching in the same direction across the whole country, forms the boundary between the valleys of the Guadiana and the Guadalquivir, under the name of the Sierra-Morena, divides the province of new Castile from that of Andalusia, and has been immortalized by the wanderings of the hero of Cervantes; while a fourth, detached by itself in the southern extremity of the Peninsula, forms the romantic mountains of Ronda, whose summits, wrapped in perpetual snow, withstand the genial sun which ripens oranges and citrons and all the productions of Africa on their sides. Two great and rich alluvial plains alone are to be found in Spain, the character of whose inhabitants differs from that of all the rest of the peninsula: in the first of which, amidst water-melons, luxuriant harvests, and all the richest gifts of nature, the castanets and evening dances of the Valencians recall the unforeseeing gaiety of tropical regions; while in the second, the indolent habits, fiery character, and impetuous disposition of the Andalusian, attest, amidst myrtle thickets,

(1) Suchet's Mem. i. 42, 49. Nap. i. 52, 53. Laborde's Spain, i. 163, 169. Introd.

the perfume of orange groves, and the charms of a delicious climate, the undecaying influence of Moorish blood and Arabian descent (1).

Extraordinary resolution with which in every age the Spaniards have defended their cities. Spain has never been remarkable for the number or opulence of its towns; Madrid, Cadiz, Valencia, Barcelona, and Bilboa, the largest of which, after the capital, does not contain above eighty thousand inhabitants, alone deserve the name of cities (2). But it has in every age been distinguished beyond any other country recorded in history, by the unconquerable resolution with which their inhabitants have defended their walls, even under circumstances when more prudent courage would have abandoned the contest in despair. The heart of every classical scholar has thrilled at the fate of Numantia, Saguntum, and Astapa, whose heroic defenders preferred perishing with their wives and children in the flames to surrendering to the hated dominion of the stranger, and the same character has descended to their descendants in modern times (3). With invincible resolution Barcelona held out for its rights and privileges, after Europe had adjusted its strife at Utrecht, and England with perfidious policy had abandoned her Peninsular allies to the arms of their enemies; the double siege of Saragossa, the heroic defence of Gerona, the obstinate stand at Roses, have put the warriors of northern Europe to the blush for the facility with which they surrendered fortresses to the invader, incomparably stronger and better provided with arms and garrison; while Cadiz alone of all European towns successfully resisted the utmost efforts of the spoiler, and after a fruitless siege of two years, saw the arms even of Napoleon roll back.

Peculiarities in the civil history of the peninsula, which have rendered it a divided community. The peculiar political constitution of the Spanish monarchy, and the revolutions which its inhabitants have undergone in the course of ages, have been as favourable to the maintenance of a defensive and isolated internal, as they were prejudicial to the prosecution of a vigorous external warfare by its government. Formed by the amalgamation at various times of many different nations of separate descent, habits, and religion, it has never yet attained the vigour and unity of a homogeneous monarchy. Its inhabitants are severed from each other, not only by desert ridges or rocky sierras, but by original separation of race and inveterate present animosity. The descendants of the ancient inhabitants of the Spanish soil are there mingled with the children of the Goth, the Vandal, and the Roman; with the faithlessness of Moorish or the fire of Arabian descent. These different and hostile races have never thoroughly amalgamated with each other; for many centuries they maintained separate and independent governments, and kept up prolonged and bloody warfare with each other; and when at length they all yielded to the arms and fortune of Ferdinand and Isabella, the central government neither acquired the popular infusion, nor the inherent energy, which is necessary to mould out of such discordant materials a vigorous state. The example of Great Britain, where the various and hostile races of the Britons, the Saxons, the Danes, Scots, and Normans have been at length blended into one united and powerful non-

(1) Malte-Brun, *Art. Espagne*. Humboldt, *Géog. de l'Espagne*, in Laborde, i. 170, 175. Lord Caernarvon's *Spain*, ii. 234, 370.

(2) Madrid contained, in 1808, 190,000 inhabitants.—*Edin. Gazetteer, Art. Madrid*.

(3) *Locum in foro destinant, quo pretiosissima rerum suarum congererent, super eum cumulum, conjuges ac liberos considerare quum jussissent, ligna eirea exstruunt, fascisque virgultorum conjiciunt. Fœdior alia in urbe trucidatio erat, quum turbam*

fœminarum puerorumque inbellem inermemque cives sui caderent, et in successum rogam semina pleraque injicerent corpora, rivique sanguinis flammam orientem restinguerent; postremo ipsi, eade miseranda suorum fatigati, eum armis medio se incendio injecerunt.—Liv. xxviii. c. 22, 23. Numantia and Saguntum have become household words over the world, but the heroism of ASTAPA has not received the fame it deserves.

archy, proves that such an amalgamation is possible; that of Ireland, where the Saxon and the Gael are still in fierce and ruinous hostility with each other, that it is one of the most difficult of political problems. Without the freedom of the English constitution, which unites them by the powerful bond of experienced benefits and participated power, or the crushing vigour of the Russian despotism, which holds them close in the bands of rising conquest, it is hardly possible to give to such a mixed race the vigour of homogeneous descent. In Spain this had never been attempted: the Arragonese were jealous of the Catalonians; the Castilians despised the Valencians; the Galicians even were at variance with the Asturians; and the freeborn mountaineers of Navarre and Biscay had their local antipathies; while all the inhabitants of the north regarded as an inferior race the natives of Granada and Andalusia, where Moorish conquest had degraded the character, and Moorish blood contaminated the descent of the people; and where, amidst orange groves, evening serenades, bewitching forms, the whole manly virtues were thought to be fast wearing out under the enervating influence of an African sun.

Effect of these circumstances in promoting the means of internal and separate defence.

But while these circumstances were destructive to the external vigour and consideration of the Spanish monarchy, they were, of all others, those best calculated to enable its inhabitants, when deprived of their central government and left to their own guidance, to oppose a formidable resistance to the invader. When deprived of the directions of their sovereign, the provinces of Spain did not feel themselves powerless, nor did they lose hope because it was abandoned by those who were their natural protectors. Society, when resolved into its pristine elements, still found wherewithal to combat; the provinces, when loosened or severed from each other, separately maintained the contest. Electing juntas of government, and enrolling forces on their own account, they looked as little beyond their own limits as the Swiss peasants in former times did beyond the mountain ridges which formed the barriers of their happy valleys. If this singular oblivion of external events and concentration of all their energies on local concerns was destructive in the end to any combined plan of operations, and effectually prevented the national strength from being hurled, in organized and concentrated masses, against the enemy, it was eminently favourable, in the first instance, to the efforts of tumultuary resistance, and led to the assumption of arms, and the continuance of the conflict under circumstances when a well-informed central government would probably have resigned it in despair. Defeats in one quarter did not lead to submission in another; the occupation of the capital, the fortresses, the military lines of communication, was not decisive of the fate of the country; as many victories required to be gained as there were cities to be captured, or provinces subdued, and like the Anglo-Saxons, in the days of the English heptarchy, they fought resolutely in their separate districts, and rose up again in arms when the invader had passed on to fresh theatres of conquest.

Corruption of the nobility, and extent to which entails were carried.

The nobility in Spain, as in all countries where civilisation and wealth have long existed, and the salutary check of popular control has not developed their energy and restrained their corruption, were sunk in the lowest state of selfish degradation. Assembled for the most part in the capital, devoted to the frivolities of fashion or the vices of a court; taught to look for the means of elevation, not in the energy of a virtuous, but the intrigues of a corrupted life, they were alike unfit for civil or military exertion, and alone of all the nation, must, with a few brilliant exceptions, be considered as strangers to the glories of the Peninsular

war. Not more than three or four of the higher grantees were in the army when the war broke out in 1808; and the inferior noblesse, almost all destitute alike of education, vigour, or active habits, took hardly any share in its prosecution. The original evil of entails had spread to a greater extent, and produced more pernicious consequences, in Spain than in any other country of Europe; a few great families engrossed more than half the landed property of the kingdom, which was effectually tied up from alienation, and of course remained in a very indifferent state of cultivation; while the domains of the cities, or corporate bodies, held in mortmain, were so extensive, and for the most part uncultivated, that a large proportion of the arable land in the kingdom was in a state of nature (1).

Notwithstanding these unfavourable circumstances, the elements of great political activity and energetic national conduct existed in the Peninsula. The peasantry were every where an athletic, sober, enduring race; hardy from exercise, abstemious from habit, capable of undergoing incredible fatigue, and of subsisting on fare which to an Englishman would appear absolute starvation. The officers in the Spanish armies during the war, drawn from the ill-educated urban classes, were, for the most part, a most conceited, ignorant, and inefficient body; but the men were almost always excellent, and possessed, not only the moral spirit, but the physical qualities calculated to become the basis of an admirable army. Colonel Napier has recorded his opinion that the Catalonian miquelets or smugglers formed the finest materials for light troops in the world, and the Valencian and Andalusian levies presented a physical appearance greatly exceeding that of both the French and English regular armies. The cause of this remarkable peculiarity is to be found in the independent spirit and general well-being of the peasantry. Notwithstanding all the internal defects of their government and institutions, the shepherds and cultivators of the soil enjoyed a most remarkable degree of prosperity; their dress, their houses, their habits of life, demonstrated the long-established comfort which had for ages prevailed among them; vast tracts, particularly in the mountainous regions of the north, were the property of the cultivators, a state of things of all others the most favourable to social happiness, when accompanied with a tolerable degree of mildness in the practical administration of government; and even in those districts where they were merely tenants of the nobility, the cities, or the church, their condition demonstrated that they were permitted to retain an ample share of the fruits of their toil (2).

(1) Foy, iii. 151, 152. Jovellanos, 164. Laborde, i. 197, 212.
(2) Lord Caernarvon's Spain, ii. 235, 360. Burgoyne's Espagne, i. 267; ii. 384.

Statistical details on the peasantry, especially in the northern and mountainous provinces, is easily explained by the number of them who were owners of the soil, coupled with the vigour and efficacy of the provincial immunities and privileges which, in Catalonia, Navarre, the Basque Provinces, Asturias, Arragon, and Galicia, effectually restrained the power of the executive, and gave to the inhabitants

of those districts the practical enjoyment of almost complete personal freedom. So extensive were their privileges, so little did government venture to disregard them, that in many cases they were to be rather considered as democratic commonwealths, inserted into that extraordinary assemblage of separate states which formed the Spanish monarchy, than subjects of a despotic government. The classification of the population was as follows, which speaks volumes as to the condition of the people, and the causes of their prolonged resistance to the French invasion:—

Total inhabitants	10,409,879
— of whom were Families engaged in agriculture.	872,000
— Owners of the soil they cultivated.	360,000
— Farmers holding under landlords.	502,000
— Ecclesiastical proprietors.	6 216
— Mendicant friars.	43,149
— Cities, towns, and villages.	25,463
— of whom are free cities or burghs.	12,071
— — subject to a feudal superior.	9,466
— — — to an ecclesiastical superior.	3,926

— See HARDENBERG, x. 173, 174.

The church.
Its usefulness,
character, and
influence on
the people.

But the peasantry, hardy and undaunted as they were, would have been unable to have combined in any effective league for their common defence, destitute as they, for the most part, were of any support from their natural leaders the owners of the soil, if it had not been for the weight and influence of a body which, in every age, has borne a leading part in the contests of the Peninsula. This was THE CHURCH, the lasting and inveterate enemy in every country of revolutionary innovation. The ecclesiastics in Spain were very numerous, amounting, according to the census taken in 1787, to 22,480 parish priests, and 47,710 regular clergy belonging to monasteries or other public religious establishments (1). The influence of this great body was immense. Independent of their spiritual ascendancy in a country more strongly attached than any in Europe to the Romish church, they possessed, as temporal proprietors, an unbounded sway over their flocks. As in all other countries, it had long been felt that the church was the best and most indulgent landlord; the ecclesiastical estates, which were very numerous and extensive, were much better cultivated in general than any in the hands of lay proprietors; and the tenantry held their possessions under them for such moderate rents, and by so secure a tenure, that they had long enjoyed almost the advantages and consideration of actual landholders. Nor was this all; the charity and beneficence of the monks had set on foot, in every part of the country, extensive institutions, through which, more than any others by which they could be affected, the distresses of the poor had been relieved. They partook in a great degree of the character of the *hospice*, particularly in the northern provinces. To the peasant they often served as banking establishments, where none other existed in the province, and as such essentially contributed to agricultural improvement. The friars acted as schoolmasters, advocates, physicians, and apothecaries. Besides feeding and clothing the poor, and visiting the sick, they afforded spiritual consolation. They were considerate landlords and indulgent masters; peace-makers in domestic broils, a prop of support in family misfortune; they provided periodical amusements and festivities for the peasants; advanced them funds if assailed with misfortune; furnished them with seed if their harvest had failed. Most of the convents had *fundaciones* or endowments for professors who taught rhetoric and philosophy, besides keeping schools open for the use of the poor; they also supplied parochial ministers when wanted, and their preachers were considered the best in Spain. Superficial or freethinking travellers, observing that the aged, the sick, and the destitute were always to be found in numbers round the convent gates, supposed that they created the suffering which they were so instrumental in relieving, and in consequence that the church was chargeable with the augmentation of pauperism; forgetting that the poor ever will be assembled together round those establishments where their sufferings are relieved; and that to represent such beneficent institutions as the cause of this distress, is just as absurd as it would be to decry fever hospitals, because their wards are generally filled with typhus patients, or poor laws in Ireland, because a large proportion of its *two millions* of present destitute inhabitants will hereafter infallibly be found in the neighbourhood of the workhouses where parochial relief is about to be dealt out (2).

Its great
influence in
the Spanish
contest.

It is observed with surprise by General Fox, that in every age the king, the church, and the people have combined together in Spain: an alliance utterly inexplicable on the principles of the

(1) Laborde, iv. 194.

(2) Walton's *Revolutions of Spain*, ii. 374, 376.

French revolutionary school, but susceptible of an easy solution when the benefits which the ecclesiastical bodies conferred both on the crown, in standing between it and the encroachments of the nobility, and the peasantry, in averting from them the evils of poverty, are taken into consideration. The whole course of events during the Peninsular war demonstrated that this influence was established on the most durable foundations; every where the parish priests were the chief promoters of the insurrection; it was their powerful voice which roused the people to resistance; and many of the most renowned leaders of the desultory bands who maintained the contest when the regular forces were destroyed, came from the ecclesiastical ranks. The clergy, both regular and parochial, early perceived the total destruction of their interests which would ensue from the triumph of the French invasion; they recollected the decrees of the Convention against the clergy, and the horrors of the war in la Vendée; and though Napoléon had to a certain extent restored the altar, yet they were well aware that even his powerful hand had been able to do this only in a very ineffectual manner; that religion was tolerated in France, not re-established; and that the indigent curés, who drew a wretched pittance yearly from the public treasury to the north of the Pyrenees, were very different, both in consideration and influence, from the dignified clergy in possession of their own estates, who formerly constituted so important a part of the French monarchy. It was this body, possessed of such influence, and animated with such feelings, who in Spain proved the real leaders of the people; who, in the absence of the government, the nobility, and the army, boldly threw themselves into the breach; and organizing out of the strength and affections of the peasantry the means of prolonged resistance, rendered the Peninsula the charnel-house of the French armies, and the grave of revolutionary power.

Spain was still unexhausted by revolutionary passions. Most of all, Spain was still a virgin soil. Her people were not exhausted with revolutionary passions; they had not learned by bitter experience the vanity of all attempts to regenerate mankind by any other means than the improvement of their moral and religious principles. Though the monarchy was grey in years, the nobility corrupt or selfish, the government feeble and incapable, the nation as a whole was still untainted; the debility of the Bourbon reign had passed over the state without either weakening the force of popular passion, or destroying the fountains of public virtue. The peasants in the mountains, the shepherds in the plains, still inherited, in unmixed descent, the blood of the Cid and Pelajo; still were animated by the spirit which sustained the conflict of seven centuries with the Moorish invader. They were free from that last and worst cause of national corruption, which springs from the people having been themselves admitted to a share of power, participating in its passions, feeling its sweets, profiting by its corruptions; they were exempt from that despair and apathy which results from the experienced impossibility, by changing the class which governs, of eradicating either the vices of the governors, or the sufferings of the governed. Hence an intermixture in the Peninsular revolutionary war of passions the most opposite, and usually ranged in fierce hostility against each other; and hence the long duration and unexampled obstinacy with which it was conducted. While the rural population, at the voice of their pastors, every where took up arms, and rushed with inconsiderate zeal into the conflict, to combat under the banners of the cross for their salvation; the indolent urban multitudes were roused not less by temporal ambition, to league their forces under the national colours; the dissolution of government, the resolution of society into its pristine elements, had

generally thrown political power and the immediate direction of affairs into their hands; revolutionary passion, democratic ambition, were called into activity by the very necessity which had every where thrown the people upon their own resources; the provincial juntas, chosen in the chief towns, soon became so many centres of revolutionary action and popular intrigue; and thus the two most powerful passions which can agitate the human heart, religious enthusiasm and democratic ambition, usually seen in opposite ranks, and destined to fierce collision in that very realm in future times, were for a season, by the pressure of common danger, brought to unite cordially with each other.

Such was the country which thereafter became the grand theatre of the contest between France and England; and such the eminently favourable battle-field which the unbounded ambition of the French Emperor at length afforded to the British arms. They now descended to the conflict on the *popular* side; they went forth to combat, not merely for the real interests, but the present desires of the people. The forces, indeed, which the contending parties could bring into this great arena were, to appearance at least, very unequal; and even the most sanguine could not contemplate without alarm the enormous preponderance which weighed down the scale on the side of the Emperor Napoléon. He had six hundred thousand French soldiers, including seventy thousand horse, and at least a hundred and fifty thousand of the allied states at his disposal; but the magnitude of this force, great as it was, constituted the least part of its formidable character (1). It was the quality, experience, and spirit of his soldiers, which was the real source of their strength. They stood forth to the conflict, strong in the experience of fifteen years of warfare, terrible from the recollection of a hundred victories. The halo of glory which surrounded, the *prestige* of victory which preceded them, was more difficult to withstand than either the charges of their cuirassiers or the ravages of their artillery. It fascinated and subdued the minds of men; spread universally that belief of their invincibility which was the surest means of realizing it; paralysed alike the statesman who arrayed nations, and the generals who marshalled armies, for the combat; and spread even in the bravest hearts the dispiriting belief that the contest was hopeless, and that to sink honourably was all that remained to gallant soldiers. This feeling especially prevailed at this juncture, after the hopes of Europe, strongly elevated by the strife of Eylau, had been dashed to the earth by the wreck of Friedland, and the reserve of Christendom, on whom so many eyes had been turned in breathless anxiety (2), had abandoned the conflict as one apparently striving against the decrees of fate.

Nor was the actual efficiency of this immense army inferior to its imaginative terrors. Though the wars of Germany and Poland had made frightful chasms in the ranks of the veteran soldiers, yet the officers and non-commissioned officers, the bones and sinews of the army, possessed the immense advantage of tried merit and long experience. Such had been the consumption of human life during the late campaigns, that every

And numbers. (1) The numbers were as follows, all paid by the French government.

Infantry of the line.	380,000
Cavalry.	70,000
Swiss, Germans, Hanoverians, and Irish, in French pay.	32,000
Artillery and engineers.	46,000
Gendarmerie, coast guards, veterans.	92,000

620,000

Besides the forces of the Confederation of the Rhine, Italy, Naples, Holland, and the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, at least 150,000 disposable more.—See Fox, i. 52. 53.

(2) Foy, i. 52, 53.

conscript who survived a few years was sure of becoming an officer : and while this certainty of promotion to the few survivors kept alive the military spirit of the whole population, it ensured for the direction of the army the inappreciable basis of tried valour and experienced skill. Every military man knows, that if the officers and non-commissioned officers are experienced and brave, it is no difficult matter, even out of the most unpromising materials, to form an effective army; the examples of the Portuguese and Hindoos, under British, and the northern Italians, under French officers, were not required to establish a fact illustrated by the experience of every age from the days of the Romans. This advantage appeared not merely in the field of battle; desperate valour, fortunate accident, can sometimes there supply the wants of experience and organization; but in the long run, in undergoing the fatigues of a campaign, in discharging its multifarious duties, and facing its varied difficulties, the superiority of veteran armies, or even new levies incorporated with a veteran frame, soon becomes conspicuous. The Spaniards never were a match for the French, either in the field or the conduct of a campaign; and although the native courage of the English, even in the outset, uniformly gave them the advantage in pitched battles, yet it was long before they became at all equal to their opponents in the general conduct of a campaign. In marching, throwing up fieldworks, enduring famine, conducting sieges, cooking their victuals, procuring provisions, preserving their spirit during retreat, and abstaining when necessary from intoxication, the English soldiers were for long and painfully inferior to their enemies; and it augments our admiration for the illustrious chief and his able lieutenants who ultimately led them to victory under such disadvantages, that they were compelled, not only to lead, but in a manner to educate their troops in presence of the enemy; and that it was while struggling to maintain their ground against superior bands of a veteran foe, that they imbibed in many respects even the rudiments of the military art (1).

The English army, however, at this period was far from being in the inefficient state, either with respect to discipline or experience, which was generally supposed on the Continent : and the French government, which judged from recent events, and were ignorant of the vast efforts in the military department which had been made since the commencement of the war, were equally mistaken as to the force and capacity of the regular forces, and the extent to which a warlike spirit had imbued the nation. The British army in the spring of 1808, consisted of no less than one hundred and eighty thousand men; of whom twenty-six thousand were cavalry : besides nearly eighty thousand of the militia, equal in discipline and equipment to the troops of the line, though not bound to serve beyond the British isles, and two hundred and ninety thousand volunteers, of whom twenty-five thousand were cavalry, in a very considerable state of efficiency (2). Great part of this immense force, without doubt, was absorbed in the

Force and
character of
the British
army.

(1) Foy, i. 80, 81. Jom. ii. 36. Hurd. x. 157, 158.

(2) The numbers were in July, 1807 :—

Regulars.		(The amount of its various branches.)		Volunteers.	
		Militia.			
Infantry	156,561	77,996		Infantry	254,544
Cavalry	26,315			Cavalry	25,342
				Artillery	9,420
<hr/>				<hr/>	
	182,876				289,306
		In all,	Regulars	182,867	
			Militia	77,990	
			Volunteers	289,306	
			<hr/>		
		In arms	550,163		

defence of the numerous and extensive colonies which formed part of the British dominions; but the official returns proved that a hundred thousand men, including twenty thousand cavalry, were disposable in the British isles. and in a minute made out by the Duke of York it was proved, that "in 1808, sixty thousand men could have been provided for the campaign in Spain without detriment to any other service." Of this force, it is not going too far to say that it was all in the highest state of discipline and equipment; and that not only was it equal in a pitched battle to any force of similar amount which could be brought against it, but, if all assembled, was adequate to the encounter of the largest army ever yet collected in a single field under the standards of Napoléon (1)!

Admirable spirit with which it was animated and regarded by the people.

But it was not so much from underrating the numerical strength, as mistaking the spirit which animated the British army, and the degree of interest which its exploits excited in the country, that the French government was led to regard too lightly the chances of success which it possessed in a Continental struggle. With all his information and sagacity, Napoléon here fell into the usual error of judging of the present by the past. The English soldiers had achieved so little during the war, that it was generally supposed they were incapable of doing any thing: their navy had done so much, that it was taken for granted the whole interest and pride of the nation was centred on its triumphs. In the interim, however, the general arming of the people, the excitement produced by the threats of invasion, the profound interest kept alive by the Continental war, the triumphs of Maida and Alexandria, had awakened a most extraordinary degree of military ardour, and diffused no inconsiderable amount of military information throughout the people. The warlike establishments which pervaded the country were admirably calculated to foster this growing enthusiasm, and turn it to the best account in augmenting the numbers and increasing the spirits of the regular army. The militia served as an invaluable nursery for the line: the volunteers, changed soon after into local militia, corresponding very nearly to the German landwehr, provided a never-failing supply of recruits tolerably instructed in the rudiments of discipline for the militia. Numbers of young men of all ranks, caught by the animation, the idleness, or the dress of soldiers, embraced the military profession: thenceforward to the end of the war there was no difficulty whatever experienced in finding adequate supplies of recruits for the army, and filling up all the fearful chasms which war and disease made in its ranks. Thus, while the French were deluded with the idea that the English were altogether contemptible at land, they had already made great progress in the formation of a powerful army, and while they were talking about sea-wolves and maritime skill, the spirit was engendered destined to produce the triumphs of Vittoria and Waterloo (2)!

Character and qualities of the British soldiers.

The vast improvements effected by the Duke of York in the discipline and organization of the army, and the improved military education which the younger officers had now for some years received, had at the same period afforded increased advantages for the successful display of that physical strength and undaunted moral resolution which, in every age, has formed the great characteristic of the British soldiers. This

Of this force of regulars, 81,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry were at home in the British isles, and of course disposable. In the muster-rolls of the English army, sabres and bayonets are alone estimated, which is otherwise in the French and Continental services; a peculiarity which made the real

strength of the English regular army about 200,000 men.—*Parl. Deb.* ix. iii. *App.*

(1) *Parl. Returns*, July 1807. *Parl. Deb.* ix. 3d *App.* and Napier, i. 81. *App.* and Foy, i. 210.

(2) Foy, i. 210, 212, 220, 221. *Ibid.* x. 158, 159.

invaluable quality gave them a very great advantage : it is the true basis of a powerful army. Skill, experience, discipline can be superadded by practice, or acquired by exercise; but if this one moral quality be wanting, all such acquisitions will prove of little avail. How inferior soever to their antagonists in experience, or that skill in the varied duties of a campaign which actual service alone can give, the English soldiers, from the very first, had the animating conviction that they were their equals, possibly their superiors, in actual combat; and that all the advantages of their veteran opponents would be at an end if once they engaged in a regular battle. And so it proved even from the outset; and it is inconceivable how soon this one quality of *dogged resolution in the field* came to neutralize all the superiority of acquired skill and veteran discipline. The military is essentially a practical art; its wants and necessities are soon brought home by actual experience and suffering to an army in the field. If it possesses the resolution to fight, and the discipline to obey, a very short time will supply the rest : there is no education so rapid and effectual as that which takes place in presence of an enemy. Of various natural and acquired excellence, it is hard to say whether, in the Peninsular war, the British or French soldiers, after a few years, were the most admirable. In the service of light troops; in undergoing with cheerfulness the fatigues of a campaign; in dexterity at making themselves comfortable under privation; in rapidity of firing, care of their horses by the cavalry, and enthusiastic gallantry at the first onset; the French troops for a long period had the advantage : but when the hostile lines actually met, and the national resolution was fairly put to the test, the British soldiers, from the very beginning, successfully asserted their superiority. Splendid in appearance, overflowing with strength, irresistible in a single charge, their cavalry could hardly be said to be equal, at least for general service, or the protracted fatigues of a campaign, to that of Napoléon; a remarkable circumstance, when the great attention bestowed on horses in England is taken into consideration : but their artillery, superior to any in the world in the admirable equipment of the guns and ammunition train, was second to none in the coolness and practice of the gunners; and, in the steadiness and precision of their fire, the constancy which they displayed under danger, their calmness in anger, and the terrible vehemence of their charge with the bayonet, the British infantry was beyond all question the first in Europe (1).

Important effect of their officers being exclusively taken from the higher ranks. In one important particular, the English army was founded upon an entirely different principle from the French. In the latter, the officers formed in no degree a separate class from the soldiers; the equality, which was the object of universal desire at the outset of the Revolution, and the conscription, which reached indiscriminately all ranks in its later stages; forbade alike any such line of demarcation; and not only had all the marshals and generals in the service originally entered on the military career in the ranks, but to such as survived the rapid consumption of life in the imperial wars, promotion was still certain from the humblest station to the highest grades in the army. In the former, again, a line, in practice almost impassable, separated the private soldier from the officer; they were drawn from different classes in society, accustomed to different habits, instructed by a different education, actuated by different desires. To the French conscript, glory, promotion, the prospect of ultimate greatness, were the chief stimulants to exertion : in the English army, though

(1) Foy, i. 226, 227,

"Le soldat Anglais," says General Foy, "pos-

sède la qualité la plus précieuse dans la guerre, le calme dans la colère."—Foy, i. 227.

the influence of such desires was strongly felt by the officers, yet the efforts of the common men were chiefly excited by a different set of motives; and a sense of military duty, the wish to win the respect of his comrades, an instinctive principle of courage, an anxious desire to uphold the renown of his regiment, a firm determination to defend the cause of Old England, and an undoubting faith in the superiority of its arms, constituted the real springs of military exertion. The great majority of the English soldiers felt no desire to be made officers; to become sergeants and corporals was indeed a very general and deserved object of ambition to the meritorious privates, because that elevated them in, without taking them out of, their own sphere in life: but they felt that they would be uncomfortable in the daily society of the commissioned officers, their superiors in birth, habits, and acquirements; and though many, in the course of the war, from the force of extraordinary merit, broke through these restraints, and some discharged, in the most exemplary manner, the duties of the most elevated ranks, who had originally borne a musket on their shoulders, yet in general the situation of privates who had risen to the officers' mess was not so comfortable as to render the change an object of general desire. It may appear paradoxical to assert, but it is nevertheless strictly true, that this feeling of the propriety of each class striving to become respectable in itself, without seeking to overstep its limits, is the natural effect of long-established freedom and order; and is much more nearly allied to the genuine spirit of liberty than the feverish desire of individual elevation, which, throughout all its phases, was the mainspring of the French Revolution. Where each class is respectable and protected in itself, it feels its own importance, and often disdains to seek admission into that next in succession; the universal passion for individual exaltation is the offspring of a state of society where the rights and immunities of the humbler ranks have been habitually, by all persons in power, trampled under foot. The clearest proof of this is to be found in daily experience. The men who, throughout so many ages, have maintained the liberties of England, are not those who were striving perpetually to elevate themselves by a sudden start above their neighbours, but those who, by a life of unobtrusive honest industry, rose to comfort or opulence in their own sphere, without any desire to leave it; and the strength of the state at present is not to be found in the anxious aspirants after aristocratic favour, or the giddy candidates for fashionable distinction, but in the unheeded efforts of that more numerous but unobserved class, which is too proud of its own rank to aspire to any beyond it (1).

Severe discipline. An iron discipline had given the military force, thus constituted, a degree of firmness and regularity unknown to any other service in Europe. The use of the lash was still frequent: and instances of soldiers, for inconsiderable offences, receiving 500, 800, and even 1000 stripes; but though the friends of humanity beheld with horror this barbarous infliction, so foreign to the spirit of the English constitution, and disused in the French and several Continental armies, yet the experienced observer, who marked the class from which English recruits were almost exclusively drawn, and the impossibility of giving them the prospect of promotion which operated so strongly on French conscripts, hesitated as to the practicability of abolishing this painful but necessary correction; and regarded its disgrace as the price paid by the nation for the economy which denied to the soldiers such a pay as would secure for the ranks of its army a class to whom such inflictions might be unnecessary, or

(1) Duke of Wellington's Evid. on Military Punishment. Parl. Pro. June 1836. Foy, i. 226, 227.

render expulsion from them a sufficient object of dread; and that constitution, which, by confining commissions in the military service to men of family and property, possessed of a permanent interest in the commonwealth, had obtained the best possible security against its force being applied to the destruction of the public liberties (1). Better fed, clothed, lodged, and paid than any other in Europe, the English soldier had an attention devoted to his wants, both in health and sickness, and experienced an integrity in the administration of every department of the army, which could be attained only in a country where habits of freedom have long co-existed with those of order, and experience had pointed out the mode of effectually checking the abuses which invariably have a tendency to grow up in every branch of the public administration. Pensions, varying according to the period, or the amount of service, secured for the veteran, the maimed, or the wounded, an adequate maintenance for the remainder of life. True, he fought, in the glowing language of Colonel Napier, in the cold shade of aristocracy; true, he could not boast that the rays of imperial favour would be attracted by the helmet of the cuirassier, or the bayonet of the grenadier; but he was sure, from good conduct, of obtaining that respect in his own sphere, and those substantial advantages which were adapted to his situation and his wishes; and experience has abundantly proved that the concentration of government support on those whose only title to power was military distinction, is a sure prelude to unbridled administration, and that if the soldier would no longer fight in the cold shade of aristocracy, the citizen would pine in the hopeless frost of military despotism (2).

(1) Duke of Wellington, *ut supra*.

General Foy's graphic contrast of the English and French soldiers. (2) General Foy has left a graphic picture of the different habits of the English and French officers during a campaign in the Peninsular war, of the truth of which every one must, to a certain degree, be convinced. "Behold," says he, "the French battalions, when they arrive at their bivouacs after a long and painful march. No sooner have the drums ceased to beat, than the haversacks of the soldiers, disposed around the piles of arms, mark out the ground where they are to pass the night. They put off their coats; clothed only in their greatcoats, they run to collect provisions, water, and straw. The fires are lighted; the soup is soon prepared; trees brought from the adjoining woods are rudely carved into supports or beams for the huts. Quickly the simple barracks are raised; the air resounds with the sounds of the hatchet; while the soup is preparing, the young men impatient of their idleness, clean their arms, arrange their knapsacks, clean their gaiters. The soup is soon ready; if wine is wanting the conversation soon flags, and the noisy multitude is speedily buried in sleep. If, on the other hand, the generous fluid circulates, joyous looks follow the barrels as they are brought on men's backs into the centres of the rings; the veterans recount to the young conscripts the battles in which their regiment has acquired so much renown, and the universal transport when the Emperor, mounted on his white charger and followed by his Mameluke, suddenly appeared among them.

"Turn now to the English camp: you see the soldiers exhausted and motionless, reclining on the ground: are they waiting like the Spahis in the Turkish camp till the slaves prepare their victuals? No! they have made at leisure a very moderate march, and have reached at two in the afternoon the ground they are to occupy for the night. Bread and meat are brought: the sergeant makes the distribution; he tells them where they will find water and straw, and

where the trees which are to be felled will be found. When the logs arrive he shows where each is to be placed: he reprimands the unskilful, and stimulates the lazy. Where is the industrious, enterprising spirit of that nation which has outstripped all others in vigour and intelligence? Out of their own routine the soldiers can do nothing: if once the restraints of discipline are broken, excesses of every kind are indulged in, and intemperance prevails to an excess which would astonish the Cossacks themselves. Nevertheless, do not hazard an attack unless you are well assured of success; the English soldier is not brave at times merely; he is so whenever he has eat well, drunk well, and slept well. Yet their courage, rather instinctive than acquired, has need of solid nutriment; and no thoughts of glory will ever make them forget that they are hungry, or that their shoes are worn out. [Foy, i. 231, 233.]

And of the officers of the English army. "Nor is the difference less remarkable in the superior officers. While a French general of division is occupied with his troops, during the leisure moments of a campaign in studying the topography of the country or the disposition of its inhabitants; in attending to the nourishment, drilling, or haranguing of his troops; in endeavouring to persuade the Spanish people to adopt the system of administration, or yield to the political conduct of his country,—the English general opposed to him spends his time between the chase, riding on horseback, and the pleasures of the table. The first, alternately governor, engineer, commissary, has his mind continually on the stretch; his daily occupations lead to an enlargement of his mind, and a continual extension of his sphere of activity. The other, as indifferent to the localities of the country in which he makes war as to the language, disposition, or prejudices of its inhabitants, applies to the commissary to supply provisions; to the quarter-master-general for information concerning the country in which he was to act, and the marches he was to perform; to the adjutant-general for any other supplies of which he

Difficulty of
keeping any
considerable
force to-
gether in
the interior
of the Pen-
insula.

Nor was the inequality of force with which this great struggle was to be conducted, so great in its progress as it appeared in the outset. Napoléon indeed commenced the contest with a hundred and fifteen thousand infantry, and sixteen thousand horse, in the Peninsula (1), and the possession of all the most important strongholds which it contained; and the force permanently maintained over its surface, after the British troops landed, exceeded two hundred and fifty, and rose at times as high as three hundred and fifty thousand men; while there never were so many as fifty thousand British soldiers in the Peninsula, and the actual force under the standards of Wellington seldom exceeded thirty, and was generally for the first three years not above twenty-five, thousand English sabres and bayonets. Still this force formed the nucleus of an army which, with the addition of the Portuguese levies of equal amount, and disciplined and led by British officers, soon became extremely formidable. Its fortunate central position in Portugal, resting on what became, under the tutelary genius of Wellington, an impregnable intrenched position in front of Lisbon, afforded to a commander of talent a favourable opportunity of striking serious blows at the enemy before their dispersed forces could collect from different quarters: if they did so, the insurrection burst forth again in the provinces they had evacuated; if they remained long together, famine, in an inland country so plentifully intersected by arid plains or desert ridges, soon paralysed any considerable offensive operations. The truth of the old saying, "if you make war in Spain with a small army you are beaten, if with a large one starved," was never more strongly evinced than in the Peninsular campaigns; and although Wellington frequently experienced this difficulty in the severest manner, when he advanced into the interior of the country, yet his army, in the general case, from the vicinity to the sea-coast of Portugal or the water-carriage of its principal rivers, was in comparison abundantly supplied with provisions; and though he was in general inferior in number to the enemy, sometimes to a very great degree, when he hazarded a battle, yet the discrepancy in this respect was never so great as the extraordinary difference in the sum total of the regular forces which the two nations had in the field might have led us to expect (2).

Military
force of
Spain at the
commence-
ment of the
contest.

The military establishment of Spain, when the contest commenced at the signal of the French cannon in the streets of Madrid on the 2d May, was far from being considerable. It consisted, in 1807, of 80,000 troops of the line, including 16,000 cavalry, and 50,000 militia; but the ranks were far from being complete, and the total effective force, including the militia, was under a hundred thousand men. From this

may stand in need. Unless when employed in a separate command, he seeks to narrow the sphere of his exertions and responsibility. He leads on his troops in battle with the most admirable courage; but in cantonments his habitual exertions are limited to superintending the police of his troops, seeing that their exercises are duly performed, and transmitting reports to his superiors.—See Fox, i. 231, 235, 256, 257. Notwithstanding his admirable general candour, the French general appears, in this graphic description, to have been somewhat influenced by the prejudices of his country, though the outline of the sketch is undoubtedly correct. But the military is essentially a practical art; and notwithstanding all their riding and hunting, experience soon made the English generals as expert at all the really useful parts of their profession as the more inquisitive and instructed Frenchmen; and they are not the worst soldiers who, without dis-

quieting themselves at the duties or designs of their superiors, are at all times ready with undaunted courage to carry them into effect.

(1) Viz. : In Spain :

	Infantry.	Cavalry.
Dupont's corps, . . .	24,428	4,056
Moncey's do. . . .	29,341	3,860
Bessières' do. . . .	19,096	1,884
Duhesme's do. . . .	12,724	2,033
Imperial Guard, . . .	6,412	3,300
In Portugal :—		
Junot's corps, . . .	24,978	1,771
	116,979	16,901

Besides 44,374 infantry, and 4,685 cavalry, who arrived by the 1st August, 1808, on theebro.—Fox, iv. *Table 1, Appendix.*

(2) Napier, i. 47. Fox, i. 204.

number were to be deducted sixteen thousand, under Romana in Holstein, six thousand in Tuscany, or on the march thence to the north of Germany, and the garrisons of the Canary and Balearic isles; so that the troops that could be brought into the field did not at the utmost exceed seventy thousand, of whom twenty thousand were already partially concentrated in the Alentejo and Oporto, and the only considerable body of the remainder, about ten thousand strong, was in the lines of St.-Roque, at Gibraltar. The composition of this force was still less formidable than its numerical amount. Enervated by a long Continental peace, the soldiers had lost much of the spirit and discipline of war; the men, enrolled for the most part by voluntary enlistment, and only in case of necessity, and in some of the provinces by conscription, were sober, active, and brave; but the officers were, in most instances, extremely deficient, both in the knowledge and proper feelings of their profession. They were, indeed, for the most part, composed of men of family, a certain proof of descent being necessary to obtaining commissions in two-thirds of the military offices at the disposal of government; but the restriction afforded no security either for extended information or generous sentiments in a country where four hundred thousand hidalgos, too proud to work, too indolent to learn, loitered away an inglorious life, basking in the sun, or lounging in the billiard-rooms or coffeehouses of the great towns. From this ignorant and conceited class the great bulk of the officers of all ranks were taken; not more than three or four of the high nobility held situations in the army when the war broke out. Leading an indolent life in towns, sleeping half the day in uncomfortable barracks, associating indiscriminately with the common soldiers, many of whom were superior in birth and intelligence to themselves, and knowing no enjoyment but idleness, gallantry, and billiards, they were as deficient in the energy and vigour which the Revolution had developed in the French, as in the sentiments of honour and integrity which the habits of a monarchy, tempered by freedom, had nursed in the English army. It was easy to foresee that no reliance could be placed, in a protracted struggle, on this debilitated force; yet such is the importance of discipline and military organization, even in their most defective form, in warlike operations, that the only great success achieved in the field by the Spaniards during the whole war was owing to its exertions (1).

Military force and physical character of Portugal. Though Portugal had a population of somewhat above three millions, instead of the twelve millions which were contained in Spain, yet it possessed in itself the elements of a more efficient military force than its powerful neighbour. The invaluable institution of *ordenanzas*, or local militia, had survived the usurpation of Spain; and during twenty-seven campaigns which followed the restoration of the independence of the country in 1640, it had rendered more important services to the state than the regular army. By the Portuguese law, every person is legally obliged to join the battalions arrayed in defence of the country, from the age of eighteen to that of sixty years; these battalions consist of 250 men each, under the command of the chief landed proprietors of the district; and such is the native strength of a country so defended, that, with a very little aid from England, it enabled the Portuguese for two centuries to maintain their independence. The physical peculiarities of the country rendered it singularly well adapted for the active operations of an irregular force of this description. Intersected in many directions, but especially to the north of the Tagus, by lofty sierras, terminating in sharp inaccessible cliffs, which rise, even in that

(1) Foy, ii. 216, 221. Nap. i. 46. Jom. ii. 52.

favoured latitude, almost into the region of eternal snow; destitute for the most part of roads, and such as do exist perpetually crossing rivers without bridges, or ravines affording the most favourable positions for a defensive army; covered with Moorish towers or castles perched on the summits of rocks, or villages in general surrounded with defensible walls, inhabited by a bold, active, and independent peasantry, long habituated to the use of arms, and backed by impregnable mountain ridges washed by the sea, Portugal presented the most advantageous fulcrum which Europe could afford whereon to rest the military efforts of England. But these advantages were all dependent on the physical situation and natural character of the inhabitants, or the consequences of their former and more glorious epochs; for at the period when the Peninsular war broke out, no country could be in a more debilitated state, as far as concerns either political vigour or military efficiency. Corruption pervaded every department of the public service, and to such an extent as to be apparently irremediable; the army, ill fed, worse paid, and overrun by a swarm of titled locusts who devoured the pay of the soldier for doing nothing, was both an unpopular and inefficient service. Forty thousand men, including eight thousand cavalry, of whom the troops of the line nominally consisted, might have furnished an excellent base whereon, with the addition of the militia and ordenanzas, to construct a powerful military establishment; but such were the abuses with which it was infested, and the ignorance of the officers in command, that hardly any reliance could be placed on this force; and it was not till they were recast in the mould of British integrity, and led by the intrepidity of British officers, that the Portuguese arms reappeared with their ancient lustre on the theatre of Europe (1).

Amount, quality, and disposition of the French army at this period in Spain. In the disposition of his forces when the contest commenced, Napoleon had principally in view to overawe and secure the metropolis, conceiving that Madrid was like Paris or Vienna, and that there was little chance of the country holding out for any length of time against the power in command of the capital. The Imperial Guards, with the corps of Moncey and Dupont, were assembled in that city or its immediate neighbourhood; and as this concentration of above fifty thousand men in the heart of the kingdom exposed the communication with the Pyrenees to danger, the Emperor was indefatigable in his endeavours to form a powerful corps of reserve at Burgos and Vittoria, under Marshal Bessières; and with such success were his efforts attended, that by the beginning of June this able officer had twenty-three thousand men under his standards. At the same period the troops under Duhesme, in the fortresses of Barcelona and Figueras in Catalonia, was above fifteen thousand men, sufficient, it was hoped, to overawe the discontented in that province. Thus, after making every allowance for the detachments necessary to maintain the capital and frontier fortresses, and keep up the communications, fifty thousand men, including eighty guns, were ready, in the north and centre of Spain, to commence offensive operations; a force amply sufficient, if concentrated, to crush any attempt at resistance which could have been made in the Peninsula. But the composition of these troops was very unequal; and though the Imperial Guard and some of the veteran divisions in the capital were in the finest state of discipline and efficiency, yet this was by no means the case with the whole army; and though all partook of the admirable organization of the French service, yet the ranks were for the most part filled up with raw conscripts, hardly yet instructed in the rudiments of the military art. Had it not been for the excellence of the ske-

(1) Foy, ii. 1. 88. Napier, i. 27.

letons on which they were formed, and the officers by whom they were directed, the difference between them and the insurgent peasantry would not have been very considerable. They were very different from the soldiers of Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland; the enormous consumption of life in those bloody campaigns had almost destroyed the incomparable army which, disciplined on the heights of Boulogne, had so long chained victory to the imperial eagles (1).

Such was the situation of the French army when the insurrection at once broke out in every part of the Peninsula. It burst forth with such force and unanimity in all the provinces, that it could not have been more simultaneous if an electric shock had at once struck the whole population. With the intelligence of the commotion and massacre at Madrid, a convulsive thrill ran through every fibre of Spain; the sense of their wrongs, the humiliation of their situation, the thirst for vengeance, burst at once upon the people, and one universal cry to arms was heard from one end of the kingdom to the other. Every where the peasantry met together in tumultuous crowds; from town to town, from village to village, from hamlet to hamlet, the news flew with incredible rapidity; and as the French troops, though in possession of the capital and frontier fortresses, were by no means scattered over the country, the proceedings of the insurgents hardly any where met with molestation. The fever was universal: the young and the old, the feeble and the strong, the shepherds of the mountains and the cultivators of the plains, the citizens of the towns and the peasantry of the country, all joined in the general transport. Arms were quickly sent for and obtained from the nearest depots in the district; officers and colonels of battalions elected; provisional juntas of government formed in the chief towns, to direct the affairs of the provinces; and in the absence of all central authority, local governments soon sprang up in every part of the kingdom. Spain awoke from the slumber of centuries, and started at once to her feet with the vigour and resolution of an armed man. Passing over in disdain the degradation or insignificance of the Bourbon dynasty, the people came forth fresh for the combat, glowing with the recollections of the Cid and Pelajo, and the long struggle with the Moors, and the heroic days of the monarchy. Nor was this extraordinary and unanimous burst of feeling lost in mere empty ebullition; resolving, with a facility peculiar to themselves, into the pristine elements of the monarchy, the different provinces, with unparalleled rapidity, formed separate and independent juntas of government, which early gave a systematic direction to their efforts, and effected the formation of numerous and enthusiastic legions for their defence. It was easy to foresee how prejudicial to any combined or efficient general operations this unavoidable partition of the directing power into so many separate and independent assemblies must in the end necessarily prove; but, in the first instance, it tended strongly to promote the progress of the insurrection, by establishing in every province a centre of insulated, detached, and often ill-advised, but still vigorous operations. Before the middle of June numerous bodies were raised, armed, and to a certain degree disciplined in all the provinces; and a hundred and fifty thousand men were ready to support the regular army. Even the presence of the French garrisons in the capital and the frontier fortresses, could not repress the general effervescence. Almost all the regular soldiers in Madrid escaped, and joined the insurgent bands of New Castile; and even under

(1) Napoléon's Notes, App. No. 3. Napier, vol. i. Thiebault, 64, 72. Napier, i. 47. Duhesme's Guerre en Catalogne, 17, 21.

the guns of their strong castles of Montjuic and St. Juan de Fernando alarming symptoms of disaffection appeared in Barcelona and Gigueras, and their Spanish garrisons almost all made their escape to the enemy (1).

Frightful disorders which signalized the commencement of the insurrection in some cities.

In the northern provinces, especially Catalonia, Asturias, Léon, and Galicia, the insurrection took place, and the provincial juntas were established in a comparatively regular manner, without any of the usual frightful ebullitions of popular passion; but it was far otherwise in the cities of the south and east of Spain. The usual vehemence and intemperance of the unbridled populace of great towns was there increased by the fiery intermixture of Moorish blood. Frightful atrocities were committed. At Badajoz, the governor, who endeavoured to restrain the furious multitude which surrounded his house clamouring for arms, was dragged out and murdered: numbers were massacred, on the supposition of being agents or partizans of the French, at Carthagena, Granada, Carolina, Cadiz, and other places: and at Cadiz a fearful altercation took place between the governor, Solano, who refused to commence the hostilities which were required of him against the French squadron of five ships of the line, which had lain in the harbour since the battle of Trafalgar, and the ardent populace, who clamoured for an immediate attack. Independently of a secret leaning to the French interest, he naturally hesitated, as an officer of prudence and honour, at taking the decisive step of attacking, without any previous declaration of war or authority from the executive power, a squadron of an allied state which had taken refuge in Cadiz during the hostilities with Great Britain; and he openly expressed an apprehension that, during these dissensions, the English would break in, and destroy the fleet of both contending parties. Finding that the popular effervescence was becoming too strong to be openly resisted, he endeavoured to temporize, called a council of war, and gave symptoms of submission to the public wish; but the populace, distrusting his sincerity, broke into his hotel, and chased him into the house of Mr. Strange, an English merchant, where he was discovered by a blood-thirsty set of assassins, who dragged him from his place of concealment, notwithstanding the courageous efforts of Mrs. Strange to save his life, and massacred him while on the road towards the gallows. He met his fate with dignity and composure, bidding his heroic supporter, Mrs. Strange, farewell till eternity. Don Thomas Morla, the second in command, was next day nominated to the government of Cadiz by popular acclamation, and immediately entered on the duties of his important office (2).

At Valencia the first burst of popular indignation was accompanied with still more frightful atrocities. Three hundred French merchants or traders had long been established in that city, and when the insurrection broke out there in the end of May, they all, as a measure of precaution, took refuge in, or were sent to the citadel, where they were supposed to be safe from any violence that might arise. An ardent, resolute, and able Franciscan monk, Juan Rico, early acquired by his powers of public speaking the lead in the movement, but the junta elected for the government was composed, as in most other instances, of a mixture of persons of noble and plebeian origin. The people, however, early conceived a jealousy of their nobles; and to such a height did that feeling arrive, that the commander of the troops, Don Fernando Saavedra, was massacred before the eyes of the Conde Cervellon, a nobleman of the popular side, to whose palace

Massacres with which the revolution in Valencia commenced. May 24.

May 29.

(1) Tor. i. 173, 175. South. i. 335, 337. Du-lesme, 11, 12. Foy, iv. 32, 33. Lond. i. 80, 81. Napier, i. 55. (2) South. i. 341, 356. Nell. i. 134, 143. Tor. i. 209, 214. Foy, i. 201, 208.

he had fled for safety. This deed of blood was but the prelude to still greater atrocities, and the popular appetite for slaughter being once aroused, the multitude fell, as usual in such circumstances, under the direction of the most worthless and sanguinary leaders. In Valencia there appeared at this period one of those infamous characters who degrade the human race by their cruel deeds, and who is worthy of a place in history beside Robespierre, Collot-d'Herbois, and the other political fanatics whose atrocities have for ever stained the annals of the French Revolution. P. Balthasar Calvo, a canon of Madrid,

June 1. denounced the fugitives in the citadel to the mob as being in correspondence with Murat for the purpose of betraying that stronghold to the French troops. As invariably ensues, in such moments of excitement, strong assertions passed for proofs with the multitude, and no difficulty was experienced in finding persons to undertake the most sanguinary designs. A general massacre of the unfortunate French was resolved on, and its

June 5. execution fixed for the 5th June. Mingling perfidy with cruelty, Calvo, on the evening of that day, repaired to the citadel, and told the trembling victims, who already had conceived, from vague rumours, apprehensions of their fate, that their destruction was resolved on, and that their only remaining chance of safety was to avail themselves of the means of escape which, from an impulse of Christian charity, he had prepared for them. Trusting to these perfidious assurances, the unhappy victims agreed to his proposal, and two hundred of them set forth by the wicket through the walls, which, according to his promise, was left open for them. No sooner had this flight begun, than Calvo, with a band of assassins, hastened to the spot, and spreading the cry that the French were escaping, so worked upon the passions of the populace assembled as to induce them to join his murderers, and they were all massacred on the spot. Wearing with slaughter, and yielding to the solicitations of some benevolent ecclesiastics, who earnestly besought them to desist, the assassins at length agreed to spare those who still survived in the citadel; but no sooner did Calvo hear of this returning feeling of humanity than he hastened to the spot, and conducted the remaining prisoners outside the walls to a ruined tower called the Tour de Cuarte. There he spread a false report that papers had been found upon them, proving a design to deliver up the citadel to the French, and the mob, again infuriated, fell upon their victims, and dispatched them without mercy. Above three hundred French citizens, wholly innocent of the misdeeds of their Emperor, perished on that dreadful night; the junta were overawed; the magistrates of the city, elected by popular suffrage, powerless, as might have been expected, in repressing their excesses; and Calvo, drunk with blood, not only dispatched his orders from the citadel during the whole massacre like a sovereign prince, but in the morning was named a member of the junta, at the very moment that Rico was concerting measures for his apprehension, and took his seat with his clothes yet drenched with gore, at the council-board of government! It affords some consolation to the friends of virtue to know that the triumph of this miscreant was not of long duration. Excited almost to insanity by his execrable success, he openly aspired to supreme power, and had already given orders for the apprehension of the other members of the government, when a sense of their common danger made them unite, like the Convention on the 9th Thermidor, against the tyrant. He was suddenly arrested and sent to Minorca, before the mob, who certainly would have rescued him and massacred the junta, were aware of his seizure. There he was strangled in prison, and the government having regained their authority by this vigorous act, two hundred of his associates underwent the

same fate; a severe but necessary deed of public justice, which at least rescued the nation generally from the disgrace of these atrocious deeds, and indicating a very different standard of public morality from that which prevailed in France during its Revolution, where not only were such crimes almost invariably committed with impunity, but their perpetrators elevated to the highest situations in the state (1).

These deplorable disorders sufficiently demonstrated that even the best of causes could not obviate the dangers of popular insurrection; and that, unless the higher orders and holders of property early and courageously exert themselves to obtain its direction, a revolutionary movement, even when called forth by the national defence, speedily falls under the guidance of the most depraved of the people. But by adopting this prudent and patriotic course, the higher classes at Seville succeeded not only in preserving their own city from military atrocities, but acquired an ascendancy which was attended with the greatest public benefit, and gave their junta almost the general management of the affairs of Spain. There, as elsewhere in the south, the public effervescence began with murder, and the Count d'Aguila, one of the chief magistrates and most enlightened citizens, who became the innocent object of their suspicion, fell a

May 25. victim to the ungovernable passions of the populace, who, when too late, lamented the irreparable crime they had committed. Speedily, how-

May 27. ever, the junta was elected; and, happily, though all ranks were represented, a preponderance of votes in the twenty-three members of which it was composed, were in the hands of the nobility. The wisdom of the choice which had been made, soon appeared in the measures which were adopted; immediately they dispatched couriers to Cadiz and Algeziras to secure the co-operation of the naval and military forces who were there assembled; and by the aid of CASTANOS, the commander of the former, who was at the head of the troops before Gibraltar in the camp of St.-Roch, and who had already entered into communication with Sir Hew Dalrymple, the governor of that fortress, the entire co-operation of the army was secured. A violent demagogue, named Tap-y-Nunez, who had acquired a great sway over the populace, and who required that the nobility should be expelled from the junta, was arrested and sent to Cadiz; and this necessary act of vigour confirmed the authority of the provisional government. At its head was Don Francisco Saavedra, who had formerly been minister of finance, and P. Gil de Sevilla, who had both been sufferers under Godoy's administration; and the combined prudence and energy of their measures formed a striking contrast to the conceit, declamation, and imbecility which, in many other quarters of the Peninsula, afterwards rendered nugatory all the enthusiasm of the people. The regular troops were immediately directed towards the Sierra Morena to secure the passes; a general levy of all persons between the years of 18 and 45 was ordered; subsidiary juntas formed in all the towns of

(1) Tor. i. 236, 244. Foy, iii. 244, 247. South, i. 363, 370.

Only one prisoner escaped this hideous massacre. Chance had selected for his murderer a man whom he had frequently relieved in prison; the wretch recognised his benefactor, and though he twice raised his dagger to strike him, yet twice a sense of pity arrested his uplifted arm, and at length he suffered him to escape, in the obscurity of the night, among the populace. An extraordinary instance of presence of mind occurred in the daughter of the Count de Cervellon. The people, distrustful of their leaders, had insisted that the mail from Madrid

should be brought to the Count, and the letters it contained publicly read; hardly was it opened when one from the *Auerdo Real* was discovered, to Murat, exculpating himself from the share he had taken in the insurrection, and demanding troops. The courageous young lady, who was present, instantly seized the letter, and tore it in pieces in presence of the multitude, saying it related to her own private affairs; thereby saving the whole members of the junta from immediate death, though at the imminent hazard of her own life.—See SOUTHEY, i. 367, and TORRES, i. 234, 235.

Andalusia; the great foundery of cannon at Seville, the only one in the south of Spain, put into full activity, and arms and clothing manufactured; war

declared in a formal manner against France, and a manifesto issued, which not only eloquently defended the national cause, but contained the most admirable instructions as to the mode of successfully combating the formidable enemy with whom they had to contend (1). This declaration from so great a city, containing 90,000 inhabitants, and possessing all the nobility of the south of Spain within its walls, was of the utmost consequence, and gave, both in reality and in the eyes of Europe, a degree of consistence to the insurrection which it could never otherwise have obtained (2).

The first important blow struck at the French was delivered at Cadiz. The fleet there, consisting of five ships of the line and one frigate, early excited the jealousy of the inhabitants, to whom the French flag had become an object of perfect abhorrence; while Lord Collingwood, at the head of the English fleet, which lay off the harbour, effectually prevented their departure. To withdraw as far as possible from the danger, Rosilly, the French admiral, warped his ships in the canal of Caracca to such a distance as to be beyond the reach both of the fire of the castles and the fleet; and at the same time endeavoured, by negotiating, to gain time for the

(1) Foy, iii. 204, 203. South. i. 342, 346. Tor. x. 204, 207, 215. Espanol. i. 13.

(2) In this proclamation, which may be considered as the national declaration of the Junta of Seville against France, it was not less justly than eloquently observed: —“The King, to whom we all swore allegiance with emotions of joy unprecedented in history, has been decoyed from us: the fundamental laws of our monarchy have been trampled under foot: our property, customs, religion, laws, wives, and children, are threatened with destruction—and a foreign power has done this: done it too, not by force of arms, but by deceit and treachery; by converting the very persons who call themselves the heads of our government into instruments of these atrocious acts. It therefore became indispensable to break our shackles; and to demonstrate that noble enrage with which in all former ages the Spanish people have defended their monarch, their laws, their honour, their religion. The people of Seville have assembled, and, through the medium of all their magistrates and constituted authorities, and the most respectable individuals of every rank, formed this Supreme Council of Government. We accept the heroic trust; we swear to discharge it; and we reckon on the strength and energy of the whole nation. We have again proclaimed Ferdinand VII; again sworn allegiance to him; sworn to die in his defence: this was the signal of our union, and it will prove the forerunner of happiness and glory to Spain.

“The abdication, extorted by such detestable artifices from Ferdinand, was void, from want of authority in him who made it. The monarchy was not his to bestow, nor is Spain composed of animals subject to the absolute control of their owners. His title to the throne was founded on his royal descent and the fundamental laws of the realm. His resignation is void, from the state of compulsion in which it was made, from the want of consent in the nation to whom it related, from the want of concurrence in the foreign princes, the next heirs in succession to the throne. The French Emperor summoned a few deputies, devoted to himself, to deliberate in a foreign country, and surrounded by foreign bayonets, on the most sacred concerns of the nation; while he publicly declared a respectful letter, written to him by Ferdinand VII when Prince of Asturias, was a criminal act, injurious to the

rights of the sovereign! He has resorted to every other means to deceive us; he has distributed, with boundless profusion, libels to enrrupt public opinion, in which, under the mask of respect for the laws and our holy religion, he covertly insults both. He assures us that the Supreme Pontiff sanctions his proceedings, while it is notorious that he has despoiled him of his dominions, and forced him to dismiss his cardinals, to prevent him from conducting the government of the church according to its fundamental constitution. Every consideration calls on us to unite and frustrate views so atrocious. No revolution exists in Spain; our sole object is to defend all we hold most sacred against the invader who would treacherously despoil us of our religion, our monarch, our laws. Let us, therefore, sacrifice every thing in a cause so just; and, if we are to lose all, let us lose it combating like brave men. Let all, therefore, unite; the wisest and ablest, in refuting the falsehoods propagated by the enemy; the church, in imploring the assistance of the God of hosts; the young and active, in marching against the enemy. The Almighty will vouchsafe his protection to so just a cause; Europe will applaud our efforts, and hasten to our assistance; Italy, Germany, the North, suffering under the despotism of France, will eagerly avail themselves of the example set by Spain to shake off the yoke, and recover their liberty, their laws, their independence, of which they have been robbed by that nation.”

Prudent and Special and prudent instructions were given to their troops. at the same time given for the conduct of the war. “All general actions are to be avoided as perfectly hopeless and highly dangerous: a war of partisans is what suits both our national character and physical circumstances. Each province should have its junta, its generals, its local government, but there should be three generals-in-chief; one for Andalusia, Murcia, and Lower Estremadura; one for Galicia, Leon, the Castiles, Asturia; one for Valencia, Arragon, Catalonia. France has never dominated over us, nor set foot with impunity in our territory. We have often mastered her, not by deceit, but force of arms; we have made her kings prisoners, and the nation tremble. We are the same Spaniards, and France and Europe and the world shall see we have not degenerated from our ancestors.”—*Proclamation of the Junta of Seville, June 6, 1808; SOUTHEY, i. 389, 393.*

arrival of the succours under Dupont, which he was aware were rapidly approaching through La Mancha and the Sierra Morena. Equally sensible, however, with his skilful opponent, of the importance of time in the operation, the Spanish general Morla insisted upon an immediate surrender, and constructed batteries in such places as to command the French ships even in their new stations. Lord Collingwood, who, with the English fleet in the bay, was an impatient spectator of these hostile preparations, offered the assistance of the British squadron to ensure the reduction of the enemy; but the offer was courteously declined, from a wish, no doubt, that England might have no ground for any claim to the prizes which were expected. At length, on the 9th June, a sufficient number of guns being mounted, a heavy fire was opened upon the French ships, which being in a situation where they could not make any reply, soon produced a sensible effect, and led to a negotiation

June 14. which terminated in the unconditional surrender of the whole French fleet five days afterwards. Thus was the last remnant of that proud armament, which was intended to convey the invincible legions of Napoléon to the British shores, finally reft from the arms of France, and that, too, by the forces of the very allies who were then ranged by their side for our subjugation (1).

Insurrection in Asturias, Galicia, Catalonia and Arragon. In the northern provinces the insurrection spread with much fewer circumstances of atrocity, but an almost equal degree of enthusiasm. Excepting Barcelona, Figueras, St.-Sebastians, and a few other places where the presence of the French garrisons overawed the people, they every where rose in arms against their oppressors. A junta for the Asturias was formed before the end of May at Oviedo, the capital of Asturias; the first which was organized in Spain, and which thus gave to that province a second time the honour of having taken the lead in the deliverance of the Peninsula. The first step of this body was to dispatch deputies to England, soliciting arms, ammunition, and money, whose arrival produced an extraordinary impression, as will immediately be shown, in the British isles. The Junta of Galicia, secure behind their almost inaccessible mountains, took the most vigorous measures to organize the insurrection;

June 29. and not only arrayed all the regular soldiers at Ferrol and Corunna under its standard, but summoned the Spanish troops, ten thousand strong, to join them without delay; a summons which was immediately obeyed by the whole body, who set out for Galicia by the route of Traz os Montes, and thus laid the foundation of a powerful force on the flank and rear of the invader's communications. A junta was formed at Lerida, which assumed the general direction of the affairs of Catalonia, and soon arrayed thirty thousand hardy mountaineers under the national colours; while, nothing daunted by the proximity to France, and the alarming vicinity of powerful French corps,

June 2. the Arragonese proclaimed Ferdinand VII at Saragossa; and after choosing the young and gallant Palafox for their commander, who had attended Ferdinand to Bayonne, and escaped from that fortress, issued a proclamation, in which they declared their resolution, should the royal family be detained in captivity or destroyed by Napoléon, of exercising their right of election in favour of the Archduke Charles, as grandson of Charles III and one of the Imperial branch of the Spanish family (2).

Measures of Napoléon in regard to the insurrection.

From the outset Napoléon was fully impressed with the importance and danger of this contest, and in an especial manner alive to the vital consequence of preserving entire the communications

(1) Tor. i. 217, 218. Foy, iii. 213, 214. Collingwood, ii. 43.

(2) South. i. 337, 341, 372, 378. Foy, iii. 190, 192. Tor. i. 181, 195, 215, 250. Napier, i. 57.

of the army, which had been pushed forward into the very heart of the kingdom, with the French frontier. Murat, after the catastrophe of 2d May, had been taken ill and withdrawn from Madrid, and was on his route to take possession of the throne destined for him on the shores of Naples; and he had been succeeded in the general direction of affairs at Madrid by Savary. Napoléon, on his departure from Bayonne, spoke to him in such a way as sufficiently demonstrated his growing anxiety for the issue of the contest, as well as the sagacity with which he had already discerned in what way it was most likely to be brought to a successful issue (1). Reinforcements were poured into Spain with all possible expedition; Burgos, Vittoria, and all the principal towns along the great road to Madrid from Bayonne, were strongly occupied; General Dupont, with his whole corps, was moved from La Mancha towards the Sierra Morena and Andalusia, in order to overawe Seville and Cordova, and, if possible, disengage the French squadron at Cadiz; and Marshal Moncey detached into Valencia, with instructions to put down, at all hazards, the violent and blood-thirsty revolution which had burst forth in that province (2).

Proceedings
of the Notables
assembled at Bay-
onne,
June 15.

But while making every preparation for military operations, the French Emperor, at the same time, actively pursued those civil changes at Bayonne, to which, even more than the terror of his arms, he trusted for subjugating the minds of men in the Spanish

Peninsula. The Assembly of Notables met at that fortress on the 15th June, agreeably to the summons which they had received; and they comprised the principal nobility and a large proportion of the leading characters in Spain. Having been selected by the junta of government at Madrid, without the form even of any election by the people, they were entirely in the French interest, and the mere creatures of the Emperor's will. Their proceedings formed a singular and instructive contrast to the generous and fearless bursts of indignant hostility with which the resignations at Bayonne had been received by the middling and lower orders through the whole of Spain. Even before the Assembly had formally met, such of them as had arrived at Bay-

June 8.

onne published an address to their countrymen, in which they indulged in the usual vein of flattery to the astonishing abilities and power of the august Emperor, and strongly advised them to accept his brother for their sovereign (3). The levees of Joseph were attended by all the chief

(1) "The essential point," said he, "at this moment, is to occupy as many places as possible, in order to have the means of diffusing the principles which we wish to inculcate upon the people; but to avoid the dangers of such a dispersion of force, you must be wise, moderate, and observe the strictest discipline. For God's sake, permit no pillage. I have heard nothing of the line which Castanos, who commands at the camp of St-Roch, will take; Murat has promised much on that head, but you know what reliance is to be placed on his assurances. Neglect nothing which can secure the rapidity and exactness of your communications; that is the cardinal point, and spare nothing which can secure you good information. Above all, take care to avoid any misfortune; its consequences would be incalculable."—SAVARY, iii. 247, 251.

(2) Sav. iii. 247, 249. Nap. i. 59.

Proclamation of the Grandees of Spain to their countrymen. (3) "An irresistible sense of duty, an object as sacred as it is important, has made us quit our homes, and led us to the invincible Emperor of the French. We admit it; the sight of his glory, of his power, was fitted to dazzle us; but we arrived here already determined to address to him our reiterated supplications for the prosperity of a

monarchy of which the fate is inseparably united with our own. But judge of our surprise, when we were received by his imperial and royal Majesty with a degree of kindness and humanity not less admirable than his power. He has no other desire but that of our preservation and happiness. He gives us a sovereign to govern us, it is his august brother Joseph, whose virtues are the admiration of his subjects. If he is engaged in modifying and correcting our institutions, it is in order that we may live in peace and happiness. If he is desirous that our finances should receive a new organization, it is in order to render our navy and army powerful and formidable to our enemies, Spaniards! worthy of a better lot, avoid the terrible anarchy which threatens you. What benefit can you derive from the troubles fomented by malevolence or folly? Anarchy is the greatest curse which God can inflict upon mankind; during its reign unbridled license sacks, destroys, burns every thing; worthy citizens, men of property, are invariably the first victims, and an abyss of horror follows its triumphs."—*Proclamation of the Grandees of Spain to their countrymen, dated Bayonne, 8th June, 1808*; NELLEATO, ii. 214, No. 70.

grandees of Spain; every day appeared to add to the strength of the party who were inclined to support his elevation to the throne. All the principal counsellors of Ferdinand, Cevallos, Escoiquiz, and others, not only took the oath of allegiance to the new monarch, but petitioned to be allowed to retain their honours and employments under the new dynasty (1). The Spanish corps in Holstein took the oath of allegiance to Joseph; but under a reserva-

tion that his appointment was ratified by a free Cortes, convened in Spain according to the fundamental customs of the monarchy. A procla-

mation was addressed by the new King, in which he accepted the cession of the crown of Spain, made to him by his august brother Napoléon I, and appointed Murat his lieutenant-general. The consent of Russia was already secured to all the changes in the Peninsula; and, in order to reconcile

the other courts in Europe to them, an elaborate circular note was addressed to all their cabinets, in which it was announced that "the occupation of the kingdoms of Spain and Portugal, the regeneration of these fine nations, the creation of the fleets of Cadiz and the Tagus, would be a mortal stroke to the power of England, and put the finishing hand to the triumph of the maritime system, in which all the Continental powers were so warmly interested." Finally, on the 15th June, ninety-two deputies, out of the one hundred and fifty summoned, assembled at Bayonne, and formally accepted the constitution prepared for them by the Emperor Napoléon (2).

Constitution
of Bayonne
given by
Napoléon to
the Span-
iards.

By this constitution it was provided that the crown was to be vested in Joseph and his heirs-male; whom failing, the Emperor and his heirs-male; and in default of both, to the other brothers of the imperial family, in their order of seniority, but under the condition that the crown was not to be united on the same head with another. The legislature consisted of a senate of eighty members, nominated by the King; a cortes, consisting of one hundred and seventy-two members, arranged in the following proportions and order:—twenty-five archbishops and bishops, and twenty-five grandees on the first bench; sixty-two deputies of the provinces of Spain and the Indies; thirty of the principal towns; fifteen of the merchants and manufacturers; and fifteen of the arts and sciences. The first fifty, composing the peers, were appointed by the King, but could not be displaced by him; the second class were elected by the provinces and municipalities; the third was appointed by the King out of lists presented to him by the tribunals and chambers of commerce, and the universities. The deliberations of the Cortes were not to be public; none of their proceedings were to be published, under the penalties of high treason; the finances and expenditure were to be settled by them at one sitting for three years; the colonies were constantly to have a deputation of twenty-two persons at the seat of government to superintend their interests; all exclusive exemptions from taxation were abolished; entails permitted only to the amount of 20,000 piastres, and with the consent of the King; an alliance offensive and defen-

Degrading
letter of
Escoiquiz
and Ferdi-
nand's coun-
sellors to
Joseph.

(1) "The subscribers have given the strongest proofs of their fidelity to the former government; they trust it will be considered as the surest pledge of their sincerity of the oath which they now take of obedience to the new constitution of their country, and fidelity to the King of Spain, Joseph I. The generosity of your Catholic Majesty, your goodness and humanity, induce us to hope that, considering the need which these princes have of a continuation of their services in the situations which they respectively held under the old dynasty, the magnanimity of your

august Majesty will induce you to continue them in the enjoyments of the estates and offices which they formerly held. Assured thus of the continuance of the posts which they have hitherto enjoyed, they will ever prove faithful subjects to your Majesty, and true Spaniards, ready to obey blindly even the smallest wish which your Majesty may express." Signed, SAN CARLOS, JUAN ESCOQUIZ, MARQUIS AYERLEE, and others, 22d June, 1808.—NELLEBTO, i. 250, 251.

(2) Thib. vi. 395, 401. South. i. 400, 409. Nell. ii. 214, 224, 226.

sive was concluded with France, and a promise held out of the establishment of the liberty of the press within two years after the commencement of the new constitution (1).

Every thing was conducted by the Junta of Notables at Bayonne to the entire satisfaction of Napoléon. The grandees of Spain rivalled his own senate in graceful adulation of his achievements, in obsequious submission to his will. When the constitution was read to them, it was received with transport, and adopted by acclamation; thunders of applause shook the hall when the new King made his appearance

in his royal robes; when he retired, two medals were unanimously voted to record the memorable acts of Bayonne; and the Assembly, in a body, hastened to the Emperor to lay at his feet the homage of their gratitude for the unparalleled services which he had rendered to their country. There was in the flattery of the Spanish nobles a mixture of studied servility with Oriental grandiloquence, which was novel and agreeable to a sovereign who had exhausted all the arts of European adulation (2). Two days after, the new King set out for the capital of his dominions; he was accompanied as far as the frontier by his imperial brother in a splendid cortége of an hundred carriages, and crossed the Bidassoa amidst the roar of artillery

and all the pomp of more than regal magnificence. On the 20th, Napoléon himself set out from Bayonne, having first given such instructions to Savary as he deemed sufficient to bring the insurrection, which had now broken out on all sides, to a successful issue; and returned by Pau, where he visited the birthplace of Henry IV, Bordeaux, la Vendée, the mouth of the Loire, Nantes, and Tours, to St.-Cloud, which he reached in the middle of

August. Meanwhile, Ferdinand VII, resigning himself to his chains, wrote to the Emperor from Valençay, thanking him for his condescension,

and requesting permission to meet him on his route to lay his homage at his feet (3), which was not granted; and Charles IV, after testifying

his entire satisfaction with the palace, parks, and country around Compeigne, requested permission, on account of his health, to pass the winter

in a warmer climate, which was graciously accorded, and in the autumn he moved to Marseilles, where he lingered out in ease and obscurity the remainder of his inglorious life (4).

The ministry appointed by Joseph, before his departure from Bayonne, was mainly taken from the counsellors of the Prince of Asturias; and this selection, joined to their ready acceptance of their new dignities, throws a

(1) See constitution of Bayonne, Thib. vi. 402, 403; and Tor. i. 292, 295.

(2) "Sire!" said M. Azanza, the President of the Notables, "the Junta of Spain has accomplished the glorious task for which your Majesty convened it in this city. It has accepted, with as much eagerness as freedom, the great charter which fixes upon a sure foundation the happiness of Spain. Happily for our country, an overruling Providence has employed your irresistible band to snatch it from the abyss into which it was about to be precipitated. It is well that it was irresistible; for an inexplicable blindness has caused those who ought most to rejoice at this benefit to misapprehend it. But all Spain, sire! will open its eyes. It will see that it required a total regeneration, and that from your Majesty alone it could obtain it. Public evil was at its height; the agents of a feeble government devoured the public patrimony, or extended unceasingly the limits of arbitrary power: the finances were a chaos; the public debt an abyss; the period of total dissolution was approaching. To what other power

but that of your imperial and royal Majesty could it be reserved, not merely to arrest the evil, but entirely to remove it? Such are the wonders, sire, which you have wrought in a few days, and which fill the world with astonishment."—SOUTHEY, i. 436, 437.

(3) "My uncle and brother have been equally charmed with myself at the announcement of the arrival of your imperial and royal Majesty at Pau, which brings us nearer your presence; and since, whatever route you choose, you must pass near this, we should regard it as a very great satisfaction if your imperial and royal Majesty would permit us to meet you, and renew in person those homages of sincere attachment and respect which we all feel, if it is not inconvenient."—FERDINAND VII to NAPOLEON, 26th July, 1808; NELLETO, ii. 262. Napoléon, however, declined the honour, and never saw Ferdinand or any of his family more.

(4) See the Letter in Nell. ii. 262. Thib. vi. 406, 408. Tor. i. 294, 295.

New Ministry of Joseph, and his journey to, and arrival and reception at Madrid.

deep shade of doubt over the fidelity with which they had served that unhappy prince during his brief but eventful possession of the throne. Don Luis de Urquijo was made Secretary of State; Don Pedro Cevallos, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Don Sebastian de Pinuela, and Don Gonzalo O' Farril, Ministers of Justice and at War; Don Miguel Azanza obtained the Colonies, and Mazaredo the Marine. Even Escoiquiz wrote to Joseph, protesting his devotion to him, and declaring that he and the rest of Ferdinand's household "were willing to obey his will blindly, down to the minutest particulars." The Duke del Infantado was

June 22, 1808.

appointed to the command of the Spanish; and the Prince of Castel-Franco to that of the Walloon Guards. Joseph entered Spain surrounded with the

July 20.

highest grandees and most illustrious titles of Spain. He reached Madrid on the 20th, having lingered for several days at Burgos and Vittoria, and received there the oaths of allegiance from the Council of State, the Council of the Indies, and that of the Finances. His reception in the capital was melancholy in the extreme; orders had been given that the houses of the inhabitants should be decked out to receive their new sovereign, but very few obeyed the injunction. A crowd assembled to see the brilliant cortège and splendid guards which accompanied the King, but no cheers or applauses were heard. Every countenance bore a mournful expression; hardly any ladies appeared at the windows, notwithstanding the passionate fondness of the Spanish women for such displays. The bells of all the churches rang together, but they resembled rather the dismal toll at the interment of the dead, than the merry chime which announces a joyful event to the living (1).

Honourable instances of resistance to the general torrent of adulation among the grandees in his favour.

To the honour of Spain and of human nature it must be stated, that in the midst of this humiliating scene of aristocratic baseness, some sparks of an independent spirit were elicited, and some men in high station asserted the ancient honour of the Spanish character. When the Duke del Infantado, at the head of the grandees of the monarchy, delivered their address to the new sovereign, he concluded it with these words: "The laws of Spain do not permit us to go farther at present. We await the decision of the nation, which can alone authorize us to give a freer vent to our sentiments." No words can convey an idea of the anger of Napoléon at this unexpected reservation. Instantly approaching the Duke, he said, "As you are a gentleman, you should conduct yourself as such; and instead of disputing here on the words of an oath, which you will doubtless violate as soon as you have an opportunity, you would do better to withdraw at once, put yourself at the head of your party, and combat there openly and honourably. But you may rest assured, that if you take an oath here, and afterwards fail in its performance, before eight days you shall be shot." This violent apostrophe intimidated the Duke; the address was corrected, and delivered as above mentioned, by Azanza; but the Duke retained his opinions, and ere long appeared in the ranks of his country. The Council of Castile prefaced their address by the fulsome expression,—“Your Majesty is one of a family destined by Heaven to reign over mankind;” but they eluded, by alleging want of authority, the simple and unqualified taking of the oath of allegiance. Jovellanos, who had been liberated by the resignation of Charles IV and the fall of Godoy from his long captivity in the dungeons of Minorca, was offered by Joseph the portfolio of the Minister of the Interior; but the lengthened sufferings of that incorruptible patriot, under an oppressive government, could not blind him to the injustice now at-

tempted by his deliverers, and he declared his resolution to abide by the fortunes of his suffering countrymen rather than accept wealth and greatness from their oppressors (1). The Bishop of Orense, when nominated as one of the junta to proceed to Bayonne by the regency of Madrid (2), returned an answer declining the honour in such independent and elevated terms as must for ever command the respect of the generous among mankind (5).

Universal joy with which the news of the insurrection is received in England. Future ages will find it difficult to credit the enthusiasm and transport with which the tidings of the insurrection in Spain were received in the British islands. The earliest accounts were brought by the Asturian deputies, who reached London in the first week of June; and their reports were speedily confirmed and extended by the accounts from Corunna, Cadiz, and Gibraltar. Never was public joy more universal. As the intelligence successively arrived of province after province having risen in indignant fury against the invader, and boldly hoisted the flag of defiance to his legions, the general rapture knew no bounds. It was evident now, even to the most ordinary capacity, that the revolutionary ambition of France had brought it into violent collision with the patriotic and religious feelings of a high-spirited and virgin people. "Never," says Southey, "since the glorious morning of the French Revolution, before one bloody cloud had risen to overcast the deceitful promise of its beauty, had the heart of England been affected by so generous and universal a joy." All classes joined in it; all degrees of intellect were swept away by the flood. The aristocratic party, who had so long struggled, with almost hopeless constancy, against the ever advancing wave of revolutionary ambition, rejoiced that it had at last broke on a rugged shore; and that, in the insolence of apparently unbounded power, it had finally proceeded to such extremities as had roused the impassioned resistance of a gallant people. The lovers of freedom hailed the Peninsular contest as the commencement of the first real effort of the PEOPLE in the war. Former contests had lain between cabinets and armies on the one side, and democratic zeal ripened into military prowess, on the other; but now the case was changed; it was no longer a struggle for the power of kings or the privileges of nobles; the energy of the multitude was roused into action, the spirit of liberty was enlisted in the cause; the mighty lever which had shaken all the thrones of Europe had now, by the imprudence of him who wielded it, fallen into the hands of the enemy; it would

(1) "I am resolved," said he, in reply to the reiterated instances of Joseph and his Ministers, "to decline the place in the administration which you offer me; and I am convinced that you will strive in vain to overcome the resistance, by means of exhortations, of a people so brave and resolute to recover their liberties. Even if the cause of my country were as desperate as you suppose it, it will never cease to be that of honour and loyalty, and which every good Spaniard should embrace at any hazard."—TORENO, i. 299.

(2) Tor. i. 281, 299, 413. *Pièces Just.* Memorial (3) "Spain," said this courageous answer of the prelate, in his letter to the junta at Madrid, "now sees in the French Emperor the oppressor of its princes to Bayonne, and its own tyrant; it feels itself enslaved, while it is told of its happiness; and these chains it owes even less to perfidy than the presence of an army which it admitted to its strongholds when in terms of perfect amity. The nation is without a king, and knows not which way to turn. The abdication of its sovereign, and the appointment of Murat as lieutenant-general of the kingdom, all took place in France amidst foreign armies, and under the eyes of an Emperor who

conceived he was bestowing prosperity on Spain by placing on her throne a prince of his own family. The supreme junta has against it a thousand rumours, besides its armed president, and the troops which surround it; all which forbid its acts from being regarded as those of a free assembly. The same may be said of the councils and tribunals of justice. What a chaos of confusion, of misfortune to Spain! and will these misfortunes be avoided by an assembly held without the kingdom, convened in a situation where its deliberations can never be regarded as free? And if, to the tumultuous movements which menace the interior of the kingdom, we add the pretensions and probable pretensions of princes and powers abroad, and the probable intervention of a foreign armed force in the contests of which the Peninsula will soon be the theatre, what can be imagined more frightful, or more worthy of pity? Cannot the love and solicitude of the Emperor find some other mode of manifesting itself, than by such measures as will lead to its ruin rather than its cure?—Answer of PEDRO, Bishop of ORENSE, to the Junta of Government at Madrid, which had named him as representative at Bayonne, May 29, 1808; TORENO, i. 413, 414; *Pièces Just.*

cast down the fabric of imperial as it had done that of regal power. With honest zeal and fervent sympathy, the great body of the British people united heart and soul with the gallant nation who, with generous, perhaps imprudent, enthusiasm, had rushed into the contest for their country's independence, and loudly called on the government to take their station by their side, and stake all upon the issue of so heart-stirring a conflict; while the few sagacious and well-informed observers, whom the general transport permitted to take a cool survey of the probable issue of the contest, observed with satisfaction, that the ambition of the French Emperor had at length offered a sea-girt and mountainous region for a battle-field, where the numerical inferiority of the British armies would expose them to less disadvantage than in any other theatre of European warfare (1).

Noble
speech of
Mr. Sheri-
dan on the
Spanish war
in Parliam-
ent.
June 15.

The first notice taken of these animating events in the British Parliament was on the 15th June, when the subject was introduced in a splendid speech by Mr. Sheridan, which merely embodied, in glowing language, the feelings which then, with unprecedented unanimity, agitated the British heart. "Never before," he exclaimed, "has so happy an opportunity existed for Great Britain to strike a bold stroke for the rescue of the world. Hitherto Bonaparte has run a victorious race, because he has contended with princes without dignity, ministers without wisdom, or people without patriotism; he had yet to learn what it was to combat a people who were animated with one spirit against him. Now is the time to stand up boldly and fairly for the deliverance of Europe; and if the ministry will co-operate effectually with the Spanish patriots, they shall receive from me as cordial a support as if the man whom I most loved (2) were restored to life. Will not the animation of the Spanish mind be excited by the knowledge that their cause is espoused, not by the Ministers merely, but the Parliament and the people of England? If there be a disposition in Spain to resent the insults and injuries, too enormous to be described by language, which they have endured from the tyrant of the earth, will not that disposition be roused to the most sublime exertion by the assurance that their efforts will be cordially aided by a great and powerful nation? Never was any thing so brave, so noble, so generous, as the conduct of the Spaniards, never was there a more important crisis than that which their patriotism has thus occasioned to the state of Europe. Instead of striking at the core of the evil, the Administrations of this country have hitherto gone nibbling merely at the rind; filching sugar islands, but neglecting all that was dignified and consonant to the real interests of the country. Now, therefore, is the moment to let the world know that we are resolved to stand up, firmly and fairly, for the salvation of Europe. Let us then co-operate with the Spaniards, but co-operate in an effectual and energetic way; and if we find that they are really resolved to engage heart and soul in the enterprise, advance with them in a magnanimous way and with an undaunted step for the liberation of mankind. Formerly, the contest in la Vendée afforded the fairest chance of effecting the deliverance of Europe; but that favourable chance was neglected by this country. What was then neglected is now looked up to with sanguine expectation; the only hope now is, that Spain may prove another la Vendée. Above all, let us mix no little interests with this mighty contest; let us discard or forget British objects, and conduct the war on the great principles of generous support and active co-operation (3).

(1) South. i. 443, 444. Ann. Reg. 1808, 193, 195.

(2) Mr. Fox.

(3) Parl. Deb. xi. 886, 889.

Reply of
Mr. Secre-
tary Can-
ning.

These generous sentiments, worthy of the real friends of freedom and the leaders of the liberal party in its last asylum, found a responsive echo in the members of Administration. Mr. Secretary Canning replied, — “His Majesty’s Ministers see, with as deep and lively an interest as my right honourable friend, the noble struggle which the Spanish nation are now making, to resist the unexampled atrocity of France, and preserve the independence of their country; and there exists the strongest disposition on the part of the British government, to afford every practicable aid in a contest so magnanimous. In endeavouring to afford this aid, it will never occur to us to consider that a state of war exists between this country and Spain. Whenever any nation in Europe starts up with a determination to oppose a power, which, whether professing insidious peace or declaring open war, is alike the common enemy of all other people, that nation, whatever its former relation may be, becomes, *ipso facto*, the ally of Great Britain. In directing the aid which may be required, government will be guided by three principles—to direct the united efforts of both countries against the common foe—to direct them in such a way as shall be most beneficial to our new ally—and to such objects as may be most conducive to British interests. But of these objects the last will be out of all question, compared with the other two. I mention British objects, chiefly for the purpose of disclaiming them as any material part of the considerations which influence the British government. No interest can be so purely British as Spanish success; no conquest so advantageous to England as conquering from France the complete integrity of the Spanish dominions in every quarter of the globe (1).”

Reflections
on this de-
bate.

This debate marks, in more ways than one, an important era in the war, and indicates a remarkable change in the sentiments with which it was regarded by a large portion of the liberal party in the British dominions. There were no longer any apologies for Napoléon, or the principles of the Revolution; no deprecation of any attempt to resist the power of France, as in the earlier periods of the war. The eloquent declamations of Mr. Fox and Mr. Erskine in favour of the great republic—their sophistical excuses for the grasping ambition in which its fervour had terminated—had expired. Experience and suffering, danger and difficulty, had, in a great degree, subdued even political passion, the strongest feeling, save religious, which can agitate mankind. Mr. Sheridan and Mr. Windham, from the *Opposition* benches, earnestly called on the government to engage deeply in the war; they loudly and justly condemned the selfish policy and Lilliputian expeditions of the aristocratic government in its earlier years, and demanded, in the name of public freedom, that England should at last take her appropriate place in the van of the conflict, and, disregarding all selfish or exclusively national objects, stand forth with all her might for the deliverance of mankind. In such sentiments from such men, none but the vulgar and superficial could see any inconsistency with their former opinions; whatever others might do, it was not to be supposed that the highest intellects and most generous hearts in the empire were to gaze all day at the east in hopes of still seeing the sun there. Resistance to French despotism and invasion was not only not inconsistent with, but necessarily flowed from, the real principles of the ardent philanthropists who had formerly opposed the overshadowing what they then deemed the brilliant dawn of the French Revolution; but it had the appearance of change to the numerous class who judge by words instead of things, and are attached, not to abstract principles, but

(1) Parl. Deb, xi. 890, 891, 895.

actual parties; and, therefore, the enunciation of such sentiments by any of the Whig leaders not only was an honourable instance of moral courage, but evinced a remarkable change in the general feeling of their party. Not less clearly was the disclamation of interested views or British objects by the ministerial chiefs, an indication of the arrival of that period in the contest, when the generous passions were at length aroused, and the fervent warmth of popular feeling had melted or overcome that frigid attention to interested objects, which, not less than their tenacity and perseverance, is the uniform characteristic of aristocratic governments among mankind.

English Budget for 1808. Animated by such powerful support, from the quarter where it was least expected, to enter vigorously into the contest, the English government made the most liberal provision for its prosecution. The supplies voted for the war-charges amounted to the enormous sum of L.48,500,000; to meet which, ways and means, to the value of L.48,400,000, were voted by Parliament; and the total income of the year 1808, including the ordinary and permanent revenue, was L.86,780,000, and the expenditure L.84,797,000. The loan was L.10,102,000 for England, and L.2,000,000 for Ireland, and the new taxes imposed only L.500,000; the Chancellor of the Exchequer having adhered, in a great measure, to the system approved of by both sides of the House in the finance debates of the preceding year, of providing for the increased charges of the year and the interest of the loans, in part at least, by an impignoration, in time of peace, of the war taxes. A April 14. subsidy of L.1,100,000 was provided for the King of Sweden. But these sums, great as they are, convey no adequate idea of the expenditure of this eventful year; the budget was arranged in April, before the Spanish contest had arisen; and for the vast expenses with which it was attended, and which, not having been foreseen, had not been provided for, there was no resource but a liberal issue of Exchequer bills, which fell as an oppressive burden upon future years (1).

(1) Parl. Deb. xi. 14, 21, and App. No. I. Ann. Reg. 1808, 103, 105. Marshall's Tables. Statement, No. 1.

The Budget was as follows:—

<i>War Income.</i>	
Malt and Pension duties,	L. 3,000,000
Bank advances,	3,500,000
Surplus of consolidated fund,	4,225,876
Surplus income of 1807,	2,253,111
War taxes,	20,000,000
Lottery,	300,000
Exchequer bills,	4,500,000
Do. for East India Company,	1,500,000
Exchequer bills charged on 1809,	1,161,100
Loan (*),	8,000,000
War income,	L.48,441,087
<i>Permanent Income, viz.</i>	
Customs,	L. 7,462,380
Excise,	17,896,145
Stamps,	4,458,735
Land and assessed taxes,	7,073,530
Post-Office,	1,277,538
Pension tax,	62,685
Do.,	71,353
Hackney coaches,	26,455
Hawkers and pedlars,	10,325
Total permanent,	L.38,339,146
Add War,	48,441,087
Grand Total,	86,780,233

War Expenditure.

Navy,	L.17,496,047
Army,	19,439,189
Ordnance,	4,534,571
Miscellaneous,	1,750,000
East India Company,	1,500,000
Swedish subsidy,	1,100,000
Vote of credit,	2,500,000

War expenditure, L.48,319,807

Permanent Expenditure, viz.

Interest of public debt,	L 20,771,871
And charges,	210,549
Sinking Fund,	10,188,606
Interest of Exchequer bills,	1,616,562
Civil lists,	1,638,677
Civil Government of Scotland,	85,470
Miscellaneous charges,	787,262

Total Permanent, L.35,298,997

Add War, 48,319,807

Grand Total, L.83,618,804

The increased expenditure arising from the Spanish war, which was not foreseen in the budget, raised the charges to L.84,797,000.—See *Parl. Deb.* xi. 1—15; *Parl. Papers and Ann. Reg.* 1808, 103—105.

(*) It was afterwards by the vote of credit extended to L.10,100,000.

Immense
extent of
the supplies
which were
sent out to
Spain from
Great Bri-
tain.

The supplies of all sorts sent out during this year to the Spanish patriots, though in great part misapplied or wasted, were on a princely scale of liberality, and worthy of the exalted station which, by consent of all parties, England now took at the head of the alliance. In every province of the Peninsula juntas were established, and to all British envoys were sent, who made as minute enquiries into the wants and capabilities of the district as the circumstances would admit, and received ample powers from government to afford such aid, either in money, arms, clothing, or warlike stores, as they deemed it expedient to demand. Supplies of all sorts were, in consequence of these requisitions, sent to Corunna, Santander, Cadiz, Gibraltar, Valencia, Malaga, and other places, with a profusion which astonished the inhabitants, and gave them at least ample means to fit themselves out for the contest in which they were engaged. It may readily be conceived, that amidst the enthusiasm and animation of the insurgent provinces, and the universal transport with which the British envoys were received, abundance of room was afforded for misrepresentation or delusion; that the accounts transmitted to government must, in many cases, have been inaccurate; and that, amidst the extraordinary profusion with which supplies of all sorts were poured into the country, there were many opportunities afforded to the native authorities of fraud or embezzlement, of which, amidst the general confusion, they were not slow of availing themselves. In truth, lamentable experience afterwards demonstrated that great part of these magnificent supplies was misapplied or neglected; the money being squandered or secreted, the stores sold or wasted, the arms piled and forgotten in magazines, when the patriots in the field were in want of the most necessary part of military equipment. Still with all these evils, inseparable probably from the condition of a country thus driven into a dreadful contest in the absence of any regular government, and unavoidably thrown under the direction of local and recently elected authorities, alike destitute of the knowledge, unacquainted with the arrangements, and relieved from the responsibility requisite for the faithful discharge of official duty, the prodigal bounty of England was attended with the most important effects upon the progress of the strife. It removed at once the imputation of cautious and prudential policy which the incessant declamations of the French writers, during the former periods of the war, joined to the feeble temporizing measures of preceding cabinets, had so strongly affixed to the British name; it demonstrated the sincerity and energy of a cabinet which thus, with unprecedented profusion, spread abroad in every quarter the means of resistance; and inspired boundless confidence in the resources of a power which, great at all times, seemed capable of gigantic expansion at the decisive moment, and appeared rather to have increased than diminished from a contest of fifteen years' duration (1).

(1) *Tor.* i. 301, 307. *Ann. Reg.* 1808, 194. *Hard.* x. 191, 193, 236. *Lond.* i. 102.

The following is a statement of the sums of money and warlike stores sent by Great Britain to the Peninsula, from the beginning of the contest in June, 1808, to the commencement of 1809 :—

Subsidies in money,	L. 3,100,000
Pieces of cannon,	98
Cannon balls,	31,000
Mortars,	38
Mortar charges,	7,200
Cannonades,	80
Muskets,	200,177
Carabines,	220

Sabres,	61,300
Pikes,	79,000
Cartridges,	23,477,000
Lead balls,	6,000,000
Barrels of powder,	15,400
Haversacks,	34,000
Cartridge-boxes,	240,000
Infantry accoutrements,	39,000
Tents,	40,000
Field equipages,	10,000
Ells of Linen,	113,000
Cloth,	125,000
Cotton,	82,000
Cloaks,	50,000
Coats and trousers,	92,000

Military
measures
adopted by
Napoléon
against the
insurrec-
tion.

No sooner was Napoléon made aware, by the general progress and formidable character of the insurrection, that a serious contest awaited him, than he set about, with all his usual caution and ability, preparing the means of overcoming its difficulties. Bessières received orders to put Burgos into a state of defence, to detach Lefebvre Desnouettes, with five thousand foot and eight hundred horse, against Saragossa, and to move his main body so as to overawe the insurgents in Biscay, Asturias, and old Castile. A reinforcement of nine thousand men was prepared for Duhesme in Catalonia, which it was hoped would enable him to make head against the enemy in that quarter; a reserve was organized, under General Drouet, on the Pyrenean frontier of Navarre, which, besides nourishing Bessières with continual additions of force, established five thousand men in the openings of the valleys towards the castle of Jaca, which was in possession of the enemy; another reserve was established in Perpignan, and detachments were stationed in the eastern passes of the mountains. The communications and rear being thus adequately provided for, Marshal Monecy was directed, with part of his corps, to move upon Cuença, so as to prevent any communication between the patriots of Valencia and Saragossa, and subsequently threatened the former city; while Dupont, with two divisions of his corps, ten thousand strong, received orders to proceed across the Sierra Morena towards Cordova and Seville; the remainder of his corps and of that of Monecy being stationed in reserve in La Mancha to keep up the communications of the divisions pushed forward, and be in readiness, if necessary, to support either which might require assistance. With so much foresight and caution did this great commander distribute his forces, even against an insurgent peasantry, and an enemy at that period deemed wholly unable to withstand the shock of his veteran legions (1).

Successful
operations
of Bessières
and Frere in
Old Castile
and Léon,
against the
insurgents.

The first military operations of any importance were those of Marshal Bessières in Biscay and Old Castile. That able officer was at Burgos with twelve thousand men, when the insurrection broke out with great violence in all directions around him; and he received advices that a body of five thousand armed men had got possession of the important depot of artillery at Segovia, and another assemblage of equal force was arming itself from the royal manufactory of arms at Palencia, while General Cuesta, the captain-general of the province, with a few regiments of regular troops and a strong body of undisciplined peasantry, had taken post at Cabicon on the Pisuerga. These positions appeared to Savary, who was now the chief in command at Madrid, so alarming, that he detached General Frere with his division, forming part of Dupont's corps, in

June 6. all haste to Segovia, where he routed the peasantry, and made himself master of all the artillery they had taken from the arsenal, amounting to thirty pieces. Meanwhile, Bessières divided his disposable force into several movable columns, which issuing from Burgos as a centre, traversed the country in all directions, every where defeating and disarming the insurgents, and

June 6. reinstating the French authorities whom they had dispossessed. One of these divisions, under Verdier, routed the enemy at Logrono, and

Shirts,	35,000
Cotton pieces,	22,000
Pairs of shoes,	96,000
Soles of Shoes,	15,000
Canteens,	50,000
Hats and bonnets,	16,000

In addition to these immense national supplies, private subscriptions were entered into in the chief towns of the empire, and large sums collected and remitted from the British Islands to the Spanish patriots.—*Annual Register*, 1808; 195.

(1) Napoléon's Orders. Napier, i. App. No. 2. Ibid. i. 60. Foy, iii. 265, 268.

—See *Parl. Pap.*, and *HARD*, x. 492; *Pièces Just*,

with inhuman and unjustifiable cruelty put all their leaders to death; and
 June 7. other, under Lasalle, broke the armed peasantry at Torquemada, burned the town, pursued them with merciless severity, and entered Palencia on the day following; while a third, under Merle, uniting with Lasalle, made straight for Cuesta at Cabicon, who accepted battle, but was speedily

June 12. overthrown, and his whole new levies dispersed, with the loss of all their artillery, and several thousand muskets, which were thrown away in the pursuit. By these successes the whole level country in the upper part of the valley of the Douro was overawed and reduced to submission. Segovia, Valladolid, Palencia, and all the principal towns, which had revolted, were compelled to send deputies to take the oath of allegiance to Joseph; and the terrible French dragoons, dispersing through the smaller towns and villages, diffused such universal consternation, that all the flat country in this quarter submitted to King Joseph and the French; requisitions and taxes were levied without difficulty throughout the whole remainder of the campaign. General Merle continuing his success, marched northward against the
 June 23. province of Santander in Asturias, forced the rugged passes of Lantuerio and Venta d'Escudo, and descending the northern side of the ridge of Santander, in concert with a portion of the reserve, which the Emperor dispatched to his assistance, made themselves masters of that town, and forced the intrepid bishop, with his warlike followers, to take refuge in the inaccessible fastnesses of the neighbouring mountains (1).

Operations in Arragon. While Leon and Castile were the theatre of these early and important successes, the province of Arragon, though almost entirely
 First siege of Saragossa. destitute of regular forces, was successful, after sustaining several bloody reverses, in maintaining a more prolonged resistance to the enemy. By indefatigable exertions, Palafox and the energetic junta of Saragossa had succeeded in arming and communicating the rudiments of discipline to a tumultuous assembly of ten thousand infantry and two hundred horse, with which, and eight pieces of artillery, his brother, the Marquis Lazan, ventured to march out of the city and await Lefebvre in a favourable position behind the Huecha. But though the French were not more than half the number of the enemy, they were, from the want of discipline in their opponents, and their own great superiority in cavalry, much more than a match for them.

June 12. The peasants withstood, without flinching, several attacks in front; but a vigorous charge in flank threw them into disorder, and a gallant attack by the Polish lancers completed their route. Notwithstanding this defeat, the Arragonese who had escaped, having received reinforcements, again stood
 June 13. firm on the following day at Gallur, still nearer Saragossa, and were again overthrown. Upon this Palafox himself marched out of the capital, at the head of five thousand undisciplined burghers and peasants, and moved to reinforce the wreck of the former army at Alagon; an advantageous position, four leagues from the capital of the province, on the banks of the Jalon, near its confluence with the Ebro, where the whole took post. But the

June 14. undisciplined crowd, discouraged by the preceding defeats, was now in no condition to make head against the French legions. The burghers, at the first sight of the enemy, broke and fled; and though Palafox, with a few pieces of artillery and three companies of regular troops, contrived for long to defend the entrance of the town, they too were at last compelled to yield, and retire in disorder into SARAGOSSA; and the French troops appeared before the heroic city. In the first tumult of alarm the gates were feebly de-

(1) Napier, i. 62, 64. Tor. i. 300, 307. Foy, iii. 269, 285.

fended, and a battalion of French penetrated by the Corso as far as Santa Engracia; but being unsupported, it was compelled to retire, and the inhabitants, elated with this trifling advantage, crowded to the walls and prepared seriously for their defence (1).

Description of Saragossa. Saragossa, which has now, like Numantia and Saguntum, become immortal in the rolls of fame, is situated on the right bank of the Ebro, in the midst of a fertile plain abounding in olive groves, vineyards, gardens, and all the marks of long-continued civilisation. It contained at that period 55,000 inhabitants, though the sword and pestilence consequent on the two memorable sieges which it underwent, have since considerably reduced its numbers. The immediate vicinity is flat, and in some places marshy; on the southern or right bank of the river it is bounded by the little course of the Huerba, the bed of which has been converted into a canal, while on the northern, the clearer stream of the Gallego, descending from the Pyrenean summits, falls at right angles into the Ebro. On the southern side, and at the distance of a quarter of a league, rises Mont Torrero, on the side of which is conducted the canal of Arragon, a noble work, forming a water communication, without a single lock, from Tudela to Saragossa, commenced by the Emperor Charles V. This hill commands all the plain on the left bank, and overlooks the town; several warehouses and edifices, constructed for the commerce of the canal, were intrenched and occupied by twelve hundred men. The city itself, surrounded by a low brick wall, not above ten or twelve feet in height, and three in thickness, interrupted in many places by houses and convents which were built in its line, and pierced by eight gates, with no outworks, could scarcely be said to be fortified. Very few guns were on the ramparts in a state fit for service; but the houses were strongly built, partly of stone, partly of brick, and in general two stories in height, with each story vaulted in the roof, so as to render them nearly proof against fire; and the massy piles of the convents, rising like castles in many quarters, afforded strong positions, if the walls were forced, to a desperate and inflamed population. Few regular generals would have thought of making a stand in such a city; but Florus has recorded that Numantia had neither walls nor towers when it resisted so long and heroically the Roman legions; and Colmenar had said, nearly a century before, with a prophetic spirit, "Saragossa is without defences; but the valour of its inhabitants supplies the want of ramparts (2)."

The resolution to defend Saragossa cannot with justice be ascribed to the honour of any single individual, as the glory belongs to the whole population, all of whom, in the first movements of confusion and excitement, had a share in the generous resolution. When Palafox retired after his repeated defeats into the town, he either despaired of being able to defend it, or deemed it necessary to collect reinforcements for a prolonged resistance from other quarters, and accordingly set out with a small body of regular troops for the northern bank of the river, leaving the armed population nearly unsupported to defend the walls. This measure was well adapted to increase the ultimate means of resistance which might be brought to bear upon the invader, if the town, when left to its own resources, could make head against the enemy; but it exposed it to imminent hazard of being taken, if, in the first moments of alarm consequent on the removal of the captain-general and regular forces, the besiegers should vigorously prosecute their operations.

June 15. This accordingly happened. On the day after the repulse of his first

(1) Foy, iii. 291, 292. Tor, i. 307, 308. South. i. 437.

(2) Tor. ii. 1, 4. Foy, iii. 293, 294. Nap. i. 65, 66. Cavallero, Siége de Saragossa, 29, 33.

attack, Lefebvre presented himself in greater force before the gates, and commenced an immediate assault. But the people, though without leaders, with surprising energy prepared to repulse it. In the first moment of assault, indeed, a column of the enemy penetrated to the street Santa Engracia; the people, though violently excited, were without leaders or concert, and a few additional battalions would have made the enemy masters of Saragossa. But at this critical moment a desultory fire from some peasants and disbanded soldiers arrested his advance, and the inhabitants, regaining hope from the hesitation of the assailants, exerted themselves with such vigour, that the enemy again retired beyond the gates. Instantly the whole population were in activity; men, women, and children flew to the ramparts; cannons were dragged to the gates; loopholes struck out in the walls; fascines and gabions constructed with astonishing celerity, and in less than twenty-four hours the city was secure from a *coup de main* (1).

Operations
of Palafox
to relieve
the city.
He is de-
feated, and
re-enters it.

The loss sustained by Lefebvre in these unsuccessful assaults was very severe, and sufficient to convince him that operations in form would be requisite before the town could be reduced. He withdrew to a little distance, therefore, from the walls, and sent for heavy

artillery from Pampeluna and Bayonne, with a view to the commencement of a regular siege. Meanwhile, Palafox, who had issued into the plain on the left bank of the Ebro, moved to Pina, where he crossed the river and advanced to Belchite, where he joined the Baron Versage, who had assembled four thousand new levies; and uniting every where the volunteers whom he found

June 23. in the villages, gained, by a circuitous route, the river Xalon, in the rear of the French army, with seven thousand infantry, an hundred horse, and four pieces of cannon. Some of his officers, seeing so respectable a force collected together, deemed it imprudent to hazard it by attempting the relief of Saragossa, and proposed that they should retire to Valencia. Palafox assembled the troops the moment that he heard of this proposal, and, after describing in energetic colours the glorious task which awaited them of delivering their country, offered to give passports to all those who wished to leave the army. Such was the ascendancy of his intrepid spirit that not one person left the ranks (2). Taking advantage of the enthusiasm excited by this unanimous determination, the Spanish general led them against the enemy, but before they could reach him night had fallen. They took up their quarters accordingly at Epila, where they were unexpectedly assailed, after dark, by Lefebvre with five thousand men. The Spanish levies, surprised and unable to form their ranks during the confusion of a nocturnal combat, were easily

July 2. dispersed; although a few fought with such obstinacy that they only effected their retreat to Calatayud the following morning. Despairing from the issue of this conflict, of being able to keep the field (3), Palafox became sensible that Saragossa must be defended within its own walls, and, making a long circuit, he at length re-entered the city on the 2d July.

(1) Cavallero, 46, 47. Tor. i. 6, 7. Napier, ii. 66, 67.

(2) Colonel Napier, who is never favourable to aristocratic leaders, says, that "Palafox, ignorant of war, and probably awed by Tio Jorge (an urban chief of humble origin), expressed his determination to fight," but he "did not display that firmness in danger which his speech promised, as he must have fled early and reached Calatayud in the night, though many of the troops arrived there unbroken next morning." Neither the words in italics, nor any corresponding words, are to be found in Cavallero, whom he quotes as his authority, nor in any Spanish historian with whom I am acquainted. Toreno,

though an avowed Liberal, after recounting Palafox's speech on this occasion, says, "such is the power which the inflexible resolution of a chief exercises in critical circumstances." There is not the least reason to suspect the distinguished English author of intentional misrepresentation, but the insinuations here made are vital to the character of Palafox; and as there is no ground for them, at least in the author quoted by him, it is desirable that the authorities on which they are made should be given in the next edition of that able work.—See CAVALLERO, *Siège de Saragosse*, 49; TORENO, ii. 11; and NAPIER, i. 67.

(3) Tor. i. 11, 12. Cav. 49, 50. Nap. i. 67, 68.

Meanwhile, the besieging force, having received heavy artillery and stores from Bayonne and Pampeluna, were vigorously prosecuting their operations, which were in the first instance chiefly directed against Monte Torrero, on the left bank of the river. Destitute at this critical moment of any noble leaders, the people of Saragossa did not at the same time sink under their difficulties. Calvo de Rozas, to whom the command had been devolved in his absence by Palafox, was a man whose calm resolution was equal to the emergency; and he was energetically supported by a plebeian chief, Tio Martin, to whom with Tio Jorge, of similar rank, the real glory of resolving on defence, in circumstances all but desperate, is due. Encouraged by the intrepid conduct of their chiefs, the people assembled in the public square, and with the magistrates, officers, and troops of the garrison, voluntarily took an oath "to shed the last drop of their blood for the defence of their religion, their king, and their hearths." They had need of all their resolution, for the means of attack against them were multiplying in a fearful progression. Verdier, whose talents had been fatally felt by the Prussians and Russians in the Polish campaign, was appointed to the command of the siege; the troops under his command were strongly reinforced, and Lefebvre detached to act under the orders of Bessières against the insurgents in Leon.

At the end of June, the besieging force being augmented to twelve thousand men, and the battering train having arrived, an attack was made on the convent of St.-Joseph, situated outside of the walls, which at first failed, though the besieged had no other defence than loopholes struck out in the rampart; but being resumed with greater force, the defences were carried, and the brave garrison, after obstinately defending the church, refectory, and

cells, set fire to the edifice, and retreated to the city. Monte Torrero was the next object of attack, while a tremendous fire, kept up with uncommon vigour on other parts of the town, diverted the attention of the besieged from the quarter where the real attack was to be made. The commander, despairing of success with the undisciplined crowd under his command, and not aware of the difference between fighting with such troops behind walls and in the open field, evacuated that important post; for which, though perhaps inevitable, he was remitted to a council of war, condemned and executed (1).

Having gained this vantage-ground, Verdier commenced a vigorous bombardment of the city, and battered its feeble walls furiously from the advantageous position which had so unexpectedly fallen into his power; and amidst the terror and confusion thus excited, made repeated attacks on the gates of El Carmen and Portillo; but such was the ardour and tenacity of the defence, and the severity of the fire kept up from the windows, walls, and roofs of houses, that he was on every occasion repulsed, after desperate struggles, with severe loss. These repeated failures convinced Verdier of the necessity of making approaches in form, and completing the investment of the city, which still received constant supplies of men and provisions from the surrounding province. With this view he threw a bridge of boats over the Ebro, and having thus opened a communication with the left bank, the communication of the besieged with the country, though not entirely cut off, was, after hard fighting, for many days restrained within very narrow limits. Before this could be effected, however, the patriots received a reinforcement from the regiment of Estremadura eight hundred strong, with the aid of which they made a desperate sally with two thousand

(1) Nap. i. 67, 68. Cav. 52, 53. Tor. i. 15, 16.

men to retake the Monte Torrero; but though the assailants fought with the utmost vehemence, they were unable to prevail against the disciplined valour of the French, and were repulsed with very heavy loss, including that of their commander. After this disaster they were necessarily confined to their walls;

Aug. 3. and the French approaches having been at length completed, the breaching batteries opened against the quarters of St.-Engracia and Alfajiria, and a terrible bombardment having at the same time been kept up, a powder-magazine blew up with terrific devastation in the public walk of the Cosso. The slender wall being soon laid in ruins, the town was summoned to surrender; but Palafox having rejected the offer, preparations were made for an assault (1).

Fruitless assault of the town. The storm took place on the 4th August. Palafox at an early hour stationed himself on the breach, and even when the forlorn hope was approaching, refused all terms of capitulation. The combat at the ruined rampart was long and bloody; but after a violent struggle, the French penetrated into the town, and made themselves masters of the street of Santa Engracia. Deeming themselves now in possession of Saragossa, their numerous battalions poured through the deserted breach, overspread the ramparts on either side, while a close column pushed on, with fixed bayonets and loud cheers, from Santa Engracia to the street of Cosso. But a desperate resistance there awaited them. Despite all the efforts of the citizens, they penetrated to the centre of the street, planted the tricolor flag on the church of the Cross near its middle, and pierced into the convent of S.-Francisco on its left, and the lunatic asylum on its right, whence the insane inmates, taking advantage of the confusion, issued forth, and mingled, with frightful cries, shouts, and grimaces, among the combatants. To add to the consternation, another powder magazine blew up in the thickest of the fight, and the burning fragments falling in all directions, set the city on fire in many different quarters. But notwithstanding all these horrors, the Spaniards maintained the conflict; an incessant fire issued from the windows and roofs of the houses; several detached bodies of the enemy, which penetrated into the adjoining streets, were repulsed; a column got entangled in a long crooked street, the Arco de Cineja, and was driven back into the Cosso with great slaughter; Palafox, Calvo, Tio Jorge, and St.-Martin, vied with each other in heroism; and when night separated the combatants, the French were in possession of one side of the Cosso and the citizens of the other (2).

Continued contest in the streets, and raising of the siege. The successful resistance thus made to the enemy after they had penetrated into the city, and the defences of the place, in a military point of view, had been overcome, showed the Saragossans with what prospects they might maintain the conflict even from house to house; but their gallant leader was not without apprehensions that their ammunition might fail, or their defenders be ruinously reduced during so prolonged a struggle; and, therefore, no sooner had the first triumph of the enemy been arrested, than he hastened out of the town to accelerate the arrival of the reinforcements which he knew were approaching, and exerted himself with so much vigour during the succeeding days, that on the morning of the 8th he succeeded in eluding the vigilance of the besiegers, and entered the city at the head of three thousand men and a large convoy of ammunition and provisions. It may easily be imagined with what trans-

(1) Cav. 51, 55. Tor. ii. 21, 25. Foy, iii. 298, (2) Cav. 56, 59. Tor. ii. 25, 29. Nap. i. 70.

300. Nap. i. 68, 69.

ports they were received, for, in the interim, the citizens had had a desperate conflict to maintain, from which they never enjoyed one moment's respite. From street to street, from house to house, from room to room, the fight was kept up with incredible obstinacy on both sides; every post became the theatre of bloody strife, to which company after company, column after column, regiment after regiment, were successively brought up; while the fire of musketry, the roar of artillery, the flight of bombs, the glare of conflagration, and the cries of the combatants, continued without intermission night and day. But all the efforts of the besiegers were in vain : animated almost to frenzy by the long duration and heart-stirring interest of the conflict, all classes vied with each other in heroic constancy; the priests were to be seen at the posts of danger, encouraging the soldiers, and administering consolation to the wounded and the dying; the women and children carried water incessantly to the quarters on fire, attended the wounded, interred the dead; many even forgot the timidity of their sex, and took the places of their slain husbands or brothers at the cannon side; the citizens relieved each other night and day at the mortal and perpetual struggle with the enemy. Such was the vigour of the resistance, that from the 4th to the 14th August the besiegers made themselves masters only of four houses; one in front of the Treasury was only won after an incessant combat of six day's duration. After the arrival of the reinforcements under Palafox, the conflict was no longer equal; symptoms of discouragement were manifest in the enemy; sinister rumours circulated on both sides, of a great disaster in the south; and they were gradually losing ground, even in those quarters of which they had obtained possession during the first burst of the assault. Still the fire of artillery continued, and was particularly violent during the night of the 14th August; but at daybreak on the following morning it suddenly ceased, and the besieged, when the sun rose, beheld with astonishment the enemy at some distance, in full retreat, traversing the plain towards Pampeluna. The victory was complete : the heavy cannon and siege stores were all abandoned or thrown into the canal; and the inhabitants, with enthusiastic shouts of transport, concluded, amidst cries of "Long live our Lady of the Pillar," the ceremony of the *Fête-Dieu*, which had been interrupted by the commencement of the siege on the 16th June (1).

Operations of Moncey in Valencia. In truth, while this sanguinary conflict was raging in Saragossa, disasters of the most serious nature had been experienced by the French in the south and east of Spain. Moncey, who had set out from June 5. Madrid early in June, with eight thousand men, to suppress the insurrection in Valencia and cut off the communication between that city and Saragossa, reached Cuença on the 11th, where he remained inactive for several days. Resuming at length his march on the 16th, he advanced by Pesquiera towards Valencia : but as he penetrated farther into the country, the universal desertion of the towns and villages, and evident traces of armed men on his line of march, gave gloomy presages of an approaching storm. In the first instance, however, these indications proved fallacious. Some Swiss companies, with a body of armed peasants and four pieces of cannon, had, indeed, taken post to defend the strong and important pass of the June 21. bridge of Pajazo, on the river Cabriel; but the new levies dispersed on the first appearance of the enemy, and the greater part of the Swiss troops joined the invaders; so that the bridge was gained without any difficulty. Encouraged by this success, Moncey wrote to General Chabran, who was

ordered to co-operate with him from the side of Catalonia, appointing a rendezvous on the 28th, under the walls of Valencia; and, advancing forward, approached the rocky ridge of calcareous mountains called Cabrillas, which forms the western boundary of the kingdom of Valencia. A single road traversed, by a rapid and laborious ascent, this rugged barrier; and as the adjoining heights were impassable for cavalry, a more advantageous position for resisting the enemy could not have been desired. The summits of the rocks which bordered the defile on either side, were covered with armed peasants to the number of six thousand; and four pieces of artillery, supported by a regiment of regular troops, and a troop of horse, guarded
 June 24. the main road. All these obstacles, however, were speedily overcome: while the cavalry and artillery engaged the attention of the enemy in front, General Harispe turned their flank, and by a rapid attack over almost inaccessible rocks, threw them into confusion, dispersed the new levies, and captured all the ammunition, baggage, and artillery. Nothing now existed to retard the advance of the invaders; the summit of the ridge was soon gained, from which the French soldiers, wearied with the arid mountains and waterless plains of Castile (1), beheld, with the delight of the Israelites of old, the green plains and irrigated meadows and level richness of the promised land, and three days afterwards they appeared before the walls of Valencia.

Description of Valencia, and preparations for its defence. Situated on the right of the Guadalaviar or Turia, and in the vicinity of the sea, Valencia is one of the most delightful cities which is to be found in Europe. It contains a hundred thousand inhabitants; but of that number more than one-half inhabit the enchanting suburban villas which lie without the walls. These consist of an old rampart of unhewn stones, rudely put together, including within their circuit a decayed citadel. In a military point of view, therefore, it could hardly be regarded as a place of defence; but the spirit and circumstances of the inhabitants rendered the slightest rampart a tower of strength. The enthusiasm of the people ran high; their hatred of the invaders was inextinguishable; and the crimes they had committed were too serious to give them any rational hope of safety but in the most determined resistance. It is a melancholy but certain fact, that in revolutionary movements, as in all others where passion is the prime mover, the most enduring and often successful efforts result from the consciousness of such enormities as leave no hope but in obstinate hostility—*una salus victis, nullam sperare salutem*. The junta had ably and energetically directed the public activity; engineers had marked out intrenchments and planted batteries to protect the principal gates of the city; a fortified camp had been constructed at a league from the walls; and the inhabitants, without distinction of age, rank, or sex, had laboured night and day for several weeks past, to complete the works on which their common safety depended. Within the gates preparations had been made for the most vigorous resistance; trenches had been cut, and barriers constructed across the principal streets; chariots and carts overturned so as to impede the advance of the assailants; the windows were filled with mattresses, and the doors barricaded; while a plentiful array of fire-arms, stones, and boiling oil, was prepared on the flat tops of the houses to rain down death on the enemy (2).

Attack on the city. Its repulse. The wreck of the troops and armed peasants who had combated at the Cabrillas, took refuge in the intrenched camp at Cuarte,

(1) Nap. i. 92, 93. Tor. i. 326, 329. Foy, iii. 250.
 253.

(2) Tor. 329, 330. Foy, iii. 253, 255. Nap. i. 93.

without the walls, where they occupied in force the sides of the canal which unites the waters of the Guadalaviar to those of the Fera. In that position

June 27. they were attacked early on the morning of the 27th, and, after three hours' firing, driven back to the batteries and intrenchments in front of the gates. There, however, a more determined stand was made; and Moncey, desirous of bringing up his whole forces and artillery, deferred the attack on the city itself till the following day. Hardly an eye was closed in Valencia during the succeeding night; all ranks, and both sexes, laboured incessantly to complete the preparations of defence; and so great was the universal activity, that when the rays of the morning sun appeared above the blue expanse of the Mediterranean, it was hardly possible for the assailants

June 28. to hope for success but from the pusillanimity of the defenders. Moncey disposed his field-pieces in the most favourable situations to reply to the heavy artillery on the ramparts and outworks; and having driven the enemy through the suburbs, commenced the assault. Such, however, was the vigour of the defence, that very little success was gained: the light artillery of the French was soon overpowered by the heavy cannon on the walls; a murderous fire of grape was kept up from the top of the rampart and the intrenchments round the entrances of the city; while the new levies, wholly unable to withstand the shock of their veteran opponents in the open field, contended on terms of comparative equality in the houses and behind the walls or enclosures adjoining the gates. The enthusiasm within increased as the fire approached their dwellings; the priests traversed the streets with the cross in their hands, exhorting the people to continue the contest; the women brought up ammunition to the combatants; and when the grape-shot began to fail, the ladies of rank instantly furnished an ample supply of missiles to charge the guns. A city so defended was beyond the reach of a *coup de main*: the French troops rapidly melted away under the dropping fire with which they were assailed from many different quarters; and in the evening Moncey drew off to Cuarte, having lost two thousand men in this fruitless attack (1).

Progress of the insurrection, and partial successes of the patriots in that quarter.

The spirit of the Valencians was roused to the very highest pitch by this glorious result; and in the first burst of their triumph they confidently expected that the Conde Cervallon, who commanded a corps six thousand strong, consisting chiefly of armed peasants on the banks of the Xucar, would fall upon the enemy in his retreat and complete his destruction. But while these flattering illusions were filling the city with transport, Cervallon himself narrowly escaped destruction. Attacked by Moncey in his retreat, he was surprised with

July 1. one-half of his corps on one side of the river, and the remainder on the other; the part first assailed made a feeble resistance; in the confusion of the rout, the French made themselves masters of a bridge, and rapidly passing over, soon completed the defeat of the portion on the other side. Two days after, three thousand, who had escaped from the first disaster, were attacked and dispersed, with the loss of all their artillery, near Al-

July 3. manza, the celebrated theatre of the victory of the French over the allies in the Succession War. But these advantages, though considerable, gained by a retreating army in the course of its flight, were no counterpoise to the disaster experienced before Valencia; the whole province was up in arms at the glorious tidings; the communication both with Catalonia and Madrid was cut off; Cuença was besieged by a body of seven thousand pea-

July 1. sants, who overpowered the detachment left in that town; and though the victors were themselves assailed two days after and dispersed with great slaughter by Caulaincourt, whom Savary dispatched from Madrid

July 3. with a powerful body of horse to restore the communication with Moncey in that quarter, yet the object of the advance towards Valencia was totally lost; and the French general, finding that Frere, with his division, on whose aid he had calculated in a renewed attack which he was preparing against that city, had been recalled to Madrid by orders of Savary, who was alarmed at the advance of Cuesta and Blake towards the Guadarrama pass, gave up the expedition in despair, and returned by Ocana to the capital (1).

The ultimate failure of the expedition of Moncey towards Valencia was occasioned by the terror excited in the capital of the threatening advance of Cuesta and Blake, with their united forces, upon the French line of communication between Madrid and the Bayonne frontier. There, it was evident, was the vital point of the contest; there a disaster would instantly be attended with fatal consequences; secured in that quarter, the failure of less considerable expeditions emanating from the capital was of comparatively little importance. Napoléon, who was strongly impressed with these views, had used the utmost efforts to reinforce Bessières, to whom the defence of the line through Old Castile was intrusted; and after providing for the occupation of the various points in which he had so early and successfully suppressed the insurrection, he could concentrate twenty thousand men to act against the enemy, who were approaching from the Galician mountains. But meantime the enemy had not been idle. Filanghieri, Captain-General of Galicia, had, with the aid of the bountiful supplies of England, succeeded in organizing twenty-five thousand men—including the soldiers who had come to Corunna from Oporto, originally part of Junot's expedition, and the garrisons of that place and Ferrol, with a considerable train of artillery—and taken post in the mountains ten miles in the rear of Astorga. The situation of this corps, threatening the line of communication between Bayonne and Madrid, was such as to excite the utmost disquietude in the breast of Napoléon; and he sedulously impressed upon Savary that it was there that the decisive blow was to be struck (2). That general, however, was not so well aware as his imperial master where the vital point was to be found; and instead of reinforcing Bessières with all his disposable forces, he dispatched Frere with his division on the track of Moncey, to endeavour to reopen the communication with that marshal, which the intervening insur-

Operations of Bessières against Blake and Cuesta in Léon.

June 28. rection had entirely cut off; and sent on Vedel and Gobert, with their respective divisions, to reinforce Dupont, who had by this time crossed the Sierra Morena, and was far advanced in his progress through Andalusia. Impressed, in a short time afterwards, with the increasing danger to his communications which arose from the junction of the Galician army near Astorga with that which still kept its ground in Leon under Cuesta, he hastily countermanded these orders; recalled Frere to Madrid; ordered Vedel, Gobert, and even Dupont himself, to remeasure their steps, and held himself in readiness to march from the capital with all the disposable troops he could collect, to reinforce Bessières on the line of the great northern communica-

(1) Nap. i. 97, 98. Tor. ii. 336, 343. Foy, iii. 260, 262, and iv. 40, 44.

(2) "A stroke delivered by Bessières," said he, "would paralyse all Spain. What signifies now Valencia and Andalusia? The only way really to strengthen Dupont is to reinforce Bessières. There is not a citizen of Madrid, not a peasant in the re-

motest valleys of Spain, who does not feel that the fate of the campaign is exclusively in the hands of Marshal Bessières. What a misfortune, then, that in so important an affair we should lose a chance, how inconsiderable soever, of success."—*NAPOLEON TO SAVARY, July 13, 1808; Foy, iv. 45, 46, and NAPIER, i. Appendix, No. 1.*

tion. These dispositions, as usual with alterations made in general designs on the spur of the moment, and in presence of the enemy, were essentially erroneous; the decisive point should have been looked to at first; the subsequent vacillation was too late to strengthen Bessières, but was calculated essentially to weaken Dupont, whom it went to deprive, in imminent danger, of one of his best divisions. As such they excited the greatest displeasure in Napoléon, who gave vent to it in an able and acrimonious despatch (which throws great light on the state of the campaign at this period), and never afterwards in military transactions intrusted Savary with any important command (1). But meanwhile the danger had blown over in the north; Bessières, though unsupported, had not only made head against Cuesta and Blake, but defeated them; and a great victory in the plains of Leon had opened to Joseph the gates of Madrid.

Movements
preparatory
to a battle
on both
sides.

Blake, with the army of Galicia, having effected a junction with the remains of Cuesta's troops which had escaped the route of Palencia, their united forces having left a division at Benevento to protect their stores, advanced into the plains of Léon to give battle to Bessières. This plan could not but appear rash, considering the veteran character of the French troops, their superiority in cavalry, and the undisciplined crowd of which a large part of the Spanish levies was composed. It was undertaken solely on the responsibility of Cuesta, who had assumed the chief command, and against the strongest remonstrances of Blake, who urged that by falling back to the frontiers of Galicia, where the French general could never pretend to follow them, they would gain time to discipline and equip their troops, and would soon be enabled to advance again at the head of forty thousand effective men. This sage counsel was rejected. Cuesta, who was a brave but inexperienced veteran, equally headstrong and obstinate, insisted upon an immediate action; and finding that Blake still declined to obey, he addressed himself to the junta of Galicia, who, yielding to popular clamour, seconded his orders, and directed Blake forthwith to advance and give battle. Having now no alternative but submission, Blake did the utmost in his power, during the short interval which remained, to put his

(1) Sav. iii. 248, 252. Tor. ii. 344, 345. Foy, iv. 40, 47. Nap. i. 101, 102.

"The French affairs in Spain," said Napoléon, "would be in an excellent state if Gobert's division had marched upon Valladolid to support Bessières, and Frere's division had occupied San Clemente, alike ready to reinforce Moncey or Dupont as circumstances might require. Instead of this, Gobert having been directed upon Dupont, and Frere being with Moncey, harassed and weakened by marches and counter-marches, our situation has been sensibly injured. It is a great mistake not to have occupied the citadel of Segovia; of all positions in that quarter it is the most dangerous to the French army, as, situated between two roads, it intercepts both communications. *If Dupont should experience a check, it is of no consequence*; the only effect of it would be to leave him to repossess the mountains; but a stroke delivered to Marshal Bessières would tell on the heart of the army, which would give it a locked-jaw, and speedily be felt in all its extremities. It is on this account that it is so unfortunate that the prescribed orders have not been specifically obeyed. The army of Bessières should have had at least 8000 men more than it has, in order to remove all chance of a disaster in that quarter. The affair of Valencia was a matter of no importance; Moncey was alone adequate to it; it was absurd to think of reinforcing him. If he could not take that

town with the forces he had, he could not have done so with 20,000 more; in that view it would become an affair of artillery. You cannot take by a stroke on the neck a town with 80,000 or 100,000 inhabitants, who have barricaded the streets and fortified the houses. Frere, therefore, could have added nothing to the means of Moncey against Valencia, while the abstraction of his division seriously weakened Dupont. Moreover, if the latter general was to be succoured, it would have been better to have sent him a single regiment direct, than three by so circuitous a route as that by which Frere was ordered to march. In civil wars it is the important points which must be defended, and no attempt made to go every where. The grand object of all the armies should be to preserve Madrid; it is there that every thing is to be lost or won. Madrid cannot be seriously menaced but by the army of Galicia; for Bessières has not adequate forces to ensure its defeat. It may be threatened by the army of Andalusia, but hardly endangered; for, in proportion as Dupont falls back, he is reinforced, and with their 20,000 men he and Vedel should at least be able to keep the enemy in check in that quarter."—Notes addressed to SAVARY on the affairs of Spain by NAPOLEON, 13th July, 1808; taken at the battle of Vittoria, in KING JOSEPH'S Portfolio; NAPIER, i. Appendix, No. 1.

July 13. troops into good condition; and on the 15th July, Cuesta moved forward with the united forces, amounting to twenty-five thousand infantry, four hundred cavalry, and thirty pieces of cannon, to Rio Seco. Bessières' force was upon the whole less numerous, amounting only to fifteen thousand men, and twenty-five guns; but of these nearly two thousand were admirable horsemen, and the composition of the whole was such as more than to counter-balance the inferiority in point of numbers (1).

Battle of Rio Seco, and defeat of the Spaniards, July 14. The dispositions of Cuesta for the battle were as faulty as the resolution to hazard it was ill advised. Contrary alike to the rules of the military art, and the dictates of common sense on the subject, he drew up his troops in two lines, at the distance of nearly a mile and a half from each other. The first, ten thousand strong, under Blake, with fifteen pieces of cannon, was stationed on a plateau in advance, of rugged and difficult access; the second, fifteen hundred toises (9000 feet) in the rear, led by Cuesta in person, consisted of fifteen thousand men, almost all regular soldiers, and fifteen guns. The few cavalry they had were with the first line. Bessières, perceiving at once the advantage which this extraordinary disposition offered to an enterprising attack, prepared to avail himself to the utmost of it, by throwing the bulk of his forces into the wide chasm between the two lines, so as to overwhelm the first before the second could come up to its assistance. Penetrating rapidly into the open space between the two parts of the army, he attacked Blake both in flank and rear with such vigour, that in an instant his lines were broken, his artillery taken, his men dispersed. As soon as he saw the rout of his first line, Cuesta moved forward with the second to the attack, and succeeded in reaching the enemy before the disorder consequent on their rapid success and pursuit had been repaired. The consequences had wellnigh proved fatal to the victors. Cuesta's right wing, advancing swiftly and steadily forward in good order, overthrew several French battalions which had not fully recovered their ranks, and captured four guns. This disaster, like that experienced by Zach's grenadiers at Marengo, might, with a less skilful commander or less steady troops, have turned the fortune of the day; for the example of disorder is contagious, and the confusion was already spreading into the French centre, when Bessières, with the cavalry of the Imperial Guard, twelve hundred strong, charged the Spanish right in flank, which had become exposed by the rapidity of its advance, with great vigour; and Merle's division returning from the pursuit of Blake, renewed the combat in front. A short but sanguinary struggle ensued; the Spanish infantry fought bravely, and for a few minutes the fate of the battle hung by a thread; but at length they were broken, and the loud shouts of victory, which had been raised in the Castilian ranks, passed to the French side. After this it was no longer a battle, but a massacre and rout; the Spaniards broke and dispersed on all sides, leaving eighteen guns and their whole ammunition, besides two thousand prisoners, in the hands of the enemy. Three thousand had fallen on the field, while the loss of the victors did not exceed twelve hundred men. The town of Rio Seco, taken in the pursuit, was sacked and plundered with merciless severity, and all the nuns in the convents were subjected to the brutal violence of the soldiery. Few days have been more disastrous to Spain; for, worse than the loss of artillery and prisoners, it destroyed all confidence in the ability of their troops to withstand the enemy in the field; while to Napoleon it was the source of unbounded, and, as it turned out, undeserved

(1) Nap. 106. Tor. ii. 317, 318. Foy, iii. 302, 303.

exultation. "It is Villa Viciosa" (Almanza), he exclaimed, when the joyful intelligence arrived at Bayonne; "Bessières has placed Joseph on the throne of Spain (4);" and deeming the war over, he left that fortress, and pursued his journey by Bordeaux for the French capital; while Joseph, relieved now of all anxiety in regard to his communications, pursued his journey to Madrid, where he arrived, as already mentioned, on the 21st July.

Napoléon was premature in this judgment: Rio Seco placed Joseph on the throne of Madrid; but it neither finished the war, nor maintained him there. He did not, however, on that account suspend his military preparations: nine thousand Poles, who had entered the service of France, were directed, with four regiments of infantry and two of cavalry from the grand army in Germany, towards the Pyrenees. All the Princes of the Rhenish Confederacy received orders to send a regiment each in the same direction: the guards of Joseph followed him to Spain from Naples. Tuscany and the kingdom of Italy were commanded to send their contingents to reinforce Duhesme in Catalonia. Reinforcements to the amount of forty thousand men were thus provided for, which all arrived in Spain during the three following months, but too late to arrest the progress of disaster. While both the French Emperor and his royal brother were indulging in the sanguine hope that all was terminated, a dreadful disaster had occurred in Andalusia, and a blow been struck on the banks of the Guadalquivir which resounded from one end of Europe to the other (2).

Dupont, who was at Toledo when the insurrection broke out in all parts of Spain, received, on the 24th May, an order from Murat, then Lieutenant-General of Spain, to move upon Cadiz, by the route of the Sierra Morena, Cordova, and Seville. He was to be joined in Andalusia by four thousand men and ten guns drawn from the army of Portugal. He immediately set out, and experienced no resistance while traversing the open plains of La Mancha; and in the Sierra Morena found the villages indeed deserted, but no enemy to dispute his progress. At Andujar, however, where he arrived on the 2d June, he received information of the real state of matters in that province,—that Seville, Cadiz, and all the principal towns were ruled by juntas, which had declared war against France; that the army at St.-Roque had joined the patriot cause, and that the peasants by tens of thousands were flocking into the burghs to enrol themselves under the national banners. Alarmed by this intelligence, Dupont wrote to Madrid for reinforcements, and after establishing an hospital at Andujar and taking measures of precaution to secure his rear, set out four days afterwards, and continued his march towards Cordova, still following the left bank of the Guadalquivir. This road, however, after running eight-and-twenty leagues on that bank of the river, crosses it at Vinta de Alcolea by a long bridge of nineteen arches, strongly constructed of black marble. It was at its extremity that the Spaniards awaited the enemy. The end of the bridge on the left bank was fortified by a *tête-de-pont*, twelve guns were mounted on the right bank to enfilade the approach to it, and three thousand regular troops, supported by ten thousand armed peasants, waited in Alco-

(1) South. i. 480, 481. Foy. iii. 310, 313. Tor. ii. 352, 354. Nap. i. 107.

In allusion to the battle at Villa Viciosa, where Philip V and the Duke de Vendôme gained a complete victory over the allies, which decided the Succession War in favour of the house of Bourbon. But the comparison was the reverse of the truth; for at Villa Viciosa, Philip and the Spaniards com-

bated for Spain against foreign armies; and the affair was decisive, for the whole military force of both sides was collected in one field; whereas at Rio Seco, the general of an intrusive king sought to beat down the native troops of Castile, and a fragment only of the military strength of either side was engaged.—See Fox, iv. 47.

(2) Foy, iv. 48, 49.

lea to dispute the passage; while the heights on the left bank, in the rear of the French, were occupied by a cloud of insurgents ready to fall on them behind as soon as they were actively engaged with the more regular force in front. The French general, seeing such preparations made for his reception, delayed the attack till the following morning, and meanwhile made his dispositions against the numerous enemies by whom he was surrounded. This was no difficult matter: a very small part only of the Spanish force was adequate to the encounter of regular soldiers. At daybreak on the following morning, General Fresia, with a battalion of infantry and a large body of cavalry, attacked the peasants on the left bank, and by a few charges dispersed them: at the same time a column with ease broke into the *tête-de-pont*, the works of which were not yet finished, and rapidly charging across the bridge, of which the arches had not been cut, routed the Spanish troops at Alcolea on the opposite side with such loss that all their artillery was taken, and Echevarria, the commander, despairing of defending Cordova, fled with such precipitance, that before night he reached Ecija, twelve leagues from the field of battle (1).

Taking and sack of Cordova. Abandoned to their own resources and destitute of any leaders for their guidance, the magistrates having all fled on the first alarm, the inhabitants of Cordova before which the French presented themselves the same day, were in no condition to resist the invaders. The gates nevertheless were shut, and the old towers which flanked their approaches filled with armed men, by whom, as the cannon of the enemy approached, a feeble fire was kept up. A parleying for surrender, however, took place, and the conferences were going on, when, under pretence of a few random shots from some windows, the guns were discharged at the gates, which were instantly burst open; the troops rushed into the town, where hardly any resistance was made, but which notwithstanding underwent all the horrors of a place carried by assault. A scene of indescribable horror ensued, fraught with acute but passing suffering to the Spaniards, with lasting disgrace to the French. An universal pillage took place. Every public establishment was sacked, every private house plundered. Armed and unarmed men were slaughtered indiscriminately; women ravished; the churches plundered; even the venerable cathedral, originally the much-loved mosque of the Omniade Caliphs, which had survived the devastations of the first Christian conquest, six hundred years before, was stripped of its riches and ornaments, and defiled by the vilest debauchery. Nor was this merely the unbridled licence of subaltern insubordination; the general-in-chief and superior officers themselves set the first example of a rapacity as pernicious as it was disgraceful; and from the plunder of the Treasury and Office of Consolidation, Dupont contrived to realize above 10,000,000 reals, or £197,000 sterling. Not content with this hideous devastation, the French general, when the sack had ceased, overwhelmed the city by an enormous contribution. It is some consolation, amidst so frightful a display of military license and unbridled cupidity, that a righteous retribution speedily overtook its perpetrators; that it was the load of their public and private plunder which shortly after retarded their retreat along the banks of the Guadalquivir; and that it was anxiety to preserve their ill-gotten spoil which paralysed their arms in the field, and brought an unheard-of disgrace on the French standards (2).

(1) Foy, iii. 224, 230. Nap. i. 112, 113. Tor. i. 320, 321.

(2) Foy, iii. 229, 231. Tor. i. 321, 323. Nap. i. 113. South. i. 475, 476. Lond. i. 87.

Colonel Napier says (i. 114, 1st Edit.), "As the inhabitants took no part in the contest, and received the French without any signs of aversion, the town was protected from pillage, and Dupont

Accumulation of forces round the invaders under Castanos. Dupont remained several days at Cordova, but learning that the insurrection had spread and was gathering strength in all directions, and finding his communications with Madrid intercepted by the patriot bands in his rear, he deemed it imprudent to make any farther advance in the direction of Seville. Meanwhile the insurgents closed around and hemmed him in on every side. The armed peasants of Jaen and its vicinity crossed the Guadalquivir, and overwhelmed the detachment left at Andujar in charge of the sick there, and with savage cruelty, in revenge for the sack of Cordova, put them all to death; the smugglers of the Sierra Morena, relinquishing their illicit traffic for a more heart-stirring conflict, issued from their gloomy retreats, and beset all the passes of their inaccessible mountains. Even the peasants of La Mancha had caught the flame; the magazines of Mudela had fallen into their power; the sick at Manzanares had been put to the sword; the roads were so beset that even considerable detachments in his rear were captured or defeated; General Roize, with a body of four hundred convalescents, was defeated in the open plains of La Mancha; and after having joined five hundred light horse under General Belair, the united force was deemed inadequate to forcing the passes of the Sierra Morena, and fell back towards Toledo. These accumulating disasters, which were greatly magnified by popular rumour, and the impossibility of getting any correct detail of the facts from the general intercepting of the communications, produced such an impression on Dupont, that he deemed it hopeless to attempt any farther advance into Andalusia; a resolution which proved the salvation of that province, and in the end, of Spain; for such was the state of anarchy and irresolution which prevailed among the troops intrusted with its defence, that had he advanced boldly forward and followed up his successes at Alcolea and Cordova with the requisite vigour, Seville would at once have fallen into his power, and the insurrection in that quarter been entirely crushed. Castanos, indeed, was at the head of eight thousand regular troops, drawn from the camp at St.-Roque, and an enthusiastic but undisciplined body of thirty thousand armed peasants assembled at Utrera; but the latter part of his force was incapable of any operations that could be relied on in the field; and such was the consternation occasioned, in the first instance, by the success of the French irruption, that the general-in-chief was desirous of retiring to Cadiz, and making its impregnable fortifications the citadel of an intrenched camp, where the new levies might acquire some degree of consistency, and the support of ten or twelve thousand British troops might, in case of necessity, be obtained. The authority of Castanos July 10. was merely nominal; Morla, governor of Cadiz, was his enemy,

fixed his head-quarters there." It would be well if he would specify the authority on which this assertion is made, as it is directly contrary to the united testimony of even the most liberal French and Spanish historians. Foy says, with his usual admirable candour, "To some musket-shots, discharged almost by accident from the windows, the French answered by a continued discharge, and speedily hurst open the gates. Men without arms, without the means of resistance, were slaughtered in the streets; the houses, the churches, even the celebrated mosque, which the Christians had converted into a cathedral, were alike sacked. The ancient capital of the Omniade Caliphs, the greatest kings which Spain ever beheld, saw scenes of horror renewed such as it had not witnessed since the city was taken in 1236 by Ferdinand King of Castile. These terrible scenes had no excuse in the losses sustained by the conqueror; for the attack of the town had not cost

them ten men; and the total success of the day had only cost them thirty killed and eighty wounded," Torreno, though a decided liberal Spanish historian, observes:—"Rushing into the town, the French proceeded, killing or wounding all those whom they met on their road; they sacked the houses, the temples, even the humblest dwellings of the poor. The ancient and celebrated cathedral became the prey of the insatiable and destructive rapacity of the stranger. The massacre was great—the quantity of precious spoil collected immense. From the single depots of the Treasury and the Consolidation, Dupont extracted 10,000,000 reals, besides the sums extracted from public and private places of deposit. It was thus that a population was delivered up to plunder which had neither made nor attempted the slightest resistance."—See Foy, iii. 230, 231; and TORRENO, 322.

and the junta of Seville issued orders independent of either ; so that the former general, despairing of success, had actually, under pretence of providing for the security of Cadiz, embarked his heavy artillery for that fortress. From this disgrace, however, the Spaniards were relieved by the hesitation of the enemy ; a pause in an invading army is dangerous at all times, but especially so when an insurrection is to be put down by the moral influence of its advance ; and the hesitation of Dupont at Cordova proved his ruin. He remained ten days inactive there, during which the whole effect of his victory was lost ; confidence returned to the enemy from the hourly increase of their force and the evident apprehensions of the French general : and at length some intercepted despatches to Savary were found to contain so doleful an account of his situation, that not only were all thoughts of retiring further laid aside, but it was resolved immediately to advance, and surround the enemy in the city which he had conquered (1).

Retreat of
Dupont to
Andujar
and Baylen.

The fears of Dupont, however, prevented Cordova from a second time becoming the theatre of military license. Detachments of peasants had occupied all the passes in the Sierra Morena : troops, including some regulars, were accumulating in the direction of Granada, with the design of seizing Carolina and intercepting his retreat to La Mancha. Fame had magnified the amount of the forces descending into the plains of Leon, under Cuesta and Blake ; and rumours had got abroad that Savary was fortifying himself in the Retiro. Unable to withstand the sinister presentiments consequent on such an accumulation of adverse incidents, the French general resolved to fall back ; and accordingly broke up from Cordova on the

June 16. 16th June, and three days afterwards reached Andujar without

June 19. having experienced any molestation. A strong detachment was immediately sent off to Jaen, which defeated the insurgents, and took a severe but not undeserved vengeance on the inhabitants for their barbarity to the sick at Andujar, by sacking and burning the town (2). The supplies, however, which Dupont expected from this excursion were not obtained ; for every article of provision which the town contained was consumed in the conflagration. Both sides after this continued inactive for above three weeks, during which the sick in the French hospital, as usual with a retreating army, rapidly augmented ; while the Spanish forces, under Castanos, which now approached, increased so much, by reinforcements from all quarters, that that general could now muster above twenty thousand regular infantry and two thousand horse, besides a motley crowd of thirty thousand armed peasants under his command. During the same period, however, powerful reinforcements reached the French general ; for Gobert, with his division, whose absence from Leon Napoléon had so bitterly lamented, joined Vedel at BAYLEN on the 15th July, and a brigade was pushed on under Leger Belair to open up the communication with the main body at Andujar (3), while the Spanish generals, now deeming the escape of the French impossible, were taking measures for enveloping the whole and forcing them to surrender.

Spanish
plan of at-
tack, and
preparatory
movements
on both
sides.

Meanwhile the long delay afforded by the inactivity of Dupont had been turned to the best account by Castanos. In the interim he contrived to give a certain degree of consistence to his numerous but tumultuous array of peasants, while the disembarkation of

(1) Nap. i. 114, 115. Foy, iii. 234, 236. Tor. ii. 326. Nap. i. App. No. 13.

(2) That severity, however deplorable, was perhaps rendered necessary, and therefore justified, by the massacre of the sick at Andujar ; but in the prosecution of their orders the French soldiers proceeded to excesses as wanton as they were savage ; mas-

sacring old men, and infants at the breast, and exercising the last acts of cruelty on some sick friars of St.-Dominic and Ste.-Augustine who could not escape from the town.—TORRES, i. 326.

(3) Nap. i. 117, 120. Foy, iv. 49, 52. Tor. i. 326, 360.

General Spencer with five thousand English troops, chiefly from Gibraltar, at Port St.-Mary's, near Cadiz, inspired general confidence by securing a rallying point in case of disaster. At length the regular troops from Granada, St.-Roque, Cadiz, and other quarters having all assembled, to the number of eight-and-twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, a combined plan of attack was agreed on. The army was arranged in three divisions; the first, under Reding, a Swiss general of distinction, brother to the intrepid patriot

July 11. of the same name (1), received orders to cross the Guadalquivir at Mengibar, and move to Baylen, in the rear of Andujar, where Dupont still was, and between that town and the Sierra Morena; the second, under Coupigny, was to pass the same river at Villa-Nueva and support Reding; while Castanos, with the third and the reserve, was to press the enemy in front, and a body of irregular troops, under Don Juan de la Cruz, passing by the bridge of Marmolejo, to harass his right flank. A glance at any good map of the country will at once show that the effect of these dispositions, which were ably combined, was to throw a preponderating force in the rear of Dupont directly on his line of communications, and either separate the division under his immediate command from those of Gobert and Vedel, or interpose between them both and the road to Madrid. They were promptly and vigorously carried into execution; Castanos, with the troops under his immediate command, approached to within a league of Andujar, and so alarmed Dupont that he

July 14. sent to Vedel for assistance, who came with his whole division, except thirteen hundred men left to guard the ford of Mengibar. This small body

July 16. was there attacked, two days after, by Reding with eight thousand men, defeated, and the passage of the river forced; Gobert, advancing from Baylen to support the broken detachment, received a ball in the forehead, and fell dead on the spot. The French in dismay retreated to Baylen; the Spaniards, seeing themselves interposed in this manner between Gobert and Vedel, with forces little superior to either, taken singly, also retired in the night across the ford to the other bank of the river. But this bold irruption into the middle of their line of march, and the disaster of Gobert, spread dismay through the army; a loud cannonade heard the whole day from the side of Andujar, where Castanos was engaging the attention of Dupont, induced the belief that they were beset on all sides, and the accounts which reached both armies in the evening of the disaster experienced before Valencia, increased the confidence of the Spaniards as much as it depressed the feelings of the French soldiers (2).

Singular manner in which these armies became inter-laced.

In the whole French army there was not a general of division who bore a higher character than Dupont; and when he set out for Andalusia, in command of so considerable a force, it was universally believed that he would find his marshal's baton at Cadiz. In 1801, he had distinguished himself, under Brune, in the winter campaign with the Austrians on the Italian plains: in 1803, his gallant conduct had eminently contributed to the glorious triumph at Ulm: in 1807, he had been not less conspicuous in the Polish war at Eylau and Friedland. His courage was unquestionable; his talents of no ordinary kind. But it is one thing to possess the spirit and intrepidity which make a good general of division or colonel of

(1) *Ante*, iii. 268.

(2) *Tor.* i. 360, 363. *Foy*, iv. 59, 66. *Jom.* iii. 60, 61. *Nap.* i. 120, 121.

A singular coincidence occurred in relation to the place and day of the action in which General Gobert lost his life. On the same day (16th July) nearly six hundred years before (16th July, 1212,) there had been gained at the same place the great

battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, by Alphonso IX over the Mussulman host of Spain and Africa, two hundred thousand strong. Gobert fell on the field still called the *field of massacre*, from the carnage made of the Moors on that memorable occasion; the greatest victory after that of Tours ever gained by the Christians over the soldiers of the Crescent. — *TORRENO*, i. 363.

grenadiers; it is another and a very different thing to be endowed with the moral resolution which is requisite to withstand disaster, and act with the decision and energy indispensable in a general-in-chief. In the situation in which he was now placed there was but one course to adopt, and that was, to mass all his forces together, and bear down in a single column upon the enemy, so as to reopen his communications, and secure, at all hazards, his retreat; and twenty thousand French soldiers assembled together were adequate to bursting through at a single point all the troops of Spain.

July 17. Instead of this he divided his force, and thereby exposed it to destruction. Vedel received orders to lead back to Baylen his own division and that of Gobert, while the general-in-chief himself continued fronting Castanos at Andujar. But meanwhile Generals Dupont and Leger Belair, who had been left at Baylen, were so much disquieted by the forces under Reding and Coupigny, which had now united together, and threatened them with an attack, that they retired towards Carolina, on the road to the Sierra Morena; and Vedel, finding, on his arrival at Baylen, that it was entirely evacuated by the French troops, followed them to the same place, with the design of securing the passes of the mountains in their rear. By this fatal movement July 18. the two divisions of the French army were irrevocably separated, and Reding and Coupigny, finding no enemy to oppose them, entered in great force into Baylen and established themselves there. Thus the two hostile armies became interlaced in the most extraordinary manner; Castanos having Dupont between him and Reding, and Reding being interposed between the French general and his lieutenant, Vedel (1).

Battle of
Baylen,
July 19.

In such a situation a decisive advantage to one or other party is at hand; and it generally falls to the commander who boldly takes the initiative, and brings his combined forces to bear on the isolated corps of his opponent. Dupont, sensible of his danger, broke up from Andujar late on the evening of the 18th, and marched towards Baylen, on his direct line of retreat; while Reding and Coupigny, finding themselves relieved of all fears from Vedel and Dufour, who had moved to Carolina, in the entrance of the mountains, turned their faces to the southward, and early on the following morning marched towards Andujar, with the design of co-operating with Castanos in the destruction of Dupont. Hearing, soon after their departure, of his approach towards them, they took post in a strong position, intersected with ravines and covered by olive woods, in front of Baylen; and soon the French outposts appeared in sight. Their forces, widely scattered and coming up in disorder, resembled rather a detachment guarding an immense convoy than a corps equipped for field operations; so heavily were they laden by five hundred baggage waggons, which conveyed along the artillery, ammunition stores, and ill-gotten plunder of Cordova. Great was the dismay of the French troops when, in the obscurity of the morning, an hour before sunrise, they suddenly came upon the Spanish array right in their front, occupying this advantageous position; but there was no time for deliberation, for Castanos, having heard of their departure from Andujar, had shortly after entered that town, and passing through it with the bulk of his forces, was already threatening their rear. Dupont immediately made his dispositions for forcing his way, sword in hand, through the barrier of steel which opposed his progress; and had his troops been concentrated, there can be little doubt that he would have succeeded in doing so, and either thrown Reding back towards Vedel, or opened up his own communication with that general. But at this decisive

(1) Foy, iv, 67, 77. Tor. i. 363, 364. Nap. i. 122. Jom. iii. 60, 61.

moment the sack of Cordova proved their ruin. The troops were scattered along a line of march of three leagues in length, encumbered with innumerable waggons; the best were in rear to guard the precious convoy from the attacks of Castanos. Hastily assembling such troops as he could collect in front, Dupont, with three thousand men, commenced an attack, when the day broke, at four in the morning; but his troops, fatigued by a long night march, and discouraged by the unexpected and dangerous enemy which obstructed their advance, could make no impression on the Swiss regiments and Walloon guards, the flower of the Spanish army, which there awaited their approach. After a gallant struggle, in which they sustained a severe loss, they were driven back, and lost not only some guns which in the commencement of the action they had taken from the enemy, but even their own. As brigade after brigade successively came up to the front, they were brought forward to the attack, but with no better success; the French troops, wearied by a night march, choked with dust, disordered by the encumbrance of baggage-waggons, overwhelmed by the burning sun of Andalusia in the dog-days, were no match for the steady Swiss and Walloon Guards, who had rested all night, cool under the shade, in a strong position, or even the new levies to whom Reding had imparted his own invincible spirit; and their guns, which came up one by one, in haste and confusion, and never equalled those which the enemy had in battery, were speedily dismounted by the superior force and unerring aim of the Spanish artillery. Two thousand men had already fallen on the side of the invaders, while scarce a tenth of the number were disabled on that of their enemies; heat and thirst overwhelmed even the bravest soldiers, and that fatal dejection, the forerunner of disaster, was rapidly spreading among the young conscripts, when two Swiss regiments, which had hitherto bravely maintained the combat on the right, came to a parley with their brethren in the Spanish lines, and passed over to the side of Reding. At the same time a loud cannonade was heard from behind; and disordered fugitives, breathless from running, and almost melting with heat, burst through the ranks, and announced that a large body of the Spaniards, under La Pena, the advanced guard of Castanos, was already menacing the rear. Despairing now of extricating himself from his difficulties, ignorant of the situation of Vedel or Dufour, and deeming a capitulation the only way to preserve the army from destruction, Dupont sent to Reding to propose a suspension of arms, which was at once agreed to (1).

Tardy arrival of Vedel, who shares in the disgrace. While Dupont, with the corps under his immediate command, not ten thousand strong, was thus maintaining a painful and hopeless struggle with the concentrated masses of the Spaniards, more than double their amount, the remainder of his army, of equal force, under Vedel and Dufour, was occupied to no purpose at a distance from the scene of action. The whole of the 18th was spent by these generals at Carolina in allowing the soldiers to repose, and repairing the losses of the artillery; but as the enemy, whom they expected to find at the entrance of the passes, had disappeared, and a loud cannonade was heard the following morning on the side of Baylen, they rightly judged that it was there that the decisive point was to be found, and set out in that direction. The distance from Carolina to Baylen was only eight miles; that from Andujar to the same place was sixteen; by a little activity, therefore, Vedel might have reached the rear of Reding sooner than Castanos could that of Dupont, and then the fate which the Spanish generals designed for the French troops might

(1) Foy, iv. 77, 84. Tor. i. 364, 367. Nap. i. 122, 123. Jom. iii. 61, 62. Lond. i. 94, 95.

have overtaken themselves. When he arrived at Guaroman, however, nearly halfway, the troops were so much exhausted by the heat, that Vedel, though he heard the cannonade, now only five miles distant, hourly increasing, had the weakness to allow them some hours of repose. This halt proved decisive; while it continued, Dupont's troops, whom he might with ease have reached in two hours, were reduced to desperation. At noon it suddenly ceased, and the soldiers flattered themselves that the danger had passed; it was the suspension of arms, which was about to bring unheard-of disgrace upon them all. When they resumed their march, at two in the afternoon, they soon came upon the rear of Reding, and discrediting the statement of an armistice, which was immediately made to them, commenced an attack, made prisoners a battalion of Irish in the service of Spain, captured some guns, dispersed some of the new levies which defended them, and were within a league of their comrades in distress, when an officer from Dupont arrived with the mournful intelligence that an armistice had been agreed to, and that they had no alternative but submission. It was all over, the halt of a few hours at Guaroman had ruined the expedition: twenty thousand men were about to lay down their arms; Europe was to be electrified; the empire of Napoléon shaken to its foundation. Such is the importance of time in war (1).

Dupont, in the first instance, proposed a capitulation, in virtue of which the whole French troops were to be allowed to retire, with their artillery and baggage, out of Andalusia; and Castanos was at first inclined to have acceded to the proposal, deeming it an immense advantage to clear that province of the enemy, and gain time in this way for completing their preparations. But at this critical moment the despatches were intercepted and brought to headquarters, which announced the approach of Cuesta to the capital, and recalled Dupont to contribute to its defence. A convention would no longer be listened to; an absolute surrender of arms was required, under condition only of being sent to France by sea. After many fruitless efforts to avoid so hard a fate, this was agreed to by Dupont: but he insinuated to Vedel that he might endeavour to extricate himself from his toils. That general accordingly retired to Carolina: but the Spaniards threatened to put Dupont and his whole division to the sword if this movement was not stopped and Vedel included in the capitulation. Intimidated by these menaces, orders to this effect were dispatched by Dupont: and so completely were the spirits of the French officers broken, that, out of twenty-four whom Vedel assembled to deliberate on the course they should pursue at this crisis, only *four*, including that general himself, voted for disregarding the capitulation, and continuing their retreat, which was now open, to la Mancha. Nay, to such an extent did the panic extend, that a Spanish detachment crossed the mountains and made prisoners, upon the strength of the capitulation at Baylen, all the French dépôts and insulated bodies as far as Toledo, which, with those who laid down their arms on the field, swelled the captives to twenty-one thousand. Two thousand had fallen in the battle; a thousand in the previous operations, or from the effect of sickness: twenty four thousand men were lost to France (2)!

Immense
sensation
which it
produces in
Spain and
over Eu-
rope.

Language can convey to future ages no adequate idea of the impression which this extraordinary event produced in Europe. Nothing since the opening of the revolutionary war had at all approached to it in importance. Hitherto the career of the French

(1) Tor. i. 367, 368. Foy, iv. 85, 91. Nap. i. 122, 124. Jom. ii. 62, 63

(2) Nap. i. 123, 124. Foy, iv. 97, 106. Tor. i. 370, 372. Jom. ii. 63, 64.

armies had been one of almost unbroken success; and even though the talents of the Archduke Charles and the firmness of the Russians had for a time arrested the torrent, yet it had been suspended only to break out shortly after with accumulated force, and sweep away every obstacle which courage, combination, or genius could oppose to its progress. Even at their lowest point of depression, disgrace had never sullied the Republican ranks; victorious or vanquished, they had ever commanded the respect of their enemies; no large bodies had laid down their arms; their retreat had ever been that of brave and honourable men. Now, however, a disaster, unheard-of in Europe since the battle of Pavia, had overtaken their standards—twenty thousand men had surrendered—the imperial eagles had found in Andalusia the Caudine forks. Fame and incorrect information gave greater importance to this triumph than even its intrinsic magnitude deserved; it was unknown or overlooked that it was by a skilful series of military movements on the one side, and an extraordinary combination of errors on the other, that Dupont had been brought to such hazardous straits; by the firmness of the Swiss and Walloon Guards, the precision in fire of the Spanish artillery, and the inexperience of his own troops, that he had been compelled to surrender. It was generally imagined, that the French veterans had laid down their arms to the Spanish peasants; it was unknown or forgotten that the victory was really gained by experienced soldiers; and the imaginations of men, both in the Peninsula and over all Europe, were set on fire by the belief that a new era had dawned upon mankind; that the superiority of disciplined troops and regular armies was at an end; and that popular enthusiasm and general zeal were all that were necessary to secure the victory even over the greatest and most formidable veteran armies. How widely this belief spread, how generally it was acted upon, and what oceans of blood it caused to be spilt in vain in Spain itself, will amply appear in the sequel of this history: and probably, by inspiring the people of that country with an overweening idea of their own strength, and of the capability of raw levies to contend with regular forces, it contributed, in no small degree, to that almost unbroken train of disasters in the field which their armies, when unsupported by the British, subsequently experienced during the remainder of the war. But in the first instance it produced a prodigious and most important burst of exultation and enthusiasm; it determined the conduct of a great proportion of the grandes and nobles of Spain, who had in the first instance adhered to the usurper, but now, with the Dukes del Infantado and del Parque, Cevallos and Penuela, rejoined the ranks of their countrymen; and by throwing the capital and chief towns of the kingdom, with the exception of the frontier fortresses, into the hands of the insurgents, gave the struggle, in the eyes of all Europe, as well as of the people themselves, the character of a national contest. Nor was the effect less momentous over the whole Continent, by affording a convincing proof that the French, at least, were not invincible, and opening the eyes of all governments to the immense addition which the military force, on which they had hitherto exclusively relied, might receive from the ardour and enthusiasm of the people (1).

Opinions of Napoleon on this capitulation. Napoleon was at Bordeaux when the account of the capitulation reached him. Never, since the disaster at Trafalgar, had he been so completely overwhelmed: for a time he could not speak; the excess of his depression excited the alarm of his ministers. "Is your majesty unwell?" said the minister for foreign affairs, Maret. "No." "Has Austria

(1) Montg. vi. 345. Foy, iv. 110, 114. Lond. i. 97. Tor. i. 378. Nell. i. 124, 125. Jom. iii. 64.

declared war?" "Would to God that were all!" "What then has happened?" The Emperor recounted the humiliating details of the capitulation, and added, "That an army should be beaten is nothing; it is the daily fate of war, and is easily repaired. But that an army should submit to a dishonourable capitulation, is a stain on the glory of our arms which can never be effaced. Wounds inflicted on honour are incurable. The moral effect of this catastrophe will be terrible. What! they have had the infamy to consent that the haversacks of our soldiers should be searched like those of robbers! Could I have ever expected that of General Dupont, a man whom I loved, and was rearing up to become a marshal? They say he had no other way to prevent the destruction of the army, to save the lives of the soldiers! Better, far better, to have perished with arms in their hands—that not one should have escaped. Their death would have been glorious; we would have avenged them. You can always supply the place of soldiers; honour alone, when once lost, can never be regained (1)."

Shameful violation of the capitulation by the Spaniards. If the capitulation itself was dishonourable to the French arms, the subsequent violation of it by the Spaniards was still more disgraceful to the victors, and remains a dark stain on the Castilian good faith. From the moment that the long file of prisoners began their march towards Cadiz as the place of their embarkation, it was felt to be extremely difficult to restrain the indignation of the people, who loudly complained that so large a body of men, for the most part stained by robbery or murder, committed in Spain, should be forwarded to France, apparently for no other purpose but that they might be again let loose in the Peninsula to commit similar devastations. Alarmed at the increase and serious character of the ferment, the Junta of Seville consulted Castanos and Morla, the governor of Cadiz, in the course which they should adopt. The first, with the honour and good faith of a gallant soldier, in opposition to the public clamour, insisted that the capitulation should be religiously observed; the latter, forgetting every other consideration in the desire to gain a temporary popularity with the multitude, contended that no treaty could be binding with men who had committed such enormities on the Spanish soil as the French prisoners; that to let them return to France, loaded with the spoil of Cordova, torn from the wretched inhabitants in open violation of the laws of war, would be a palpable act of insanity; and that, having once got them in their power, the only sensible course was to retain them till the war was over. These specious but sophistical arguments, unworthy of a Spanish officer, found a responsive echo in the breast of the infuriated multitude; the public effervescence increased as they advanced in their march; in consequence of the discovery of precious spoils in the knapsacks of some of the soldiers at Lebrixa, a tumult ensued between the peasantry and the prisoners, which cost many lives to the latter; the sacred vases of Cordova and Jean were loudly demanded; and at Port St.-Mary's the accidental circumstance of one of these holy cups falling from the haversack of a soldier gave rise to such a tumult, that a general search of the baggage could no longer be prevented. These disorders were, perhaps, unavoidable in the circumstances in which the Spanish government of the province was situated, and the unexampled treachery with which they had been assailed by the French; but for the subsequent violation of the capitulation no sort of apology can be found. Desirous of maintaining their popularity, the junta of Seville acceded to the opinion of Morla, in which they in vain endeavoured to get Lord Collingwood

(1) *Thib.* vi. 439.

and Sir Hew Dalrymple to concur; instead of being sent by sea to France, the soldiers and regimental officers were crowded together into the hulks of Cadiz, where, such were the privations and misery to which they were subjected, that very few remained at the conclusion of the war (1). Dupont, the officers of his staff, and all the generals, were permitted to return to France; but the remainder, nearly eighteen thousand in number, were kept it lingering suffering in their dismal captivity, and with the exception of a few who accepted service under the Spanish government, and took the first opportunity to desert to their beloved eagles, and those contained in one hulk, who over-powered their guards during the night and contrived to float her across to the lines of their countrymen three years afterwards, during the siege of Cadiz, hardly any ever revisited their native country (2). This frightful act of injustice was as impolitic as it was disgraceful; it gave the French, in their turn, too fair a ground for inveighing against the perfidy of their enemies, exasperated the feelings of their armies, who had first entered into this contest with lukewarm dispositions or undisguised aversion, and repeatedly afterwards stimulated them to desperate and sanguinary resistance, under circumstances when, with a more trustworthy enemy, they would have entered into terms of accommodation (3).

Departure
of Joseph
from Ma-
drid, and
concentra-
tion of the
French
troops be-
hind the
Ebro.

The fatal news of the capitulation of Baylen arrived at Madrid on the 29th July, and diffused universal consternation among the adherents of Joseph. A council of war was immediately summoned by Savary; and opinions were much divided on the course which should be pursued. Moncey proposed that Bessières' division should be recalled, and that with their united forces they should take a position in front of the capital, and defend it to the last extremity. But Savary, to whom the situation which he held as Lieutenant-General of the King, as well as the known confidence which he enjoyed with the Emperor, gave a preponderating voice in the deliberations, strongly urged the necessity of retiring to the northward, and taking counsel from circumstances, as to the point to which it should be prolonged. On the 30th July the intrusive King commenced his retreat: the hospitals had previously been

(1) Sir Hew Dalrymple's answer to the junta of Seville, when his opinion was asked on this subject, is worthy of a place in history. "It is quite clear, that the capitulation is binding on the contracting parties, so far as they have the means of carrying it into execution. The laws of honour, not considerations of expediency, should ever govern soldiers in solemn stipulations of this kind; the surrender of General Vedel could only be supposed to have arisen from the confidence which he placed in the honour which characterised the Spanish nation. The reputation of a government, especially one newly formed, is public property, which ought not to be lightly squandered. The matter, therefore, is clear on considerations of honour and justice: even viewed in the light of expedience, it is far from being beyond dispute." Lord Collingwood, when applied to, answered, "that if the Spanish government had not adequate seamen to man transport-vessels for conveying the troops, he would order British seamen to fit out their merchant-vessels for that purpose: that the capitulation must be observed so far as possible; if the conditions were impossible, they annulled themselves."—SOUTHEY, i. 502, 504; COLLINGWOOD'S *Memoirs*, ii. 127, 128.

(2) Foy, iv. 107, 109. Tor. i. 375, 377. Nap. i. 125, 127. South, i. 502, 510. Collingwood, ii. 124.

(3) The fate of the generals and officers who were returned to France from Cadiz, was hardly less deplorable than that of their comrades who lin-

gered away in prolonged torments on board the Spanish hulks. Dupont and all the generals were immediately arrested and sent to prison, where they lingered, without either trial or investigation, for many years afterwards. General Marescot, who, though in a subaltern rank, had taken a certain part in the negotiation, loudly, but in vain, demanded to be brought to a court-martial. Neither he nor Dupont, nor any of the superior officers connected with the capitulation of Baylen, were ever more heard of till after the fall of Napoléon in Feb. 17, 1812. 1814. In 1812, a court of enquiry sat on the generals, and condemned them all; but public opinion was far from supporting their decision. May 1.

Shortly after (1st May, 1812), an imperial decree forbade, on pain of death, any capitulation in the field which should amount to a laying down of arms. Such was Napoléon's irritation on every thing connected with this convention, that when he afterwards saw General Legendre, who, as chief of the staff to Dupont, had officially affixed his signature to the treaty, he was seized with a trembling from head to foot, and his indignation exhaled in these words:—"How, general! did your hand not wither when you signed that infamous capitulation?" He never afterwards heard Baylen alluded to without evincing such indignation as showed how deeply it had wounded his mind.—Foy, iv. 110, 113.

evacuated for Bayonne: the heavy artillery, which could not be brought away, amounting to eighty pieces, were spiked; but the retiring monarch and his military satellites carried off with them all the jewels and precious articles from the palaces they had so recently occupied. They retired by the great road to Burgos, where headquarters were established on the 9th August; the rearguard collecting as it went along all the garrisons of the towns and castles which had been occupied by the French troops to the south of the Ebro. They experienced no molestation from the Spaniards during their retreat; notwithstanding which, all the villages and hamlets through which they passed were given up to pillage, and a great number burnt to the ground. Soon after Joseph arrived at Burgos, Bessières arrived with his corps, and Verdier came up with the force which had been engaged in the siege of Saragossa, so that, including Moncey's corps and the troops brought up from Madrid, above fifty thousand veteran troops could, notwithstanding all the losses of the campaign, be collected for the defence of the Ebro (1).

While this decisive stroke was struck in the south of Spain, the contest had already assumed a sanguinary character; the success had been more chequered in the Catalonian mountains; and the British army, under the guidance of WELLINGTON, had chased the French eagles from the rock of Lisbon.

Campaign
in Catalonia.

Napoléon, who was by no means aware of the almost insurmountable obstacles which the tenacious spirit and rugged mountains of Catalonia were to oppose to his arms, had directed Duhesme to lend a helping hand to Lefebvre Desnouettes in the siege of Saragossa. In order to accomplish this object, that general, early in June, fitted out two corps: the first, four thousand five hundred strong, under the orders of General Chabran, was dispatched towards the south, with instructions to make itself master of Tortosa and Tarragona, and then proceed on and co-operate with Marshal Moncey in the attack on Valencia: while the second, under General Schwartz, consisting of three thousand eight hundred men, after punishing Manresa, destroying the powder-mills there, and levying a heavy contribution on its inhabitants, was to push on to Lerida, and after securing that important fortress, lend a hand to Lefebvre before the walls of Saragossa. These columns, June 4. quitted Barcelona early in June, and directed their march to their respective points of destination; but both experienced defeat. The tocsin was ringing in all the hills; the villages were deserted; the woods and higher parts of the mountains, the rugged passes and inaccessible thickets, formed so many rallying points to the courageous Somatenes (2). Schwartz, indeed, in

(1) Foy, 117, 124. Thib. vi. 442, 443. Sav. iii. 275, 277.

Savary was blamed by Napoléon for this retreat to the Ebro, and he alleged that the line of the Douro might have been maintained, and the operations against Saragossa in consequence not interrupted. In justice to the French general, however, it must be observed, that his situation in the capital after the surrender of Dupont, had become extremely critical; and that the losses which the troops at the capital had undergone, were such as to preclude the hope of a successful stand being made against the united Spanish armies which might advance from the south. Shortly after his arrival at Madrid he had written in these luminous July, 1808. and explicit terms to the Emperor, in a despatch which throws great light on the state of the contest at that period.—“It is no longer a mere affair in which, by punishing the leaders, a revolt may be suppressed. If the arrival of the King does not pacify the country, we shall have a regular war on our hands with the troops of the line, and one of extermination with the peasantry. The system of

sending movable columns over the provinces, is likely to induce partial checks which will lead to the spreading of the insurrection. It is indispensable that your Majesty should consider seriously of the means of carrying on the war. We lose four hundred men a-month in the hospitals alone; our army can in no respect be compared to that which occupies Germany. Every thing has been calculated according to the turn which it was expected affairs would assume, not that they have actually taken. Many battalions have not four officers; the whole cavalry is fit for the hospital together. The crowds of young and presumptuous men who crowd the army, contribute rather to embarrassment than any thing else. There is an incalculable difference between such coxcombs and a steady veteran sergeant or officer.”—SAVARY to NAPOLEON; Foy, iv. 34, 35.

(2) The *Somatenes* are the *levy-en-masse*, which, by an ancient law of Catalonia, are bound to turn out and defend their parishes whenever the *Somaten* or alarm-bell is heard from the churches.—TORNADO, i. 309.

his march towards Saragossa, forced the celebrated pass of Bruch, though beset with armed men; but advancing a little further, he fell into a disaster at Casa Mansana: the villagers assailed the invaders with showers of stones, balls, and even boiling water from the roofs of the houses: the peasants, who had fled in disorder a few minutes before through the streets, returned to the charge: threatened on all sides, Schwartz resolved to retreat, which he effected at first in good order; but his advanced guard having attempted to force the passage of the town of Esparraguera, which lay on his

road, during the night, was repulsed with loss, and his troops, thrown into disorder by that nocturnal check, were never able to regain their proper array till they found refuge, two days after, under the cannon of Barcelona. Chabran, whose route lay through a less mountainous district, reached Tarragona in safety on the 7th, and got possession of that important town without opposition: but Duhesme was so much alarmed by the repulse of Schwartz, that he hastily recalled him to Barcelona: and so dangerous is it to make a retrograde movement while engaged with an insurrection, that a very severe resistance was experienced in the retreat at places where not a shot had been fired during the advance. Irritated by this opposition and the sanguinary excesses of the peasants, the French set fire to Villa-Franca as they retired; and Duhesme having sent Count Theodore Lecchi with the Italian division and Schwartz's troops to his assistance, the united columns again

approached the pass of Bruch: but finding the Somatenes posted on its rugged cliffs in even greater strength than before, they fell back, after a bloody skirmish, and regained the shelter of Barcelona, pursued up to the very gates by the dropping fire and taunting scoffs of their gallant though rustic opponents (1).

Universal
spread of the
insurrec-
tion. At-
tack on
Gerona.

These defeats produced the greater sensation, both among the French and Spaniards, that they were gained, not by regular troops, but a tumultuary array of peasants, wholly undisciplined, and most of whom had then for the first time been engaged either in military service or exercise. They occasioned in consequence an universal insurrection in Catalonia; the cities, equally as the mountains, caught the flame; the burghers of Lerida, Tortona, Tarragona, Gerona, and all the towns in the province not garrisoned by French troops, closed their gates, manned their ramparts, and elected juntas to direct measures of defence; while the mountain districts, which embraced four-fifths of the province, obeyed the animating call of the Somaten, and, under the guidance of their parish priests, organized a desperate Vendéen warfare. Forty regiments, of a thousand men each, were ordered to be raised for active operations of these formidable mountaineers; regular officers were, for the most part, obtained to direct their organization, and the ranks were in a short time complete, and, for the service of light troops, of a very efficient description. An equal force was directed to be prepared as a reserve, in case their mountain fastnesses should be threatened by the enemy. The peculiar nature of these extensive and thickly-peopled hill districts, as well as the character and resolution of their inhabitants; their rugged precipices, wood-clad steeps, and terraced slopes; their villages, perched like eyries on the summit of cliffs, and numerous forts and castles, each susceptible of a separate defence; their bold and energetic inhabitants, consisting of lawless smugglers or hardly peasants, long habi-

(1) Tor. i. 309, 315. Nap. i. 75, 77. Foy, iv. 143, 151. Duhesme, 18, 19.

The inhabitants of Bruch, to commemorate their victory, erected a stone in the pass, with this pom-

pous though laconic inscription:—"Victores Marengo, Austerlitz, et Jena, hic victi fuerunt diebus vi. et xiv. Junii, anno 1808."—Foy, iv. 151.

tuated to the enjoyment of almost unbounded practical freedom, rendered this warfare one of a peculiarly hazardous and laborious description (1). Aware of the necessity of striking a decisive blow in the present critical state of affairs of the province, Duhesme conceived that a sudden *coup-de-main* against GERONA, which lies on the direct road to France, would both re-

June 16. totally intercepted, and strike a general terror into the enemy. Two days after the return of the former ill-fated expedition, accordingly, he set out in the direction of that town, with six thousand of his best troops, taking the coast-road to avoid the fortress of Hostalrich, which was in the hands of the

June 17. enemy, and after cutting his way with great slaughter through a large body of Somatenes who endeavoured to obstruct his progress, appeared

June 20. on the 20th before the walls of Gerona. Little preparation had been made to repel an assault; but the gates were closed, and the inhabitants, in great numbers, were on the walls prepared to defend their hearths. Having at length got his scaling ladders ready, and diverted the attention of the besieged by a skirmish with the Somatenes on the plain at a distance from the ramparts, the assauling columns suddenly approached the walls at five in the afternoon. Though they got very near without being perceived, and a few brave men reached the summit, they were repulsed in two successive attacks with great slaughter; and Duhesme, having in vain tried the effect of a negotiation to induce a surrender, returned, by forced marches, to Barcelona, harassed at every step by the Somatenes, who descending in great strength from the hills, inflicted a severe loss on his retreating columns (2).

Siege of Gerona. After this defeat, the whole plain round Barcelona, called the Llobregat, was filled with the enemy's troops; and General Duhesmes, enraged at finding himself thus beset in the capital of the province, marched out against them, a week afterwards, and defeated a large body of

June 30. the peasantry at the bridge of Molinos del Rey, capturing all their artillery. Rallying, however, at their old fastnesses of Bruch and Igualado, they again, when the French retired, returned to the Llobregat, and not only shut up the enemy within the ramparts of Barcelona, but established a communication with the insurgents in the interior, along the sea-coast, from the Pyrenean frontier to the mouth of the Ebro, which all became the theatre of

Expeditions against Rosas and Gerona. insurrection. Napoléon, to whom the prolongation of the war in so many different quarters of Spain had become a subject of great uneasiness, no sooner received intelligence of these untoward events than he directed Duhesme to issue from Barcelona, relieve Figueras, where four hundred French were closely blockaded by the insurgent peasantry, and afterwards carry by assault both Rosas and Gerona. General Reille,

July 5. whom he sent forward with a large convoy guarded by five thousand men, defeated the Somatenes before Figueras, and raised the blockade of that fortress; but when, encouraged by this success, he attempted a *coup-de-*

July 11. *main* against Rosas, he sustained a repulse; and finding himself

(1) Though locally situated in an unlimited monarchy, the province of Catalonia, like those of Navarre and Biscay, has long enjoyed such extensive civil privileges as savour rather of democratic equality than despotic authority. Its social state differs altogether from that of Arragon, though it was so long united under the same sceptre. Nowhere, except in this mountain republic, is there so ardent a thirst after political freedom, or so large an enjoyment, at least in the mountainous districts, of its practical blessings. The inhabitants nourish the most profound hatred at the French, whom they

accuse of having excited their fathers to revolt against the government of Madrid, and abandoned, when the contest was no longer conducive to their interests. In the long and opulent district which runs along the seashore, and contains the flourishing seaports of Tarragona, Rosas, and Barcelona, commercial interests prevail; and the alliance and consequent trade with England was as much the object of desire as the withering union with France had been a subject of aversion.—Foy, iv. 137, 138.

(2) Nap. i. 77, 80. Foy, iv. 151, 159. Tor. i. 315, 317.

daily more closely straitened by the insurgents, was obliged to retire with considerable loss towards Gerona. About the same time the Spanish affairs in the whole province acquired a degree of consistency to which they had never previously attained, by the conclusion of a treaty between Lord Col-

July 22. lingwood and the Marquis Palacios, governor of the Balearic Isles, in virtue of which the whole disposable force in those islands was conveyed to the Catalonian shores, and thirteen hundred good troops were directed towards Gerona, while Palacios himself, with four thousand five hundred, and thirty-seven pieces of cannon, landed at Tarragona, where their presence excited a most extraordinary degree of enthusiasm (1).

Unsuccessful
siege of
Gerona.

Meanwhile Duhesme, with the main body of his forces, six thousand and strong, a considerable train of heavy artillery, and every thing requisite for a siege, set out from Barcelona and took the road for Gerona; but he was long delayed on the road, which runs close to the sea-shore, by the fire of an English frigate under the command of LORD COCHRANE, which sent a shower of balls among his columns whenever they came within range, on the one side, and the desultory but incessant attacks of the Somatenes on the other. At length, after encountering great difficulties and experiencing a heavy loss, he succeeded in forcing his way, by the hill-road, to Hostalrich, which he summoned in vain to surrender: and leaving a few troops only to observe its garrison, he, by infinite skill and no small good fortune, avoided

July 24. the guns of that fortress, and proceeded on to Gerona, under the walls of which he effected a junction with Reille's troops, who had come up from Rosas. Their united strength being now, notwithstanding all their losses, above nine thousand men, operations in form were commenced against

July 22. the place. Before this could be done, however, the succours from Majorca had been thrown into the town; and as the besiegers were themselves cut off from all communication, both with their reserve magazines at Barcelona and the frontier of France, by the incessant activity of the peasantry, who lay in wait for and frequently intercepted the convoys, the

Aug. 15. works advanced very slowly. On the 15th August, however, the breach of Fort Montjuic was declared practicable, and an assault was about to commence, when the besiegers were themselves assailed by a confused but formidable body, ten thousand strong, which appeared in their rear. This consisted, one-half of regular troops, which the Count Caldagues had brought up from Tarragona, the other of Somatenes and Miquelets, with which he had augmented his force during its march along the coast of Catalonia. Count Theodore Lecchi, who was left in charge of Barcelona, was in no condition to oppose their passage almost within range of the guns of the fortress; for the troops he commanded, hardly four thousand strong, were barely adequate to guard its extensive works, and the Miquelets, stationed on the heights which overhang the city, had carried their audacity to such a pitch, as not only to keep up a constant fire on the French sentinels, but even make signals to the disturbed multitude in the streets to revolt. When this powerful force approached Gerona, the besieged made a general sally on the French lines, and with such vigour, that they penetrated into the batteries through the embrasures of the guns, spiked the heavy cannon, and set fire to the works; while Duhesme with the great body of the besiegers' force was sufficiently engaged in observing the enemy which threatened them from the outside. Finding it totally impossible to continue the siege, Duhesme broke up in the

(1) Tor. i. 38, 39. Nap. i. 82, 83. Foy, iv. 169, 172. St.-Cyr, Guerre de la Catal. 14, 17. Castanos, i. 32, 84.

night, and, dividing his force into two columns, took the road for Barcelona. But here fresh difficulties awaited him: two English frigates, under the able direction of Lord Cochrane, cannonaded and raked the road by the sea-coast; overhanging cliffs prevented them from getting out of the destructive range; while the route by the mountains in the interior, besides being closed by the cannon of Hostalrich, was in many places steep and intersected by ravines, and beset by armed peasants, who from the rocks and woods above, kept up a destructive fire upon the troops beneath (1). In these circumstances the French general did not hesitate to sacrifice his artillery and stores; and thus lightened, he succeeded in fighting his way back, by mountain-paths on the summit of the cliffs which overhang the sea, amidst a constant fire, to Barcelona. In this disastrous expedition above two thousand men and thirty pieces of artillery, besides extensive stores, were lost; and at its conclusion the French possessed nothing in Catalonia but the fortress of Barcelona and the citadel of Figueras.

Universal transports in the Peninsula. Entry of the Spanish troops into the capital.

Unbounded was the joy which these extraordinary successes in every part of Spain excited among its inhabitants. The variety of quarters in which they had arisen augmented their moral effect: it was supposed that popular energy was irresistible, when it had triumphed over its enemies at once in Andalusia and Arragon Valencia, and Catalonia. Abandoning themselves to a pleasing and allowable, though short-lived illusion, the Spaniards generally believed that the war was at an end; that the Castilian soil was finally delivered from its invaders; and that, relieved of all disquietude as to the defence of their own country, the only question was, when they should unite their victorious arms to those of the English, and carry the torrent of invasion across the Pyrenees into the French plains. These enthusiastic feelings rose to a perfect climax when the Spanish army from Andalusia entered the capital, in great pomp, with Castanos at their head, under a majestic triumphal arch, erected by the citizens

Aug. 25. to do honour to their arrival; and the whole of Spain, now delivered from the enemy, with the exception of the small portion occupied by the French army in Navarre and on the Ebro, joined in one universal chorus of national exultation and hatred of the invaders. The press joined its influence to the same excitement; newspapers, warmly advocating the patriotic cause, were established at Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, and the other chief towns of Spain, and by their vehement declamation added to the general enthusiasm, as much as by their extravagant boasting they weakened the sense of the necessity of present exertion, and thus diminished the chance of bringing the contest in the end to a successful issue. But in the midst of the universal exultation, it was observed with regret, that few vigorous or efficient measures were adopted by the many separate and independent juntas to pro-

Aug. 5. secute the war against the enemy; a feeling increased by the calamitous issue of the revolt of Bilboa, which had taken up arms upon receipt of the glorious news from Andalusia. The inhabitants, in the first instance, had succeeded in expelling the French garrison; but being unsupported by

Aug. 16. any aid from Asturias or Galicia, the place was quickly recaptured, with great slaughter, by the French division of Merle. This was done by the express commands of Joseph Bonaparte, to whom this dangerous movement, in a town of such magnitude, so near his line of communications with France, had been the subject of no small disquietude; and who boasted in

(1) Cabanes, ii. 62, 81. Foy, iv. 172, 193. Tor. i. 37, 40. Nap. i. 85, 86. St.-Cyr, 40, 47. Duhesme, 28, 39.

his despatches, that "the fire of the insurrection at Bilboa had been extinguished in the blood of twelve hundred men (1)."

Meanwhile, events of a still more glorious and decisive character had liberated the kingdom of Portugal from its oppressors.

Affairs of Portugal, and disarming of the Spanish troops in that country. In every phase of modern history it has been observed that Portugal has, sooner or later, followed the course of changes which public feeling had established in Spain; and it was hardly to be expected that so great and heart-stirring an event as the insurrection of Castilian independence, was not to find a responsive echo in a kingdom so closely neighbouring, and equally suffering under the evils of Gallic oppression. At a very early period, accordingly, symptoms of an alarming effervescence manifested themselves in Portugal, and Napoléon, appreciating more justly than Junot the probable course of events in that kingdom, strongly enjoined him to abandon the pompous proclamations in which he was endeavouring to win the affections of the people, and in good earnest prepare for military operations (2). Not anticipating, however, any immediate hostilities, he ordered him to detach four thousand men to support Bessiéres in Leon, and three thousand to co-operate with Dupont in Andalusia. But these detachments were rendered impossible by the pressure of events in Portugal itself. No sooner did the intelligence of the massacre at Madrid on the 2d May, and the insurrection in Galicia reach Oporto, than the Spanish troops there, ten thousand strong, dispossessed the French authorities, and marched off in a body towards Galicia, from whence, as already mentioned, they were forwarded to Leon in time to share in the disaster of Rio Seco. The inhabitants, in the first moment of enthusiasm, installed insurrectionary authorities in room of the French ones, who had been dispossessed; but after the departure of the Spanish troops they became alarmed at their own boldness, and hastened to reinstate the tricolor-flag, and to renew their protestation of fidelity to the French general at Lisbon.

June 5. The moment, however, that he was apprised of the events at Oporto, Junot made preparations to effect the disarming of the Spanish troops in the capital; and with such secrecy and decision were his measures taken, that before they were well aware of the danger impending over them, they were all surrounded by greatly superior masses of French troops, and compelled to surrender. By this able stroke nearly five thousand Spanish troops were made prisoners, who might have been highly prejudicial to the French arms, if they had succeeded in withdrawing and forming the nucleus of an insurrection in the interior of the country (3).

Progress of the insurrection. The flame, however, excited by the glorious intelligence of popular success, which daily came pouring in from all parts of Spain, could not so easily be suppressed. The students at Coimbra were among the first to take up arms; the mountaineers of Tras-los-Montes speedily followed

June 11. the example; the tocsins were heard in their lovely hills, arms and torches gleamed in their vine-clad vales; Algarves was speedily in open re-

(1) South, ii. 287, 288. Tor, ii. 82, 85. Nap. i. 287, 288.

(2) "What is the use," said he, "of promising to the Portuguese what you will never have the means of fulfilling. Nothing is more praise-worthy, without doubt, than to gain the affections of the people; but it should never be forgotten, that the primary object of a general should be the safety of his soldiers. Instantly disarm the Portuguese; watch over the soldiers who have been sent to their homes, in order that their chiefs may not form so many centres of insurrection in the interior. Keep your

eye on the Spanish troops: secure the important fortresses of Almeida and Elvas. Lisbon is too large and populous a city; its population is necessarily hostile. Withdraw your troops from it; place them in barracks on the sea-coast. Keep them in breath—well disciplined, massed, and instructed, in order to be in a condition to combat the English army, which, sooner or later, will disembark on the coasts of Portugal."—NAPOLÉON to JUNOT, May 24, 1808.

—Foy, iv. 198, 199.

(3) Lond. i. 117, 119. South, ii. 41, 47. Nevis, 99, 109. Foy, iv. 202, 210.

volt; Alentejo was known to be ripe for insurrection, and, at the summons of Colonel Lopez de Souza, soon after took up arms. Encouraged by this revolt in their neighbourhood, the inhabitants of Oporto a second time hoisted
June 9. the standard of independence. A junta was speedily formed in that

opulent city, which shared the supreme direction of affairs with the bishop, who early signalized himself by his zeal in the patriot cause. The insurrection in the province of Entre Douro e Minho appeared so formidable, that Junot directed General Loison with a strong division to proceed against it from Almeida; but though he at first obtained some success, yet, as he advanced into the mountains, his communications were so completely cut off, and the insurrection appeared so formidable on all sides, that he was obliged to return to Lisbon by Celorico and Guarda, at which places he routed the peasantry with great slaughter (1). In the south, the patriots gained considerable successes against the French detachments, which endeavoured to penetrate into the Alentejo; in the north-east, Abrantes was threatened by the insurgents of the valley of the Tezers; in the east, the revolt at Beija was only extinguished by a bloody nocturnal assault of the town, after a rapid march

July 9. by a French brigade (2). Surrounded in this manner with embarrassments, Junot, after holding a council of war, the invariable sign of experienced difficulty, again despatched Loison with four thousand men to Abrantes; in his progress he had several severe actions with the Portuguese peasants, who were dispersed with great slaughter, but who evinced, by their courage in disaster, what materials were to be found among them for a formidable resistance in future times; and he returned to Lisbon, having irritated the insurrection more by his cruelty than he had overawed it by his success. His recall to the capital was rendered necessary by the progress of the insurrection in the Alentejo, which had elected a junta, and established a sort of

July 25. provisional government at Evora. Resolved to strike a decisive blow in that quarter, where the proximity of English succours from Gibraltar rendered it peculiarly formidable, Junot fitted out a more powerful expedition, consisting of seven thousand infantry, twelve hundred horse with eight guns, which was sent forth under the command of the sanguinary Loison.

July 29. After dispersing several armed assemblages which strove in vain to obstruct his progress, this General came up with the main body of the insurgents posted in front of Evora. Ten thousand Portuguese peasants, and four thousand Spanish troops, who had advanced to support them from Badajoz, were there assembled, with twelve pieces of cannon. They were wholly unable, however, to withstand the shock of the French legions; at the first onset, the undisciplined peasantry fled from the terrible charge of their dragoons. The Spanish auxiliaries, seeing themselves left alone with the whole weight of the action on their hands, retired in haste, and were speedily thrown into disorder; and in the general confusion, the victorious troops entered the town, where a feeble resistance only was attempted, but an indiscriminate massacre immediately commenced. Neither age nor sex were spared: armed and unarmed were inhumanly put to the sword: it is the

(1) "In this expedition," says Thiebault, "we lost 60 men killed and 140 wounded: of the insurgents at least 4000 were killed or wounded on the different fields of battle."—THIEBAULT, 155.

(2) The French general, Thiebault, boasts of this as a great exploit. "Twelve hundred Portuguese were put to death in the conflict; no quarter was shown to any one with arms in his hands. The town was afterwards set on fire and plundered; and the worst military excesses committed on the wretched

inhabitants. Kellermann shortly afterwards said, in a proclamation to the people of Alentejo—"Beija had revolted; Beija is no more. Its guilty inhabitants have been put to the sword; its houses delivered up to pillage and the flames. Thus shall all those be treated who listen to the counsels of a perfidious rebellion, and with a senseless hatred take up arms against us."—THIEBAULT, 135, 136; SOUTHEY, i. 105.

boast of the French historians, that while "they lost only two hundred and ninety, eight thousand were slain or wounded on the part of the insurgents (1)." Never, while Portuguese blood flows in the human veins, will the remembrance of that dreadful day be forgotten : never will the French be any other than an object of execration to the descendants of those who perished in that inhuman massacre (2). But the cup of human suffering was full : the hour of retribution was fast approaching ; and Loison was awakened from his fancied dream of security, and the farther prosecution of his blood-stained progress towards Elvas, by intelligence that a BRITISH ARMY HAD APPEARED OFF THE COAST OF PORTUGAL.

The English cabinet resolve on sending succours to Portugal.

Ever since the insurrection in the Peninsula had assumed a serious aspect, the English government had resolved upon sending out powerful military succours to its assistance, and at length bringing the strength of the two nations to a fair contest with land forces. Fortunately a body of about ten thousand men were already assembled at Cork ; having been collected there, by the preceding Administration, for the purpose of an expedition against South America ;—a proposed diversion of force, at a time when every sabre and bayonet was required in European warfare, which appears almost inconceivable ; unless, as Colonel Napier sarcastically observes, it was projected in imitation of the Romans, who sent troops to Spain when Hannibal was at their gates (3). The command of the expedition was given to SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY, whose great capacity had been evinced in the glorious fields of Indian warfare, and more recently in the easier conquest of the Danish militia ; and General Miranda, the able adventurer, who had so long been concerned in projects for the separation of the Spanish colonies from the mother country, was given to understand that no countenance could now be shown by the British government to any such designs. Two smaller divisions were soon afterwards prepared, and set sail from Ramsgate and Margate ; and orders were sent to Sir John Moore, who, with twelve thousand men, had been sent to Gottenburg to aid the King of Sweden in his heroic defence of his kingdom against Russia, — an offer which that gallant monarch declined to accept (4), — to return forthwith to England, to form a farther reinforcement of the armies in the Peninsula. Though the direction of the Cork expedition, however, was intrusted to Sir Arthur, yet a senior officer, Sir Harry Burrard, was appointed to supersede him in the command shortly after he landed in Portugal ; who again was to retain the supreme direction only until Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived from Gibraltar. Thus, in the most momentous period of the campaign, that in which the British troops were first to be engaged with the enemy, and when they were exposed to all the difficulty incident to a first landing on a hostile shore, they were to be intrusted successively to the command of three different generals ; an arrangement as characteristic of the happy ignorance of military affairs which at that period prevailed in the British government, as the cheerful acquiescence of their first commander in the appointment of any officer, how unknown soever to Fame, over his head, was of the single-hearted feeling and patriotic devotion which, in every age, has been found to be the accompaniment of real greatness (5).

(1) Thiebault, 165.

(2) Thiebault, 131, 175. Nap. i. 161, 165. South. ii. 72, 155. Nevis, iv. 1, 205. Foy, iv. 246, 272.

(3) Nap. i. 480.

(4) The particulars of this expedition, and the causes of the disagreement with the Swedish mo-

narch, will be found below, Chap. LIV which treats of the war between Turkey, Sweden, and Russia.

(5) Well. Desp. by Gurwood, iv. 1, 3, 21, 22, 43.

When Sir A. Wellesley received the command of the expedition at Cork, government gave him no reason to believe that he was to be superseded in

Sir A. Wellesley takes the command of the expedition, and arrives off Mondego Bay.

The expedition, under the command of Sir Arthur, sailed from Cork on the 12th July, but the general himself preceded them in a fast-sailing frigate, and arrived at Corunna on the 20th. He immediately entered into communication with the Junta of Galicia, from whom he received the distressing intelligence of the defeat at Rio Seco; and also was made acquainted with the desire of the Spaniards in that quarter to receive no succours, except in arms, stores, and money, from England; a resolution which it is hard to say, after such a disaster, savoured more of magnanimous resolution or presumptuous confidence (1). He found the opinion of all classes so unanimous in hatred of the French, "that no one dared to show that he was a friend to them." Having supplied the Junta, therefore, with L.200,000 in money, and assured them of the speedy arrival of extensive military stores, which in a great measure elevated their spirits after their late misfortunes, he proceeded to the southward to secure the main objects of the expedition, which were, in the first instance, an attack upon the Tagus; and afterwards, the detachment of such a force to the southward as might effectually secure Cadiz from any attack from the French under Dupont. As the whole force of the expedition, when joined by the reinforcements from England, the corps of Sir John Moore, and that under General Spencer, which was off Cadiz, was estimated by government at thirty thousand men, it was thought that ample means existed to achieve both these objects; and as the primary condition of all successful military efforts, by a transmarine power, is the securing strong seaports as a base for the army, and a point of refuge in case of disaster, it is evident that the attainment of one or both of these objects was an indispensable preliminary to future operations. It was fortunate, however, that subsequent events rendered the dispersion of the English force, and the formation of a double base of operations unnecessary; and that the British army was thereby concentrated in Portugal, where it had a strong country to defend, a docile population to work upon, and a central position in the flank of the French armies in Spain to maintain (2).

Landing of the British troops, and combat of Rolicca.

Sir Arthur Wellesley arrived at Oporto on the 26th, and proceeded on with the expedition to Mondego Bay, where he arrived on the 30th July. Having there received intelligence of the surrender of Dupont, he deemed all operations in Andalusia unnecessary, and having sent

the supreme direction of it. The first intimation he obtained of that intention was by a letter from Lord Castlereagh, dated 15th July, 1808, which was received by him when at sea, off Mondego Bay. Many officers, who had held the situations and achieved the victories which he had in India, would have at once resigned the command in which he was now reduced to so subordinate a station; but Sir Arthur acted otherwise. In answer to Lord Castlereagh, he said—"Pole and Burghersh have apprised me of the arrangements for the future command of the army. All that I can say on the subject is, that whether I am to command the army or not, or am to quit it, I shall do my best to insure its success; and you may depend on it that I shall not hurry the operations, or commence them one moment sooner than they ought to be commenced, in order that I may acquire the credit of the success. The government will determine for me in what way they will employ me hereafter, either here or elsewhere." When asked by an intimate friend, after his return, how he who had commanded armies of 40,000 men, received the Order of the Bath, and the thanks of Parliament, could thus submit to be reduced to the rank of a brigadier of infantry, he replied—"For this reason—I was nimuk-wallah, as we say in the

East; I have ate of the King's salt; and therefore I consider it my duty to serve with zeal and promptitude when or wherever the King or his Government may think proper to employ me." Nor was this disinterested and high-minded patriotism and sense of duty without its final reward; inferior men would probably have thrown up the command, and rested on the laurels of Seringapatam and Assaye; but Wellington pursued the path of duty under every slight, and belived to strike down Napoleon on the field of Waterloo.—See *Gurwood's Despatches*, August 1, 1808, vol. iv. 43; and *Blackwood's Magazine*, xli. 714.

(1) "Notwithstanding the recent defeat of the Galician army, the junta here have not expressed any wish to receive the assistance of British troops; and they again repeated, this morning, that they could put any number of men into the field if they were provided with arms and money; and I think this disinclination to receive the assistance of British troops, is founded in a great degree on the objection to give the command of their troops to British officers."—WELLINGTON to LORD CASTLEREAGH, Corunna, July 21, 1808; *GURWOOD*, iv. 27.

(2) *Gurw*, iv. 20, 33, Lond. i. 114, 116, Nap. i. 187.

orders to General Speneer to come round from the bay of Cadiz and join him, he determined upon an immediate landing; a bold and decisive resolution, considering that his own force did not exceed ten thousand men, and Junot had fifteen thousand at Lisbon (1). He accordingly issued a proclamation to the people of Portugal, eminently descriptive of the principles of that glorious struggle which was now about to commence (2), and which his own talents and constancy, and the resolution of the three nations, now banded together, ultimately brought to so glorious a termination. At first, Sir Arthur thought of landing on the small peninsula of Peniche, about seventy miles to the north of the Rock of Lisbon, but though the anchorage was safe and practicable, it was commanded by the guns of the fort at its extremity, which was still in the hands of the enemy. He, therefore, by the advice of Sir Charles Cotton, selected in preference Mondego Bay, where the whole fleet was assembled on the 31st July. On the following morning the disembarkation com-

Aug. 1. menced; and notwithstanding the obstacles arising from a strong west wind and heavy surf, which occasioned the swamping of several boats

Aug. 5. and the loss of many lives, it was completed by the 5th, at which time General Spencer with his division came up, and was immediately put on shore. He had not received Sir Arthur's orders to join; but with great presence of mind and the true military spirit, the moment he heard of Dupont's surrender, he made sail for the Tagus, from whence he was sent forward by Sir Charles Cotton to the general point of disembarkation. On the

Aug. 8. evening of the 8th the united forces, thirteen thousand strong, bivouacked on the beach, and on the following morning the advanced guard moved forward, and commenced that memorable march, which, though deeply chequered with disaster, was destined to be never finally arrested till the British cavalry passed in triumph from Bayonne to Calais (3).

March of
the British
troops to
Rollea.

The troops took the field in the highest spirits, and the most perfect state of discipline and equipment, confident in their leader, and not less confident in themselves; for even at this early period of the war it was the habit of the British soldiers, the habit bequeathed by centuries of glory, to admit of no doubt as to the issue of a combat. The Portuguese generals, who had six thousand men, were at first most extravagant in their demands, and would only consent to join the English upon condition that their troops should all be maintained from the British commissariat; a proposition so utterly unreasonable when made by the natives of the country to their allies, just landed from their ships, that it thus early evinced, what the future progress of the war so clearly demonstrated, that jealousy of foreign co-operation, and aversion to foreign command, were nearly as strongly imprinted on their minds as hatred at the invaders. At length they consented to let General Freire, with one brigade of infantry, fourteen hundred strong, and two hundred and fifty horse, remain with Sir Arthur; but the main body was positively prohibited to advance beyond Leira on the road to Lisbon.

(1) The exact number was 9280 sabres and bayonets—about 10,000 men, including subalterns and officers. Spencer's corps was 4793 strong—about 5000 men.—GURWOOD, iv. 20.

(2) "The English soldiers who land upon your shores do so with every sentiment of friendship, faith, and honour. The glorious struggle in which you are engaged, is for all that is dear to man: the protection of your wives and children, the restoration of your lawful prince, the independence, nay, the existence of your kingdom, the preservation of your holy religion;—objects like these can only be attained by distinguished examples of fortitude and constancy. The noble struggle against the tyranny

and usurpation of France, will be jointly maintained by Portugal, Spain, and England; and in contributing to the success of a cause so just and glorious, the views of his Britannic Majesty are the same as those by which you yourselves animated."—A. WELLESLEY'S Letter. It is seldom that a proclamation in the outset of a struggle, so faithfully represents the real objects at issue in it; still seldomer that it so prophetically and truly describes its ultimate result after many and long continued disasters.—See GURWOOD, iv. 46.

(3) GURW. iv. 66, 67. Nap. i. 190, 191. Lond. 124, 125.

The truth was, that they entertained a secret dread of the French troops, and deeming the English totally inadequate to contend with them, they were unwilling to commit themselves by their side to a decisive affair. This defection of the native troops threw a chill over the English army, not from any doubt as to its ability to contend single-handed with the forces of Junot, but from the apprehensions which it inspired regarding the sincerity of their allies' professions of zeal against the common enemy. Sir Arthur, notwithstanding, continued his advance, and was received every where by the people with rapturous enthusiasm. His route lay by Alcobaca to Caldas, Aug. 15. which latter place he reached on the evening of the 15th; Laborde, who commanded a division of five thousand French, which Junot on the first alarm had sent down to the coast, retiring as he advanced. A trifling unsuccessful skirmish occurred on the same day at Obidos, in which a few men were killed and wounded on both sides: memorable as the FIRST BRITISH SOLDIERS who fell in the Peninsular war (1).

Combat of
Rolica.

Meanwhile Junot despatched orders in all directions to call in his detached columns, and concentrate all his forces for the protection of Lisbon; and Laborde, to give him time to complete his arrangements, resolved to stand firm at ROLICA, a little village situated at the southern extremity of a large oblong valley, running nearly north and south in the bosom of the Monte Junta, in the centre of which the little village and Moorish tower of Obidos are situated. His force, five thousand strong, including five hundred horse and five guns, was stationed on a small elevated plateau in front of Rolica, at the upper end of the valley; and the hills on either side which shut it in were occupied by detachments, who, from amidst the rocky thickets and close underwood of myrtles and gumcistus with which they were covered, threatened to keep up a heavy fire on the assailants. Sir Arthur divided his force into three columns: the right, consisting of the Portuguese infantry, and fifty horse under Colonel Trant, was directed to turn the mountains in the rear; while the centre, under Sir Arthur in person, attacked the plateau in front; and the left, under General Ferguson, was ordered to ascend the hills abreast of Obidos, and menace the French right by turning it in the mountains. As the centre advanced, preceded by nine guns, the corps on the right and left moved simultaneously forward in the hills, and the aspect of the body in the plain, nine thousand strong, moving majestically forward at a slow pace, in the finest order, and constantly closing again, after the array had been broken by trees or houses in the line of its advance, strongly impressed the French soldiers, most of whom, like the British, were that day to make their first essay in real warfare against an antagonist worthy of their arms. No sooner, however, was Laborde made aware of the risk he ran, if he remained in his present situation, of being outflanked on either side, than he fell swiftly back, in admirable order, and took up a second position much stronger than the former, in a little plain projecting into the valley higher up in the gorge of the pass, and shut in by close rocky thickets on either side. Thither he was rapidly pursued by the British, the right, centre, and left still moving in the same order. Never, in the whole progress of the Peninsular campaigns, did war appear in a more picturesque and animating form than in the first engagement of the British soldiers. The loud shouts of the advancing columns, re-echoed by the surrounding hills, and answered by as confident cheers from the enemy; the sharp rattle of the musketry among the woods, which marked the advance of the assailants as they drove before them

(1) Gurw. iv. 71, 80. Nap. i. 198, 199. Lond. i. 128, 130.

the French light troops; the curling wreaths of smoke which rose above the foliage, and were wafted by the morning air up the sides of the mountains, amidst the rays of a resplendent sun, formed a scene which resembled rather the mimic warfare of the opera stage, than the opening of the most desperate and sanguinary strife recorded in modern times. Such was the impetuosity of the attack, that the leading troops of the centre column, particularly the 29th regiment, forced their way through the gorge, and alone sustained the brunt of the enemy's fire, before any of their comrades could come up to their assistance. But the severity of the concentric discharges, not merely from the line in front, but the woods on either flank, was so great, that this gallant regiment, on first emerging into the little plain, wavered and broke, and their noble colonel, Lake, as he waved his hat to lead them back to the charge, was killed. At that critical moment, however, the 5th and 9th came up, the 29th rallied, and the whole rushed forward with irresistible impetuosity upon the enemy. The French were obliged to give ground; the position was carried before it was menaced by the flank columns getting into its rear. Even then the enemy retired slowly, and in compact order, keeping up a continued fire from the rearguard, and exhibiting, equally with the advance of the assailants, the finest specimen of discipline and steadiness amidst all the confusion incident to a retreat over broken ground and through entangled thickets. In this brilliant affair the British lost five hundred men killed and wounded; the French six hundred, and three pieces of cannon: and as the former, though nearly triple the enemy upon the whole, were necessarily, from the narrow and rugged character of the ground, inferior, in the first instance at least, at all the points of attack, it was hard to say to which of these two gallant nations the palm of courage and skill in this their first encounter in the Peninsula was to be awarded (1).

On the following morning orders were, in the first instance, issued for the continuance of the pursuit, and it was universally believed in the army that the enemy would be pursued, at the point of the bayonet, to the Rock of Lisbon; but at noon accounts arrived at headquarters of the arrival of Generals Anstruther and Ackland, with their respective brigades from England, off the coast; and, at the same time, that Junot had marched with all his disposable force out of Lisbon to bring matters to the issue of a decisive battle. Orders were, therefore, given to suspend the pursuit, and the line of march was directed by Lourinham to Vimero, where headquarters were established on the 19th, in order to be near the seacoast to take advantage of the reinforcements which were at hand. On the other hand, Junot, having by great exertion collected all his disposable force, and formed a junction at Torres Vedras with the retiring divisions of Laborde, found himself at the head of only fourteen thousand men—including, however, twelve hundred horse and six-and-twenty pieces of cannon; so

(1) Foy, iv. 304, 315. Thieb. 174, 182. Gurw. iv. 81, 84. Nap. i. 202, 205. Lond. i. 130, 137.

In this, as in all the other actions of the war, the estimate of the numbers engaged is taken from a medium of the accounts on both sides; keeping in view the credit due to the different narratives, and the maxim, *testimonia ponderanda sunt potius quam numeranda*. In this affair Sir Arthur estimates the French at 6000 men, Thiebault at 1900, Foy at 2500, Torneo at 5000, Thibaudau at 3500.—See THIEB. 179; GURW. iv. 81; FOY, iv. 314; TOR. ii. 46; THIB. vi. 464. With the utmost wish to maintain an impartial view, and the greatest anxiety to avoid the influence of undue national partiality, it is impos-

sible to study the French accounts of the actions in the Peninsular war, and particularly the numbers engaged and lost on the opposite sides, without feeling as great distrust of the fidelity of their facts as admiration for the brilliancy of their descriptions and the talent of their observations; and arriving at the conclusion, that the two rival races of modern Europe have here, as elsewhere, preserved their never-failing characteristics; and that, if the palm for the eagle-glance and the scientific reflection is frequently to be awarded to the writers of the Celtic, the credit due to honest and trustworthy narrative is in general due to the historians of the Gothic race.

heavily had the necessity of occupying many different points in a hostile country, weighed upon and divided the twenty-five thousand which still remained at his disposal. On the 19th, General Anstruther's brigade was landed, and on the 20th, General Ackland's; and these reinforcements raised the English army to sixteen thousand fighting men, besides Trant's Portuguese, and two regiments which were with Sir Charles Cotton off the Tagus. It had, however, only eighteen guns and a hundred and eighty horse British, and two hundred Portuguese horse, so that the superiority of infantry was nearly counterbalanced by the advantage of the enemy in the other arms of war. Accurately informed of the nature of the country through which he was to advance, Sir Arthur proposed, on the 21st, to turn the strong position of Torres Vedras, and gain Mafra with a powerful advanced guard, while the main body was to move forward, and seize the adjoining heights, so as to intercept the French line of retreat by Montachique to Lisbon. But Sir Harry Burrard, Sir Arthur's superior in command, who had now arrived off the coast, forbade any such hazardous operation, as endangering unnecessarily part of the army, when the force already in hand, and still more the powerful reinforcement approaching under Sir John Moore, rendered ultimate success a matter of certainty without incurring any such risk. The troops, therefore, were concentrated at Vimiero, and every arrangement made for a decisive battle on the morrow; while Junot, having mustered every man he could collect at Torres Vedras, set out, soon after nightfall, and advanced, through tedious and difficult defiles, to within a league and a half of the British outposts, where he arrived by seven o'clock on the following morning (1).

The ground occupied by the British in front of Vimiero, though not clearly defined as a military position, was yet of considerable strength. The village of that name stands in a beautiful valley, running in a north-west-
Battle of
Vimiero,
Aug. 20.
 erly direction from the interior towards the Atlantic, with the clear stream of the Maceira glittering over a pebbly bottom in its bosom, at the distance of about three miles from the sea. Hills rise on either side, especially on the northern, where a range of abrupt heights overhang the little plain. Over the summit of these runs the great road from Lisbon, through the hamlets of Fontaniel and Ventoza to Lourinham; while on the south-east is a sort of high table-land, covered in the ravines with myrtle, in the open part bare, over which the approach on the side of Torres Vedras passes. A still

(1) Gurw. iv. 89, 93. Sir A. Wellesley's Evid. *Ibid.* iv. 181. Lond. i. 137, 142. Nap. i. 207, 209. Foy, iv. 319, 323. Thib. 183, 195.

The road by which Sir Arthur proposed to have advanced from Vimiero to Mafra was near the sea-coast; that by which Junot actually came up from Torres Vedras to Vimiero was further in the interior, but nearly parallel to the former. If, therefore, the design of the English general had been followed out, it would have brought the two armies into a position similar to the French and Prussian at Jena; they would have mutually turned and crossed each other in their march, and when they came to blows, Junot would have fought with his back to Oporto and his face to Lisbon, and Wellington with his back to Lisbon and his face to Oporto. But there would have been this essential distinction between the situation of the two armies, after having thus mutually passed each other; that Junot, cut off from all his reserves and supplies at Lisbon, would have been driven, in case of disaster, to a ruinous retreat through the insurgent and hostile mountains of the north of Portugal; whereas Wellington, backed by the sea, and having his fleet, containing powerful reinforcements, to fall back upon, would have fought in the most advantageous position. There can be

little doubt that, in these circumstances, defeat to Junot would have been attended with decisive consequences, and that Wellington was pursuing the plan of an able commander in throwing himself in this manner upon his enemy's line of communication without compromising his own; the great object and most decisive stroke which can be dealt out in war. At the same time it is not surprising that Sir Harry Burrard, who came in on the broadside of the affair, and could not be supposed to appreciate so clearly as the commander actually engaged, the vital importance of not delaying an hour the proposed night-march between the sea and the hills, should have declined to plunge at once into so perilous an operation. His real error consisted in interfering at all with an important and delicate military operation, at the time when it was on the eve of execution by an able and experienced general; and the chief fault lay with the government in subjecting the army, at such a critical time, to the successive command of three different generals, who could not be supposed properly to enter into, or thoroughly understand, the operations in the course of execution at the time when they successively assumed the direction.

loftier mass of heights overlook these in the rear, and lie between them and the sea. On this rugged ground the British army lay in bivouac on the night of the 20th, the village of Vimiero being occupied by a strong detachment, and a few pickets stationed on the heights towards Lourinham, to give warning of the arrival of the enemy. The first information of their approach was obtained at midnight, when a horseman in haste rode up to Sir Arthur with the account that Junot's whole army, said to be twenty thousand strong, was approaching. Shortly before sunrise a cloud of dust was seen to arise in the direction of the road leading from Torres Vedras to Lourinham—column after column were soon after discerned through the morning dawn, to cross the sky-line of the opposite eminences, and it was evident that the French were bearing down in great force on the British left. After they descended from the heights on the opposite side, however, the direction of their march could no longer be distinctly perceived, and the advanced guards were upon the English videttes almost as soon as they were perceived. But Sir Arthur, concluding from the line of the road on which they were marching, that the left was the principal object of attack, had meanwhile ordered four brigades successively to cross the valley from the heights on the south to those on the north of the stream; and before the action began, the left was secure. Observing the rapid concentration of troops on the English left the French accumulated their forces on their own right. General Laborde commanded a column, six thousand strong, which advanced against the centre; while Brennier, with his division of five thousand, moved against the left of the British; and the reserve under Kellerman, with the cavalry led by Margaron, in all about three thousand men, was ready to support any point where their aid might be required. Generals Ferguson, Nightingale, and Bower, commanded the English left. Aekland united the left to the centre, which, strongly grouped together in the valley in front of Vimiero, was formed of the brigades of Anstruther and Fane (1); while, on the right, Hill's brigade, in a massy column, rested on the summit of the heights, which formed the southern boundary of the valley.

Battle of Vimiero, Aug. 21. The action began with the head of Laborde's column, which, advancing with the utmost impetuosity against the British centre, first came in contact with the 50th regiment. Its light troops were driven in with great vigour, and the French mounted the hill to the north-east of Vimiero with loud cries and all the confidence of victory; but when they reached the summit, they were shattered by a well-directed fire from the artillery, disposed along the front of the English line on the edge of the steep; and their troops astonished by the effect of the shrapnel shells, then first used against them, which, after striking down by a point-blank discharge whole files of soldiers in front, exploded with all the devastation of bombs in the rear. While yet breathless with their ascent, they received a discharge within pistol-shot from the 50th, and were immediately charged with the bayonet with such vigour, that ere the rush took place they broke and fled (2). At the

(1) Lond. i. 140, 142. Nap. i. 208, 212. Foy, iv. 324, 333. Thib. 192, 194. Gurw. iv. 93, 94.

(2) Colonel Walker, of the 50th regiment, finding his battalion, which had only 700 bayonets in the field, unable, by a direct resistance in front, to withstand the assault of above two thousand men in column, when Laborde led on, most skilfully drew it up obliquely to their advance, with the left, against which they were directed, thrown back. The effect of this was to expose the flank as well as front of the French column to the British fire, almost every shot of which told on their crowded ranks, while a small

number only would return the discharge, and the numerous ranks in rear were perfectly useless. When the order to charge was given, the British regiment in line came down in compact order on the French column, partly in front and partly in flank, and in the attempt to deploy and form line to withstand the leveled steel, they almost unavoidably broke and fled. This method of resisting the French attack in column was very frequently afterwards employed by Wellington, and always with the same success. It can hardly fail of proving so, if the part of the line menaced by the head of the

same time Fane's brigade repulsed, with equal success, an attack on the village of Vimiero in the centre, and, after a desperate contest, seven pieces of cannon were taken in that quarter; while the few horsemen with the army who were there stationed broke forth among the retreating lines with great execution; but pursuing their advantage too far, they were assailed when in disorder by the superior troops of the French cavalry, and almost cut to pieces. While these successes were achieved in the centre, a most severe conflict was going on in the hills to the left, where the road to Lourinham ascends the steep heights to the north of Vimiero. Brennier and Solignac commanded in that quarter; and as Junot perceived that their attack did not at once prove successful, they were supported in the end by the whole reserve of infantry, under Kellerman. The French, under Solignac, preceded by a cloud of light troops, came on with the utmost impetuosity, and first encountered Ferguson's brigade on the summit of the ridge. Several terrible discharges of musketry were exchanged between these dauntless antagonists with extraordinary execution on both sides, as the fire-arms, almost within pistol-shot, told with murderous effect on the dense array of either line; but at length the three English regiments, which had hitherto singly maintained the combat (56th, 40th, and 71st), being supported by three others, levelled their bayonets, and rushing forward with irresistible impetuosity, drove the French line headlong down the steep, with the loss of all their artillery. So dreadful was the execution of the bayonet on this occasion, that the whole front line of one of the French regiments went down like grass before the scythe, and three hundred men lay dead as they had stood in their ranks. Brennier's, however, still remained, as well as the reserve under Kellerman—the flower of the French army—and with these choice troops Junot made a gallant attempt to regain the day. Forming his men under the cover of the rocks and woods which concealed them from the enemy, Brennier, with his columns in admirable order, came suddenly upon the victorious British as they were lying on the ground, in loose array in the valley, reposing after their success, and, suddenly charging, drove them back, and retook the guns; but his triumph was but momentary; the surprised troops rallied upon the heights in their rear, to which they had been driven, and, facing about, poured in a destructive volley upon their pursuers; and immediately charging with a loud shout, not only again captured the artillery, but made Brennier himself prisoner, and drove the enemy a second time in utter confusion down the hill. So complete was the rout, that Solignac's brigade was driven off the ground in a different direction from Brennier's; the former general was desperately wounded, and his troops would all have been made prisoners, had not an unexpected order from Sir Harry Burrard obliged Ferguson to halt in the midst of his success. The broken French upon this rallied and reunited, and the whole fell back to the heights on the opposite side of the valley, considerably to the north of the ground from which they had commenced their attack in the morning—leaving in the hands of the victors thirteen pieces of cannon, a large quantity of ammunition, and four hundred prisoners, besides two thousand who had fallen on the field. The English

column can be relied on to withstand the shock till the fire of the other parts on the flank of the column has produced the desired effect; but unless this is the case, the column will break the line, and deploying against the oblique line, now itself taken in flank, soon drive it off the field. Of all the European troops, the British are the only ones by whom this hazardous, but, if successful, decisive mode of

resisting the attack in column was habitually practised. General Loison, who witnessed this able movement, desired, after the Convention of Cintra, to be introduced to Colonel Walker, and, with true military frankness, congratulated him on the steadiness and talent with which he had, with a battalion in line, withstood the formidable attack of the French column.—See *Scott's Napoleon*, vi. 235.

had to lament the loss of nearly eight hundred men in killed and wounded (1).

Sir A. Wellesley proposes to follow up the victory but is prevented by Sir Harry Burrard.

Like the allied sovereigns at Austerlitz, Junot had made his attack by a flank march directed in echelon athwart the front, against the left of the British in position; and his disaster, like theirs, was in a great measure owing to that cause, which brought his different columns not simultaneously, but at successive periods into action. Sir Arthur Wellesley had as decisive success in his power as Napoléon, at the close of the day; for not only had the three brigades under Hill on the right and the Portuguese never fired a shot, but two other brigades had suffered very little; the whole army was in excellent order and the most enthusiastic spirits; the shouts of victory, the triumphant clang of trumpets, was heard along their whole line; and from the direction which the broken French had taken after their defeat; they were entirely cut off from the retreat to Lisbon; while the British, who had repulsed their oblique attack, and driven them off in a north-easterly direction, were masters of the great road by Torres Vedras to the capital. This situation of things promised the greatest results to immediate activity; Sir Arthur was fully aware of the vast advantages thus placed within his grasp, and prepared, by immediate and decisive operations, instantly to turn them to the best account. He proposed with the five brigades on the left, about nine thousand men, and the Portuguese, five thousand more, to follow up his success against the retreating columns of the enemy, now blended together in great confusion on the opposite heights, and drive them as far as possible back in a north-easterly direction over the Sierra da Baragueda, away from the capital; while Hill, Anstruther, and Fane, six thousand strong, should make straight for the defile of Torres Vedras, which lay open to the south, and thence push on to Montachique, and cut off all retreat by the French to the capital. Considering that Junot had lost two-thirds of his artillery, and great part of his reserve park of ammunition, there can be no doubt that this operation would have proved successful, and that not only would Lisbon have fallen an easy prey to the victors, but Junot himself, driven to an eccentric and disastrous retreat through an insurgent and mountainous country almost destitute of roads, would have been too happy to find shelter under the cannon of Almeida with half his forces. Orders to that effect were already given, the army was preparing to execute them, when the assumption of the command by Sir Harry Burrard at once stopt short the career of victory. That officer, who had arrived on the field with his staff early in the day, had, with generous forbearance, declined to take the command from Sir Arthur during the battle; but after it was over, considering the responsibility of ulterior operations as resting on himself, he gave orders to halt at all points, and remain in position at Vimiero till the expected reinforcements under Sir John Moore joined the army. Sir Arthur, in the strongest terms and with military frankness, represented to his superior general, on the field of battle, the inestimable importance of instantly following up the beaten enemy, driving him still further to the north-east, and interposing between his disordered columns and the strong defiles of Torres Vedras, the real gates of the capital. But all was in vain. Sir Harry Burrard, though a respectable and gallant veteran, had none of the vigour or daring requisite for decisive success; he belonged to the old school, by whom one battle was considered sufficient work for one week, and deemed it im-

(1) Sir A. Wellesley's Despatches. *Gurw.* iv. 93, 330, 339. *Thib.* 195, 204. *Join.* iii. 71, 72. *Scott,* 96. *Nap.* i. 212, 246. *Lond.* i. 142, 144. *Foy,* iv. vi. 234, 235.

prudent, when the artillery-horses were fatigued and the cavalry destroyed, to hazard any thing by a further advance, the more especially as ultimate success without any risk was certainly to be looked for upon the arrival of Sir John Moore's division. He persisted, accordingly, in his resolution not to move from his ground: the precious moments never to be regained were lost; the disordered French, seeing with astonishment that they were not pursued, re-entered their ranks. Junot that very night, by a forced and circuitous march, regained the defiles of Torres Vedras, and secured his retreat to the capital; while Sir Arthur, seeing the opportunity was lost, and concealing the bitterness of his disappointment under an affected gaiety, said to the officers of his staff, "Gentlemen, nothing now remains to us but to go and shoot red-legged partridges (1)."

Sir Harry Burrard's tenure of the supreme direction of affairs was of short duration. Early on the morning of the 22d, Sir Hew Dalrymple arrived from Gibraltar, and immediately landed and assumed the command; so that within thirty hours a pitched battle had been fought, a decisive operation rejected, and three successive commanders called to the direction of the army. After consulting with Sir Arthur and Sir Harry, and getting the best information he could, he resolved to advance on the 25d against Junot, now in position at Torres Vedras, and orders to that effect had already been issued, when information was brought that a French flag of truce had reached the outposts. It proved to be General Kellerman, with a proposal from Junot for a suspension of arms, with a view to the evacuation of Portugal (2).

In truth, the situation of Junot since the battle of Vimiero had been such, that he had no longer any alternative to adopt. Early on the morning of the 22d, a council of war was held at Torres Vedras; and the proverb almost invariably holds good, that such a council never fights. The French generals were aware that a powerful reinforcement, under Sir John Moore, was on the eve of landing; that a city containing three hundred thousand agitated and hostile citizens was in the rear; that the forts and points of defence which it contained were hardly tenable against an army of thirty thousand English troops, and that, to attempt a retreat through Portugal, intersected as it is by mountain torrents and almost inaccessible ridges, in the face of an insurgent population, and pursued by a victorious army, could not fail to be attended with the greatest disasters. In these circumstances, it was unanimously agreed, that enough had been done for the honour of the Imperial arms, and that to endeavour to obtain, by negotiation, a convention which might restore the army to the French soil, and ultimately to renewed operations in the north of Spain, was the most prudent course which could be adopted. General Kellerman was selected for this delicate mission, and it could not have been intrusted to abler or more skilful hands. Enjoying an European reputation, not less from the glory of his father (3), the hero of Valmy, than his own inappreciable achievements on the field of Marengo (4), he was at the same time possessed of all the tact and finesse in which the French diplomatists excel all those of Europe, with the exception

(1) Sir A. Wellesley's Despatches. Gurw. iv. 99, and Evid. Ibid. iv. 207, 208. Lord Burghersh's Evidence. Ibid. iv. 214. Lond. i. 145, 146. Nap. i. 216, 217.

Lord Burghersh, in his evidence before the court of enquiry, declared,—"I recollect, that on the evening of 21st, August, Sir Arthur Wellesley urged Sir H. Burrard to advance, giving as a reason that his right was some miles nearer to Torres Vedras

than the enemy; that he had four brigades that had not been engaged; that Torres Vedras was the pass by which the enemy must retire to Lisbon, and that in his opinion, by that movement no part of the French army could reach Lisbon." — *Evidence, Court of Enquiry*.—Gurwood, iv. 214.

(2) Gurw. iv. 104. Nap. i. 220, Foy, iv. 340.

(3) *Ante*, i. 311.

(4) *Ante*, iv. 167.

of those of Russia. Perceiving from some hints dropped in conversation by the English general, Sir Hew Dalrymple, and his brother officers, who were not aware that he understood their language, that they were far from possessing the confidence of Sir Arthur Wellesley in the results to be expected from immediate and decisive operations, he began by representing, in the most favourable colours, the strength of the French army and the magnitude of its resources, especially from the aid of the sailors and artillery of the Russian fleet, as well as the resolution of its commander, whom he described as determined to bury himself under the ruins of Lisbon rather than submit to any conditions derogatory to the honour of the Imperial arms. Having thus effected his object, of producing a favourable impression of the protracted and doubtful nature of the contest which awaited them if hostilities were persisted in, he gradually opened the real object of his mission, which was the conclusion of an armistice preparatory to a convention for the evacuation of Portugal. The terms proposed were, that the French army should not be considered as prisoners of war, but be sent back to France by sea, with their artillery, arms, and baggage; that their partisans in the country should not be disquieted on account of their political opinions, but, so far as they desired it, be permitted to withdraw with their effects; and that the Russian fleet should remain in Lisbon as in a neutral harbour. The two first conditions

Aug. 23. were accepted without any difficulty by all the English generals; but Sir Arthur Wellesley strenuously opposed the last, and it was at length agreed to refer it to the decision of Sir Charles Cotton, who positively refused to agree to it. Foiled in this attempt to extricate the Russian fleet from their awkward situation, the French general was obliged to leave them to their fate, and a separate convention was some days afterwards concluded with Admiral Siniavin, the Russian commander, in virtue of which the whole fleet was to be conducted to England and retained in deposit till the conclusion of a general peace, and the officers and crews be transported to Russia at the expense of the British government, without any restriction as to their future service (1).

Senseless
clamour in
England on
the subject
leads to a
Court of
Enquiry.
Its result.

Posterity will scarcely be able to credit the universal burst of indignation with which this convention was received, both in the Peninsular nations and the British islands. Totally incapable of appreciating the real importance of the acquisition of Portugal at one blow on the future progress of the war, the inhabitants of all these countries united in condemning a treaty which was thought to step between them and the glory which they had earned, or the vengeance which was their due. The Portuguese, though they had been in no hurry to confront the invader in the field, and were strangers to the glories of Rolica and

(1) Nap. i. 220, 229. Gurw. iv. 105, 116, 117. Foy, iv. 343, 345. Lond. i. 152, 160. Thieb. 204, 209.

The Convention of Cintra excited such a clamour at the time, both in the British and Peninsular nations, that a short summary of its leading provisions is indispensable. It was provided that the French should evacuate the forts of Lisbon and the whole kingdom of Portugal, and be conveyed to France, with their artillery and sixty rounds a-gun, but with liberty to serve again; all other artillery, arms, and ammunition to be delivered up to the British army and navy; the French army to carry with them all their equipments, the cavalry their horses, and the individuals their property; the sick and wounded to be intrusted to the care of the British government, and returned to France when con-

valascent; the fortresses of Elvas, Almeida, Peniche, and Palmela shall be delivered up as soon as British detachments can be sent forward to take possession of them; all subjects of France shall be protected who are domiciliated in Portugal; all their property of every description to be guaranteed to the French citizens in Portugal; no inhabitants of that country to be disquieted on account of their political conduct or opinions; the Spanish troops in the custody of the French armies to be liberated. By the supplementary convention in regard to the Russian fleet, it was stipulated that it should be conveyed to Great Britain, to remain in deposit with all its stores till six months after the conclusion of a general peace; and the officers and men meanwhile to be returned to Russia without any restriction as to their future service.—See GRAYWOOD, iv. 113, 117.

Vimiera, were yet loud in their complaints of the capitulation which had been granted; and bitterly inveighed against the clauses which, under the specious veil of protecting private property, in effect gave the public robbers the means of securely carrying off the stores of private and ecclesiastical plunder which they had amassed. The Spaniards re-echoed the same sentiments, and with some appearance of reason; contrasted the unconditional surrender of Dupont's corps at Baylen with the unhappy convention which tended only to remove the French army from a situation where it was detached from the remainder of the imperial forces, and ran the most imminent hazard of being made prisoners of war, to one where it might be more advantageously and securely employed in forming the right wing of the army with which the invasion of the Peninsula was again to be attempted. Roused to the very highest pitch of enthusiasm by the early and decisive successes which had attended their arms—panting for their full share of the glories which had been won—and nothing doubting that an unconditional surrender would immediately follow, and that they should soon see a Marshal of France and twenty thousand men arrive as prisoners of war at Spithead, the British people abandoned themselves to unbounded vexation when the capitulation was announced which was to convey them without that last disgrace being incurred, to swell the invader's ranks at Rochefort and l'Orient. In vain were the Park and Tower guns fired on this as on other triumphs of our arms; the public voice refused to join in the acclamation; the press, both in the metropolis and the provinces, loudly condemned the convention as more disgraceful than even those of the Helder and Closter Seven, where the British troops had been constrained to sue for terms of accommodation; many of the public journals refused to stain their pages by the obnoxious articles, others appeared with their columns in mourning, as in a season of national calamity; public meetings were assembled in most parts of England, to express the general indignation, and call for the punishment of the guilty parties; and to such a length did the outcry proceed, that it was deemed indispensable to appoint a Court of Enquiry, consisting of highly respectable, though somewhat antiquated officers, who, after a full investigation, arrived at the conclusion that, considering the extraordinary manner in which three successive commanders had been invested with the direction of the army after the battle of Vimiero, it was not surprising that that victory had not been more vigorously followed up—that unquestionable zeal and firmness had been exhibited by all the three generals—and that, in the whole circumstances of the case, no further proceedings were necessary. The general odium attached to Sir Hew Dalrymple, as the senior officer in command at the time the convention was signed, though it was evident that the chief fault in the case, if there was fault at all, lay with Sir Harry Burrard as the commander-in-chief when the decisive march to Torres Vedras was declined. Such was the general discontent, that neither of these two generals, notwithstanding the acquittal of the court-martial, were again employed in any considerable command in the British army; and it required all the family influence and early celebrity of the hero of Assaye and Vimiero to save the future conqueror of Napoléon from being cut short in the threshold of his career, for no fault whatever of his own, by the very people upon whom he had conferred an inestimable benefit (1).

(1) Court of Enquiry. *Gurw.* iv. 235, 239. *South.* ii. 272, 276. *Lond.* i. 157, 165. *Tor.* ii. 57, 58.

At the meeting of Parliament, the public thanks of both Houses were voted to Sir Arthur Wellesley

for the battle of Vimiero. But he had a narrow escape, notwithstanding all his glory, from the obloquy consequent on the Convention of Cintra.—See *Gurwood*, iv. 239, 241.

Its expedi-
ence at that
juncture.

The English people in general arrive in the end at more sober and rational opinions on political subjects than any other of whom history has preserved a record; but they are prone, in the first instance, in a most extraordinary degree, to common delusions or frenzies, which almost amount to national insanity. The cruel injustice with which they persecuted Sir Robert Calder for having gained a victory, perhaps the most momentous in its ultimate consequences, and most vital to the safety of the country of any recorded in the British annals (1), is an instance of the first—the universal and senseless clamour raised about the Convention of Cintra, an example of the second. There cannot be a doubt, not only of its expedience at the juncture when it was concluded, but of its having been the means of acquiring the basis on which the whole future successes of the British arms were rested. Having missed, perhaps through an excess of caution, the opportunity of following up, according to Sir Arthur Wellesley's advice, the brilliant success of Vimiero on the evening of the battle, nothing remained but to close with the highly advantageous offer, which at once liberated Portugal from its oppressors and established the best possible base for future operations. The sea, sterile and unproductive if in the rear of the forces of any other power, is the source of strength and vigour to the British armies; to them every tide is fraught with plenty, every wind wafts the sinews of war on its gales. Thenceforward Lisbon became the great *place d'armes* to the English army; the stronghold of defence in periods of disaster, the reservoir from whence all the muniments of war were drawn in prosperous times. To have missed the opportunity of at once, and in the outset of the campaign, acquiring such a base for future operations, for the vain glory of possibly compelling a French corps and marshal, after a bloody siege of several months' duration, to lay down their arms in Lisbon, Elvas, and Almeida, would have been sacrificing the solid advantages of war for its empty honours. The restoration of twenty thousand defeated and dispirited soldiers to the standards of the enemy, was a matter of no sort of consequence to a sovereign who had seven hundred thousand disciplined men at his command; the loss of a whole kingdom, of a chain of strong fortresses, of an admirable harbour, of ten sail of the line to his ally, of the *prestige* of victory to himself, was a calamity of a very different description. Napoléon showed clearly in what light he viewed the acquisition of such advantages to the French arms, when, in the outset of his career, he stipulated only, in return for his glorious successes in the Maritime Alps, the cession of the Piedmontese fortresses from the cabinet of Turin (2); and when, after the triumph of Marengo, he at once allowed the Austrian army, cut off from the hereditary states and thrown back on Genoa, to retire unmolested to the Mincio, provided only they ceded Alexandria, Tortona, and the other strongholds in the west of Lombardy, as the reward of victory (3). On the present occasion he felt quite as strongly the vast importance of the fortified bases for future operations, so advantageously situated on the edge of the sea, and on the flank of the peninsular plains, which had thus, in the very outset of their career, been wrested from him by the British arms; had the advantage been gained by himself, he would have made Europe ring from side to side with the triumph which had been achieved. As it was, he manifested the utmost displeasure at the generals who were engaged in the Convention of Cintra; and Junot, in particular, never afterwards regained his confidence or esteem. "I was about," said

(1) *Ante*, v. 159.(2) *Ante*, ii. 49.(3) *Ante*, iv. 170.

he, "to send Junot to a council of war; but happily the English got the start of me by sending their generals to one, and thus saved me from the pain of punishing an old friend (1)."

Disgraceful
revelations
which are
made at Lis-
bon of the
plunder by
all ranks in
the French
army.
Sept. 5.

Many causes conspired to make the execution of the Convention of Cintra a matter of great difficulty to all the contracting parties. The French troops, from the time it was concluded, were constantly kept together in masses, encamped on the heights and forts, with cannon directed down the principal streets which led to their bivouacks. Notwithstanding these formidable preparations, and the proximity of the British forces, who, early in September, approached close to Lisbon, it was found to be impossible to prevent the indignation of the populace from finding vent in detached acts of aggression; crowds of infuriated peasants incessantly thronged into the city, decorated with ribbons, vociferating shouts of triumph, and bearing on their hats the favourite motto, "Death to the French," and at night the discharge of fire-arms or explosion of petards were heard on all sides, occasioned by skirmishes between the enraged populace and the French advanced posts. Loison, whose unnecessary cruelty had rendered him in an especial manner the object of universal hatred, was menaced by a serious attack; while other generals, especially Travot, who had executed their orders with humanity, were not only unmolested, but traversed the streets alone in perfect safety; a fact, as Colonel Napier justly observes (2), extremely honourable to the Portuguese, and conclusive as to the misconduct of the obnoxious officers. But these difficulties, great as they were, soon sunk into insignificance when compared with those which arose from the discoveries made, in the course of the preparations for the embarkation, of the extent to which public and private plunder had been carried by the French army. Sir John Hope, who had been appointed governor of Lisbon, took possession of the castle of Belem on the 10th September, and by his firm and vigorous conduct soon reduced the unruly multitude to some degree of order; but the complaints which daily arose as to the enormous quantity of plunder which the French were about to carry off under pretence of its being their private property, continually increased, and became the occasion of much more serious embarrassment. The museum, the treasury, the public libraries, the church plate, the arsenals of the state, equally with the houses of individuals, had been indiscriminately ransacked; most of the valuable articles left in the royal palace by the flying regent were packed up and ready for embarkation; all

(1) Thib. vi. 472. D'Abr. xii. 64, 102.

"He," says the Duchess of Abrantes, "to whom the whole life of Junot was devoted, alone viewed in a false light the Convention of Cintra. Every thing which was not a triumph he regarded as a defeat; and, like Augustus, he never ceased to demand his legions from all those who had not succeeded in conducting his young conscripts, hardly emerged from boyhood, to victory.—D'ARRANTES, xii. 64, 102.

The Duke of Wellington's opinion on the expediency of the Convention of Cintra was equally clearly expressed. "If we had not negotiated," said he, "we could not have advanced before the 30th, as Sir John Moore's corps was not ready till that day. The French would by that time have fortified their positions near Lisbon, which, it is probable, we could not have been in a situation to attack till the end of the first week in September. Then, taking the chance of the bad weather depriving us of the communication with the fleet of transports and victuallers, and delaying and rendering more difficult and precarious our land operations, which after all

could not have been effectual to cut off the retreat of the French across the Tagus into Alentejo, I was clearly of opinion, *that the best thing to do was to consent to a convention, and allow them to evacuate Portugal.* The details of the convention, and the agreement to suspend hostilities is a different matter; to both of them I have very serious objections. I do not know what Sir Hew Dalrymple proposes to do, or is instructed to do; but if I were in his situation, I would be in Madrid with 20,000 men in less than a month from this time.—SIR A. WELLESLEY to CHARLES STUART, Esq., 1st September, 1808; GURWOOD, iv. 121. Here is the clearest evidence of the advantageous results of obtaining so early in the campaign the great fortified base of Portugal for the British operations. Sir Arthur in a month proposed to have had twenty thousand men in Madrid! He is a bold man, who, on such a subject, dissents from the concurring opinion of Napoleon and the Duke of Wellington.

(2) Nap. i. 231.

the money in the public offices was laid hold of; even the sums lying in the *Deposito Publico*, a bank where they were placed to await the decision of the courts of law on matters of litigation, were appropriated by these insatiable hands. Junot even demanded five vessels to take away his personal effects. Matters at length rose to such a height that the British commanders felt themselves called upon to interfere; and the commissioners, to whom the execution of the convention had been intrusted, with much difficulty, and after the most violent altercation, succeeded in putting a stop to the disgraceful spoliation. These high functionaries, General Beresford and Lord Proby, acted with such firmness, that not only was the progress of the plunder arrested, and much which had been seized from the public offices

Sept. 12. restored, but a general order was extorted from the French commander, enjoining the immediate restitution of all the property which had been taken from public or private establishments within twenty-four hours. Yet so inveterate was the habit of plunder in all ranks of the French army, from the highest to the lowest, that within a few hours after this order was issued, Colonel Delambis, Junot's chief aide-de-camp, carried off the Prince Regent's horses—a valuable collection of private pictures was seized on by Junot himself—and two carriages belonging to the Duke of Sussex were appropriated, which were only got back by the threat of detaining the general himself as a hostage. At length, however, after vehement discussion and a complete revelation of that extraordinary system of public and private plunder which had been so long and disgracefully the characteristic of the French army, the greater part of this ill-gotten spoil was wrested from the

Sept. 15. invaders. On the 15th the first division of the fleet sailed from the
Sept. 30. Tagus; by the 30th the whole were embarked; shortly after Elvas and Almeida were given up in terms of the capitulation; and before the middle of October not a French soldier remained on the soil of Portugal. Twenty-two thousand men were disembarked on the coasts of France; thirty thousand had been placed, from first to last, by Napoléon under the orders of Junot; the remainder had perished of fatigue, disease, fallen in the field, or voluntarily enlisted in the British army. The convention, though loudly disapproved of by the British people, was, on the admission of the French themselves, carried into execution with scrupulous good faith by the British government (1).

British
troops ad-
vance into
Spain under
Sir John
Moore.

The subordinate arrangements consequent on the decisive events which had in this manner liberated Portugal, were soon concluded. Such was the violence of the groundless clamour which arose in England, on the subject of the convention, that all the Generals engaged in it, Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, were obliged to return to Great Britain; where, as already mentioned, their conduct in relation to it became the subject of deliberation to a court of enquiry, which, after a long and impartial investigation, returned a report, distinguished by little ability, and which in substance found that no blame could be attached to any of these officers. Meanwhile, the army, deprived in this way for a time of the assistance of the brave leader who had, in so glorious a manner, led it to victory, was placed under the command of SIR JOHN MOORE, an officer whose gallant conduct in Egypt, as well as admirable skill in the training and disciplining of his troops, had already rendered him distinguished

(1) Nap. i. 231, 234. South. i. 240; 249. Nevis, ii. 230, 249. Foy, iv. 356, 364. Thieb. 239.

“That same public opinion, under the influence of a free constitution, which condemned the Con-

vention of Cintra, enjoined to its government its faithful execution. In so far as depended on the English government, the convention was executed with honourable fidelity.—Foy, iv. 356.

among all his brethren in arms. His division had landed and joined the other troops at Lisbon; while another corps, fifteen thousand strong, under the orders of Sir David Baird, whose gallantry and firmness had been conspicuous at the storming of Seringapatam, was assembled in the British islands, and was destined to land at Corunna, descend through Galicia, and co-operate with those which had advanced from Portugal, in the plains of Leon. The two together, it was hoped, would amount to nearly forty thousand men, even after providing in an adequate manner for the security of Portugal, and the magazines and depots in the rear; a force which appeared, and doubtless was, if tolerably supported by its Peninsular allies, capable of achieving great things for the deliverance of Europe. Meanwhile, the Spanish troops, nearly five thousand strong, which had been liberated at Lisbon, were equipped anew at the expense of the British government, and despatched by sea to Catalonia, from whence the most pressing representations had been sent of the necessity of regular troops to aid the efforts and improve the discipline of the

Sept. 25. numerous peasants in arms in the province; the Russian fleet, in conformity with the treaty, was conducted to the British harbours; a central junta was formed at Lisbon, to administer the affairs of the kingdom in the absence of the Prince Regent; and the preparations for the campaign being
Oct 13. at length completed, the British troops began their march from the Portuguese capital, for the seat of war at the foot of the Pyrenees (1).

Appoint-
ment of the
Central
Junta at
Madrid. The decisive influence of the recent successes and central position of the English army, in possession of the capital and principal strongholds of the country, rendered the appointment of a Central Junta, and the defeat of the local intrigues every where set on foot in order to obtain a preponderating voice for particular men in its councils, a comparatively easy task in Portugal. But the case was very different in Spain, where jealousy of foreign interference had already risen to a most extravagant height; where the people entertained a most exaggerated idea of their own strength and resources; and many different provincial governments, elected under the pressure of necessity in different parts of the country, had opposite and jarring pretensions to advance for the supreme direction of affairs. Much division, and many dangerous jealousies, were rapidly rising upon this subject, when the junta of Seville, whose prudence and success, as well as the consideration due to the great cities and opulent province which they represented, had already invested with a sort of lead in the affairs of the Peninsula, had the good fortune to bring forward a project, which, from its equity and expedience, soon commanded universal assent. This was, that the

Aug. 3. different supreme juntas, each on the same day, should elect two deputies, who should, when united together, form the central government, to which all the local authorities were to be subject;—that the local juntas should nevertheless continue their functions, in obedience to the commands of the supreme junta; and that the seat of government should be some town in La Mancha, equally convenient for all the deputies. This proposal having met with general concurrence, the different provincial juntas elected their respective representatives for the central government, which was installed

Sept. 25. with extraordinary pomp at Aranjuez in the end of September, and immediately commenced its sittings. At first it consisted of twenty-four members, but their ranks were soon augmented, by the number of provinces which claimed the right of sending representatives, to thirty-five: an unhappy medium, too small for a legislative assembly, too large for an executive

cabinet. Though it numbered several eminent men and incorruptible patriots among its members, particularly Count Florida Blanca, who, though in the eightieth year of his age, preserved undecayed the vigour of intellect and cautious policy which had distinguished his long administration, and Jovellanos, in whom the severities of a tedious captivity had still left unextinguished the light of an elevated understanding and the warmth of an unsuspecting heart; yet it was easy to foresee, what subsequent events too mournfully verified, that it was not composed of the elements calculated either to communicate vigour and decision to the national councils, or impress foreign nations with a favourable idea of its probable stability. Formed for the most part of persons who were totally unknown, at least to public life, before the commencement of the revolution, and many of whom had been elevated to greatness solely by its convulsions, it was early distinguished by that overweening jealousy of their own importance, which in all men is the accompaniment of newly, and still more of undeservedly acquired, power, and torn with intestine intrigues, when the utmost possible unanimity and vigour were required to enable them to make head against the formidable tempest which was arising against them, under the guidance of the Emperor Napoléon (1).

Miserable condition of the central government, and armies on the Ebro. The Central Junta displayed a becoming vigour in asserting the inviolability of their privileges against Cuesta, who had arrested one of its members; but they were far from evincing equal energy in the more important duty of providing for the wants of the military force which was to maintain the conflict. So completely had the idea of their own invincibility taken possession of the Spaniards, that they never once contemplated the possibility of defeat; and all their arrangements were based on the assumption that they were speedily to drive the French over the Pyrenees, and intended to meet the contingencies which might then occur. Nothing was foreseen or provided for in case of disaster; there were no magazines or reserve stores accumulated in the rear, no positions fortified, no fortresses armed; there was no money in the treasury, no funds in the military chests of the generals; the soldiers were naked, destitute of shoes, and rarely supplied with provisions; the cavalry dismounted; the artillery in the most wretched condition; even the magnificent supplies which the generosity of England had thrown with such profuse bounty into the Peninsula, were squandered or dilapidated by private cupidity, and seldom reached the proper objects of their destination. Corruption in its worst form pervaded every department of the state; the inferior officers sold or plundered the stores, the superior, in many instances, made free with the military chest; in the midst of the general misrule, the Central Junta, amongst eloquent and pompous declamations, could find no more worthy object of their practical deliberations than discussing the honorary titles which they were to bear, the ample salaries which they assigned to themselves, the dress they were to wear, and the form of the medals which were to be suspended round their necks. In the midst of this general scene of cupidity, imbecility, and vanity, nothing efficient was done, either for the service of the armies, or the defence of the state. This deplorable result is not to be ascribed exclusively, or even chiefly, to the character of the members of the Central Junta, or the leaders at the head of the troops; it arose from the nature of things, the overthrow of all regular government in Spain, and the jarring and conflicting interests of the popular assemblages by which its place had been supplied. Democratic energy

(1) Tor. ii. 80, 90, 97. Nap. i. 298, 308. South. ii. 277, 313. Jovellanos Memoria, ii. 12, 34.

is a powerful auxiliary, and when directed or made use of, in the first instance, by aristocratic foresight, it often produces the most important results : but its vigour speedily exhausts itself if not sustained by the lasting compulsion of terror or force; and the despotic tyranny of a Committee of Public Safety, is not less necessary to give success to its external operations than restore credit or usefulness to its internal administration (1).

Escape of the Marquis Romana's corps from Jutland, and its forwarding to Spain. In the north of Europe, however, decisive steps were adopted by the British government, which had the happiest results, and succeeded in restoring ten thousand of the veteran soldiers, whom the prudent foresight and anticipating perfidy of Napoléon had so early removed from the Peninsula, to the Spanish standards. It has been already mentioned, that so early as spring 1807, the French Emperor had made it the price of his reconciliation with Spain, after the premature proclamation of the Prince of Peace in the October preceding, that they should furnish sixteen thousand men to aid in the contest in the north of Europe, and that the corps of the Marquis of Romana was in consequence forwarded to the shores of the Baltic (2). Soon after the commencement of hostilities in the Peninsula, Castanos, who had entered into very cordial and confidential communications with Sir Hew Dalrymple, then chief in command at Gibraltar, strongly represented to that officer the great importance of conveying to the Spanish corps, then in Jutland, secret information as to the real state of affairs, which was likely to lead at once to their declaring for the cause of their country. In consequence of this advice, the English government made various attempts to communicate with the Spanish forces, but they were at first frustrated by the vigilant eye which the French kept on their doubtful allies. At length, however, by the address of a Catholic priest named Robertson, the dangerous communication was effected, and Romana was informed, in a secret conference held in Lahn, of the extraordinary events which had occurred in the Peninsula—the victory in Andalusia, the repulse from Saragossa, the capitulation of Junot, the flight from Madrid (3). Violently agitated at this heart-stirring intelligence, the noble Spaniard did not for a moment hesitate as to the course which he should adopt. Robertson was immediately sent back with a request that a British naval force might be forwarded to convey away his troops, and that, if possible, the assistance of Sir John Moore and the English troops at Gottenburg might be granted in aid of the undertaking. The latter part of the request could not be complied with, as Sir John Moore, with the British troops, had already sailed for England; but Admiral Keats, with the fleet stationed in those seas, drew near to the coast of Jutland, and suddenly appeared off Nyborg in the island of Aug. 9. Funen. Romana having seized all the Danish craft he could collect, pushed across the arm of the sea which separated the mainland from

(1) Tor. ii. 95, 102. Lond. i. 200, 203. Nap. i. 310, 311. South. ii. 298, 307, 315.

(2) *Ante*, vi. 211.

(3) —Robertson was despatched in a boat from Heligoland, of which the English had recently taken possession, to the coast of Jutland; but the principal difficulty was to furnish him with a secret sign of intelligence which, beyond the reach of any other's observation, might at once convince Romana of the reality and importance of his mission. This was at last fallen upon in a very singular way. Ro-

mana, who was an accomplished scholar, had been formerly intimate with Mr. Frere when ambassador in Spain; and one day, having called when he was reading the *Gests of the Cid*, the English ambassador suggested a conjectural emendation of one of the lines (*). Romana instantly perceived the propriety of the proposed emendation; and this line so amended was made the passport which Robertson was to make use of, which at once proved successful.—See *SOUTHEY*, ii. 337.

(*) *Aun vea el hora que vos Merezea dos tanto.*
Mr. Frere proposed to read *Merezeades*.

that island, and with the assistance of Keats, made himself master of the Port and Castle of Nyborg. From thence he traversed another strait to Langland, where all the troops he could collect were assembled together, and publicly informed of the extraordinary events which had occurred in the Peninsula, and which went to sever them from the connexion they had so long maintained with their brethren in arms. Kneeling around their standards, wrought to the highest pitch of enthusiasm by the intelligence they had received, with hands uplifted to heaven, and tears streaming from their eyes, they unanimously swore to remain faithful to their country, and brave all the anger of the Emperor Napoléon, in the attempt to aid its fortunes. Such was the universal zeal which animated them, that one of the regiments which lay at Ebeltøft having received the intelligence at ten in the evening, immediately started, and marching all night and the greater part of the next day, reached their comrades at the point of embarkation in time to get off, Aug. 13. after having marched fifty miles in twenty-one hours. Nine thousand five hundred were brought away, and after touching at Gottenburg were forwarded in transports by the English government to the coasts of Galicia, where they were disembarked amidst shouts of joy before the middle of September, in time to share in the dangers which the efforts of Napoléon were preparing for their country. The remainder being stationed in the middle of Jutland, could not be rescued, and were made prisoners by the French troops; and as the horses of two of the regiments of cavalry which embarked could not be provided for in the English ships, they were abandoned on the beach by the horsemen whom they had transported so far from their native plains. These noble animals, eleven hundred in number, of the true Andalusian breed, all of which were un mutilated, seemed to share in the passions which agitated their masters, and no sooner were they liberated on the sands from control, than forming into squadrons, they charged violently with loud cries against each other, and when the British fleet hove out of sight, they could still be discerned by telescopes, fighting with each other on the beach, surrounded by the dead and the dying, with all the fury of human passions (1).

Deep im- This long and unprecedented train of disasters made the deepest
pression which these events make on the mind of Napoléon. This long and unprecedented train of disasters made the deepest
impression on the foreseeing and prophetic mind of Napoléon. It
was not the mere loss of soldiers, fortresses, or territory which af-
fected him; these, to a sovereign possessed of such almost bound-
less resources, were of little importance and could easily be supplied. It was
their moral influence which he dreaded; it was the shake given to the opin-
ions of men which devoured him with anxiety. No one knew better, or has
expressed more clearly and emphatically, that his empire was founded en-
tirely on opinion; that it was the minds of men whom his own victories and
those of the revolution had really subdued; and that great as their triumphs
had really been, it was the imaginative idea of their invincibility which con-
stituted the secret charm which had fascinated and subdued the world. Now,
however, the spell appeared to be broken; the veil was drawn aside, the
charm dissolved. This had been done, too, by hands whose weakness and
inexperience augmented the severity of the blow. Armies had surrendered,
kingdoms been evacuated, capitals abandoned; in Andalusia the French le-
gions had found the Caudine forks; in Portugal, experienced the fate of

(1) Tor. ii. 68, 70. South. ii. 336; 351. Nap. i. 337, 338.

The singular anecdote as to the horses, which were all of the highest breed, and in the finest

condition, is related by Southey on the authority of Sir Richard Keats himself, as well as in a contemporary journal, *Plain Englishman*, i. 291, on the same high testimony.—SOUTHEY, ii. 346.

Closter Seven. These disasters had been inflicted not by the sternness of Russia or the discipline of Austria; not by the skill of civilisation or the perfection of art, but by the simple enthusiasm of an insurgent people; by hands at which the French legions had with reason scoffed; by those island warriors whose descent on the continent his tutored journals had hailed as the dawn of yet brighter glories to the French arms (1). Such misfortunes, coming from such quarters, appeared with reason to be doubly calamitous; his proclamations, instead of the heralds of victory, had become the precursors of defeat; and he anticipated in their ultimate effect, not merely the possible expulsion of his arms from the Peninsula, but the general resurrection of Europe from his authority (2).

Already this effect had in some degree appeared.—Austria, by a decree of 9th June, had directed the formation of a landwehr, or local militia, in all the provinces of her still vast dominions. The Archduke Charles, at the head of the war department, had infused an unheard-of activity into all branches of the army; and three hundred thousand provincial troops, already in the course of formation, promised to add an invaluable reserve to the regular forces. Pressed by Napoléon to give some account of such formidable preparations, Count Metternich, the Imperial ambassador at Paris, alleged the specious excuse that the cabinet of Vienna was only imitating the conduct of its powerful neighbours; and that when Bavaria had not merely adopted the system of the French conscription, but organized national guards, which raised its disposable force to a hundred thousand men, it became indispensable to take corresponding measures of security in the hereditary states. The reason assigned was plausible; but it failed to impose upon the French Emperor, who forthwith directed the princes of the Rhenish confederacy to call out and encamp their respective contingents, and shortly after adopted the most energetic measures for the augmentation of the military strength of the empire (3).

By a senatus consultum of the 10th September, the senate of France placed at the disposal of the French Emperor eighty thousand conscripts, taken from those coming to the legal age (18 to 19), in the years 1806-7-8 and 9, and eighty thousand additional from those of 1810, which last were, in an especial manner, destined to the defence of the coasts and frontiers of the empire. So far had the demands of the French Emperor already exceeded the growth of the human race, and the boundless consumption of mankind in the revolutionary wars outstripped even the prolific powers of nature! The adulatory expressions with which this frightful demand was acquiesced in by the senate, was not less characteristic than its anticipating the resources of future years, of the iron tyranny as well as fawning servility which distinguished the government of the empire. "How," said Lacépède, their president, "would the shades of Louis XIV, of Francis I, of the great Henry, be consoled by the generous resolutions taken by Napoléon! The French hasten to respond to his sacred voice! He requires a new proof of their affection; they hasten with generous ardour to furnish it to him. The wish of the French people,

(1) "Nothing," said the President of the Senate, in his public speech, "can be more agreeable to the French and to the Continent, than to see the English at length throw off the mask and descend into the lists to meet our warriors. Would to God that eighty or a hundred thousand English would present themselves before us in an open field! The

Continent has in every age been their tomb." Fifteen days afterwards the Convention of Cintra was published!—See *Moniteur*, 22d Sept. 1808.

(2) *Trib.* vii. 1, 14. *Month.* vi. 350. *South.* ii. 359, 360. *Jom.* ii. 79, 81.

(3) *Jom.* ii. 80. *Pelet*, i. 64, 72.

people, sire! is the same as that of your Majesty; the war of Spain *is politic, it is just, it is necessary; it will be victorious.* May the English send their whole armies to combat in the Peninsula; they will furnish only feeble glories to our arms, and fresh disgrace to themselves." Such was the roseate hue under which the titled and richly endowed senators of France represented the hideous spectacle of a hundred and fifty thousand human beings being torn from their homes to meet certain destruction, in the prosecution of the most perfidious and unjust aggression recorded in history; and such the triumphs which they anticipated for their arms, when Providence was preparing for them the catastrophes of Salamanca and Vittoria (1).

Subsidiary
treaty with
Prussia,
Sept. 8.

At the same time, a subsidiary treaty was concluded with Prussia, calculated to relieve, in some degree, that unhappy power from the chains which had fettered it since the battle of Jena. Napoléon, vanquished by necessity, and standing in need of a hundred thousand soldiers of the grand army for the Peninsular war, was driven to more moderate sentiments. It was stipulated that, for the space of ten years, the Prussian army should not exceed forty thousand men; that Glogau, Stettin, and Custrin should be garrisoned by French troops till the entire payment of arrears of contributions of every description; that their garrisons, four thousand strong each, should be maintained and paid solely at the expense of Prussia; that seven military roads, for the use of France and her allies, should traverse the Prussian dominions; and that the arrears of the war contributions should be reduced to 140,000,000 francs, or L.5,600,000 sterling; but that, at the expiration of forty days after these sums were provided for, the French troops should, with the exception of these fortresses, evacuate the Prussian dominions (2). To Prussia this evacuation was a source of unspeakable relief, and notwithstanding that the restriction on the army was both humiliating and hurtful, yet the cabinet of Frederick William had no alternative but submission: although, by the skilful change of the soldiers called out into actual service, they eluded the most galling part of the obligation, and prepared the means of political resurrection in future times (5).

Interview
at Erfurth
with Alex-
ander.

Napoléon, however, was well aware that, even after these treaties and precautions, he was still exposed to great danger from the renewed hostility of the German States in his rear, while engaged with the armies of England and Spain in front in the Peninsula, if he was not well secured in the alliance with Russia, and that it was in the breast of Alexander that the true security for the peace of the Continent beyond the Rhine was to be found. This was more especially the case, as the losses and serious aspect of the Spanish war had already rendered it necessary to withdraw a large part of the grand army from the north of Germany; and before winter, not more than a hundred thousand French soldiers would remain to assert the French supremacy in the centre of Europe. Impressed with these ideas, the French Emperor used his utmost efforts to prevail on the Czar to meet him at a town in the north of Germany, where the destinies of the world might be arranged; and such was the ascendant which he had gained over his mind during the negotiations at Tilsit, and such the attractions of the new objects of ambition in Finland and on the Danube, which he had had the address to present to his ambition, that Alexander completely fell into his views. Erfurth was the town selected for this purpose, and there a conference was held between the two potentates, almost rivalling that of Tilsit in

(1) Montg. vi. 350. Join, ii. 82, 83.

(2) *Ante*, vi. 216.

(3) Montg. vi. 350. Martens, Sup. v. 113, 127.

interest and importance. On his route for Germany, the Emperor met large bodies of the grand army on their road from the Rhine to the Pyrenean frontier; he addressed them in one of those nervous proclamations which ever bear so strong an impress of his genius, but which, long the heralds of his victories, began now to afford a curious contrast to the disasters he was destined to undergo (1). The troops traversed France in the highest spirits, animated by the Emperor's address, magnificently feasted by the municipalities, beneath triumphal arches, and amidst songs of congratulation from their fellow-citizens. Vain illusion! They were marching only to the scene of protracted agony; to whiten by their bones the fields of Spain; to a lengthened conflict, which, ushered in at first by brilliant victories, was destined in the end to thin their ranks by its carnage, and overwhelm their honour by its disasters (2).

Its secret object, and tenor of the conferences held there. The Emperor Alexander set out before Napoléon, and on his way paid a melancholy visit to the King and Queen of Prussia at Königsburg. Proceeding on his route, he rapidly traversed the Prussian States, received with marked gratification the honours paid to him by the French troops; took Marshal Lannes with him in his own carriage, and expressed publicly to the French officers the satisfaction which he felt "at finding himself among such brave men, such renowned warriors." Proceeding in this manner, and received every where with the utmost distinction by the French authorities, he arrived at Weimar late on the evening of the 26th, Sept. 25.

and found every thing prepared for his reception by his brother the Grand Duke Constantine, and the French ambassador Caulincourt, who had arrived two days before. Meanwhile Napoléon, in more than regal state, was leisurely advancing from Paris, surrounded by the sovereigns, princes, and ministers of Germany, enjoying the first satisfaction of exhibiting the Russian Autocrat awaiting his arrival in an inconsiderable town of Germany, above five hundred miles distant from the nearest point of his dominions. At ten o'clock on the morning of the 27th, he made his public entry into Erfurth, and after reviewing the troops, proceeded on horseback to meet Alexander, who had left Weimar at the same hour to approach his august ally. The two sovereigns met on the highway, between the village of Ottsted and Nora, near a remarkable pear-tree which is still to be seen on the road-side. Alexander immediately descended from his carriage; Napoléon alighted from his horse, and the two monarchs embraced with the strongest marks of mutual esteem. The French Emperor was decorated with the order of St.-Andrew of Russia, the Russian bore the grand badge of the legion of honour on his bosom. Magnificent presents were interchanged on both parts; side by side the two Emperors rode into Weimar, amidst the roar of artillery, the cheers of multitudes, and the thundering acclamations of ten thousand soldiers. When they arrived at the hotel of the Czar the monarchs again embraced, and ascended the stairs arm in arm. Napoléon requested Alexander to give him the watchword of the day; he complied, and it was "Erfurth and confidence." The

(1) Soldiers! after having triumphed on the banks of the Danube and the Vistula, you have traversed Germany by forced marches. I now make you traverse France without giving you a moment's repose. Soldiers! I have need of you. The hideous presence of the leopard (the arms of England) defiles the continent of Spain and Portugal. Let it fly dismayed at your aspect! Let us carry our arms to the Columns of Hercules; there also we have outrages to avenge.—Soldiers! you have surpassed the renown of all modern armies, but have you yet equalled the glory of the Roman legions, which in

the same campaign frequently triumphed on the Rhine and the Euphrates, in Illyria and on the Tagus? A long peace, a durable tract of prosperity, shall be the reward of your labours. A true Frenchman should never taste of repose till the seas are enfranchised from their oppressors.—Soldiers! all that you have already done, all that you will yet do for the happiness of the French people, will be eternally engraved on my heart.—THIÉBAUD, vii. 50.

(2) Thib. vii. 49, 51. Montg. vi. 352. Join, ii. 84, 85.

two monarchs dined together, and in the evening a general illumination evinced the intoxicating joy of the inhabitants (1).

Fêtes and
spectacles
at Erfurth.

No adequate idea can be formed of the greatness of Napoléon's power, or the almost irresistible sway which he had acquired, in northern and central Europe, but by those who had witnessed the pomp and deference with which he was surrounded at Tilsit and Erfurth, and, four years afterwards, at Dresden. Environed by a brilliant *cortège* of marshals, generals, diplomatists, and staff-officers, he was at the same time the object of obsequious attention to a crowd of princes and inferior potentates, who depended on his breath for their political existence or nominal independence. All the beauty, rank, and distinction of Germany were assembled; seventy princes or independent sovereigns were in attendance; and literally it might be said, that the monarchs of Europe watched for a favourable sign from the mighty conqueror's chamberlains. The two Emperors spent the forenoons together, conversing on the public affairs of Europe, and the separate plans of administration for their vast dominions; they then rode out in company to a review or inspection of their respective troops, dined alternately with each other, and in the evening went to the same box at the theatre. A brilliant band of the most distinguished French performers had come from Paris to grace the conference, and during a fortnight, the theatre of Erfurth, resplendent with illustrious men and beautiful women, beheld the masterpieces of Racine and Corneille performed by the talents of Talma, Saint-Prix, Mesdemoiselles Duchesnois and Bourgoïn, besides a host of inferior performers (2). On the 6th October the whole court proceeded to Weimar, where they were magnificently entertained by the Grand Duke of that place, and Napoléon enjoyed the satisfaction of conversing with Goethe, Wieland, and the other illustrious men who have thrown an imperishable lustre over German literature. On the 7th, the whole party visited the field of Jena. An elegant temple had been constructed by the Grand Duke on the highest summit of the Landgrafenberg, the scene of Napoléon's frigid bivouac two years before, on the night before the battle (3); and a little lower down were a number of tents,

(1) Thib. vii. 61. Mont. iv. 235.

(2) The attentions of Alexander and Napoléon to each other at Erfurth, though delicate, were got up with so much anxiety as to impress the spectators with the impression that the intimacy of Tilsit had somewhat declined, and that a feeling, of which they were on every occasion so very adroit to give public demonstration, could not in reality have a very deep foundation. On one occasion Alexander expressed great admiration for a singularly beautiful dressing-case, and breakfast set of porcelain and gold, in Napoléon's sleeping apartment: they were sent to him as a present on the same evening. At the representation of *OEdipe* on October 3, when the line was repeated,—

"L'amitié d'un grand homme est un bienfait des Dieux."

Alexander turned to Napoléon, and presented to him his hand. A few days after, the Czar, when preparing to go into the *salle-à-manger* to dinner, perceived that he had forgotten his sword. Napoléon immediately unbuckled his own, and presented it to him.—"I accept it as a mark of your friendship," replied Alexander. "Your Majesty may be well assured I shall never draw it against you." In the midst of all his grandeur, Napoléon had sufficient greatness of soul and true discernment to attempt no concealment of his origin. At dinner one day the conversation turned on the Golden Bull, and the primate of Germany insisted that it had been published in 1409.—"I beg your pardon," observed Napoléon; "*H'en I was a second lieute-*

nant of artillery, I was three years at Valence, and there I had the good fortune to lodge with a learned person, in whose library I learned that and many other valuable details. Nature has given me a memory singularly tenacious of figures." Made-moiselle Bourgoïn, whose personal charms were equal to her talents as an actress, attracted the particular notice of the Emperor Alexander; and he enquired of Napoléon if there would be any inconvenience in his forming her personal acquaintance. "None whatever," replied Napoléon, "except that it would be a certain mode of making you thoroughly known to all Paris. The day after to-morrow, at the post hour, the most minute particulars of your visits to her will be dispatched; and soon there will not be a statuary in Paris who will not be in a situation to model your person from head to foot." This hint had the effect of cooling the rising passion of the Russian Emperor, who, with all his admiration for the fair sex, had an extreme apprehension of such a species of notoriety. It was at Erfurth that Napoléon made the memorable observation to Talma on his erroneous view of the character of Nero, in the *Britannicus* of Racine: that the poet had not represented him as such in the commencement of his career; and that it was not till love, his ruling passion at the moment, was thwarted, that he became violent, cruel, and tyrannical.—See LAS CASAS, iv. 232; and THIBAudeau, vii. 61, 65, 71.

(1) *Ante*, v. 360.

of sumptuous construction, where the Emperor and his *cortège* of kings were entertained, and from whence he pointed out to Alexander the line of the different movements, which, on that memorable spot, had led to the overthrow of his most cherished projects. At length, after seventeen days spent together in the closest intimacy, the two Emperors, on the 14th October, the anniversary of the battle of Jena, rode out together to the spot where they had met on the 27th September; they there alighted from their horses, and walked side by side for a few minutes in close conversation, and then embracing, bade each other a final adieu. Alexander returned rapidly towards Poland; Napoléon remeasured his steps slowly and pensively towards Erfurth. They never met again in this world (1).

Though Austria was not admitted as a party to the conference at Erfurth, Baron Vincent, envoy of the cabinet of Vienna, came with a letter from the Emperor Francis on the subject of the armaments on either side in southern Germany; and a joint memorial was presented by the Emperors of France and Russia, proposing a termination of hostilities to the government of Great Britain. But these important state papers will more fitly come under consideration in the succeeding chapters, which treat specifically of the affairs of Austria and England at this momentous crisis of their history (2).

Secret views
of both parties
at the
conference.

But it was neither to amuse themselves with reviews and theatrical representations, nor to make proposals to Austria and England, which they were well aware could not be listened to, that the two Emperors had come so far and remained together so long. It was with no view to peace, but, on the contrary, with a clear prophetic anticipation of an approaching multiplication of hostilities, that the conference at Erfurth took place. Napoléon clearly perceived that Austria was about to take advantage of his immersion in the Peninsular war, and of the extraordinary preparations which England was making for a continental campaign, to renew the contest in Germany, and it was to Russia alone that he could look for a sure guarantee of the peace of the North of Europe during the arduous crisis which was approaching. Albeit internally convinced of the necessity of a fearful contest in the end with the power of France, Alexander was not less sensible of the importance of gaining time for the preparations for it; and, strongly impressed with the conviction that the peculiar and national interests of Russia, were in the mean time chiefly to be promoted by remaining firm in the French alliance, and that when the evil day did come, the best preparation for it would be found in the augmentation of the strength of the empire in Finland and on the Danube, which was likely to follow an adherence to his present engagements. Thus, while both these great potentates were lavishing professions of friendship and regard on each other, they were in reality nursing the feelings destined to lead to inextinguishable hostility in their hearts; Napoléon returned, almost blinded by Russian flattery, to Paris, to prepare, in the subjugation of the Peninsula, the means of arranging the countless host which he was afterwards to lead to the Kremlin; and Alexander, loaded with French presents, remeasured his steps to Muscovy to organize the force, destined, after adding Finland and the Principalities on the Danube to his dominions, to hurl back to the Seine the tide of Gallic invasion (3).

(1) Thib. vii. 61, 76. Montg. vi. 353, 354. Las Cas. iv. 232. Hard. x. 239.

In one of their conversations Alexander strongly represented to the French Emperor the resistance which he experienced in his senate from the aristocratic chiefs, in his projects for the public good, "Believe me," said Napoléon, "how large soever a

throne may be, it will always be found too small for two masters."—MONTGAILLARD, vi. 354.

(2) See below, Chaps. lii. and liii.

(3) Thib. vii. 76, 78. Boutourlin, i. 32, 33, 45. Join. iii. 86.

"The Emperor Alexander," says Boutourlin, "felt that the alliance concluded at Tilsit and

Tenor of the
conferences
held there.

The conferences of Erfurth were not reduced, like those of Tilsit, to formal or secret treaties; at least, if such were signed, they have not yet transpired from any of the European archives. But they were not, on that account, the less important, or the less calculated to determine, for a course of years, the fate of the continental monarchies. In the verbal conversations which took place, the great object of the two potentates was to obtain the consent of each other to their respective projects of aggrandizement, at the expense of the lesser states in their vicinity; and their mutual interests or necessities rendered this an easy task. Alexander gave his sanction to the invasion of Spain and Portugal, and the placing of Princes of the Bonaparte Dynasty on the thrones of the Peninsula, as well as to the establishment of Murat in the kingdom of Naples, and the annexation of Tuscany to the French empire. The effects of this consent soon appeared, in the accrediting of Russian ambassadors to the courts of these infant sovereigns. On the other hand, Napoléon consented to the uniting of Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia to the already vast dominions of the Czar, admitted his relation and future brother-in-law, the Grand Duke of Oldenberg, into the Confederation of the Rhine, gave satisfactory explanations in regard to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and held out to the Emperor of the East the prospects of obtaining aid from France in the attempt to stretch his mighty arms over the Asiatic continent, and give a deadly wound to the power of England on the plains of Hindostan. In return for so many concessions, he procured from Alexander a promise to aid France with a considerable force in the event of a war with Austria; and conceded to his earnest entreaties a considerable relaxation of the oppressive burdens under which Prussia had so long groaned. The arrear of contributions, fixed at 140,000,000 francs, by the treaty of 8th September (1), was reduced to 125,000,000; and a more important relaxation took place in the form of payment, by which, in consideration of 50,000,000 of francs received by Daru on the 5th November and 70,000,000 more, for which promissory-notes were granted, the royal revenues were to be restored to the Prussian authorities; and the French troops, which were urgently required in the Peninsula, were, with the exception of the garrisons of Stettin, Custring, and Glogau, entirely to evacuate the Prussian dominions. Thus had Napoléon the address to make his disasters in Spain, which imperatively required the removal of the French troops from the North of Germany, the means of gratifying Alexander by an apparent concession to his wishes, and diminishing the irritation of Prussia, which, in the event of hostilities with Austria, might prove, even after all its disasters, a formidable enemy in his rear. Two other more delicate subjects of discussion were, after being touched on, averted rather than settled, by the diplomatic skill of the two Emperors, and left the seed of inextinguishable future jealousy in their minds. The first was a proposal by Napoléon, who already had resolved to divorce Joséphine, for the hand of the Grand Duchess Catharine Paulowna, the favourite sister of the Emperor; a proposal which the astute Russian evaded by referring the matter not to the reigning

cemented at Erfurth, as soon as it ceased to be conformable to the interests of Napoléon, would come to an end; and that the grand crisis was approaching which was destined either to consolidate the universal empire which the French Emperor was endeavouring to establish on the Continent, or to break the chains which retained so many Continental states under his rule. Determined never to submit to any condition inconsistent with the honour of his crown, the Emperor of Russia re-

garded the rupture as near and unavoidable, and thenceforward applied himself silently to organize the immense resources of his states, to resist the danger which was approaching; a danger which promised to be the more terrible, that Russia would have to sustain it, to all appearance alone, against the accumulated forces of the greater part of Europe."—BOUTOURLIN, i. 45.

(1) *Ante*, vi. p. 376.

Empress, whose ambition its brilliancy might have dazzled, but the Empress-Dowager, whose firmness of character was proof against the seduction, and who hastened to terminate the dangerous negotiation by alleging religious scruples, and shortly after marrying her daughter to Prince Oldenberg. The second was, the amicable but resolute contest for the possession of Constantinople. Napoléon, as he himself has told us (1), could not bring his mind to cede to his rival the Queen of the East: Alexander, with justice, regarded it as the outlet to his southern dominions—the back-door of his empire, and was earnest that its key should be placed in his hand. Fearful of interrupting their present harmony by any such irreconcilable theme of discord, the subject was, by common consent, laid aside: the city of Constantine was suffered to remain in the hands of the Turks, who, in every other respect, were abandoned to Muscovite ambition; but the tender point had been touched—the chord which jarred in the hearts of each struck; and the inestimable prize formed the secret subject of hostility, which, as much as jealousy of English power, afterwards led the French legions to Borodino and the Kremlin(2).

Nov 5, 1808. Immediately after the conference at Erfurth, a formal treaty was concluded with Prussia, by which the alleviations to her miseries provided for by the arbiters of Europe were reduced to writing: and in a short time the evacuation of the Prussian States, with the exception of the three retained fortresses, took place. Restored by this removal, and the recovery of the right of collecting his revenue, in a certain degree to his rank of an independent sovereign, Frederick William, in company with his beautiful Queen, returned to the capital, and made his public entry into Berlin amidst the transports and tears of his subjects (5).

Dec. 3. The secret objects of the conference at Erfurth soon developed themselves. Murat was declared by Napoléon King of Naples and Sicily; and leaving the theatre of his sanguinary measures and rash hostility in the Peninsula, hastened to take possession of his newly acquired dominions. He was received with universal joy by the inconstant people, who seemed equally delighted with any sovereign sent to them by the great northern conqueror. His entry into Naples was as great a scene of triumph, felicitations, and enthusiasm, as that of Joseph had been. Shortly afterwards, however, he gave proof of the vigour which was at least to attend his military operations, by a successful expedition against the island of Capri, which the English had held for three years, but now yielded, with a small garrison under Sir Hudson Lowe, which capitulated and was sent back to England, to a vigorous and well-conceived attack from the French forces (4).

Secured by the conferences at Erfurth from all danger in his rear, Napoléon speedily returned to Paris; and after presiding over the opening of the Legislative Assembly, then resolved, with his wonted vigour, to set out for the Pyrenees, determined by a sudden attack to disperse the Spanish armaments and capture Madrid, before either the English auxiliaries could acquire a solid foundation in the Peninsula, or Austria could gain time to put in motion the extensive armaments she was preparing on the Danube. Leaving Paris in the end of October, he arrived at Bayonne

(1) "We talked," says Napoléon, "of the affairs of Turkey at Erfurth. Alexander was very desirous that I should consent to his obtaining possession of Constantinople, but I could never bring my mind to consent to it. It is the finest harbour in the world, is placed in the finest situation, and is itself

worth a kingdom."—LAS CASAS, iv. 231, and O'MEARA, i. 382.

(2) Thib. vii. 76, 78. Hard. x. 239, 245. Bout. i. 34, 35. Jom. iii. 86. Las Cas. iv. 232, 233. O'Meara, i. 382.

(3) Montg. vi. 365. Martens, Sup. v. 106.

(4) Thib. vii. 149. Bot. iv. 237, 239.

Napoléon
returns to
Paris.

Murat is
declared King
of Naples,
and takes
possession of
his dominions.

Oct 29.

Nov. 3. on the 5d November, and immediately disposed his forces for active operations (1).

The effect of the vigorous exertions which he had made to strengthen his armies in that quarter, was now beginning to display itself. The fifty thousand soldiers who, in the middle of August, were concentrated on the Ebro, ^{French forces on the Ebro.} dejected by disaster, dispirited by defeat, had now swelled by the end of September, as if by enchantment, to ninety thousand men, present under arms on the Ebro, besides twenty thousand under St.-Cyr, in Catalonia. This body, already so formidable, subsequently received vast accessions of force from the troops arriving from Germany, especially the Imperial Guard, and the corps of Soult, Ney, and Mortier, all of which were veterans from the Grand Army, confident in themselves, and inured to victory. During the whole of October, the road from Bayonne to Vittoria was crowded with horsemen and carriages; through every opening in the Pyrenees, foot-soldiers were pouring in endless multitudes to reinforce the grand muster in Navarre. Conformably to his general custom, Napoléon divided the whole army into eight corps, commanded by so many marshals, whose names, already rendered immortal in the rolls of fame, seemed a sure presage to victory (2). Their united force, when the Emperor took the field in the beginning of November, was not less than three hundred thousand men, of whom at least forty thousand were cavalry; and, after deducting the troops in Catalonia, and those which required to be maintained in garrison in the northern fortresses, and the sick and absent, at least a hundred and eighty thousand could be relied on for offensive operations on the Ebro. But the magnitude of this force, great as it was, constituted the least formidable part of its character. It was its incomparable discipline, spirit, and equipment, the skill and vigour of its officers, the docility and experience of its soldiers, the central and impregnable position which it occupied among the mountains of Navarre, and the unity of design which it was well known would soon be communicated to its operations by the consummate talents of Napoléon, which constituted its real strength and rendered the friends of freedom in Europe justly fearful of the collision of such a host with the divided and inexperienced armies of the Spanish provinces (3).

These armies, though very numerous on paper, and in considerable strength in the field, were far from being in a situation, either from discipline, equipment, or position, to make head against so formidable an enemy. The Spanish troops were divided into three armies; that of the right, under Palafox, consisting of eighteen thousand infantry, and five hundred horse, occupied the country between Saragossa and Sangüessa,

(1) Thib. vii. 150, 153.

(2) First corps, Victor, Duke of Belluno,	33,937
Second do., Bessières, Duke of Istria, afterwards Soult, Duke of Dalmatia,	33,054
Third do., Moncey, Duke of Cornegiano,	37,690
Fourth do., Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic,	25,984
Fifth do., Mortier, Duke of Treviso,	26,713
Sixth do., Ney, Duke of Elchingen,	38,033
Seventh do., General St.-Cyr in Catalonia,	42,107
Eighth do., Junot, Duke of Abrantes,	25,730
Reserve, Napoléon in person,	42,382
On march from France,	14,060

319,690

(3) Tor. ii. 119. Nap. i. 361, 362, 377. South. ii. 386, 387. Thib. vii. 152.

Before assuming the command of the army, Napoléon had said, in his opening address to the Legislative Body at Paris, "In a few days I shall set out to place myself at the head of my army, and

with the aid of God, crown at Madrid the King of Spain, and plant my eagles on the towers of Lisbon!" —Discourse, 25th October, 1808. *Moniteur*, 26th October, 1808; and THIB. vii. 86; and Imperial Muster-rolls, NAPIER, i, 88, Appendix.

and was composed almost entirely of Arragonese : the centre, under Castanos, which boasted of the victors of Baylen in its ranks, was twenty-eight thousand strong, included thirteen hundred horse, and had thirty-six pieces of cannon ; it lay at Tarazona and Agreda, right opposite to the French position ; the left, under Blake, thirty thousand in number, almost entirely Galicians, but with hardly any cavalry, and only twenty-six guns, was stationed on the rocky mountains near Reynosa, from whence the Ebro takes its rise. Thus, seventy-four thousand infantry, and two thousand horse, with eighty-six guns, were all that the Spaniards could rely upon for immediate operations on the Ebro ; for although considerable reserves were collecting in the rear (1), yet they were too far from the scene of action, and their discipline and equipment not in a sufficient state of forwardness to permit of their either arriving in time at the theatre of conflict, or taking any useful part in it, if they were there. Seventy thousand Spanish infantry and two thousand Spanish cavalry, could never be considered a match for a hundred and fifty thousand French foot, and thirty thousand horse, even under the most favourable circumstances : least of all could they be relied on, when the French occupied a central position, defended by almost inaccessible mountains, and were guided by one commander of consummate abilities ; while their undisciplined antagonists, scattered over a circumference two hundred miles in length, and separated from each other by deep ravines, rapid rivers, and impassable ridges, were under the command of different and independent generals, jealous of each other, and gifted with comparatively moderate military talents (2).

March, position, and strength of the British army.
Oct. 13.

The British forces, it is true, under Sir John Moore and Sir David Baird, were rapidly approaching the scene of action ; but their distance, notwithstanding all their efforts, was still such as to preclude the hope of their being in a situation to render any effectual

assistance. Sir John Moore's forces, which set out on their march from Lisbon, as already mentioned, in the middle of October, had broken, for the sake of procuring better roads for the artillery and waggon-train, into two columns ; and while the main body, under Sir John in person, followed the direct road by Abrantes, Almeida, and Ciudad Rodrigo, a lesser division, but with the reserve and most of the guns, took the more circuitous route by

Nov. 8. Elvas, Badajoz, Talavera, and Madrid. It was not, however, till the 8th November, that this heavily encumbered corps reached the Spanish capital, and on the 27th of the same month that it crossed the Guadarrama mountains, before which time the fate of all the Spanish armies on the Ebro was sealed. Meanwhile, Sir John Moore was farther advanced ; for,

Nov. 11. on the 11th, he crossed the Spanish frontier, and, on the 18th, had collected the bulk of his forces at Salamanca ; but Sir David Baird, who had

Oct. 13. landed at Corunna on the 15th October, had only, by great exertion, succeeded in reaching Astorga in Leon, four days' march from Salamanca, on the 20th November. Thus, the British army, not in all more than thirty thousand strong, was split into three divisions severally stationed at

(1) These reserves were stated to be as follows ; but they were all distant from the scene of action, and had, for the most part, hardly acquired the rudiments of the military art.

Castilians at Segovia, about 150 miles in the rear,	12,000
Estremadurans at Talavera,	13,000
Andalusians in La Mancha,	14,000
Asturians in reserve at Llanes,	18,000

Total, 57,000

(2) Nap. i. 362, 363, Tor. ii. 103, 104. Thib. vii. 152, 153. Tor. ii. 108.

the Escorial, Salamanca, and Astorga, distant eighty or a hundred miles from each other, and without any common base or line of operations; and the Spaniards, a hundred miles farther in advance, were also divided into three armies, separated by still greater distances from each other, while Napoléon lay with a hundred and eighty thousand veteran troops clustered round the basin of Vittoria. It was easy to see that the Allies, exhibiting in this respect a melancholy contrast to their antagonists, were but novices in the art of war, and signally ignorant of the importance of time in its combinations; and that the English in particular, inheriting too much of the character of their Saxon ancestors, were, like Athelstane the Unready, still unprepared to strike till the moment for decisive operations had passed (1).

Movements
on the
French left
before the
arrival of
Napoléon.

Napoléon, who was well aware of the importance of striking a decisive blow in the outset, and dispersing the Spanish armies in his front before the warlike and disciplined reserve of the English troops could arrive at the scene of action, lost no time, after his arrival on the Bidassoa, in pressing forward the most active operations. Some inconsiderable actions had, before his arrival, taken place on the left, where Blake had, since the 18th September, been engaged in an offensive movement, from which no material results had ensued. Prior to this the French had evacuated Burgos and Tudela, and extended themselves towards Bilboa, which they still held, much against the will of Napoléon, who strongly censured such a proceeding, as gaining nothing in strength of position, and losing much in moral influence (2). Blake broke up from Reynosa on the 18th

(1) South. ii. 470. Nap. i. 425, 431. Lond. i. 181, 199.

These observations apply to those having the general direction of the Allied campaign, and especially the English government, who, at this period, were far from being adequately impressed with the vital importance of time in war. Their instructions for the campaign were dated so late as October 6. Both the gallant generals intrusted with the direction of the English army, pressed forward with all imaginable expedition after they received them; and Sir John Moore in particular, as it will appear in the sequel, with mournful resolution, commenced an important advance, under circumstances, to all but a soldier of honour, utterly desperate. It was impossible for him to commence operations before the junction with Sir David Baird, which did not take place till the end of November. But still, in all concerned, there was at this period an evident want of the vigour and expedition requisite for success in war. Napoléon would never have permitted the main English army to have lingered inactive at Lisbon from the end of August, when the Convention at Cintra was concluded, till the middle of October, when the march for Spain commenced, nor delayed the British expedition under Sir David Baird till it reached the Spanish shores for the first time on the 18th of that month. But these were the faults of government. The greatest error, in a military point of view, of Sir John Moore, was separating the artillery from the infantry and cavalry in the advance into Spain. For this oblivion of the first rule of military movements, viz. to station each portion of the army so that its different arms may, in case of need, support and aid each other, it is hardly possible to find any excuse. It is difficult to conceive how the direct road by Alameda could at that period have been impassable for artillery and waggon, when it had so recently before been traversed by Junot, with all his army, and was ever after the great line of military communication which the Duke of Wellington made use of from the capital to the frontier; and, at any rate, if the passage at that

period was impracticable for the guns, that might have been a good reason for sending the whole army round by Elvas, but it could be none for separating it into two parts, severed by two hundred miles from each other, and exposing either to the chance of destruction, when the other was not at hand to lend it any support. Colonel Napier, much to his credit, admits that this separation violated a great military principle, though he endeavours to defend it in that particular case as unattended with danger. It will appear in the sequel, that the greatest commanders sometimes unnecessarily fall into a similar forgetfulness; and that the cantoning the English infantry apart from the cavalry and artillery on the Flemish frontier, and within the reach of the enemy's attack, in 1815, had wellnigh induced a serious disaster at Quatre-Bras.—See NAPIER, i. 334, and *Iufra*, vol. viii., *voce Waterloo*.

(2) "The line of the Elbro," says Napoléon, "was actually taken; it must be kept. To advance from that river without an object, would create indecision; but why evacuate Burgos—why abandon Tudela? Both were of importance, both politically and morally; the latter as commanding a stone bridge and the canal of Saragossa; the former as the capital of a province, the centre of many communications, a town of great fame, and of relative value to the French army. If occupied in force, it would threaten Palencia, Valladolid, even Madrid itself. If the enemy occupies Burgos, Logruno, and Tudela, the French army will be in a pitiful situation." It is remarkable how early the experienced eye of the French Emperor, at the distance of three hundred leagues from the scene of action, discerned the military importance of Burgos—a town then unknown to military fame; but the value of which was afterwards so strongly felt by the Duke of Wellington, that he strained every nerve, and exposed himself to imminent risk in the close of the brilliant campaign of 1812, in the unsuccessful attempt to effect its reduction.—*Vide Note, Sur les Affaires d'Espagne, August 1808, taken at Vittoria.*—NAPIER, *App.* No. iv. p. 18.

September with thirty thousand Galicians, and advanced to Santander. The effect of this movement was to make the French concentrate their forces in the basin of Vittoria; and Blake attacked Bilboa with fifteen thousand men, which fell the day after it was invested; while the French withdrew up the valley of Durango, and all the lateral valleys in its vicinity, to the higher parts of the mountains of Navarre. But though these operations were at first successful, yet the natural effects of the presumption and want of foresight of the Spanish government and generals, soon developed itself. Blake had engaged in this laborious and dangerous mountain warfare without magazine stores, or any base of operations, and with only seventy rounds of ammunition for each gun. His men, when the winter was approaching and the snow beginning to fall, were without great-coats, and many without shoes. The bulk of his forces, grouped around Burgos, exposed his right flank to successful attack (1).

A combined attack had been arranged between the Spanish generals along the whole circumference which they occupied upon the central mountain position of the French army. But such a complicated movement, difficult and hazardous even with the best disciplined troops, when acting along such an extensive and rugged line of country, was altogether hopeless with the disorderly and ill-appointed bands of the Peninsular patriots. An attack by Castanos, with the Andalusian army, upon the French posts on the Ebro around Logrono, though at the first attended with some success, at length terminated in disaster; and the Spanish division of Pignatelli was driven back with the loss of all its artillery, and immediately dispersed. Discouraged by this check, Castanos fell back to Calahorra; and dissensions, threatening very serious consequences, broke out between that general and Palafox, who retired with the Arragonese levies towards Saragossa. Meanwhile Blake, whose forces, from the junction of the troops under Romana, which had come up from Corunna, and the Asturians, with whom he was in communication near Santander, were increased to nearly fifty thousand men, commenced a forward movement on the French left in the Biscayan provinces, and stretching himself out by the sea-coast, and up the valley of Durango, threatened to interpose between the advanced divisions of Lefebvre and Ney's corps, which lay most exposed, and their communication with the French frontier on the Bidassoa (2).

This offensive movement was well conceived, and if conducted and followed up with the requisite vigour, might have led to great results. As it was, however, his forces were so scattered, that though thirty-six thousand were under his immediate orders, only seventeen thousand were collected by Blake in front of the enemy, without any artillery, in the valley of Durango; the remainder being stretched inactive along the sea-coast, or separated from the main body by impassable mountain ridges. Alarmed, however, by the probable consequence of an interposition of such a force between the bulk of his troops and their communications with Bayonne and St.-Sebastians, Lefebvre resolved to make a general attack upon the enemy, and drive them back to the neighbourhood of Bilboa. Descending from the heights of Durango under cover of a thick fog, he suddenly attacked the Spanish army at daybreak on the 31st October, with such vigour, that the divisions in front were thrown back on those in the rear, and the whole driven in utter confusion to Bilboa, from whence they continued their

(1) Nap. i. 343, 369. South, i. 387, 389. Tor. ii. 104, 105.

(2) Tor. ii. 110, 113. Nap. i. 368.

retreat in the night to Balmaseda, in the direction of the Asturias. Lefebvre followed him up next day; but Blake having assembled his troops, turned upon his pursuers, and after some sharp partial engagements, the French retired to Bilboa, of which they were allowed to retain undisturbed possession (1).

Position of
the French
and Spanish
armies on
Napoléon's
arrival.

Matters were in this state in Navarre and Biscay, when Napoléon arrived at Vittoria, and instantly, as if by an electric shock, communicated his own unequalled energy to the operations of the army.

Disapproving of Lefebvre's unsupported attack upon Blake, which promised merely to force him back from the scene of action, without effecting those decisive results which his presence both usually occasioned and at present required, he immediately gave orders for the most vigorous operations. The position of the allied armies promised the greatest results to immediate attack. Blake, with twenty-five thousand defeated and starving mountaineers, was near Espinosa in Biscay; the Conde de Belvidere, with the Estremaduran levies, twelve thousand strong, was in Burgos; Castanos and Palafox, little dreaming of the danger which was approaching, were preparing to advance again towards Logrono, and confidently expected to drive the invaders over the Pyrenees; while the English forces, slowly converging towards the scene of action, were still scattered, from Corunna to Madrid, over the half of Spain. Napoléon, on the other hand, had a hundred thousand excellent troops ready for immediate operations, in a circumference of twenty miles round his headquarters at Vittoria, besides nearly an equal force at a greater distance in Biscay and Navarre (2).

Defeat of
Blake at
Reynosa
and Espi-
nosa.
Nov. 10.

The plans of the French Emperor were immediately formed. Blake, whose eyes were at length opened to the perilous situation in which he was placed, so far in advance, and destitute of all communication with the other Spanish armies, had retired to ESPINOSA, where he had concentrated nearly all his troops, including those which had come with Romana from the Baltic, in a very strong position; while his reserves and park of artillery were stationed in the rear at Reynosa. He had now rejoined his artillery, and had collected twenty-five thousand men; but his troops, half naked and in great part without shoes, were shivering from the inclemency of the weather, and exhausted by incessant marching and counter-marching, often without food, for fourteen days. In this state they were attacked on the forenoon of the 10th, by Marshal Victor, with twenty-five thousand men, while Lefebvre, with fifteen thousand, marched upon the Spanish line of retreat. Romana's infantry, posted in a wood on the right, made a gallant resistance, and not only was the action prolonged till night-fall, without any disadvantage, by those gallant veterans, but the Spanish centre, who were protected by the fire of a battery well posted, to which the French had no guns to oppose, had gained ground upon the enemy. Next morning, however, the result was very different. Victor, who had changed his columns of attack during the night, renewed the action at daybreak, and

Nov. 11. directed their efforts against the left, where the Asturian levies were posted. These gallant mountaineers, though almost starving, and but recently embodied, stood their ground bravely as long as their chiefs, Quiron, Acevedo, and Valdes, remained to head them; but the French, perceiving the influence which they exercised over the minds of their followers, sent forward some sharpshooters under cover of the rocks and thickets in front of the position, who speedily killed the first and severely wounded the two lat-

(1) *Tor.* ii. 120, 123, *Nap.* i. 379, 381.

(2) *Nap.* i. 385, 387. *Tor.* ii. 124, 125.

ter. Disheartened by this loss, the Asturians broke and fled. Blake detached a column of grenadiers to support them, but instead of doing so, they were themselves overwhelmed by the torrent of fugitives, and swept along; in a short time the whole army disbanded, and rushed in the wildest disorder towards the river Trueba, which encircles the rear of the position (1). Great numbers perished in the stream, which was deeply swoln with the rains of winter; those who reached the fords dispersed, and made the best of their way into their own provinces, carrying dismay into all parts of Galicia, Asturias, and Leon, where Romana afterwards contrived to rally ten thousand men. With difficulty Blake collected seven thousand men, with whom he fell back to Reynosa, where he endeavoured to make a stand, with the aid of his reserve artillery which was still stationed there: but this ineffectual attempt only rendered his defeat in the end more complete. Soult who, as well as Lefebvre, was now upon his traces, dispatched a large body of troops on the 10th, to cut him off from his retreat towards Leon; and upon the 13th he was

Nov. 13. attacked by the advanced guard of the former marshal, who displayed even more than his wonted vigour on the occasion, completely routed, with the loss of his whole artillery and ammunition, and driven, with a few thousand miserable and spectre-looking followers, into the heart of the Asturian mountains. Meanwhile, Bilboa, Santander, and the whole line of the intermediate sea-coast, with great stores landed at the latter port by the British, fell into the hands of the enemy (2).

Battle of Burgos, and defeat of the Spanish centre, Nov. 10. While these decisive blows in a manner annihilated the Spanish right, an equally important stroke was delivered by Soult, who had taken the command of the second corps, against the centre. It consisted of the army of Estremadura, under the Count de Belvidere, with which were united some of the bravest regular troops in Spain; in particular, the Spanish and Walloon guards, some of the best appointed regiments of the line, and the Royal Carabineers; and the whole were completely equipped and clothed by the English government. It made, however, even less resistance than the undisciplined levies of Asturias and Galicia. The Spanish soldiers, eighteen thousand strong, of whom eleven thousand were regulars, were posted at Gamonal, in front of Burgos, with twenty pieces of cannon disposed along their front; the right occupied a wood, the left the walled park of Villemer. The action commenced by General Lasalle, with the French horse, driving in the Spanish right, and threatening its flank, while Mouton, with a division of veterans, charged rapidly through the trees, and assailed their front; Bonnet followed closely with another division immediately in his rear; but such was the vigour and effect of Mouton's attack, that the enemy broke and fled in utter confusion towards Burgos, pursued all the way by Bessières' heavy dragoons, who did dreadful execution among the fugitives, and took all the guns which had been saved from the first attack. Don Juan de Henestrósa, who commanded the Spanish cavalry, to cover the retreat, charged this dreadful body of horse with more gallantry than success; his dragoons, led by youths of the best families in Spain, were unable to withstand the shock of the French cuirassiers, and shared in the general rout. Two thousand Spaniards fell on the field, or in the pursuit; all the artillery, consisting of twenty guns, with eight hundred prisoners, fell into the hands of the victors; all the ammunition and stores of the army were taken in

(1) Great part of the disasters of this defeat were owing to the injudicious selection of a position for battle, with a river in the rear—another example,

like that of the Russians at Friedland, of one of the most fatal errors which a general can commit.

(2) *Tor.* ii. 126, 135. *Nap.* i. 391, 393. *Jom.* ii. 97, 98. *South.* ii. 389, 393.

Burgos, which was given up to pillage, and the dispersion of the defeated troops was complete (1).

Movement
against Cas-
tanos and
Palafox.

Burgos now became the centre of the Emperor's operations; headquarters were established there on the 12th, and ten thousand light troops were despatched forward to scour the country, levy contributions, and diffuse a general terror of the French arms. Such was the consternation produced by their advance, that they traversed the open fields in every direction, without experiencing the slightest opposition; they swept over the plains of Leon as far as Benuente, Toro, and Tordesillas, spreading every where the triumphant proclamations of the Emperor, and boasting that, notwithstanding their utmost exertion, the French horsemen could not overtake the English army, which, abandoning its allies without striking a blow, was flying in disgrace to its ships. But while, by these incursions, the attention of the enemy was drawn to the side of Salamanca, the eyes of Napoleon were, in reality, turned in a different quarter; and it was against Castanos and Palafox that the weight of his forces was directed. The position of the French army seemed to expose them to certain destruction; for Ney's corps, which had been destined to act against the army of Estremadura at Burgos, being rendered disposable by its sudden destruction, was in a situation to make a circuit round their position, and cut them off from the line of retreat to New Castile and Madrid. That brave marshal accordingly, reinforced by a division from the reserve, was directed to move from Aranda by Soria to Agreda, which was directly in their rear; while Lannes was despatched from Burgos, with two divisions of infantry and one of heavy cavalry from the reserve, to put himself at the head of Moncey's corps, and attack them in front (2). Meanwhile, Castanos, finding himself separated both from Belvidere and Blake's armies, with the destruction of which he was unacquainted, had adopted the extraordinary plan of forcing a passage through the French forces in his front, and marching by Concha-de-Hara and Soria to Burgos, where he was to annihilate the Emperor's reserves and rearguard, and thence pass on to Vittoria to co-operate with Blake in the destruction of the two corps in Biscay (3).

Battle of
Tudela, and
route of the
Spanish
right.

In the midst of these extravagant projects, the hand of fate was upon him. Marshal Ney, who left Aranda on the 19th, entered Soria on the 21st, upon which Castanos retreated towards TUDELA, which he reached on the evening of the 22d. There his army formed a junction with that of Arragon under Palafox, and their united forces amounted to thirty-nine thousand infantry, and four thousand cavalry, with forty guns. The generals of the armies of Andalusia and Arragon could not concur in any plan of common operations: Palafox contending strongly for the defence of Arragon, Castanos for the more prudent plan of retiring before the enemy. Nothing was as yet decided between these conflicting opinions, when it was announced from the outposts that the enemy were already upon them. In haste, the troops were drawn up nearly on the ground which they occupied at the moment, which was along a range of inconsiderable hills, nearly six miles long, stretching from Tudela to Tarazona. The Arragonese, with Palafox, were on the right, leaning on Tudela; the Valencians and Castilians

(1) Nap. i. 389, 390. Jom ii. 96. Tor. ii. 131, 132. South. ii. 395, 396.

(2) In crossing a mountain range near Tolosa, the horse of Marshal Lannes fell with him, and he sustained several severe and dangerous bruises. He was cured, in a very singular manner by being

wrapped in a warm skin of a newly slain sheep, and was able in two days to resume the command of the army.—LARRET, *Mémoires et Camp.* iv. 237.

(3) Thib. vii. 160, 161. Tor. ii. 138, 139. Nap. i. 395, 401.

loosely scattered in the centre; the veterans of Andalusia, proud of the laurels of Baylen, on the left, stretching to Tarazona, which they occupied with three divisions, the flower of the army. Lannes, who commanded the French, and had concentrated thirty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, with sixty pieces of cannon, instantly perceived the weakness of the enemy's line, and prepared to pierce the long and feebly guarded front in the centre, where it was weakest, and composed of the most inexperienced troops, so as to separate altogether the army of Arragon from that of Andalusia. This well-conceived plan proved entirely successful. General Maurice Mathieu, with a strong body of infantry, and the whole cavalry under Lefebvre Desnouettes, attacked the Valencians and Castilians in the centre with great vigour, and soon compelled them to give ground; but they were in their turn charged by the Spanish guards, whom Castanos despatched to their assistance from the left, who threw the assailants into confusion; and the Spanish line in that quarter was gaining ground, when they were taken in flank by General Morlot, who had beaten back the Arragonese on the right, and now turned fiercely upon the enemy's centre. Aided by such powerful auxiliaries, Maurice Mathieu and Lefebvre Desnouettes regained the advantage, and, in their turn, drove back and threw into confusion the Valencians and Castilians, who had got into disorder by the length of the combat. The centre was speedily routed, and Lefebvre, charging the right with vigour, drove them entirely off the field in confusion towards Saragossa. Meanwhile la Pena, with the victors of Baylen on the extreme left, had routed the French under la Grange, to whom he was opposed; but when following up their success in some disorder, and already confident of victory, the victors were suddenly met by a solid mass of infantry which diverged from the victorious centre of the enemy, and broken; the other divisions of the army of Andalusia, three in number, and embracing twelve thousand soldiers, took no part in the action. They commenced their retreat, however, in good order, when it was evident the battle was lost; but some of the advanced troops of Ney's corps having appeared in their rear, from the side of Soria, and a powder-wagon exploded by accident, the retreat became disorderly, and it was with some difficulty the guns were brought off. As it was, the separation of the Spanish armies was complete; fifteen thousand men, Arragonese, Valencians, and Castilians, had taken refuge in Saragossa, without either guns or ammunition-waggons. Twenty thousand, under Castanos, with all their artillery, fell back, comparatively in good order, to Catalayud, and were immediately ordered up by the Central Junta to Madrid, to defend the capital. Five thousand were killed and wounded, or made prisoners on the field; the remainder, with twenty guns, dispersed in the pursuit, and were never more heard of. But if Napoléon's directions had been implicitly followed by Ney, who arrived at Soria on the 22d, and if, instead of remaining in that town, as he did, inactive for two days, he had advanced in the direction of Catalayud, he would have fallen perpendicularly on the retreating columns of Castanos, and totally destroyed them. This failure, on the part of Ney, excited great displeasure in Napoléon (who had with reason calculated upon much greater results from the battle), and was attended with important consequences on the future fortunes of the war (1).

(1) *Jom.* ii. 99, 100. *Tor.* ii. 138, 142. *Nap.* i. 401, 406. *Soult.* ii. 399, 401.

Colonel Napier says, "Palafox, with the right wing and centre, fled to Saragossa with such speed, that some of the fugitives are said to have arrived there the same evening." It would be desirable that

the authority on which this serious charge is made against Palafox should be given, as no foundation appears for it in the military authorities with which I am acquainted. Jomini says merely that after the battle "Palafox took the road to Saragossa;" *Tor.* i. 401. Don Joseph Palafox in the morning

Disorderly and eccentric retreat of the Spanish armies from the Ebro.

The battles of Espinosa, Burgos, and Tudela, were not only totally destructive of the Spanish armies in the north, but they rendered, by the dispersion of their forces with which they were attended, the approach to the capital a matter of ease to the French Emperor. Blake's troops, of which Romana had now assumed the command, had almost all dispersed, some into Asturias, others into Leon; and it was with the utmost difficulty that that gallant commander had rallied ten thousand of the starving fugitives, without either artillery, ammunition, or stores, in the rugged mountains from which the Ebro takes its rise; the remnant of the army of Estremadura, routed at Burgos, had fallen back, in the utmost confusion, towards the Guadarrama mountains; while Castanos with the army of Andalusia, was driven off in a south-easterly direction to Catalayud, in the road to Valencia; and Palafox, with the levies of Arragon and Castile, had sought a refuge behind the walls of Saragossa. Thus, the Spanish armies were not only individually and grievously weakened by the losses they had sustained, but so disjointed and severed, as to be incapable of acting in concert, or affording any support to each other: while Napoléon, at the head of a hundred thousand men, occupied a central position in the heart of them all, and was master of the great road leading direct to the capital (1).

Rapid and concentrated advance of the French armies to Madrid.

It was in such circumstances that the genius of that great general appeared most conspicuous, which never shone with such lustre as in the vigour and ability with which he followed up a beaten enemy. Abandoning the remains of Blake's army to Soult's, and the care of watching the English troops to Lefebvre's corps, and directing Lannes to observe Saragossa and the discomfited but warlike multitude which it contained, while Ney was to press incessantly on Castanos, and drive him off, as far as possible, in an easterly direction, the Emperor himself, with the Imperial Guards, Victor's corps, and the reserve, at least sixty thousand strong, advanced towards Madrid. So skilfully were these various movements combined, that while each corps had the following up and destroying of its own peculiar antagonist in an especial manner intrusted to its care, the whole combined to protect and support the advance of the main body to the capital; Lefebvre protecting its right flank, Ney its left, while Lannes and Soult secured and protected the rear, at the same time that they disposed of the remnants of the Arragonese and Galician armies (2).

Forcing of the Somo-sierra pass.

Departing from Aranda de Douro on the 28th, the Emperor arrived at the foot of the Somo-sierra on the morning of the 30th. Some field-works, hastily constructed at the summit of the pass, were garrisoned by a disorderly crowd, composed of the reserve of the divisions of Andalusia, which had been sent forward from Madrid, with which were united the remains of the army of Estremadura, in all about twelve thousand men, with sixteen pieces of cannon, under the command of General St. Juan. The guns swept the road along the whole ascent, which was long and very steep; and as it was impossible that the toilsome acclivity could be surmounted by the troops except during a considerable time, a very serious loss was anticipated by the assailants. Preceded, however, by a cloud of sharpshooters, which covered the mountains on either side, a column of three regiments ascended the causey, while as many assailed the position on its right, and a like number on its left. The fire, however, of the artillery on the summit was very

(*dès le matin*) resumed the route to Saragossa." Neither say any thing about any of the Arragonese or Palafox himself having either *fled* to Saragossa, or arrived there that night.—See NAPIER, i. 403, 1st Ed.; TORENO, ii. 141; JOMINI, iii. 100.

(1) Nap. i. 405, 406. Jom. ii. 102. Tor. ii. 141.

(2) Nap. i. 407. Jom. i. 101, 102. Tor. ii. 143, 144.

violent, to which it was difficult to reply, as a thick fog, intermingled with smoke, hung over their line on the higher part of the ridge, on entering into which the French found themselves torn by a descending shower of balls from an enemy whom they could not discern. The head of the column on the causeway was already arrested, and hesitation, as always ensues in such an event, was beginning to spread in the rear, when Napoléon, having rode to the bottom of the pass, at once ordered the Polish lancers and chasseurs of the guard, under General Montbrun, to charge. Advancing up the steep ascent at a rapid pace, these brave men opened a way for themselves through the columns of infantry with which it was encumbered, and attacked the battery; the first squadrons, shattered by a terrible discharge, reeled and fell back, but the next, galloping forward before the guns could be reloaded, dashed among the artillerymen, and carried the pass. Meanwhile the Spanish infantry, stationed on either flank, retired, after discharging their muskets at the swarms of tirailleurs by whom they were assailed, and the whole body falling into confusion, soon fled in disorder to Segovia, where a small number only could be rallied by the efforts of their gallant leader, San Juan, who cut his way, sword in hand, through a body of Polish lancers, by whom he was enveloped (1).

Great was the dismay in the Spanish capital when the alarming intelligence arrived, early on the morning of the 1st December, that the Somo-sierra pass had been forced, and that Napoléon with his terrible legions was advancing with rapid strides against its defenceless walls. The central Junta at Aranjuez, at the same time, heard of the disaster, and instantly fixing on Badajoz as their point of union, they set out with all imaginable haste for Talavera de la Reyna in different parties and by different roads, and were fortunate enough to arrive at their place of destination without accident. Meanwhile, the general government of Madrid was intrusted to a provisional junta, of which the Duke del Infantado was head, while the direction of its military defence was in the hands of Don Thomas de Morla, who had early taken a lead in the Cadiz insurrection, but whose subsequent violation of faith to the prisoners taken at Baylen, augured ill for the integrity with which he would discharge the arduous duties now intrusted to his care. The regular troops in the city consisted only of three hundred regular soldiers, with two battalions and a single squadron newly levied. Nevertheless, vigorous preparations were made for defence; eight thousand muskets, and a still greater number of pikes, were hastily distributed from the arsenal to the people; heavy cannon were planted on the Retiro and principal streets; the pavement was torn up, barricades constructed, and the most enthusiastic spirit pervaded the multitude. Ammunition was served out in abundance; but some of the cartridges were discovered to be filled with black sand instead of gunpowder—a discovery which, in the excited state of the inhabitants, proved fatal to the Marquis Perales, who was at the head of that department. He had formerly been the idol of the people; but with their usual inconstancy, upon the first discovery of this fraud, originating probably in the cupidity of some inferior agent, a furious mob assailed his house, dragged him into the street, and there murdered him. On the morning of the 2d, the advanced guards of the French arrived on the heights to the north of Madrid; and the emperor, who was extremely desirous of gaining possession of the capital on the anniversary of his coronation, and of the battle of Austerlitz, immediately summoned it to surrender;

Capture of
the Retiro,
and prodigious agita-
tion at
Madrid.

Dec. 2.

(1) Tor. ii. 145, 146. Nap. i. 409. Jem. ii. 103.

but the proposal was indignantly rejected. On the same day the Duke del Infantado was fortunate enough to make his escape, under cover of a thick fog, and directed his steps to Guadalaxara, to join the army of Castanos, which had retreated in that direction. During the night the French infantry arrived Dec. 3. in great strength around the capital, and on the following morning a thick fog overspread both the agitated multitude within, and the host without by which it was menaced. By degrees, however, the mist was dispelled by the ascending rays of the sun, and the Emperor directed his columns of attack against the RETIRO, the heights of which completely commanded the city. A battery of thirty guns soon made a practicable breach in its weak defence, and a French division advancing to the assault, speedily rushed in and made themselves masters of that important post (1).

Fall of that capital. The agitation in Madrid now became excessive; twenty thousand armed men were within its walls, but almost entirely disorganized; agitated by furious passions, burning with individual ardour, but destitute of the organization and discipline necessary for success against the formidable enemy by whom they were now assailed. The city presented the most frightful scene of disorder; exasperated crowds filled the streets; strong barricades were erected in various quarters, the bells of two hundred churches rang together; a confused murmur, like the sound of a mighty cataract, was heard incessantly, even during the night, which was audible at the distance of miles from the capital; while in the French lines all was silent and orderly, and the step only of the passing sentinel broke the stillness;—a striking image of the difference between the disorderly passions which agitate the populace, without being directed by superior intelligence to any useful end, and the experienced discipline which restrains an ardour not less powerful, till the moment for letting it loose with decisive effect has arrived. But the possession of the Retiro, in a military point of view, is possession of Madrid; bombs from its heights can reach the furthest points of the city. Sensible of the impossibility of maintaining the defence, the Spanish authorities were deliberating on the expedience of proposing terms of capitulation, when a flag of truce arrived from Berthier, threatening the utmost severity of military execution if the white flag was not hoisted within two hours. Morla and Ivriarte were, upon that, despatched to the head-quarters of the Emperor, to negotiate the terms of surrender. He received the former with unusual sternness, and in just but cutting terms reproached him with his violation of good faith towards the unhappy prisoners taken at Baylen (2). “Injustice and bad faith,” said

(1) Tor. ii. 149, 152. Nap. i. 411, 415. South. ii. 410, 414. Jom. ii. 103.

(2)——— When Morla appeared before him, Napoleon addressed Morla in these words:—“You in vain seek to shelter yourself under the name of the people; if you cannot now appease them, it is because you have formerly excited and misled them by your falsehoods; return to Madrid, assemble the clergy, the magistrates, the principal inhabitants; tell them, that if by to-morrow morning at six o'clock the town has not surrendered, it will cease to exist. I neither will nor ought to withdraw my troops. You have massacred the unhappy French prisoners who fell into your hands: within these few days you have suffered two servants of the Russian ambassador to be dragged into the streets and murdered, because they were born in France. The unskilfulness and cowardice of a general bad

placed in your hands troops who had capitulated on the field of battle, and the capitulation was violated. What sort of a letter did you, M. Morla, write to the general who subscribed that capitulation? (*) It well became you to speak of pillage, you who in Roussillon had carried off women, and divided them like booty among your soldiers. What right, besides, had you to hold such language? The capitulation expressly forbade it. What have the English done, who are far from piquing themselves on being strict observers of the law of nations? they complained of the convention of Cintra, but nevertheless carried it into execution. To violate military conventions is to renounce civilisation and put ourselves on a level with the Bedouins of the desert. How can you now venture to demand a capitulation, you who have violated that of Baylen? See how injustice and bad faith ever recoil upon

(*) Alluding to Morla's letter to Dupont of 10th August, 1808, in which he sought to vindicate the violation of the capitulation by the plunder of the French soldiers.

he, "ever in the end recoil upon those who practise them." Prophetic words! of the truth and universal application of which Napoléon himself, on the rock of St.-Helena, afterwards afforded a memorable example. Filled with consternation at the perilous predicament in which he was individually placed, from the well-founded resentment of the Emperor, and inspired with a sense of the necessity of appeasing the wrath of the conqueror by an immediate surrender, Morla returned to the city, and easily persuaded the majority of the junta that submission had become a matter of necessity. Dec. 4. A few gallant men, with the Marquis Castellás and Viscount de Gacete, disdaining to surrender, withdrew from the city during the night, and took the road for Estremadura. At daybreak the capitulation was signed, and by ten o'clock the principal points of the city were in the possession of the French troops (1).

Napoléon's measures for the tranquillizing of Spain. Napoléon did not himself enter Madrid, but established his headquarters at Chamartin, in the neighbourhood of the capital, where he received the submission of the authorities, and fulminated his anathemas against the functionaries who had resisted or swerved from his government. In a short time every thing wore the appearance of peace; the theatres were re-opened; the shopkeepers displayed their tempting wares, secure in the discipline of the conquerors; the Prado and public walks were crowded with spectators. Numerous deputations, embracing some of the most wealthy and respectable inhabitants of Madrid, waited on the Emperor, and renewed their protestations of fidelity to his brother Joseph, who was established at the Royal Palace of Pardo: it then appeared how completely and fatally the corruptions and enjoyments of opulence and civilized life disqualify men from acting an heroic part in defence of their country (2). Measures of great severity were adopted against all the constituted authorities who, after having recognised Joseph as King of Spain, had joined the popular party. The Marquis des Simon, a Frenchman by birth, who had to the last prolonged the conflict after the capitulation had paralysed all general resistance, and was taken fighting bravely, when endeavouring to cut his way through at the gate of Fuencarral, was ordered to be shot. He owed his life to the intercession of his daughter, who threw herself at the Emperor's feet, and obtained from his clemency a commutation of the sentence. All the members of the Council of Castile who had declared that they had sworn allegiance to Joseph, under Jesuitical mental reservations, were dismissed, and ordered to be detained prisoners in their own houses. Nor were general measures awaiting, calculated to reconcile the nation to the sway of the Dec. 4. intrusive monarch. By a solemn decree, the Inquisition was abolished, and all its funds directed to be applied towards the reduction of the public debt; feudal rights were suppressed; all personal restrictions and privileges declared at an end; the number of convents throughout the kingdom

those who commit them. I had a fleet at Cadiz; it had come there as to an ally's harbour; and you directed against it the mortars of the town which you commanded. I had a Spanish army in my ranks, but I preferred allowing it to escape on board the English vessels, and precipitating it from the rocks of Espinosa to disarming it. I would rather have seven thousand additional enemies to combat than be wanting in good faith. Return to Madrid, I give you till to-morrow at ten; return then if you are the bearer of submission; if not, you and your troops shall be all put to the sword." —THIÉBAUDAU, vii. 165, 166. There can be no doubt that consciousness of his former breach of

faith now paralysed Morla, and impelled him into a second act of pusillanimity, if not treachery, to his own countrymen: so true it is, in Napoléon's words, that "*injustice and bad faith ever recoil in the end upon those who commit them.*" Morla lingered out a few years, abhorred and shunned by all; he died as he had lived, devoured by remorse and sunk in misery.—See TORENO, ii. 155.

(1) Tor. ii. 152, 155. Thib. vii. 163, 165. Nap. i. 413, 415. South. ii. 414, 417.

(2) Their number amounted to above *twelve hundred*, comprehending the most eminent and wealthy individuals of all classes in the metropolis.—JOMINI, iii. 105.

was at once reduced a third, and their inmates turned adrift, while all novices were permitted to leave their places of seclusion. One-half of the proceeds of the estates of the suppressed convents was to be applied to the public debt, the other to the relief of the cities and towns which had suffered from the French invasion; and all the barriers between province and province, which had so long impeded the internal commerce of the kingdom, were declared

Dec. 7.

at an end. A few days after, the Emperor fulminated a bulletin against the English government, which deserves to be recorded, from the singular contrast which its predictions exhibited to the future march of events with which his own destinies were so deeply implicated (1).

Nor was the Emperor less actively employed during the fortnight that he remained at Madrid, in dispersing his armies so as to spread them over the greatest possible space, and complete in all the provinces that thorough conquest which had already been effected in the capital. Ney's corps, which had been brought up from Soria, was stationed at Madrid, under his own immediate control, with the guards and reserve; Victor was advanced to Toledo, which, notwithstanding its expressed determination to hold out to the uttermost, opened its gates on the first summons, while his light cavalry scoured the plains of La Mancha, carrying devastation and terror to the foot of the Sierra Moreno; Lefebvre advanced to Talavera, on the great road for Badajoz and Elvas; Soult was reposing on the banks of the Carrion, preparing to follow the broken remains of Romana's army into the fastnesses of Galicia; Junot's corps was broken up, and the divisions composing it incorporated with Soult's troops; Moncey was ordered up to Madrid for an expedition against Valencia; while Mortier was directed to advance to support his corps, which was occupied with the siege of Saragossa. Thus the Emperor, from his central position at Madrid, was preparing expeditions to subdue the insurrection at once in Andalusia, Estremadura, Galicia, Valencia, and Arragon; following out these measures on his favourite maxim, which had been acted upon with such fatal effect against the Prussians after the battle of Jena, that the true secret of war is to concentrate when a decisive blow is to be struck, but to disperse when the broken remains of the enemy are to be pursued, and the moral effect of victory is to be magnified by the numerous minor successes by which it is followed.

Vast as such a plan of operations undoubtedly was, it was not disproportioned to the resources of the Emperor; for the Imperial muster-rolls, on October 10th, showed in the Peninsula the enormous number of three hundred and thirty thousand men and sixty thousand horses, of whom no less than two hundred and fifty thousand were present with the eagles and with their regiments, and the losses since sustained had been more than counterbalanced by the reinforcements received; so that, after making every allow-

(1) Thib. vii. 168, 170. Tor. ii. 156, 158. South. ii. 419, 420.

— "As to the English armies, I will chase them from the Peninsula. Saragossa, Valencia, Seville, shall be reduced to subjection, either by persuasion or force of arms; there is no longer any obstacle which can long retard the execution of my wishes. *The Bourbons can never again reign in Europe*; the divisions in the Royal family have been fomented by the English. It was not the old King Charles or his favourite whom the Duke del Infantado, the instrument of England, wished to overturn from the throne; his papers recently taken prove what the real object was; it was British preponderance which they wished to establish in Spain. Insensate project! which could have led to no other result but a war without end, and the shedding of oceans of

blood. No power influenced by England can exist on the Continent; if there are any which desire it, their wish is insensate, and will, sooner or later, cause their ruin. If you swear allegiance to my brother with sincerity and truth, without equivocation or mental reservation, I will relinquish all the rights which conquest have now afforded me, and make it my first object to conduct myself towards you as a faithful friend. The present generation may differ in opinion; too many passions have been brought into action; but your grandchildren will bless me as their regenerator; they will place among their memorable days that in which I appeared among them, and from those days will date the future prosperity of Spain."—*NAPOLÉON'S Proclamation to the Spaniards, Dec. 7, 1808*; JOMINI, iii. 108, 110.

ance for the troops requisite for garrisons and communications, at least a hundred and sixty thousand were disposable for active operations, or above thirty thousand men could be directed against each of the provinces menaced with an attack (1). The disorganized condition of the Spanish armies, the deplorable state of destitution to which they were reduced, the vast distance which separated them from each other, and the want of any efficient central government to combine their operations, rendered it too probable that this vigorous and unrelenting system of conquest would be attended with the desired effect, and that the national resistance of the Spaniards would, in the first moments of consternation consequent on their disasters (2), be speedily suppressed in all the provinces; when the career of victory was arrested from a quarter whence it was least expected, and by an enemy who had been hitherto almost forgotten, from the mistaken view which the Emperor entertained of his prowess.

While these disasters were accumulating on the Spanish monarchy, the English army, unobserved and unassailed, had at length been concentrating its forces. Baird had come up from Corunna, Hope from the Escorial, and Sir John Moore found himself at the head of nearly thirty thousand men, of whom above two thousand were cavalry in admirable condition, and sixty pieces of cannon (3). The English general was for long extremely perplexed what to do, in consequence of the imperfect information which he received, and the contradictory nature of the remonstrances addressed to him by Mr. Frere, the British ambassador at Madrid, who strongly urged an immediate advance to the capital, and the evidence which the progress of events around him was daily affording of the utter incapacity of the Spanish armies to contend with the formidable legions of Napoléon. At one time, the intelligence of the successive rout of all the Spanish armies appeared so alarming, that orders were given to the troops to retreat, and Sir David Baird's heavy baggage, which was coming up from

Nov. 29. Lugo to Astorga commenced a retrograde movement to the latter place. This determination excited the utmost dissatisfaction in the troops; officers and men loudly and openly murmured against such a resolution, and declared it would be better to sacrifice half the army than retire from so fair a field without striking a blow for the allies who had staked their all in the common cause. The gallant spirit of the general himself secretly recoiled from the mournful resolution, which nothing had made him adopt but an imperious sense of duty to the troops intrusted to his care, the gloomy forebodings consequent on the overwhelming strength of the enemy, and the defeat and dispersion of all the Spanish forces by whom it had been attempted

(1) Imperial Muster-Rolls, Nap. i. app. 28.

Eight corps, as in p. 382, . . .	319,690
Of whom were present under arms, . . .	247,834
Horses,	56,567
Detached,	32,536
In hospital,	37,419

—See *Imperial Muster-rolls*; NAPIER, i. p. 88, *App.*

(2) Nap. i. 421, 422. Jom. iii. 104. Tor. ii. 166, 172.

(3) The British army, however, had its full proportion of that usual drawback upon all armies, the difference between the actual numbers appearing on the muster-rolls, and the efficient force that could really be brought into the field. The following is the state of the British army from the Adjutant-General's statement, 19th December, 1808:

Fit for duty.	In Hospital.	Detached.	Total.
Cavalry. 2,278	182	794	3,254
Infantry. 22,222	3,786	893	26,871
Artillery. 1,358	67		1,455
<hr/> 25,858	<hr/> 4,035	<hr/> 1,687	<hr/> 31,580

2275 were left in Portugal, or were on the march between Lugo and Villa-Franca, and must be deducted from this number.—See NAPIER, i. 83, *App.*

to arrest his progress. These feelings, both in the general and the soldiers, were wrought up to the highest degree, when intelligence was received shortly after the advance of the French to Madrid, of the enthusiastic preparations made for the defence of the capital, and the determination of the inhabitants to bury themselves under its ruins rather than submit to the invader. Giving vent joyfully to the native courage of his disposition, as well

Dec. 5. as the loudly expressed wishes of the army, Sir John Moore now sent orders to Sir David Baird to suspend his retreat, and, to the infinite joy of the troops, directions were given, indicating a disposition to advance.

Dec. 9. These preparations were not relaxed, although Colonel Graham, the future hero of Barrosa, returned on the 9th with the disheartening intelligence of the capture of the Retiro, and perilous situation of Madrid; the British general knew that his countrymen looked to him for some great exploit, and, though fully aware of the danger of such a step, he resolved to throw himself upon the enemy's communication, and menace Soult, who lay exposed to his blows, with fifteen thousand men, in unsuspecting security

Dec. 11. in the valley of the Carrion. The gallant resolution was no sooner taken than it was acted upon; two days after, the British army completely concentrated, commenced its advance, and Moore, with twenty-five thousand men around his banners, ventured to essay it against Napoléon, who had two hundred thousand under his command (1).

To Sahagun, on the French line of communication. The forward march of the English forces, however, was combined as prudence, and, indeed, necessity, dictated, with preparations for a retreat; and as it was uncertain which line would be adopted, magazines were formed both on the great road to Lisbon and at Benavente, Astorga, and Lugo in the direction of Galicia. On the 15th, headquarters reached Alaejos, and the advanced posts of cavalry extended to Rueda and Toro, at the former of which places they surprised a French post, and made eighty prisoners. Great was the astonishment of these haughty conquerors at finding themselves thus assailed by an enemy whom the boastful proclamations of the Emperor had led them to believe was in full retreat for his ships.

Dec. 14. At first, Sir John's march was directed towards Valladolid, in order to facilitate the junction with Baird's corps; but an intercepted despatch from Napoléon on the 14th having made him acquainted with the fall of Madrid, and the unsuspecting security in which Soult's corps lay in the valley of the Carrion, the columns were moved towards Toro and Benavente, and Valderas was assigned as the point of junction for the two armies. At Toro,

Dec. 16. where headquarters were on the 16th, information was received that Romana, who had been informed of the movement and invited to co-operate in it, instead of doing so, was, in consequence of the retrograde movement of Sir David Baird a few days before, in full retreat towards the Galician mountains; the truth was, his troops, from hunger, fatigue, and misery, had dwindled away to eight thousand ragged and disheartened fugitives, totally unfit to take the field with regular forces, and whom he was even ashamed to array by their side. Notwithstanding this disappointment, the English

Dec. 20. forces continued to advance; on the 20th, the junction between Sir David Baird and Sir John Moore was fully effected at Moyorga; and on the

Dec. 21. 21st, the united forces were established at Sahagun, near which town Lord Paget, afterwards Marquis of Anglesea, at the head of the 10th and the 15th hussars, not above four hundred strong, fell in with, and after a short but brilliant action, totally defeated a body of seven hundred French

(1) Nap. i. 435, 451. Lond. i. 217, 233. Moore's Camp. in Spain, 187, 194. Tor. i. 178, 182.

cavalry, making two colonels and one hundred and sixty men prisoners in twenty minutes. Soult, now seriously alarmed, hastily called in his detachments from all quarters, and with some difficulty concentrated eighteen thousand men on the banks of the Carrion, and between that and Saldana, where Moore was making preparations for attacking him on the 25d (1).

It instantly paralyses their further advance to the south. Never was more completely evinced than on this occasion, the prophetic sagacity of the saying of Napoléon seven months before, that a victory by the allies on the plains of Leon would give a locked-jaw to every French army in Spain. No sooner was the advance of Sir John Moore known at Madrid, than it instantly paralysed the movements of the whole French armies in the south of Spain. Napoléon immediately dispatched orders in all directions to suspend the expeditions into the different provinces which were in preparation. Milhaud's and Lasalle's cuirassiers were arrested at Talavera; Victor's advanced guards were recalled from La Mancha; the expedition against Valencia was abandoned, the preparations Dec. 21. against Saragossa suspended; and fifty thousand men, under the Emperor in person, including the Imperial Guards, the whole of Ney's corps, and great part of the reserve, the flower of the army, were, at a few hours' notice, suddenly marched off in the direction of Somo-Sierra (2).

Dec. 22. Rapid march of Napoléon with an overwhelming force towards the English troops. On the evening of the 22d, they were at the foot of the Guadarrama Pass, but a violent hurricane of wind and snow enveloped the higher parts of the mountains, where the thermometer was at 10° of cold (5); and the general in command of the advanced guard, after twelve hours of fruitless toil, reported that the passage was impracticable. The conqueror of the St.-Bernard, however, was not so easily

Dec. 23. to be arrested. Napoléon in person hastened to the advanced posts, and ordered the march to be continued without interruption, himself setting the example by pressing forward with the leading files on foot. The example animated the men to fresh exertions; amidst storms of snow and sleet, which in the higher parts of the passage were truly frightful, the columns pressed

Dec. 25. on with ceaseless activity, and after two days of incessant labour, the difficulties were surmounted, and the whole were collected on the northern side of the mountains, in the valley of the Douro. Urging on his troops with indefatigable activity, and riding even at that inclement season with the advanced posts in person, the Emperor soon arrived at the scene of action;

Dec. 26. on the 26th, headquarters were at Tordesillas, the cavalry were at Valladolid, and Ney's corps at Rio Seco. Fully anticipating the immediate destruction of the English army, from the immense force now brought to bear against them, Napoléon on the same day wrote to Soult:—"The advanced posts of the cavalry are already at Benavente; if the English remain another day in their position they are undone; should they attack you with all their forces, retire a day's march to the rear; the further they advance the better for us; if they retreat pursue them closely (4)."

They retreat on the line of Galicia. The march of Ney by Zamora and Rio Seco towards Benavente was so direct, that he early intercepted the British from their communication with Portugal; and if he could have reached the latter town before Sir John Moore, he would have cut him off from the line of retreat to Galicia also, and rendered the situation of the army all but desperate. This catastrophe, however, was prevented by the prudent foresight of the English commander, who, having received vague but alarming accounts of the march of a large

(1) *Tor.* ii. 178, 187. *Nap.* i. 450, 461. *Lond.* i. 212, 213.

(3) About 14° of Fahrenheit above zero.

(4) *Thib.* vii. 171, 175. *Tor.* ii. 187, 189. *Nap.* i. 461, 462. *Jom.* ii. 113, 114.

(2) *Jom.* ii. 113. *Tor.* ii. 187. *Nap.* i. 461.

French army from the south, suspended his advance on the 23d, and on the 24th commenced his retreat towards Galicia, to the infinite mortification of the soldiers, who were in the highest state of vigour and spirits, and in whom an unbroken series of brilliant successes at the outposts had produced an unbounded confidence in their own prowess, likely, if not met by overwhelming odds, to have led to the most important and glorious results. On the 26th,

Dec. 26. Baird's troops passed the Esla on their retreat, while Moore, who was with the rearguard to protect the passage of the stores and baggage over the bridge of Castro-Gonzalo, was threatened by a large body of Ney's horsemen. Lord Paget, however, with two squadrons of the 10th, charged and overthrew them, making a hundred prisoners, besides numbers killed and wounded. Indeed, the superiority of the English horse had become so apparent, that they set all odds at defiance, never hesitated to attack the enemy's cavalry, though threefold in number, and had already made five hundred prisoners, during the few days they had been engaged in active operations (1). By this timely retreat, Sir John Moore reached Benavente before the enemy; and the hazardous operation of crossing the Esla, then a roaring torrent swollen by melting snow, and over planks laid across the broken arches of the bridge of Castro, in the dark, was successfully performed by General Craufurd with the rearguard. The army remained two days at that place, reposing from its fatigues, under the shelter of its magnificent baronial castle, almost unequalled in Europe for extent and grandeur (2). Discipline, however, had already become seriously relaxed during the retreat, though only of three days' duration, from Sahagun; the spirit of the men had been surprisingly depressed by the thoughts of retiring before the enemy; the officers had, in a great degree, lost their authority, and disorders equally fatal to the army and inhabitants had already commenced. But these evils were accumulating only in the front part of the column, which was suffering merely under the fatigues of the march and the severity of the weather; no decline of spirit or enterprise was perceptible in the rearguard, which was in presence of the enemy. Piquets of cavalry had

Dec. 28.

been left to guard the fords of the Esla; and, on the 28th, a body

(1) Lond. i. 247, 253. Nap. i. 462, 464. Tor. i. 138, 189.

(2) This splendid relic of feudal grandeur is thus described by an eloquent eye-witness, whose pictures, equally vivid in travels as history, have given to prose all the colours of poetry. "The Castle of Benavente is one of the finest monuments of the age of chivalry; nothing in England approaches to it in magnificence. Berkeley, Raby, even Warwick, are poor fabrics in comparison. With Gothic grandeur it has the richness of Moorish decoration; open alcoves where Saracenic arches are supported by pillars of porphyry and granite; cloisters with fountains playing in their courts; jasper columns, and tessellated floors; niches all over, and seats in the walls, over-arched in various forms, and enriched with every grotesque adornment of gold and silver, and colours which are hardly less gorgeous. It belonged to the Duke of Ossuna, and the splendour of old times was still continued there. The extent of this magnificent structure may be estimated from this single circumstance, that two regiments, besides artillery, were quartered within its walls; they proved the most destructive enemies that had ever entered them; the officers, who felt and admired the beauties of this venerable pile, attempted in vain to save it from devastation. Every thing combustible was seized; fires were lighted against the fine walls, and pictures of unknown value, the works, perhaps of the greatest Spanish masters,

were heaped together as fuel. Fortunately the archives of the family escaped."—SOUTHEY, i. 499.

In the midst of this disgraceful scene of unbridled licence and military devastation, there is one trait of heroic presence of mind, which in some degree redeems the character of the British soldier. Several thousand infantry slept in the long galleries of an immense convent built round a square; the horses of the cavalry and artillery, scarcely less numerous, were in the corridor below, so closely jammed together, that no one could pass between them, and there was but one entrance. Two officers, returning at night from the bridge of Castro, being desirous of finding shelter for their men, entered the gate of this convent, and perceived with horror that a large window-shutter was on fire, and the flames were spreading to the rafters above, from whence a single spark falling on the straw under the horses would ignite the whole, and six thousand men and horses would inevitably perish. Without saying a word, one of them (Captain Lloyd of the 43d) made a sign to his companions to keep silence, and springing on the nearest horse, ran along the backs of the others till he reached the flaming shutter, which by great efforts he tore from its hinges and flung into the court-yard without giving any alarm; which, in such circumstances, would have been hardly less destructive than the flames.—See *Life of a Sergeant*, p. 143; and *Napier*, i. 467.

of six hundred horsemen of the Imperial Guard crossed over, and began to drive in the rearguard, stationed in that quarter to repel their incursions. Instantly, these gallant horsemen made ready to oppose them, and though only two hundred in number, repeatedly faced about, and by successive charges, under Colonel Otway, retarded the advance of the enemy till assistance was at hand. At length the enemy having been drawn sufficiently far into the plain, the 10th, who were formed, concealed by some houses, suddenly appeared, and advanced to the assistance of their brave comrades. At the joyful sight of the well-known plumes, the retiring horsemen wheeled about, a loud cheer was given, and the whole bore down at full speed upon the enemy. The Imperial Guard, the flower of the French army wreathed with the trophies of Austerlitz (1), were in an instant broken and driven over the Esla, with the loss of a hundred and thirty killed, and seventy prisoners, among whom was their commander, General Lefebvre Desnouettes (2).

Return of
the Emperor
to Paris. The destruction of the bridge of Castro-Gonzalo was so thoroughly effected that it delayed for two days the advance of the French, who could not cross the stream at other points from its swollen state; but at length, the arches having been restored, Bessières crossed on the 30th, with nine thousand horsemen, and reached Benavente, which had been evacuated by the English on the same day. At the same time, the bridge of Mansilla, guarded by Romana's troops, was forced by a charge of cavalry, and Soult passing over, overspread the plains of Leon with his troops, and captured the town of the same name, with great stores belonging to the Spanish government. The whole army, consisting of the guards, reserve, Soult and Ney's corps, seventy thousand strong, including ten thousand horse, and a hundred pieces of cannon, were, on the 1st January, united by the Emperor at Astorga. The union of so great a force in that remote part of the Peninsula, was both the highest compliment that could be paid by that great general to the prowess of the English army, and the important stroke delivered by its commander, and the strongest proof of the vigour and celerity with which, by long experience and admirable arrangements, the movements of the French troops could be effected. In ten days Napoléon had not only transported fifty thousand men from Madrid to Astorga, a distance of two hundred miles, but crossed the Guadarrama range when enveloped in a frightful snow-storm, and the torrent of the Esla when swollen by wintry rains; in each of which operations more than a day's march had been lost, so that the advanced posts of his army at least had marched the astonishing number of twenty-five miles a-day when actually in motion, in the depth of winter; an instance of exertion almost unparalleled in modern times (3). But they were there left by Napoléon. On the road between Benavente and Astorga, when riding in pursuit at the gallop with the advanced posts, he was overtaken by a courier with despatches; he instantly dismounted, ordered a bivouac-fire to be lighted by the roadside, and seating himself beside it on the ground, was soon so lost in thought as to be insensible to the snow which fell in thick flakes around him. He had ample subject for meditation: they

(1) *Ante*, v. 481.

(2) *London*, i. 253, 256. *Nap.* i. 467, 468. *Tor.* i. 189, 190. *Larrey*, iii. 127.

(3) It has been greatly exceeded, however, in the same country in later times, though by a much smaller force. In December 1836, the Spanish general Gomez marched from the lines of St.-Roque in front of Gibraltar to Tudela on the Ebro: he left St.-Roque on the 24th November, and reached the Ebro on the 17th December, having repeatedly

fought, and been driven to circuitous roads to avoid the enemy on the way. The distance was above 500 miles, performed in twenty-five days. There is no such instance of sustained effort in modern times. Septimius Severus marched from Vienna to Rome, a distance of 800 miles, in forty days, or twenty miles a-day; but he had the glittering prospect of the empire to animate his exertions. —See *Ann. Reg.* 1836, 379, 380, and *Gibbon*, ch. iv.

contained authentic intelligence of the accession of Austria to the European confederacy, and the rapid preparation which her armies were making for taking the field. On the spot, he wrote an order for calling into immediate activity the second levy of 80,000 conscripts authorized by the *senatus consultum* of 10th October preceding; and proceeding slowly and pensively on to Astorga, remained there for two days, writing innumerable despatches, and regulating at once the pursuit of the English army, the internal affairs of Spain, the organization of the forces of the Rhenish confederacy, and the developement of the gigantic strength of France for the German war. On

Jan. 3. the 5d he returned to Valladolid, where he remained three days, still indefatigably engaged in writing despatches, and then returned, with extraordinary celerity, by Burgos (1) and Bayonne, to Paris, where he arrived on the 25d. He took back his guards, but sent on Soult and Ney with two divisions of the reserve, in all about sixty thousand men, to continue the pursuit of the English (2), who were falling back by rapid marches, and in great disorder, towards the Galician mountains.

Sir John
Moore re-
tires to
Lugo.

The withdrawing of the Emperor, however, made no change in the vigour with which the pursuit of the English army was continued.

Soult, who immediately pressed upon their retiring columns, had twenty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry under his command; and though the British army was still nearly twenty thousand strong (3), yet the inclemency of the weather and rapidity of the retreat, had, in a great degree, relaxed the bonds of discipline, and diminished the moral strength of the troops. The rearguard, indeed, still with unabated resolution repelled the attacks of the enemy; but the other troops, who had not the excitement of combat, often sank under the rigour of the season, or yielded to the temptations of intemperance, which the extensive stores of wine along their line of march too readily afforded. The native and ineradicable vice of northern climates, drunkenness, here appeared in frightful colours; the great wine-vaults of Bembibre proved more fatal than the sword of the enemy; and when the gallant rearguard, which preserved its ranks unbroken, closed up the array, they had to force their way through a motley crowd of English and Spanish soldiers, stragglers and marauders, who reeled out of the houses in disgusting crowds, or lay stretched on the roadside an easy prey to the enemy's cavalry, which thundered in close pursuit. The condition of the army daily became more deplorable: the frost had been succeeded by a thaw; rain and sleet fell in torrents; the roads were almost broken up; the horses foundered at every step; the few artillery-waggons which had hitherto kept up, fell one by one to the rear, and being immediately blown up to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands, gave melancholy token, by the sound of their explosions, of the work of destruction which was going on. The mountain-passes through which the retreat was conducted, presented, indeed, positions at every step in which a few regiments might have arrested, on that single road, an army; but it was unhappily thought there was no use

(1) On leaving Valladolid he rode to Burgos, a distance of *thirty-five French leagues*, in five hours! This rapidity would appear incredible, were it not for the circumstance that the Emperor here had his saddle-horses arranged by divisions of nine each at every three or four leagues along the road, so that every eight or ten miles he found fresh relays of his own horses, which were in admirable condition. This was his usual practice wherever there appeared the least chance of his riding on horseback during his journeys. The remainder of the road to Paris

he travelled in his carriage.—See THIEBAUDEAU, vii. 194.

(2) Nap. i. 469, 473. Tor. ii. 189, 195. Lond. i. 256, 259. Thib. vii. 176, 185. Pellet, *Guerre de* 1809, i. 47, 48.

(3) Three thousand men, chiefly light troops, had been detached from the main body to Vigo, to facilitate the embarkation on which the English commander was already determined.—NAPIER, i. 473.

in contesting them, as the vastly superior numbers of the enemy, and the advancing columns of Ney's corps, were supposed to enable the pursuers speedily to turn them on either flank; and it is well known to all really acquainted with war, that a mountainous region, in appearance the most defensible, is in reality often the most indefensible of all districts, against a superior and enterprising enemy, led by a skilful general. Sir John Moore was constantly with the rearguard, doing his utmost to arrest the disorders
 Jan. 5. and protect the retiring columns; and at Villa Franca a sharp skirmish ensued with the rearguard, in which, though the French cavalry were at first successful, they were ultimately repulsed by a heavy fire from the British light troops, with the loss of several hundred men, including General Colbert, who fell while gallantly leading on the vanguard. In other quarters, however, the same discipline was not preserved; disorders went on accumulating with frightful rapidity along the whole line, and such was the general wreck of presence of mind or foresight, that at Nogales the military-chest of the army, containing £25,000 in dollars, having stuck fast in the mud, the treasure was rolled in the casks in which it was contained over a precipitous descent, and became the prey of the peasantry, who picked it up at the bottom. All order or subordination was now at an end; the soldiers, exhausted by fatigue, or depressed by suffering, sank down by hundreds on the wayside, and breathed their last, some with prayers, others with curses on their lips; and the army, in frightful disorder, at length reached Lugo, late on the evening of the 6th January (1).

And offers battle, which is declined. Here, however, Sir John Moore halted, and in a proclamation issued next day, severely rebuked the insubordination of the troops, and announced his intention of halting to give battle to the enemy. The army, accordingly, was drawn up in a strong position, extending along a ridge of low hills, flanked on either side by precipitous rocks, from the mountains to the bed of the Minho; and it then speedily appeared that the preceding disorders of the march had at least not been owing to want
 Jan. 7. of courage. Instantly, as if by enchantment, the disorder ceased; joyfully the men fell into their places, the stragglers came up from the rear; arms were cleaned, faces brightened, confidence was restored; and before the morning of the 8th, nineteen thousand men stood in battle array, impatiently awaiting the attack of the enemy. Soult, however, declined the combat, though on that day he had seventeen thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and fifty pieces of artillery in line; and Moore, having gained his object of recruiting his troops, and having little food remaining in the stores of Lugo, broke up in the following night and retired towards Corunna (2).

Continues the retreat to Corunna. Hardships undergone by the troops. The night was cold and tempestuous; a severe storm of wind and rain, mixed with sleet, burst upon the troops; and in the confusion of a nocturnal retreat, two divisions lost their way, and complete disorganization ensued, insomuch that a large part of the army became little better than a mass of stragglers, who were only prevented from becoming the prey of the pursuers by none of his cavalry fortunately appearing in sight. Order having, at daylight, been in some degree restored, Sir John Moore collected the army into a solid mass, and the retreat to Corunna was effected without further molestation from the enemy, the night-march from Lugo having gained to the British twelve hours' start of the pursuers, which they were never afterwards able to regain; but notwithstanding

(1) Tor. ii. 194, 198. Nap. i. 473, 481. Lond. i. 260, 267. South. ii. 504, 514.

(2) Nap. i. 485, 486. Tor. ii. 195, 196. Lond. i. 270, 276.

this, it was nearly as disorderly and harassing as the preceding part had been.

Jan. 11. As the troops successively arrived at the heights from whence the sea was visible, and Corunna, with its white citadel and towers, rose upon the view, all eyes were anxiously directed to the bay, in hopes that the joyful sight of a friendly fleet of transports might be seen; but the wide expanse was deserted, and a few coasters and fishing-boats alone were visible on the dreary main. Deeply did every one then lament that a battle had not been fought long before; and as the officers cast their eyes on the low sand-hills in front of the ramparts of the town, on which they well knew the contest for their embarkation must be sustained, they thought with poignant regret of the innumerable positions, a hundred times stronger, which might have been taken up in the course of the retreat for the encounter. Now, however, there was no alternative; the sea was in their front, the enemy in their rear; fight they must to secure the means of embarkation; be the positions favourable or unfavourable. The brigades, as they successively arrived, were passed on into the town, and all the means which circumstances would admit of taken to strengthen the land defences,

Jan. 12. which, though regular, were very weak; the inhabitants cheerfully and honourably joining in the toil, though they well knew, from the preparations which were going forward, that an embarkation was intended. On the

Jan. 13. day following, two powder magazines, at a short distance without the walls, containing four thousand barrels of powder, the gift of England, were blown up with an explosion so terrific, that nothing in the whole course of the war approached to it. The coast resembled the sudden explosion of a volcano; the city was shaken to its foundations, the rocks torn from their bases, the sea was tossed as in a tempest, the earth shook for leagues around; while slowly arose in the air a huge black cloud, shooting forth dazzling sparks, from whence, at a great height, stones burst forth with a prodigious sound, and fell with a sharp rattle in all directions. A stillness yet more awful ensued, broken only by the hoarse and sullen lashing of the still agitated

Jan. 14. waves on the shore (1). On the following day, the transports from Vigo hove in sight, and soon after stood into the bay; preparations were immediately made for the embarkation of the sick and wounded; the cavalry horses were almost all destroyed, and the greater part of the artillery, consisting of fifty-two pieces, put on board; eight British and four Spanish being only reserved for immediate use. Notwithstanding all the sufferings of the retreat, not one gun had been taken by the enemy. Meanwhile, the bulk of the army, still fourteen thousand strong, was drawn up with great care by Sir John Moore, on a range of heights, or rather of swelling knolls, which form a sort of amphitheatre around the village of Elvina, at the distance of rather more than a mile from CORUNNA. Hope's division was on the left, its flank covered by the muddy stream of the Mero, commanding the road to Lugo; Baird's next, directly behind Elvina; then the rifles and Fraser's division, which watched the coast-road to St.-Jago, and was prepared to support any menaced point; General Paget, half a mile in the rear, with the reserve, at the village of Airis. The French, fully twenty thousand strong, were posted on a higher semicircular ridge, sweeping round the lesser one occupied by the British at the distance of about a mile; Laborde's division was on the

(1) It is from Colonel Napier, an eye-witness, that this eloquent description is taken. Whoever has had the good fortune to see that most sublime of spectacles, an eruption of Vesuvius, will have no difficulty in giving implicit credit to the graphic

truth of the picture. The author witnessed one twenty years ago; and the act of transcribing these lines recalls, in all its vividness, the thrilling recollection of the matchless scene.

right, Merle's in the centre, Mermet's on the left; their light field-pieces were distributed along the front of the line; the dragoons, under Lahoussaye, Lorge, and Franceschi, to which the English had nothing to oppose, clustered to the left of the infantry, and menaced the British right flank, while a great battery of twelve heavy guns, advantageously posted on a steep eminence between their foot and horse, not twelve hundred yards from Baird's division, was prepared to carry devastation along the whole line (1).

Battle of
Corunna.
Jan. 16. From the inactivity of the French army during the two preceding days, Sir John Moore had been led to imagine that they had no serious intention of disquieting his retreat, and preparations, on the 16th, were making for withdrawing the troops into the town as soon as the darkness would admit of its being done without observation; when, about noon, a general movement was seen along their whole line, and soon after, at two o'clock, their infantry, in four massy columns, was observed to be descending from the heights which they occupied, and advancing with a swift step towards the English position. Perceiving that the hour he had so long and so passionately wished for was at hand, Sir John Moore instantly galloped to the front; the troops every where stood to their arms, and were deployed into line, while the French, according to custom, advanced in long and deep columns, preceded by a cloud of light troops. Their onset, as at Vimiero, and in all the subsequent actions of the war, was extremely impetuous. A cloud of skirmishers led the way, which drove in the English advanced posts with great vigour; and, in the confusion of their retreat, made themselves masters of Elvina, directly in front of the centre. As they drew near to the British position, they deployed into line, and it soon appeared that they extended greatly beyond its extreme right; but the 4th regiment, which was there stationed, no ways discouraged by this alarming circumstance, threw back its right wing, and presenting a front in two directions, in which attitude it advanced, was soon warmly engaged with the enemy. Highly delighted with this display of presence of mind, and deeming the right secure when intrusted to such intrepid defenders, Sir John Moore rode up to Baird's division in the centre, which was now come to blows with Mermet's troops, who having carried Elvina, were bursting through the enclosures which lay between its houses and the British, with loud cries and all the exultation of victory. The action now became extremely warm along the whole line; the French and English centres advanced to within pistol-shot of each other, and after exchanging a few volleys, the 50th and 42d charged bayonets, and drove the enemy opposed to them in the most gallant style back again through Elvina, and a considerable way up the slope on the other side. But this furious onset being carried too far, and not adequately supported, met with a severe check; the victorious troops, when broken by the enclosures and stone-walls on the other side of the village, were assailed in their turn by fresh French regiments, and driven back a second time through its streets, Major Napier, who commanded the 50th, being wounded and made prisoner. But Moore was at hand to repair the disorder; instantly addressing the 42d regiment with the animating words, "Highlanders, remember Egypt!" and bringing up a battalion of the Guards to its support, he again led them forward to the charge. The shock was irresistible; borne back at the point of the bayonet, the enemy were again driven into Elvina, from whence, after a desperate struggle, they were finally expelled with great slaughter. In this decisive contest, however, Sir John Moore received a mortal wound from a cannon-

(1) Nap. i. 487, 488, Tor. i. 199, 200. Lond. i. 278, 280. South. ii. 519, 523, Journ. iii. 116.

shot, and Sir David Baird, struck down at the head of his men, had been shortly before carried from the field in a senseless condition (1).

Foiled in this attempt to pierce the centre, Soult renewed his attacks with Delaborde's division on the left, while a heavy column endeavoured to steal unperceived round the British right, where they so greatly outflanked their opponents. But the ground on the left being in favour of the English, all his efforts were defeated with comparative ease; and General Hope, who commanded there, pressing forward in pursuit of the repulsed columns, carried the village of Palavio Abaxo, close under the enemy's original position, which remained in his hands at nightfall; while, on the right, General Paget, with the reserve, not only at once perceived and advanced to meet the column which was endeavouring to turn his flank, but assailed it with such vigour, that it was thrown back upon Lahoussaye's dragoons, and the whole driven in disorder to the foot of the hill, on which the great battery was placed. When night, arriving in that wintry season at an early hour, separated the combatants, the enemy was not only repulsed at all points, but the British line was considerably advanced, holding, on the left, Palavio Abaxo; on the centre, Elvina; and on the right, being advanced to the acclivity of their central battery. Had Fraser's troops, stationed on the coast road to St.-Jago on the extreme right, been at hand to support this splendid advance of the reserve, and an hour more of daylight remained, the enemy would have been routed; had the cavalry been on the field, and the horses not foundered, he would have been thrown back in irretrievable confusion on the swampy stream of the Mero, now flooded by the full tide, and traversed only by a single arch at El Burgo, and totally annihilated. Night, however, having supervened when the success was still incomplete, and the means of embarking unmolested having been gained by the enemy's repulse, General Hope, upon whom the command had devolved (2), did not conceive himself warranted in making any change in the preparations for departure, and after dark the troops were withdrawn into the town, where they were all got on board without either confusion or delay (3).

Death of
Sir John
Moore.

Sir John Moore received his death-wound while animating the 42d to the charge. A cannon-ball struck his left breast, and beat him down by its violence to the earth; but his countenance remained unchanged, not a sigh escaped his lips, and sitting on the ground, he watched with an anxious and steadfast eye the progress of the line. As it advanced, however, and it became manifest that the troops were gaining ground, his countenance brightened, and he reluctantly allowed himself to be led to the rear. Then the dreadful nature of the wound appeared manifest; the shoulder was shattered to pieces; the arm hanging by a film of skin, the breast and lungs almost laid open. As the soldiers placed him on a blanket to carry him from the field, the hilt of his sword was driven into the wound; an officer,

(1) General Hope's account of the battle. *Ann. Reg.* 1809, p. 372. *Nap. i.* 494, 496. *Lond. i.* 285, 286. *Tor. ii.* 201, 202.

(2) Hope's Despatch. *Ann. Reg.* 1809, p. 373. *Nap. i.* 498, 499. *Lond. i.* 287. *Tor. ii.* 201, 202.

(3) The British loss at Corunna was from 800 to 1000 men; that of the French was stated by their own officers in Colonel Napier at 3000; Sir John Hope estimated it at 1600, but it was at least 2000; a number which would, doubtless, appear surprisingly large, if the murderous effect of the fire of the British infantry, from the coolness and discipline of the men, were not decisively proved by every action throughout the war. The total loss of the army during the retreat was 4033, of whom

1397 were missing before the position at Lugo, and 2636 from that to the final embarkation of the army, including those who fell at Corunna—of this number 800 stragglers contrived to escape into Portugal, and, being united with the sick left in that country, formed a corps of 1876 men, which afterwards did good service, both at Oporto and Talavera. Six three-pounders which never were horsed were thrown over the rocks near Villa-Franca; the guns used at Corunna, twelve in number, were spiked and buried in the sand, but afterwards discovered by the enemy. Not one, from first to last, was taken in flight.—See the general returns quoted in *Napoléon, i. App. No. 26.*

destined to celebrity in future times, CAPTAIN HARDINGE, attempted to take it off, but the dying hero exclaimed, "It is as well as it is; I had rather it should go off the field with me." He was carried by the soldiers towards the town, but though the pain of the wound soon became excessive, such was the serenity of his countenance, that those around him expressed a hope of his recovery. "No," said he, "I feel that is impossible." When approaching the ramparts, he several times desired his attendants to stop, and turn him round that he might again see the field of battle; and when the advance of the firing indicated that the British were successful, he expressed his satisfaction, and a smile overspread the features that were relaxing in death. The examination of his wound at his lodgings speedily foreclosed all hopes of recovery; but he never, for an instant, lost his serenity of mind, and repeatedly expressed his satisfaction when he heard that the enemy were beaten. "You know," said he to his old friend, Colonel Anderson, "that I always wished to die this way." He continued to converse in a calm and even cheerful voice on the events of the day, enquired after the safety of his friends and staff, and recommended several for promotion on account of their services during the retreat. Once only his voice faltered, as he spoke of his mother. Life was ebbing fast, and his strength was all but extinct, when he exclaimed, in words which will for ever thrill in every British heart,—"I hope the people of England will be satisfied: I hope my country will do me justice." Released a few minutes after from his sufferings, he was wrapped by his attendants in his military cloak, and laid in a grave hastily formed on the ramparts of Corunna, where a monument was soon after constructed over his unconfined remains by the generosity of Marshal Ney. Not a word was spoken as the melancholy interment by torch-light took place (1); silently they laid him in his grave, while the distant cannon of the battle fired the funeral honours to his memory (2).

Embarka-
tion of the
troops, and
their return
to England.
Jan. 17.

On the fall of Sir John Moore, and the wound of Sir David Baird, the command devolved upon General Hope, who conducted the remaining arrangements with that decision and judgment which afterwards became so conspicuous in the Peninsular war, and whose eloquent despatch announcing the battle of Corunna and the death of Sir John Moore, agitated so profoundly the heart of his country. The boats being all in readiness, the embarkation commenced at ten at night; the troops were silently filed down to the beach, put on board with admirable order, and the whole, except the rearguard, reached the transports in safety before day. GENERAL BERESFORD, at the head of the rearguard, two thousand, and GENERAL HILL, who was stationed on the promontory behind the town, both destined to celebrity in future times, were the last to be withdrawn; the latter did not embark till three o'clock in the afternoon of the following day.

(1) Moore's Narrative, 354, 371. Nap. i. 499, 500.

(2) This touching scene will live for ever in the British heart, embalmed in the exquisite words of the poet:—

"Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note,
As his corse to the rampart we hurried:
Not a soldier discharged his farewell shot
O'er the grave where our hero we buried.

"We buried him darkly at dead of night,
The sods with our bayonets turning;
By the struggling moonbeam's misty light,
And the lantern dimly burning.

"No useless coffin enclosed his breast,
Not in sheet or in shroud we bound him:
But he lay like a warrior taking his rest,
With his martial cloak around him.

"Few and short were the prayers we said,
And we spoke not a word of sorrow,
But we steadfastly gazed on the face that was dead,
And we bitterly thought on the morrow.

"We thought, as we hollow'd his narrow bed,
And smooth'd down his lonely pillow,
That the foe and the stranger would tread o'er his head,
And we far away on the billow.

"But half of our heavy task was done,
When the clock struck the hour for retiring;
And we heard the distant and random gun
That the foe was sullenly firing.

"Slowly and sadly we laid him down,
From the field of his fame fresh and gory;
We carved not a line, and we raised not a stone,
But we left him alone with his glory."

The French gave them no annoyance, so strongly had the bloody repulse of the preceding day inspired them with respect for British valour. With a courage and generosity worthy of the highest admiration, the Spaniards manned the ramparts when the last of the English forces were withdrawn, and prolonged the defence for several days, so as to allow the whole sick, wounded, artillery, stores, and even prisoners, to be brought away. A few guns placed by the French on the heights of Ste.-Lucie, without the walls, which could not be maintained, alone occasioned, by the fire which they opened upon the vessels in the bay, great confusion among the transports, but without doing any serious damage. At length the last of the long files of baggage and stragglers were got on board, and the English fleet, amidst the tears of the inhabitants, stood to the northward, and were lost to the sight amidst the cold expanse of the watery main. Then, and not till then, the inhabitants of Corunna, feeling it in vain to prolong a defence which such a host had resigned in despair, and having honourably discharged every duty to their discomfited allies, capitulated to Marshal Soult, who, a few days afterwards, obtained possession, after a trifling resistance, of the important fortress of Ferrol, with seven sail of the line, and very extensive naval stores (1).

Extreme gloom and despondency which these events produce in the British isles. No words can convey an adequate idea of the gloom and despondency which prevailed in the British isles when intelligence of this long catalogue of disasters was received. In proportion to the warm and enthusiastic hopes which had been formed of a successful issue to the patriotic cause, had been the anxiety and interest which was felt when the crisis approached. In particular, when Napoléon, at the head of three hundred thousand chosen troops, burst through the Pyrenees, and the brave but undisciplined Spanish levies were brought in contact with his experienced veterans, the public anxiety became almost unbearable. The rout of Espinosa, the overthrow at Burgos, the defeat of Tudela, succeeding each other in rapid succession, were felt the more keenly, that the British nation had been led by the exaggerations of the public journals to form a most erroneous idea, both of the strength of the Spanish and the force of the French armies. Most of all, they were misled by the pleasing illusion, which the experience of every age has proved to be fallacious, but which is probably destined to the end of the world to mislead the enthusiastic portion of mankind, that a certain degree of popular excitement can supply the want of discipline and experience, and that general ardour is more to be relied on than organization and conduct. When, therefore, the Spanish levies, flushed with the trophies of Baylen and Saragossa, were dissipated with more ease than the regular armies of Austria and Muscovy; when the Somo-sierra pass was stormed by a charge of lancers, and Madrid fell within three weeks after the campaign had been opened by Napoléon, a sort of despair seized the public mind, and nothing seemed now capable of withstanding a power which beat down with equal ease the regular forces of northern, and the enthusiastic levies of southern Europe. A transient gleam shot across the gloom when Sir John Moore advanced to Sahagun, and the English journals confidently announced that seventy thousand English and Spaniards were rapidly interposing between the Emperor and the French frontier, and would possibly make him prisoner in the capital he had won. Proportionally deeper was the gloom when this hope also proved fallacious, when Romana's forty thousand men dwindled into a few thousand starving wanderers, and the British army, in-

(1) *Tor.* ii. 203, 205. *Nap.* i. 498, 499. *London.* i. 289, 291. *South.* ii. 530, 531.

stead of making Napoléon prisoner in the heart of Spain, was expelled, after a disastrous retreat, with the loss of its general, from the shores of the Peninsula.

Horror excited by the appearance of the army on its return. The English had hitherto only known war in its holiday dress : their ideas of it were formed on the pomp of melodramatic representation, or the interest of pacific reviews : and though strongly impressed with a military spirit, they were, from their happy insular situation, strangers to the hardships and the calamities of actual campaigns. The inhabitants of the towns along the Channel had seen the successive expeditions which composed Sir John Moore's army embark in all the pride of military display, with drums beating and colours flying, amidst the cheers and tears of a countless host of spectators. When, therefore, they beheld the same regiments return, now reduced to half their numbers, with haggard countenances, ragged accoutrements, and worn-out clothing, they were struck with astonishment and horror ; which was soon greatly increased by a malignant fever which the troops brought back with them, the result of fatigue, confinement on ship-board, and mental depression, joined to the dismal and often exaggerated accounts which were spread by the survivors of the hardships and miseries they had undergone. These gloomy narratives riveted every mind by a painful but enehaining interest : they speedily made their way into the public newspapers, and were devoured with unceasing interest by the whole people ; the fate of these gallant men became a general subject of commiseration ; and the old cry, raised for factious purposes, began to resound through the land (1), that England could never contend on the Continent with France, and that the only rational policy for the prosecution of the war was to withdraw entirely behind our wooden walls.

Reflections on the campaign ; its chequered character, but on the whole eminently unfavourable to France. And yet, to a dispassionate observer, it could not but be manifest, that though the campaign had to both parties been deeply chequered by misfortune, it had in reality been far more calamitous to the French than the allies : and that the power of Napoléon had received a shock ruder than any which it had yet received since his accession to the supreme authority. The Spanish armies, it is true, had been dispersed on the Ebro, the Somo-sierra forced, Madrid taken, and the British, after a calamitous retreat, been driven to their ships ; but the Peninsula was still unsubdued ; Saragossa was fortifying its blood-stained battlements ; Catalonia was in arms : Valencia and Andalusia recruiting their forces : Portugal was untouched, and the British troops, though in diminished strength, still held the towers of Lisbon. No submission or subjugation had followed the irruption of three hundred thousand men into the Peninsula : driven from their capital, the Spaniards, like their ancestors in the Roman and Moorish wars, were preparing in the provinces to maintain a separate warfare ; while the number of their fortresses and chains of mountains, joined to the aid of England, promised them the means of there prolonging a desperate resistance. And what had happened in the same campaign to the hitherto invincible arms of France ? One whole corps had laid down its arms with unheard-of disgrace ; another had capitulated, and surrendered a kingdom to purchase its retreat ; foiled in more than one provincial expedition, the imperial arms had been driven from the capital behind the Ebro, and only regained their lost ground by denuding Germany of its defenders, and exposing for the Peninsular thrones the Rhine itself to inva-

(1) Ann. Reg. 1809, 22, 25. Nap. i. 529.

sion. The spell which held the world enchained had been broken, the dangerous secret had been disclosed that French armies could pass under the Caudine forks. Already the effects of the discovery had become manifest: Europe had been shaken from one extremity to the other by the Peninsular disasters, and Austria, which beheld unmoved the desperate strife of Pultusk and Eylau, encouraged by the immersion of the best French armies in the Peninsula, was preparing to renew the struggle on a scale of unprecedented magnitude.

Reflections
on the
campaign,
and the
effect of
Sir John
Moore's
movement.

The movement in advance by Sir John Moore to Sahagun, his rapid subsequent retreat, when surrounded by superior forces, to Benavente, the skill with which he re-organized his shattered army at Lugo, and the firmness with which, disdaining every proposal for a capitulation (1), he boldly fronted the enemy at Corunna, and met a glorious death on the field of victory, are worthy of the highest admiration, and will for ever secure him a place in the temple of British heroes. Nor is it merely the fond partiality of national gratitude, often mistaken or exaggerated in its opinions, which has secured this distinction: a calm consideration of the consequences of his campaign must, with all impartial observers, lead to the same result. In the whole annals of the Revolutionary War, there is not to be found a single movement more ably conceived, or attended with more important consequences. Levelled against the vital line of the enemy's communications, based on the principles which, unknown to the English general, Napoléon had so emphatically unfolded six months before in his secret despatch to Savary (2), it had literally paralysed every hostile army in Spain; snatched the Spanish monarchy from the verge of destruction, when its own resources were exhausted; and by drawing Napoléon himself, with his terrible legions, into the northern extremity of the Peninsula, it both gave time to the southern provinces to restore their armies and arm their fortresses, and averted the war from Portugal, till an opportunity of organizing fresh means of resistance within its frontiers was afforded. But for this bold and well-conceived advance, Andalusia would have been overrun, Valencia taken, Saragossa subdued, within a few weeks; and before the Emperor was recalled from the theatre of Peninsular warfare by the Austrian armaments, he would have realized his favourite threat of planting the French eagles on the towers of Lisbon. These great results, however, were attended with proportional dangers; Napoléon, with seventy thousand chosen troops, was speedily sweeping round the audacious enemy who had thus interrupted his designs, and but for the celerity and skill of the retreat to Astorga, the army which achieved them must speedily have been consigned to destruction (5).

Errors
which he
committed.

But, if in these particulars the conduct of Sir John Moore was worthy of unqualified admiration, there are others in which the impartial voice of history must deal out a different measure of eulogium. Admitting that the celerity of the retreat to Astorga was unavoidable, and saved the army from destruction; where was the necessity of the subsequent forced marches to Lugo, when Napoléon had retired with his guards from the pursuit, in dreadful weather, attended as it was with such ruinous effects upon the discipline and spirit of the troops? His ablest defenders admit that

(1) It was seriously pressed upon his consideration by several officers, when the absence of the transports on the first arrival at Corunna rendered it evident that a battle must be fought for the embarkation, but he indignantly rejected the proposal.—*NAR.* i. 492, 493; *SOUTH.* ii. 520.

(2) *Ante*, vi. 335.

(3) Napoléon subsequently said, at St. Helena, that nothing but the talents and firmness of Sir John Moore saved his army from destruction.—*O'MEARA*, i. 55.

there were in the magazines of Villa Franca and Lugo provisions for fourteen days' consumption (1); and even if there had been nothing but the resources of the country to be had, subsequent events proved that they were sufficient for the maintenance of the army; for the French found wherewithal to live on and advance through it, even when following in the rear of the British soldiers. There was no necessity for hurrying on from the danger of being turned in flank, for Ney's corps were several days' march behind Soult's in the defile, and the rugged nature of the country rendered it totally impossible for his troops, worn out by a march of unexampled hardship and rapidity from Madrid, to attempt any threatening movement against the British flank: Every thing, then, counselled deliberation and order in the retreating columns, and the nature of the road through which they passed, consisting of an ascent several leagues in length, up a bare slope, followed by tremendous passes, continuing for several days' journey, shut in on every side by steep or forest-clad mountains, offered the most favourable opportunities for stopping, by a vigorous resistance on the part of the rearguard, the active pursuit of the enemy (2). The rapid restoration of discipline and order, when battle was offered at Lugo, the issue of the fight at Corunna, leave no room for doubt as to what would have been the result of such a conflict; and the example of Moreau's retreat through the Black Forest, in 1796, was not required to show how effectually such a fierce aspect on the part of the retiring force saves the blood and secures the safety of the remainder of the army (3). The luminous fact, that the losses sustained by the rearguard when they arrived at Corunna, notwithstanding all the combats they had undergone, were less than those of any other division of equal number in the army (4), affords a decisive proof how much would have been gained upon the whole by fighting at an earlier period, when the strength and discipline of the army was still comparatively unbroken.

And of Sir
David
Baird.

But most of all, the step adopted by Sir David Baird, though a most gallant officer, in unison with Sir John Moore, in counselling the British government, instead of sending out the strong reinforcements which they projected, and had in preparation, to Galicia, to forward *empty transports* to bring away the troops, appears to have been unhappy in its consequences. These despatches were sent off in the course of December, and they were not acted upon by the British government without the most severe regret, but at their distance from the scene of action they had no alternative but acquiescence (5). But for this fatal step, the English army, upon their retreat to the sea-coast, would have found, instead of transports to bring them off, thirteen thousand fresh troops, sufficient to have enabled them to hold out these important fortresses against the enemy, and possibly take a bloody revenge on their pursuers. Ney and Soult would have been retained

(1) Nap. i. 474.

(2) Lond. i. 260, 261.

(3) *Ante*, iii. 84, 85.

(4) Nap. i. 488.

(5) "The troops which had been embarked on board the transports in England to reinforce Sir J. Moore's army," said Mr. Canning, then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in his place in Parliament, "were disembarked in consequence of a distinct requisition from Sir David Baird, that he wanted a certain number of transports; and the transports from which these troops had been disembarked were sent out, pursuant to that requisition. It was an afflicting circumstance, that it had become necessary to retard these troops, and send out empty, for the purpose of bringing off the British army, those transports which had been fitted for the pur-

pose of reinforcement and assault. But at this distance from the scene of action, ministers could not venture to refuse to send out these transports. The sending them out empty cost government a severe pang; no resolution ever gave him more pain. Every dictate of the head was tortured, every feeling of the heart wrung by it; but ministers had no alternative, they were compelled to submit to the hard necessity." The troops so embarked, or in course of embarkation, were 13,000 men. What might not they have achieved, joined to the 17,000 whom Moore led back to Vigo and Corunna!—See *Parl. Deb.* xii. 1089, 1100. Sir John Moore also concurred in the propriety of withholding the reinforcements and sending out the transports empty.—See *SORTUEY*, ii. 519.

in Galicia by the presence of thirty thousand men, intrenched in fortified sea-ports on its coast; the incursion of Soult to Oporto would have been prevented, the battle of Talavera have proved a decisive victory, and the march of Wellington to the Alberche, unmenaced by the descent of Soult, Ney, and Mortier in his rear, would have led him in triumph to Madrid. If the British could not have maintained their ground behind the strong battlements of Ferrol, or the weaker fortifications of Corunna, that might have afforded a good reason for bringing the troops round to Lisbon or Cadiz, but it was none for setting sail to England with the whole expedition, abandoning the contest in the Peninsula as hopeless, when the south was still unsubdued, and leaving ten thousand English soldiers, still in Portugal, to their fate (1).

It was public opinion which was really to blame. In truth, this desponding conduct on the part of such able and gallant officers, affords decisive proof that it was a much deeper and more general cause which was in operation, and that England was now paying the penalty, not of the incapacity of its generals, but of the long-established, and, till the Peninsular war opened, discreditable prudence in military transactions of its government. Accustomed only to land on the Continent for transient expeditions, and to look always, not to their guns and bayonets, but to their ships, as their ultimate refuge, the whole English nation were ignorant of the incalculable effects of invincible tenacity of purpose upon public undertakings, and regarded the strength of the state as consisting chiefly in its naval power, when, in reality, it possessed a military force capable of contending, with fair chances of success, even against the conqueror of Continental Europe. Like the bulk of mankind in all ages, they judged of the future by the past, and were unaware of those important modifications of the lessons of experience, which the rapid whirl of events in which they were placed was every hour bringing into action. In Sir John Moore's case, this universal, and perhaps unavoidable error, was greatly enhanced by his connexion with the Opposition party, by whom the military strength of England had been always underrated, the system of Continental operations uniformly decried, and the power and capacity of the French Emperor, great as they were, unworthily magnified. Almost all his despatches, in the later stages of the campaign, evince in the clearest colours the influence of this depressing feeling, to which the false exaggerations and real disasters of the Spaniards afforded at the time too much confirmation. Instead, therefore, of casting a shade on the memory of any of the gallant officers intrusted with the direction of the campaign, let us regard its calamitous issue as the forfeit paid by the nation for the undue circumspection of former years, which had become so universal as to have penetrated the breast and chilled the hopes even of its most intrepid defenders, and inspired them with that inquietude for their country's safety which they would never have felt for their own. Nations, like individuals, never yet withdrew from the ways of error, but by the path of suffering; the sins of the

(1) —“The road from Astorga to Corunna,” says General Jomini, “traverses a long defile of thirty leagues, hounded by high mountains on either side. A slender rearguard would have sufficed to defend that *chaussée*, and it was impracticable to manœuvre on either flank of it. That rendered it impossible for Soult to get at the enemy; and Ney, entangled behind him in the defile, could do nothing. This was the more unfortunate as the English army, having prepared nothing on that line, stood in want of every thing, and was in a frightful state of disorder, in consequence of the forced marches which it took for no conceivable

reason. He cut the traces of their horses, and abandoned three or four thousand stragglers or dying men, when their line of operations was never menaced. It is impossible to conceive why the English did not defend Corunna. It is not, indeed, a Gibraltar; but against an enemy who had nothing but field-pieces, it surely could have been maintained for some time, the more especially as they could, at any time, throw in succour by sea. I could never understand their haste on that occasion, which the nation, it is true, has well wiped off in subsequent times, but was inferior to no other of the same description.”

fathers are still visited upon the children : the retreat of Sir John Moore was the transition from the paralysed timidity which refused succours to the Russians after Eylau, to the invincible tenacity which gave durable success to Wellington's campaigns. Happy the nation which can purchase absolution for past errors by so trivial a sacrifice, which can span the gulf from disaster to victory with no greater losses than those sustained in the Corunna retreat; and to whom the path of necessary suffering, commencing by the gift of a momentous benefit, is terminated by a ray of imperishable glory.

Reflections
on the cha-
racter of the
British and
French
armies, as
evinced in
their first
serious con-
tinental
campaign.

The peculiar character of the British and French troops had already clearly manifested itself in the course of this brief but active campaign. In every regular engagement, from first to last, the English had proved successful; they had triumphed equally over the conscripts of Junot and the Imperial Guards of Bessières; the heroes of Austerlitz and Friedland had sunk and quailed beneath the British steel. Considering how inexperienced almost all the English regiments were, and that most of the troops engaged at Rolica, Vimiero, and Corunna, there saw a shot fired for the first time in anger, these successes were extremely remarkable, achieved as they were, sometimes over veteran troops of the enemy, always over those who had the discipline and experience gained by fifteen years of victory to direct their organization and animate their spirits. They point evidently to what subsequent experience so clearly verified, a greater degree of courage at the decisive moment, arising either from some inherent peculiarity of race, or the animating influence of a free constitution and a long train of historic glory. But in other respects the superiority of the enemy was manifest, and all the good effects of achieved victory were liable to be lost on the English army, by the want of due discipline and docility in the troops, or of remissness and inexperience on the part of the officers. Place them in a fair field in front of the enemy, and both would honourably discharge their duty; but expose them to the fatigues of a campaign; subject them to the frozen snow or the dripping bivouac: require them to recede before the enemy, and bear the galling reproaches of a pursuer or ally in expectation of the time when the proper season for action arrived, and it was evident that they had still much to learn in the military art. Above all, intoxication, the inherent national vice, too often loosened the bonds of discipline, and exposed the army to the most serious disasters. These disorders explain the calamities of Sir John Moore's retreat, and go far to render blameless his gloomy presentiments as to the issue of the campaign. In sobriety, durable activity, perseverance under fatigue, care of their horses, versatility of talent, and cheerfulness in disaster, the French were evidently and painfully the superiors of their undaunted rivals; the British army could never, in the same time and with the same array, have made Napoleon's march from Madrid to Astorga. Such were the varied excellences of the two armies who were destined, in six successive campaigns, to emulate each other's virtues and shun each other's defects; and such the aspect of the war when Great Britain, throwing off the unworthy timidity of former years, first descended as a principal into the fight, and Wellington, alternately the Fabius and Mareellus of the contest, prepared, in the fields illustrated by a former Scipio, the triumphs of a second Zama.

